comte, auguste - the positive philosophy vol III

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tem; and again, that as the spontaneous decay was favourable to the growth of the new social elements, it becomes a fresh evidence of the fitness of the regime to carry on the great human evolution; and again, that the spontaneousness of the decay is really a distinctive feature of the Catholic and feudal regime, inasmuch as it was far more marked than in any preceding instance. In the spiritual order, carefully organized as it was, it is remarkable that the first agents of disorganization always and everywhere issued from the body of the Catholic clergy; whereas, there was nothing analogous to this in polytheism, in which the two powers were confounded. So provisional is the theological philosophy, that, in proportion as it advances, intellectually and morally, it becomes less consistent and less durable,—a truth which is confirmed by all historical observation. Fetichism was more deeply rooted and stable than polytheism, yet gave way before it. Polytheism hid more intrinsic vigour and a longer duration than monotheism and this appears, on ordinary principles, thoroughly paradoxical; while our theory explains it all by showing that the rational progress of theological conceptions consists in a perpetual diminution of intensity.

Turning now to the second period,—that in which the destruction of the old system proceeded under the superintendence of a systematic negative doctrine,—we must bear in mind what I have already said of the indispensable need of such a doctrine to shelter the growing germs of the system to come, and to obviate the danger of eternal fruitless conflict, or of a return to an exhausted regime. As to the inevitableness of such a negative doctrine, that is easily established: for instance we see it to be certain that Protestantism must arise, in course of time, from the very nature of the monotheistic regime. Monotheism introduces into the very heart of theology a spirit of individual examination awl discussion, by leaving comparatively unsettled those secondary matters of belief which polytheism dogmatically fixed to their last particulars; and thus a natural though restricted philosophical liberty was admitted, at least to determine the proper mode of administering the supernatural power in each particular case. Thus theological heresy is impossible in polytheism, and always present in monotheism, because speculative activity must fall into more or less divergence with regard to essentially vague and arbitrary conceptions and the division between the spiritual and temporal powers greatly enhanced the tendency in the case of Catholicism because it incited free inquiry to extend itself from theological questions to social problems, in order to establish among them the spe-

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cial applications of the common doctrine which could be proved legitimate. The tendency gained strength perpetually curing the whole period of the decay of the system, while the temporal powers were fighting against the spiritual, and the national clergies against the papacy; and we see in it the origin of the appeal to free inquiry which characterizes Protestantism, the first general phase of the revolutionary philosophy. The scholars who supported the authority of kings against the popes, and the national Churches which resisted the decisions of Rome, could not but claim for themselves a right of inquiry, urged more and more systematically, and unavoidably extended to all individuals and all questions, till, by a mental and social necessity, it brought on the destruction of the Catholic discipline first, then of the hierarchy, and, finally, of the dogma.

As for this character of the provisional philosophy, it is determined by the nature of its function. Popular sense has given its character in its title of Protestantism, which applies to the whole revolutionary philosophy, though commonly confined to the first state of the doctrine. In fact, this philosophy has, from the rise of primitive Lutheranism up to the deism of the last century, without excepting the systematic atheism which is its extreme phase, been nothing more, historically speaking, than a growing and increasingly methodical protest against the intellectual bases of the old social order, extended, in virtue of its absolute character, to all genuine organization whatever. Serious as are the perils attending this negative spirit, the great necessary renovation could not take place without it. In all preceding times the destruction of each form could be subordinated by the human mind to the institution of a new form, which had some perceived character and purpose; but now a total renovation was needed,—a mental as well as social renovation,—more thorough than the experience of mankind can elsewhere show. As the critical operation was necessary before the new elements were ready, the ancient order had to be broken up, while the future remained wholly unsettled; and in such a case there was nothing for it but giving an absolute character to critical principles. for, if any conditions had been regularly imposed on the negative rights which they proclaimed, such conditions must have been derived from the very system proposed to be destroyed (no other social system being then in view), and thus the whole work would have been a mere abortion. The critical dogmas concerned in the process I shall notice hereafter, more or less explicitly; meantime, I have so exhibited the grounds of the hostility and defiance manifested by this nega-

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tive philosophy towards all authority whatever, and of its instinctive and absolute tendency to control and reduce all social powers, and both the origin and aim of such tendencies, that the thoughtful reader may obtain for himself the elucidations which it is not within my scope to provide.

One more division remains to be made—of the last period of three centuries into two nearly equal portions. In the first, which comprehends the chief forms of Protestantism, properly so called, the right of free inquiry, while fully admitted, was restrained within the limits of the Christian theology; and, in consequence, the spirit of discussion was chiefly employed in destroying, in the name of Christianity, the admirable system of the Catholic hierarchy, which was, in a social sense, the only thorough realization of it. In this appeared conspicuously the inconsistency which characterizes the whole of the negative philosophy, proposing, as we here find it, to reform Christianity by destroying the indispensable conditions of its existence. The second phase presents the various schemes of deism which constitute what is called the philosophy of the eighteenth century, though its methodical formation really belongs to the middle of the preceding century. In this case the right of free inquiry was declared to be indefinite; but it was taken for granted that metaphysical discussion would remain within the general limits of monotheism, whose foundations were supposed to be unalterable. They were, in their turn, however, broken up before the end of the period, by a prolongation of the same process. The intellectual inconsistency was notably diminished by this extension on the destructive analysis; but the social dissolution appears more evident, through the absolute disposition to establish political regeneration on a series of mere negations, which can produce nothing but anarchy. It was through Socinianism that the historical transition from the one phase to the other was made. Our preceding survey explains enough of the origin and formation of these two phases; for it is evident that, in the first place, the right of free inquiry must have appeared to be limited, or it would not have been admitted; and in the next, its limits could not but be found to be moveable; and the extravagances and disturbances which were sure to ensue must have compelled the strongest minds to withdraw altogether from an order of ideas so arbitrary and discordant, and therefore so perverted from their original destination. The distinction between the two phases is so indispensable that, notwithstanding their extension among all the peoples of Western Europe under forms which. though various, are po-

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litically equivalent, they could not have the same principal seat, as we shall see hereafter. There was also a difference between them as to their share in the new social elements; for the positive spirit was at first too restricted and concentrated, as to topics and minds to have much effect in the advent of Protestantism, which on the other hand, rendered great services to positivism; whereas, under the second phase, the powerful though indirect intervention of positivism imparted a rational consistency to anti-theological analysis which it could not otherwise have obtained, and which will prove to be the chief basis of its ulterior efficacy.

The course of progress during the whole five centuries encountered no serious opposition, except from the legitimate apprehension of an entire overthrow of society; and it was this fear which imparted such energy as there was in the resistance of the ancient powers, which were themselves drawn in to participate, directly or indirectly, in the universal unsteadiness. The leaders of the movement were necessarily placed in a position of extreme difficulty, and especially after the sixteenth century, their office being to, satisfy the needs of both order and progress, which became imperative in proportion as they were found to be nearly irreconcilable. During the whole period, the highest political capacity was that which could most wisely carry on the steady demolition of the ancient system while avoiding, the anarchical disturbances which were always imminent were the critical philosophy was at work. The ability to derive social benefit from the spirit of logical inconsistency was quite as important and quite as delicate as that which is so much honoured for its beneficent social application of the theological doctrine, in the preceding ages. At the same time, the social success of the critical doctrine, in spite of its extreme logical imperfection, shows its accordance with the needs of the time, but for which the success would be inexplicable. We must therefore regard this memorable critical movement as being no accidental disturbance, but one of the necessary stages of the great social evolution, however serious are the dangers invoked in its irrational protraction to the present day.

When we study the organs of the operation which we have surveyed in the abstract, we shall find it difficult or impossible to follow up, steadily and clearly, the separation between the spiritual and temporal power, though at intervals we shall find it re-appear, under all the main aspects of modern civilization. One division, however, among the social forces which superintended the transition of the last three centuries, is naturally distinct enough,—that between the metaphysicians and the

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legists, who are, in some sort, the spiritual and temporal elements of the mixed and equivocal regime that corresponds with the inconsistent and exceptional social condition of the period. Both must necessarily arise, as I shall show, from the respective elements of the ancient system,—the one from the Catholic, and the other from the feudal power—and grow up in rivalry to them first, and then in hostility. Their rise is plainly distinguishable in the season of the greatest splendour of the monotheistic regime, especially in Italy, which was always foremost in the Middle Ages, and in which the metaphysicians, and also the legists, were rising in importance, from the twelfth century,—chiefly in the flee towns of Lombardy and Tuscany. Their character and office could not however be fully revealed till the rise and spread of change called for their intervention in lacing the foundations of the exceptional system which then have since administered. They found their instrumentality in the universities and parliaments, which have been from that time the organs of the metaphysical action and of the power of the legists. The Heads of faculties, or doctors, who represented the metaphysical power, produced the men of letters as a secondary class, and the legists, in like manner, yielded an accessory class in the judges and lawyers. We shall see hereafter how the secondary classes have now obtained the ascendancy, thereby indicating that the end of this singular anomaly is near at hand.

Fixing our attention now upon the spiritual element which continues to be the most characteristic, even in this case,—we have seen how the metaphysical spirit must naturally obtain social away at this period. After the Greek division of philosophy into natural and moral, the metaphysical spirit assumed two forms, which, in harmony with the distinction, became gradually antagonistic. The first, of which Plato must be considered the chief organ, most resembled the theological philosophy, which it at first tended rather to modify than to destroy. The second, whose type was Aristotle, approached much nearer to the positive philosophy, and tended to disengage the human understanding from all theological guardianship. The one was critical only on the side of polytheism, and superintended the organization of monotheism, under which it was itself absorbed by the theological spirit, and transmuted into religious philosophy; whereas, the other, occupied at first with the study of the external world, could not but be altogether critical, from its antitheological tendency, in combination with its total lack of power to produce any organization whatever. It was under the direction of this last that the great revolutionary movement went on. Discarded by Platonism,

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while the best minds were engaged in the organization of the Catholic system the Aristotelian spirit, which had been perpetually extending its inorganic domain, began to assume the ascendancy in philosophy, by gradually comprehending the moral, and even the social world under its sway, as soon as the need of a rational philosophic began to prevail. It was thus that, after the twelfth century, when the monotheistic system was in its glory, the growing triumph of scholasticism was actually working the destruction of the theological philosophy and authority. It assumed consistency from its natural aptitude for engrossing public instruction in the universities, which were no longer devoted to ecclesiastical education alone, but embracing all the chief kinds of intellectual culture. The works of Thomas Aquinas, and even of Dante, show that the new metaphysical spirit had gnarled the whole intellectual and moral study of individual Man, and was already extending to social speculations so as to indicate the approaching emancipation of human reason from all purely theological guardianship. The canonization of the great scholastic doctor was his due for his eminent political services; but it shows the involuntary implication of the popes in the new mental activity and their prudence in incorporating with their system whatever was not directly hostile to it. At first, the anti-theological character of metaphysics could disclose itself only in the form of a livelier and more pertinacious heresy and schism: but the great decisive struggles of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries against the European power of the popes and the ecclesiastical supremacy of the papal see, occasioned a large and permanent application of the new philosophy to social questions. Having attained all the speculative perfection it admitted of, it entered henceforth more and more into political controversy; and, as it grew more negative in regard to the old spiritual organization, it became necessarily destructive also of the corresponding temporal power, which it had at first stimulated in its universal encroachments. Thus it is that, up to the last century, the metaphysical power of the universities came to take the lead in the work of destructive change. When we hereafter review the results of the movement, we shall find abundant light cast upon the analysis here presented.

If we turn to the corresponding temporal state, we can now see how necessary was the relation, in regard both to doctrines and persons, between the class of scholastic metaphysicians and that of the contemporary legists. Through the study of ecclesiastical law, the new philosophical spirit must enter into the study of social questions and of law in

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general; and next, the teaching of law must be a privilege of the universities; besides that the canonists, properly so called, who were the immediate offspring of the Catholic system, were the first order of legists subjected to a distinct organization. The affinity of the two orders is so marked that it might he natural to look upon the legists as metaphysicians passed from the speculative into the active state: but they are not so; but rather an emanation of the feudal power, whose judiciary functions fell into their hands: and their hostility to the Catholic power was naturally for ever on the increase through the collisions between the ecclesiastical tribunals and the civil jurisdictions, royal and seigneural. They began to be powerful before the decline of the Catholic system; their influence increased during the absence of the feudal chiefs in the Crusades, from the judiciary administration of affairs at home remaining in their hands; and the great conflicts of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries opened boundless scope and congenial employment to their activity. This seas the season of their highest triumph, because their political ambition was then in harmony with their real service in aid of human progression: and, in regard to both classes, this divas the age of lofty intellect and noble character. When this new social element had sufficiently aided, first, the efforts of the kings to free themselves from the control of the popes, and then, the opposition of the national churches to the papal supremacy, it had done its highest work on behalf of modern society, and had little more to do than to guard the results obtained from the always threatening reaction of the discomfited forces of the old organization. What its later action has been, we shall soon have occasion to observe. All that I need point out here is that, as these two bodies never had any organizing principle or power, their sway could be only temporary, and for purposes of mere preparation for a future organic state; and that such social order as was preserved during their rule must be attributed to the resistant action of the ancient powers, which still retained the direction of society, though more and more encroached upon by revolutionary modifications. If led to any attempt to construct and organize, the metaphysicians have no other resort, for principles and materials, than to the theological system, nor the legists than to the military system, which it is their very function to discredit and destroy; and thus, we know by anticipation that their poorer must expire with the last remains of the ancient regime.

Having surveyed the revolutionary movement of modern society in its nature, its course, and its organs, we have now only to observe its

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fulfilment.

The spontaneous stage of the spiritual decay is the first aspect which claims our attention, because it brings after it all the rest. It was not only the first to be fulfilled. the most difficult and the most decisive, but it involved the ruin of the whole regime. The efforts of the kings to overthrow the European power of the popes, which constitute the first aspect of the decline, may he referred to the fourteenth century, beginning with the strong reaction of Philippe-le-Bel, followed be the translation of the Holy See to Avignon: while the fifteenth century is the date of the second series of efforts,—that of the national churches against the papacy; beginning with the schism which arose out of the removal of the Holy See, and strengthened by the impulse imparted by the spontaneous union of the various churches against the papacy, in the celebrated Council of Constance. The first movement was essential to the second; as the national clergies could not place themselves under the direction of their respective chiefs till the chiefs themselves had escaped from the papal thraldom. Of all revolutionary operations, this appears to me to be the greatest; for it broke up the foundations of the monotheistic regime of the Middle Ages, by occasioning the spiritual poker to be absorbed by the temporal. The kings were blind to the consequences of their own acts when they destroyed the intellectual and moral foundations of the supremacy which they hoped to usurp, but which was effectual only in virtue of being independent of temporal power; and the various clergies, striving for nationality in order to escape from Romish centralization, were unaware that they were degrading their order by passing over from the authority of a single natural head to that of a multitude of military powers, whom they must regard as their spiritual inferiors;—thus placing each church in an oppressive state of political dependence, through their own desire for an irrational independence. The reaction of these movements upon the popes tended to aggravate the injury to the Catholic constitution. From the middle of the fourteenth century, when the sagacity of the popes assured them of the approaching emancipation of the kings of England, France, etc., while the eagerness of the national clergies in supporting all restrictions on papal power indicated their approaching nationalization, it is evident that the popes began to occupy themselves with their principality, which had before been merely an accessory object of solicitude, but which was now becoming, the only real part of their political power. Before the close of the fifteenth century, the ancient chief of the European system had sunk down to be

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the elective sovereign of a part of Italy, no longer ruling the civilized world, but striving for his own territorial aggrandisement, and to obtain it royal station for the long series of pontifical families, so as to make the absence of the hereditary principle almost an evil in the midst of this flood of nepotism. The papal power was not merely Italian: it had abdicated its noblest political attributes and it lost its social utility, so as to become, more and more, a foreign element in the Constitution of modern society. Hence dates the retrograde character of the Catholic polity, which had been so long progressive. Thus it was that all the essential elements of the Middle Age polity concurred, in their several ways, in the irrevocable decline of the spiritual power, which constituted its strength and dignity. And thus it is clear that the first disorganization was almost accomplished before the advent of Protestantism, which was its result and not its cause, whatever may have been the subsequent influence which flowed from its systematic sanction of the demolition of the Catholic system.

Indispensable as this demolition was, it left an immense gap in the body of European polity, the elements of which were now delivered over to conflict without restraint. A melancholy example of this is afforded by the frivolous and fierce wars of the principal countries, and especially by those between England and France, while the unavailing efforts of the popes to mate peace proved merely that their European authority was gone. An exuberant military activity remained over from the system of defensive war; and the protracted ascendancy of the military caste united with it to give that strange character to the wars of the period which contrasts so unfavourably with the social interest of wars of an earlier time, and even with that of the religious wars of the next century. The evils of the situation were aggravated by the decline. at the same time, of the political influence had hitherto regulated international relations. Two centuries before, the papacy had struggled successfully with a similar difficulty: but now it was decrepit. Its period of splendour was not long gone be, and its will was ardent and sincere as ever, but in accordance with, and in proof of its temporary character it failed utterly in its political vocation, through no accidental obstacles, but in consequence of its early disorganization. We shall soon see by what provisional expedient modern polity endeavoured to supply, as far as possible, this vast defalcation.

The disorganization of the temporal system, though proceeding throughout the thirteenth century, could not show its effects while the

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Catholic system remained unimpaired: but no sooner did the spiritual system begin to fall asunder than there was such disorder in the temporal as threatened the entire subversion of the feudal system, by destroying the balance of powers of the kings and the nobles. The local force of the nobles had, before the end of the fifteenth century, almost entirely absorbed the central force of the kings, as well as the spiritual power,— an inevitable consequence of the rise of the industrial spirit, and the attendant antipathy to the old military temper. It may seem as if the struggles of that time showed anything but a release from a military state of society: but, in fact, such wars as were taking place were fatal to the social consideration of the dominant military class, who, in warring against the civilization which it had been their function to protect, were manifesting the most unquestionable of all symptoms of decay,— that of turning against their original aim. The feudal organism was near its end when, instead of restraining the system of invasion, it became the general invader. The memorable institution of standing armies, begun in Italy and fully developed in France, marked the complete dissolution of the temporal system of the Middle Ages, both by manifesting the repugnance of industrial society to feudal service, and by substituting a wholly new military subordination for that of feudal warriors to their chiefs. The change was highly beneficial to industry; but it deprived the ancient military caste of its special prerogative. In this process of change, the gain was certain to be on the side of the kings. When the balance was once destroyed, the nobles were sure to be the sufferers. from the encouragement that the feudal system offered to the growth of the central power. As the decline of the spiritual power wrought in the contrary direction,—that is, against the kings,—all Europe would have been in a state of complete dismemberment, but for the advantage given to the central power by the temporal dissolution. Of the few exceptional cases of the political ascendancy of the aristocracy over royalty, the most remarkable is that of England; and that it is an exceptional case should be well understood by those who would transplant the temporary system peculiar to England to the continent, with the idea that the work of political renovation was then complete. The case and polity of England are perfectly singular, owing, I think, to the two circumstances of her insular position and the double conquest she has undergone; the first admitting of an undisturbed course of social development; and the other provoking a coalition of the nobles against royalty, as a result of the Norman conquest. Moreover, that conquest, by its results, favoured the