
- •CONTENTS
- •CONTRIBUTORS
- •PREFACE
- •Introduction
- •I. A Positive Account
- •II. Normative and Historical Accounts
- •III. Explaining Legal Doctrine
- •A. Willful Breach
- •B. Comparative Fault
- •Conclusion
- •ACKNOWLEDGMENT
- •Introduction
- •C. Summary
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •B. Some Striking Nuances in Common Law Systems
- •II. A Market Function Approach
- •A. Ethics or Economics – The Wrong Question
- •B. Party and Market Expectation as Guidelines
- •D. Fault, Foreseeability, and Other “Softeners” of Strict Liability
- •Conclusion
- •I. Fault and Uncertain Contractual Intent
- •II. An Expanded Law and Economics Approach to Fault
- •III. A Fault-Based Approach to Contract Damages
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •A. A Model
- •B. Fault
- •C. A Comparison: Strict Liability Versus Negligence
- •II. Doctrine
- •A. Impossibility/Impracticability
- •B. Reasonable or Substantial Performance
- •C. Good Faith and Best Efforts
- •D. Interpretation/Implied Terms
- •E. Conditions
- •F. Damages
- •Introduction
- •I. Unconscionability
- •A. Markets
- •B. Moral Fault
- •II. Unexpected Circumstances
- •III. Interpretation
- •IV. Mistake
- •C. Cases in Which the Nonmistaken Party Neither Knew nor Had Reason to Know of the Mechanical Error
- •V. Nonperformance
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •I. Modernizing Tort and Contract Around Fault
- •II. Explaining the Fault Swap
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction: From Fault to Negligence – and Back
- •I. Tort Law
- •III. Gratuitous Transactions: Bailment and Agency
- •A. Coggs v. Bernard
- •C. Siegel v. Spear and Comfort v. McGorkle
- •D. Medical Malpractice, Occupier’s Liability, and Guest Statutes
- •IV. Frustration and Impossibility
- •Conclusion
- •Conclusion
- •A. Analogies in Criminal Law
- •B. Lay Assessments of Culpability
- •C. Two Ways of Defining “Willful”
- •B. “Willful” as a Test for Inefficiency?
- •B. Optimal Damages Under Strict Liability
- •Conclusion
- •II. Cost of Correction Versus Diminution in Value
- •B. Treatment by the Courts
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •C. An Information-Based Explanation
- •B. Informal Lessons from the Example
- •D. From Moral Hazard to Adverse Selection
- •II. Willful Breach Doctrine
- •A. Overcompensatory Expectation Damages
- •B. Tort Damages for Bad-Faith Breach
- •C. Restitution
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •I. Expectation Damages and Willful Breach
- •II. Willfulness, Material Breach, and Damages
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •A. Noncooperation
- •B. Overreliance
- •A. Setting the Stage
- •B. Noncooperation
- •1. When Should Avoiding Overreliance be the Default Rule?
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •I. Stipulation, Fault, and Mitigation
- •II. Encouraging Stipulation
- •A. How Courts Encourage Parties to Stipulate
- •B. Two Advantages of Stipulation: Knowledge and Mitigation
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •II. Comparative Negligence
- •III. Mitigation
- •IV. Reasonable Reliance
- •V. Causation
- •VI. Foreseeability
- •Conclusion
- •I. Summary of the Argument that Breach May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts
- •F. When Is Breach Immoral and When Is It Moral in Practice?
- •II. Criticism and Discussion of the Foregoing Argument
- •Conclusion
- •Introduction
- •I. Promise De-moralized, Contract Moralized
- •II. Contract and Promise: More on the Relationship
- •IV. Harm, Fault, and Remedies for Breach
- •V. Fault and Institutional Harm
- •Conclusion: Toward a Moral Law of Contract
- •I. Breach as Moral Harm
- •III. Moral Norms as Default Rules
- •Conclusion
- •CASE INDEX
- •SUBJECT INDEX
Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral • 263
Now assume that damages for breach are less than the expectation. Because breach will tend to occur whenever the cost of performance exceeds the level of damages, breach will occur more often than nonperformance would have been permitted in a completely specified contract – thus, breach might be immoral. In our example, if the measure of damages were, say, $50 instead of the expectation of $200, breach would occur whenever the cost of performance would exceed $50. Consequently, if breach occurred when the cost would be between $50 and $200, the complete contract would have insisted on performance. Such breach would be immoral.
F. When Is Breach Immoral and When Is It Moral in Practice?
Given the conclusions just reached, we can say that if damages equal the buyer’s expectation, breach can be inferred to be moral because it will occur only when the parties would have allowed nonperformance in a complete contract. However, when damages are less than the expectation, we cannot make this inference and would have to inquire directly about the cost of performance relative to its value in order to make a judgment about its morality.
Are damages fully compensatory? They are intended to be. The expectation measure is, of course, the general damage remedy employed for breach of contract, where the expectation measure is defined as the amount that would restore the victim of a breach to the position this party would have enjoyed had performance occurred.11 Th e expectation measure as it is actually applied, however, tends to be less than fully compensatory and may leave the victim of a breach substantially worse off than he or she would have been had there been performance. The reasons given for believing that the expectation measure is often undercompensatory include the following. First, courts are reluctant to credit hard-to-measure components of loss as damages. Hence, lost profits and idiosyncratic losses due to breach are likely to be inadequately compensated or neglected. Second, courts are inclined to limit damages to those that could have been reasonably foreseen at the time the contract was made. Third, damages tend not to reflect the considerable delays that victims of breach may suffer. Fourth, legal costs are not compensated.
Not only do expectation damages appear to be undercompensatory in a general sense, but damages for breach may be effectively nonexistent if the breach victim’s losses are less than the costs of bringing suit, which is to say, below a threshold of several thousand dollars. If the losses are not this high, the breach victim will not have a credible threat to litigate.
11 Second Restatement of Contracts §346–47 (1981); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 2, §14.4.