Учебный год 22-23 / William_Simons_Private_and_Civil_Law_in_the_R

Adiscussion of theYukos affair follows as a study in “illegitimate wealth facing arbitrary power”.4

The Past Revisited

For an old hand at Soviet legal studies, the Yukos affair of 2003-2005 triggered a troubling sense of déjà vu. In post-Soviet Russia—where the commitment to the development of the rule of law has been marked by a number of forward and far reaching legal reforms5—the trial of Khodor- kovsky and Platon Lebedev, a partner, which concluded late spring 2005, can only be viewed as a regressive step.

One is reminded of the concept of “dual Russia”,6 but with an ironic twist, to wit, Khodorkovsky—the principal defendant, heretofore the wealthiestandarguablythemostinfluentialprivatecitizeninthecountry— hadbeenexpelledfromOfficialRussiaandcastintothedepthsofPopular Russia. Similarly, Stalin’s prosecutorAndreiVyshinsky comes to mind, in particular the dual policies he simultaneously administered, directing the development of the Soviet legal system while presiding over conspicuous displays of political justice.7 In effect, in the Yukos affair, we have witnessed once again prerogative authority manipulating the normative process8 as political expediency has trumped legality in a classic exercise of ad hoc legal policy or the circumvention of procedural and substantive due process of law.9

Theroutineisbynowfamiliarfrompastexperience—asuitabletarget for selective prosecution was chosen, and a political trial mounted under the guise of an ordinary criminal proceeding.10 Thewholeaffairtookonthe

4Quoted in W. Thomson, “Putting Yukos in Perspective”, 21 Post-SovietAffairs 2005 No.2, 162.

5See G.B. Smith, Reforming the Russian Legal System, Cambridge, UK 1996; R. Sharlet, “In Search of the Rule of Law”, in S. White, Z. Gitelman, R. Sakwa, (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics, New York 2005, Ch.8; and R. Sharlet and F. Feldbrugge, (eds.), PublicPolicyandLawinRussia:InSearchofaUnifiedLegalandPoliticalSpace, in William B. Simons, (ed.), Law in Eastern Europe, No.55, Leiden, Boston 2005.

6R.C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind, rev. ed., New York 1971, Ch.6.

7R. Sharlet, “Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture”, in R.C. Tucker, (ed.), Stalinism, New York 1977, 155-79, and R. Sharlet and P. Beirne, “In Search of Vyshinsky: The Paradox of Law and Terror” in P. Beirne, (ed.), Revolution in Law: Contributions to the Development of Soviet Legal Theory, 1917-1938, Armonk, NY 1990, Ch.6.

8See E. Fraenkel, The Dual State, London 1941. The author is indebted to the late

DarrellP.HammerforintroducinghimtoFraenkel’sconceptwhichhelaterapplied to the study of Soviet law.

9See R. Sharlet, “Putin and the Politics of Law in Russia”, 17 Post-SovietAffairs 2001 No.3, esp. 228-30.

10See O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends, Princeton, NJ 1961, Ch.1, and Ch.3, secs.1 and 2.

characteristicsofahighprofileshowtrial11 in which power (once referred to as partiinost’) preempted legal process through a sub rosa combination of political imperatives and informal rules (previously called “instructive law”).12 In the hands of compliant prosecutors and pliable judges, this latter day shadowy “law” shaded the meaning and application of formal law.

Finally for the defendants, their courtroom defense of choice, of necessity, became the former dissident formula of legality versus political arbitrariness but was, ultimately, of no avail. As with Soviet prosecutions of dissidents in the past, the outcome was predictable and predetermined from the outset.13 With Khodorkovsky and his fellow defendant now serv- ing long terms, the question raised by the proceedings is:

“Was theYukos affair a one-off event—an unfortunate but temporary regression in Russia’s promising legal development—or did it represent a baleful harbinger of a post-Soviet Russian jurisprudence of political expediency?”

TheYukosAffair:AThumbnailSketchof

the State’s Actions

My purpose in this chapter is to examine the politics of the Yukos affair rather than analyze the legal proceedings themselves.14 In effect, I hope to explore the Putin administration’s maneuvers and machinations along the interface of politics and law in contemporary Russia for the purpose ofplacingtheYukosaffairwithinlargernational—andeveninternational political and economic—contexts.

However, first a brief history of the salient events and proceedings is in order. In summer 2003, Khodorkovsky’s partner, Lebedev, was ar- rested for fraud and tax evasion. As a result, the Yukos corporation and its employees came under considerable investigative pressure. During the fall, Khodorkovsky himself was arrested on the same charges in a highly

11On the modern version of the show trial, see K. L. Scheppele, “Show Case: The Terrorist Logics of the Spectacular Lawsuit”, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Assn., Pittsburgh, PA 2003.

12A former Soviet prosecutor, Fridrikh Neznansky, developed the concept. See his The Prosecution of Economic Crimes in the USSR, 1954-1984, Falls Church, VA 1985, 32-37 (R. Sharlet, ed.).

13For the latest addition to the vast literature on the subject, see E. Gilligan, Defending Human Rights in Russia: Sergei Kovalyov, Dissident and Human Rights Commissioner, 1969-2003, London 2004, Ch.1.

14Peter Clateman, an American attorney working for a Russian law firm in Moscow, wroteaseriesofonlinecommentariesonthespecificlegalissuesoftheproceedings throughout the Yukos affair. His commentaries were distributed through Johnson’s Russia List (<davidjohnson@starpower.net>) beginning November 2003, and including issues #7462, 8170, 8171, 8353, and 9020.

dramaticfashionmarkedwithmilitaryprecision—bymaskedpolicewith drawn guns as his private jet was being refueled on a runway at a Siberian airport. The preliminary investigations of the defendants went on for months with additional charges added as investigators and prosecutors fine-tuned their indictments. Bail was consistently denied and pre-trial detention constantly renewed. In the course of long process, it was de- cided—rather than mount two separate overlapping trials—to bring the two executives to court together under a single indictment.

Finally, in June 2004, the criminal trial against the two men opened in a Moscow raion court, not long after the state began proceedings for huge back tax claims against Yukos in the Moscow Arbitrazh Court. In comparison with previous high profile prosecutions for financial wrong doings, the Khodorkovsky-Lebedev indictment withstood the scrutiny of Western experts who found it “well written and well pled”.15 After almost a year of criminal proceedings in May 2005, the Moscow raion court brought in a verdict of guilty on all counts against the two defendants. Both were sentenced to nine years minus time served. In the course of their long criminal trial, Yukos—Russia’s largest and most efficient oil company—was effectively liquidated through the state’s relentless legal actions which forced distress sales of company assets to satisfy confisca- tory back tax judgments.

The legal teams for the two defendants promptly filed appeals to the first appellate level in the judicial hierarchy. In early fall 2005, their appeals were denied and the convictions confirmed, although two of the lesser charges were dismissed and sentences were reduced by a year.While further appeals are planned, both men began serving their sentences in the Russian penal system. Meanwhile, the state had opened a new investigation against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on money laundering charges. Therefore, hypothetically, even after the Russian appellate process is exhausted—and if an ultimate appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg succeeds—the two men are likely to still remain in custody as the state proceeds against them in a second criminal case.16

Politics of the State’s Case against Khodorkovsky

Although the state had a strong case against Khodorkovsky as principal defendant, it could just as easily have brought actions against other

15Guy Chazan, “Russian Trial Opens Messy Chapter”, The Wall Street Journal 16 June 2004.

16I am indebted to Professor Stanislaw Pomorski of Rutgers University Law School, Camden, NJ for clarifying aspects of Russian appellate procedure, as well as the procedure of the Strasbourg court.

oligarchs on the basis of similar empire-building tactics. Why, then, Khodorkovsky?

When Putin came to power in 2000, he made clear his intention to restore the authority of the federal state as well as the office of the president, both of which had been weakened and eroded under his prede- cessor.Accordingly, in just over his first 150 days in office, Putin took on the runaway provinces, the most free-wheeling oligarchs who controlled the major independent media, and the contentious general staff.17 Putin’s watchword for his vigorous campaign to bring the Federation Subjects and the oligarchs back into line became the “dictatorship of law”.18 This firstentailedreassertingtheauthorityandsupremacyoftheConstitution andfederallegislationoverrepublicsandregionswhichunderEl’tsinhad begun to act independently of Moscow on the basis of ideas such as republic sovereignty and the supremacy of local law.19 Eventually, order was restored in the provinces and Russia began to resemble the unified legal and political realm envisioned by the constitutional draftsmen of 1993.

The other area which drew Putin’s attention—if the state and its

Constitution were to be not just the de jure law of the land but de facto supreme authority as well—were the business practices of the several dozen oligarchs, most of whom had long played fast and loose with federal and regional law. However, because these men presided over significant sectors of the Russian economy which could be damaged by intemperate publicaction,abroadsideoffensivewasoutofthequestion.Instead,Putin initially targeted the media moguls Gusinsky and Berezovsky.

Through a set of swift actions involving threats of selective prosecution for past misdeeds, political intimidation, and even strong arm tactics, both oligarchs were soon “persuaded” to sell their major media properties to companies controlled by the state and chose exile over prosecution and inevitable incarceration.

Having given two conspicuous demonstrations of his determination to rein in the oligarchs, the president convened a meeting in mid-2000 withRussia’sotherbusinesstitans,warningthemagainstfurthermeddling in national politics, and vaguely implying that if they complied he would consider not re-visiting their high handed and even piratical privatization deals of the 1990s. At the meeting in the Kremlin, however, Putin spoke mainly in generalities and offered no guarantees. Nevertheless, most of

17See “Putin Sacks a Bevy of Army Generals”, 52 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2000 No.31, 9.

18See R. Sharlet, “Putin and the Politics of Law in Russia”, 17 Post-SovietAffairs 2001 No.3, 195-234, and R. Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice, London 2004, 90-92 and 138-40.

19See J. Kahn, Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia, Oxford, UK 2002, chs.5-9.

the oligarchs chose to believe that a kind of implicit social contract had been struck between them and the head of state; thereafter the majority refrainedfrombehaviorwhichmightputtheminconflictwiththepublic authorities.20

The exception was Khodorkovsky who had become the wealthiest of the oligarchs through a combination of business acumen and unscrupulous tactics.While Berezovsky, in the words of his biographer, had been “a mas- ter of political intrigue”—both in the drawing rooms and back corridors of the Kremlin21—Khodorkovsky, by contrast, was confrontational with power. Previously one of the most skillfully predatory of the oligarchs, he had become a “born again” advocate of responsible corporate behavior.22 Yukos, in turn, was transformed into a model of corporate transparency and good governance. In his new guise as the white knight of Russian capitalism, Khodorkovsky became a conspicuous player not only in domestic politics, but in foreign economic policy as well.23

In the State Duma dominatedbythepresident’sparty,UnitedRussia,

Khodorkovsky had reportedly bought control of 100 votes, not enough to carry legislation, but sufficient to block bills deemed contrary to the interests ofYukos and the oil industry. In this spirit, Khodorkovsky’s ag- gressivelobbyingin2001and2002—alongwithotheroilcompanies—had succeeded in derailing legislation to raise taxes on oil products. Again in summer of 2003, his political interventions in the Duma resulted in watering down a strong administration tax bill on petroleum.24 As the parliamentary elections approached that December, there were strong rumorsthatKhodorkovskyhadoffered$100milliontotwoliberalparties if they would run a common slate of candidates against United Russia. He had also spoken in favor of constitutional reforms toward reducing presidential powers in the direction of a parliamentary republic in spite of Putin’s oft repeated statement that the Constitution required no revi- sion for the foreseeable future. Finally, Khodorkovsky hinted at his own political ambitions in suggesting he might run for president upon the expiry of Putin’s second and final term in 2008.

The young oligarch was equally bold on the international front, ad- vocating a Russian oil pipeline to China and opening negotiations with

20W. Thomson, “Putting Yukos in Perspective”, 21 Post-SovietAffairs 2005 No.2, 16869.

21P. Klebnikov, Godfather of the Kremlin, New York 2000, 319.

22M.I. Goldman in P. Desai, (ed.), “Roundtable on Russian Privatization”, 15 Harriman Review 2004 No.1, 17.

23M.I. Goldman, “Putin and the Oligarchs”, 83 ForeignAffairs 2004 No.6, 33-44.

24A. Jack, Inside Putin’s Russia, Oxford, UK 2004, 213.

US oil companies interested in acquiring a stake in Russia’s oil fields.

Khodorkovsky took his China pipeline proposal a step further, arguing if the state did not undertake the project, he would build his own pipeline, bypassing the state’s pipeline monopoly,Transneft’, and effectively priva- tizing foreign policy. His involvement in pipeline politics ran afoul of the

Putin’s administration preference for a route to the Sea of Japan which would permit Russian oil exports to Japan, South Korea, and the United States as well as to China.25 Khodorkovsky’s US oil talks were also unset- tlingtoPutin’sentouragewhichhadalreadybeguntoworryaboutyielding piecesofRussianpetroleumassetstosignificantforeignownership.Itwas furtherfeltthatanAmericanpartnershipwouldincreaseKhodorkovsky’s sense of independence from Kremlin control.

The final straw, however—which may have clinched the administra- tion’s decision to target Khodorkovsky—was his criticism of the govern- ment on the issue of corruption at a public session with the president in early 2003. Putin did not take it well, reminding Khodorkovsky of his past tax evasion.26 Given Berezovsky’s downfall for far less, what could have motivated Khodorkovsky’s persistent interference in politics in view of Putin’s unequivocal warning to the business community? His fel- low oligarchs had urged him to stick to business and cease and desist his political activities, to which he reasonably but naively responded that his constitutional rights as a citizen took precedence over the pact with Putin.

Even Khodorkovsky’s mother cautioned him to remember what country he lived in,27 but all efforts to deflect him were to no avail. In view of his potential vulnerability to prosecution for past misdeeds, one can find no rational reason for his course of action.

The only conclusion possible is that Khodorkovsky’s hubris, his extreme arrogance, as well as a seductive belief in his relatively recent celebrity in the Russian and world press, drove him to pursue a collision course with Putin, particularly at a time when the political pendulum was swinging back from freedom toward order. Khodorkovsky seemed unable to grasp that not everyone in Putin’s circles appreciated his new self-image as a paragon of corporate ethics and champion of political democracy—both of which roles apparently gave him a false sense of security and invulnerability.

25“Russian Oil: King Solomon’s Pipes”, The Economist 7 May 2005, 60.

26Jack, op.cit. note 24, 213.

27“Special Report: The Khodorkovsky Case”, The Economist 21 May 2005, 27.

State Persecution under the Cover of Prosecution

TheYukos affair presented a paradox. In spite of its strong criminal case against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, the state—from arrest through appeal—chosetogratuitouslycommitnumerousandoftenegregiouspro- ceduralviolations,andengageinunremittinghighprofileharassmentofthe defendants, their lawyers, and nearly all associated with the proceedings. The conduct of the state authorities as such saddened and embarrassed many Russians as well as friends abroad who had long vested their hopes in Russia’s steady progress toward the rule of law.28

In the pre-trial stage,29 defense lawyers were unlawfully subjected to questioning, attorney-client privilege breached, hearings unjustifiably closed, bail arbitrarily denied, detention continuously extended without just cause, and search and seizure rules violated; there was constant pres- suretocommitself-incrimination,defendantsweregiveninsufficienttime to read hundreds of volumes of case materials at the conclusion of the investigations,andthecourt’sjudicialindependencewascompromisedby politically inspired administrative interference.30 Violation of the defen- dants’proceduraldueprocessrightsattheoutsetoftheproceedingswasso consistentlyflagrantthatonecanonlyimaginetheprosecutor-generalhad been given political license to carry out a campaign of “shock and awe”.

Most of the above violations continued during the trial phase, as well as additional procedural lapses by both prosecution and court. Attorneyclient contacts were severely limited, evidentiary rules manipulated to favor the prosecution and disadvantage the defense, defense lawyers were detainedandinterrogatedabouttheirclients’cases,attemptsweremadeto intimidate and disbar attorneys, the defense was refused essential expert witnesses, defense witnesses fearing reprisals were not called, prosecutors

28RepeatedlyduringtheYukosaffair,RussiadrewcriticismfromtheCouncilofEurope of which it is a member state. See Yukos Web Site, “The Case: Timeline of Events”, 7 October 2004, 19 November 2004, 25 January 2005 and 16 May 2005. At a press conference in Washington, DC on 31 May 2005, President George Bush commented that it looked like Khodorkovsky “had been judged prior to having a fair trial”.

29See “Constitutional and Due Process Violations in the Khodorkovsky/Yukos Case”, a “white paper” prepared by defense lawyers, fall 2003 (now available on the Yukos Web Site).

30Aside from an unseemly turnover of judges presiding in the tax case against Yukos in the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, Judge Olga Egorova (Chief Judge of the Moscow City Court system) was already notorious for bringing pressure to bear on subordinate judges on behalf of the Kremlin’s interests. The wife of a FSB general, Egorova, had been hastily appointed chief judge just prior to the earlier proceedings against

Gusinsky. Since 2000, she has forced the resignations of dozens of Moscow’s judges in what can only be considered a virtual purge of independent-minded jurists.

periodically conducted trial by press, the court ruled for the defense on just three motions from over thirty filed, burden of proof was sometimes shifted to the accused, and, in general, defendants were denied fair trial under the provisions of the Russian Constitution and the relatively new post-Soviet Code of Criminal Procedure.31

Extra-judicial harassment was also a constant during the pre-trial and trial phases of the Yukos affair. It ranged from petty bureaucratic behavior to more serious heavy handed actions. On the lighter side, the Ministry ofAgriculture opened an investigation ofYukos concerning “un- supervisedmatingofrabbits”onafarmbelongingtoacompanyaffiliate,32 while more portentously, the Natural Resources Ministry took an interest in Yukos’s oil licenses. Periodic police raids were carried out on offices and homes of Yukos executives by masked, armed men with crow bars and sledge hammers which left behind physical destruction and disruption of business activities. Over 200 such raids took place in the course of the proceedings. No one associated with the defendants was spared.

Warrantless searches of lawyers’ offices and files also occurred.The raids even included an orphanage sponsored by Yukos as well as the school of

Khodorkovsky’s daughter.

When Khodorkovsky supporters held a noisy but peaceful rally outside the courthouse during the long reading of the 1300-page verdict, the police moved in, beating several protestors, and detaining 28. On another occasion, demonstrators obtained a rally permit, but when they arrived at the site, they found the street torn up and under repair.33 An assistant prosecutor, standing on the proverbial courthouse steps, even implied that

Khodorkovsky’s elderly father might have been aware of transgressions by Yukos employees and, hence, complicit. Finally, when the Moscow

Arbitrazh Court ordered Yukos’s main oil producing asset auctioned off topaybacktaxes,thewinningbid—atabelowmarketprice—camefrom anunknownfirmclearlyfrontingforastateoilenterprisewithabusiness address listed above a provincial grocery in an obscure Siberian town.34 State persecution under guise of prosecution did not cease with reading of the guilty verdicts in late May 2005. The appeals process was consistently compromised by the authorities as well. In connection with

31“Lawyers’ writ of appeal on Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s sentence”, Yukos Web Site,

“TheTrial:Trial Updates:Appeals”, and “The Rule of Law in Russia: Getting Khodorkovsky”, Johnson’s Russia List 23 February 2005, #9065, a summary of procedural violations during the trial reported to the Council of Europe by its representative, a former German Justice Minister.

32Yukos Web Site, “The Case: Timeline of Events”, 7 November 2003.

33The New York Times on the Web (<http://www.nytimes.com>), 1 June 2005.

34“Putin versus Khodorkovsky: ‘Justice’ Postponed”, The Economist 30 April 2005.

preparing for the appeal hearing, defense lawyers were given access to official case files (400 volumes) as well as the seventeen-volume trial transcript,butunderdifficultworkingconditions,and—giventhenumber of attorneys and the amount of reading involved—subject to a restrictive timelimit.Inaddition,twolawyers—whorepresentedKhodorkovskyon appeal—were denied contact with him. To add further pressure on the team, the appellate court moved up the date of its hearing.35

The court’s appellate review in September 2005 was itself hasty and even rushed. Given the great volume of the case record to be examined, thecourtalloweditselfinsufficienttimeforathoroughandcarefulreview and, then in an hour, reaffirmed the guilty verdicts with only marginal modifications. Meanwhile, the Procuracy drew public attention to its ongoing money laundering investigation of the defendants, including an- other dramatic document raid, this time at the offices of “Open Russia”, a charity supported by Khodorkovsky. Lastly, immediately following the appeals decision—as a grand finale to what a former Russian prime min- ister referred to as a “judicial farce”36—theProcuracyandJusticeMinistry took steps to disbar and revoke the licenses of the attorneys, while the immigration authorities moved against a foreign lawyer serving as a legal observer on the defense team, abruptly expelling him from Russia.37

TheStateandtheYukosAffair:CostandBenefits

At the level of media images of the Yukos affair, the standoff between the authorities and Khodorkovsky was a draw, but in terms of the larger, strategic issues involved, the benefits to the state outweighed the costs.

Khodorkovsky’s legal team—in addition to conducting his defense under difficult circumstances—mounted an extensive campaign to win sympathy for their client by emphasizing his newly assumed role as corporate statesman. This succeeded in winning a great deal of favorable press for Khodorkovsky abroad. Conversely, many better informed journalists as well as several foreign scholars struck a more balanced note on the proceedings.ThemoreardentmediasympathizersofKhodorkovsky—and critics of Putin administration—referred to him as a “political prisoner” and even a “prisoner of conscience” although Amnesty International declined to adopt the case, while a British journalist referred to the trial

35“The Appeal of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev”, Yukos Web Site, “The Trial: Trial Updates: Appeals”, 29 September 2005, 2-3.

36Mikhail Kasyanov, Yukos Web Site, “The Case: Timeline of Events”, 19 May 2005.

37For the Canadian lawyer RobertAmsterdam’s expulsion, see “Khodorkovsky in Eu- ropean Appeal”, BBC News: World Edition (<http://news.bbc.co.uk>), 23 September 2005.

as a “DreyfusAffair”,38 an allusion to Khodorkovsky being half Jewish. In rhetorical rebuttal, a trio of Russian and American experts commented “Khodorkovsky is no Sakharov”.39

More balanced accounts of the Yukos affair took note of Khodor- kovsky’s past, while commenting critically on the state’s conduct of the proceedings against him. As one international magazine put it: “a ruthless man sunk by an even greater ruthlessness than his own.”40 At the trial’s conclusion, The New York Times editorialized while Khodorkovsky had been the “template for the breed” of predatory oligarchs, the trial had “the air of politically motivated vengeance and looting”.41 As to the defen- dant’srecklessnessinconfrontingpowerpolitically,ascholarcommented:

“Khodorkovsky was sailing not just close to, but right into the wind.”42 An authoritative article in an elite Western foreign policy journal concluded:

“If it is difficult to defend Khodorkovsky and the other oligarchs, it is equally difficult to justify the methods Putin used against them.”43

However, since media images pro and con have a relatively short shelf life, it is the Putin administration’s broader aims in bringing the case—and to what extent they were realized—that one must evaluate to reachacost-benefittallyofthelongproceedings.Onthecostside,clearly the administration suffered some short term bad press which was not effectively rebutted by spokesmen. In responding to more general criti- cism of Russia’s slippage on the democracy path in early 2005, the best

Defense Minister Ivanov could come up with was: “Democracy is not just a potato that can be transplanted from one garden to another.”44 On the conduct of the trial itself, Putin on a couple of occasions disingenuously commented that Khodorkovsky was, of course, innocent until proven guilty and noted that the proceedings could not be politically motivated since the defendant had never run for or held public office.45

Another near-term concern that the Yukos affair would scare off foreign investors was not realized. Regarding Khodorkovsky as a “trouble-

38Anthony Robinson in Prospect (UK), Johnson’s Russia List 17 March 2005, #9093.

39M. McFaul, N. Petrov and A. Ryabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, Washington, DC 2004, 297.

40“Special Report: The Khodorkovsky Case”, The Economist 21 May 2005, 27.

41“Justice on Trial in Russia”, The New York Times 19 April 2005, A20.

42S. Kotkin, “What is to be done?”, Financial Times 6 March 2004.

43M.I. Goldman, “Putin and the Oligarchs’, 83 ForeignAffairs 2004 No.6, 41.

44“That Democracy is Not a Potato”, RFE/RL Newsline, No.30, Part 1, 14 February 2005.

45“Putin Denies Yukos Case is Politically Motivated”, Interfax 21 November 2004.