Comte - The positive philosophy. Vol. 1

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When this exposition of Positive Philosophy unfolds itself in order before their eyes, they will, I am persuaded, find there at least a restingplace for their thought,—a rallying-point of their scattered speculations, —and possibly an immoveable basis for their intellectual and moral convictions. The time will come when the book itself will, for a while, be most discussed on account of the deficiencies which M. Comte himself presses on our notice; and when his philosophy will sustain amplifications of which he himself does not dream. It must be so, in the inevitable growth of knowledge and evolution of philosophy; and it is the fate which the philosopher himself should covet, because it is only a true book that could survive to be so treated: but, in the meantime, it gives us the basis that we demand, and the principle of action that we want. and as much instruction in the procedure, and information as to what has been already achieved, as could be given in our time;—per- haps more than could have been given by any other mind of our time. Even Mathematics is here first constituted a science, venerable and unquestionable as mathematical truths have been for ages past: and we are led on, tracing as we go the clear genealogy of the sciences, till we find ourselves among the elements of Social science, as yet too crude and confused to be established, by the others, by a review of what had before been achieved; but now, by the hand of our master, discriminated. arranged, and consolidated, so as to be ready to fulfil the conditions of true science as future generations bring their contributions of knowledge and experience to build upon the foundation here laid. A thorough familiarity with the work in which all this is done would avail more to extinguish the anarchy of popular and sectional opinion in this country than any other influence that has yet been exerted, or, I believe, proposed.

It was under such convictions as these that I began, in the spring of 1851, the analysis of this work, in preparation for a translation. A few months afterwards, an unexpected aid presented itself. My purpose was related to the late Mr. Lombe, who was then residing at Florence. He was a perfect stranger to me. He told me, in a subsequent letter, that he had wished, for many years, to do what I was then attempting, and had been prevented only by ill health. My estimate of M. Comte’s work, and my expectations from its introduction into England in the form of a condensed translation were fully shared by him; and, to my utter amazement he sent me, as the first act of our correspondence, an order on his bankers for £500. There was time, before his lamented death, for me to

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communicate to him my views as to the disposal of this money, and to obtain the assurance of his approbation. We planned that the larger proportion of it should be expended in getting out the work, and promoting its circulation. The last words of his last letter were an entreaty that I would let him know if more money would, in any way, improve the quality of my version or aid the promulgation of the book It was a matter of deep concern to me that he died before I could obtain his opinion as to the manner in which I was doing my work. All that remained was to carry out his wishes as far as possible; and to do this, no pains have been spared by myself, or by Mr. Chapman, who gave him the information that called forth his bounty.

As to the method I have pursued with my work,—there will be different opinions about it, of course. Some will wish that there had been no omissions, while others would have complained of length and heaviness, if I had offered a complete translation. Some will ask why it is not a close version as far as it goes; and others, I have reason to believe, would have preferred a brief account, out of my own mind, of what Comte’s philosophy is, accompanied by illustrations of my own devising. A wider expectation seems to be that I should record my own dissent, and that of some critics of much more weight, from certain of M. Comte’s views. I thought long and anxiously of this; and I was not insensible to the temptation of entering my protest, here and there, against a statement, a conclusion, or a method of treatment. I should have been better satisfied still to have a adduced some critical opinions of much higher value than any of mine can be. But my deliberate conclusion was that this was not the place nor the occasion for any such controversy. What I engaged to do was to present M. Comte’s first great work in a useful form for English study: and it appears to me that it would be presumptuous to thrust in my own criticisms, and out of place to insert those of others. Those others can speak for themselves, and the readers of the book can criticize it for themselves. No doubt, they may be trusted not to mistake my silence for assent, nor to charge me with neglect of such criticism as the work has already evoked in this country. While I have omitted some pages of the Author’s comments on French affairs, I have not attempted to alter his French view of European politics. In short, I have endeavoured to bring M. Comte and his English readers face to face, with as little drawbacks as possible from intervention.

This by no means implies that the translation is a close one. It is a very free translation. It is more a condensation than an abridgment: but

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it is an abridgment too. My object was to convey the meaning of the original in the clearest way I could; and to this all other considerations here made to yield. The serious view that I have taken of my enterprise is proved by the amount of labour and of pecuniary sacrifice that I have devoted to my task. Where I have erred, it is from want of ability, for I have taken all the pains I could.

One suggestion that I made to Mr. Comte, and that he approved, was that the three sections—Mathematics, Astronomy, and Physics— should be revised by a qualified man of science. My personal friend, Professor Nichol, of Glasgow, was kind enough to undertake this service. After two careful readings, he suggested nothing material in the way of alteration, in the case of the first two sections, except the omission of Comte’s speculation on the possible mathematical verification of Laplace’s Cosmogony. But more had to be done with regard to the treatment of Physics. Every reader will see that that section is the weakest part of the book, in regard both to the organization and the details of the subject. In regard to the first, the author explains the fact, from the nature of the case,—that Physics is rather a repository of somewhat fragmentary portions of physical science, the correlation of which is not vet clear, than a single circumscribed science. And we must say for him, in regard to the other kind of imperfection, that such advances have been made in almost every department of Physics since his second volume was published, that it

would be unfair to present what he wrote under that head in 1835 as what he would have to say now. The choice lay therefore between almost re-writing this portion of M. Comte’s work, or so largely abridging it that only a skeleton presentment of general principles should remain. But as the system of Positive Philosophy is much less an Expository than a Critical work, the latter alternative alone seemed open, under due consideration of justice to the Author. I have adopted therefore the plan of extensive omissions, and have retained the few short memoranda in which Professor Nichol suggested these, as notes. Although gentleman has sanctioned my presentment of Comte’s chapters on Mathematics and Physics, it must not be inferred that he agrees with his Method in Mental Philosophy, or assents to other conclusions held of main importance by the disciples of the Positive Philosophy. The contrary, indeed, is so apparent in the tenour of his own writings, that so far as his numerous readers are concerned, this remark need not have been offered. With the reservation I have made, I am bound to take the entire

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responsibility,—the Work being absolutely and wholly my own.

It will be observed that M. Comte’s later works are not referred to in anv part of this book. It appears to me that they, like our English criticisms on the present Work, had better be treated of separately. Here his analytical genius has full scope; and what there is of synthesis is, in regard to social science, merely what is necessary to render his analysis possible and available. For vitrious reasons, I think it best to stop here, feeling assured that if this Work fulfils its function, all else with which M. Comte has thought fit to follow it up will be obtained as it is demanded.

During the whole course of my long task, it has appealed to me that Comte’s work is the strongest embodied rebuke ever given to that form of theological intolerance which censures Positive Philosophy for pride of reason and lowness of morals. The imputation will not be dropped, and the enmity of the religious world to the book will not slacken for its appearing among us in an English version. It cannot he otherwise. The theological world cannot but hate a book which treats of theological belief as a transient state of the human mind. And again, the preachers and teachers, of all sects and schools, who keep to the ancient practice, once inevitable, of contemplating and judging of the universe from the point of view of their own minds, instead of franking learned to take their stand out of themselves, investigating front the universe inwards, and not from within outwards, must necessarily think in of a work which exposes the futility of their method, and the worthlessness of the results to which it leads. As M. Comte treats of theology and metaphysics as destined to pass away, theologians and metaphysicians must necessarily abhor, dread, and despise his work. They merely express their own natural feelings on behalf of the objects of their reverence and the purpose of their lives, when they charge positive Philosophy with irreverence. lack of aspiration, hardness, deficiency of grace and beauty, and so on. They are no Judges of the case. Those who are—those who have passed through theology and metaphysics, and. findings what they are now worth have risen above them—will pronounce a very different judgment on the contents of this book, though no appeal for such a judgment is made in it, and this kind of discussion is nowhere expressly provided for. To those who have learned the difficult task of postponing dreams to realities till the beauty of reality is seen in its full disclosure, while that of dreams melts into darkness, the moral charm of this work will be as impressive as its intellectual satisfactions. The aspect in which it presents Man is

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as favourable to his moral discipline, as it is fresh and stimulating to his intellectual taste. We find ourselves suddenly living and moving in the midst of the universe,—as a part of it, and not as its aim and object. We find ourselves living, not under capricious and arbitrary conditions, unconnected with the constitution and movements of the whole, but under great, general, invariable laws, which operate on us as a part of the whole. Certainly, I can conceive of me instruction so favourable to, aspiration as that which shows us how great are our faculties, how small our knowledge, how sublime this heights which we may hope to attain, and how boundless an infinity may be assumed to spread out beyond. We find here indications in passing of the evils we suffer from our low aims, our selfish passions, and our proud ignorance; and in contrast with them, animating displays of the beauty and glory of the everlasting laws, and of the sweet serenity, lofty courage, and noble resignation that are the natural consequence of pursuits so pure, and aims so true, as those of Positive Philosophy. Pride of intellect surely abides with those who insist on belief without evidence and on a philosophy derived from their own intellectual action, without material and corroboration from without and not with those who are too scrupulous and too humble to transcend evidence, and to add, out of their own imaginations, to that which is, and may be, referred to other judgments. If it be desired to extinguish presumption, to draw away from low aims, to fill life with worthy occupations and elevating pleasures, and to raise human hope and human effort to the highest attainable point, it seems to me that the best resource is the pursuit of Positive Philosophy, with its train of noble truths and irresistible inducements. The prospects it opens are boundless; for among the laws it establishes that of human progress is conspicuous. The virtues it fosters are all those of which Man is capable; and the noblest are those which are more eminently fostered. The habit of truth-seeking and truth-speaking, and of true dealing with self and with all things, is evidently a primary requisite; and this habit once perfected, the natural conscience, thus disciplined, will train up all other moral attributes to some equality with it. To all who know what the study of philosophy really is,—which means the study of Positive Phi- losophy,—its effect on human aspiration and human discipline is so plain that any doubt can be explained only on the supposition that accusers do not know what it is that they are calling in question. My hope is that this book may achieve, besides the purposes entertained by its author, the one more that he did not intend, of conveying a sufficient

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rebuke to those who, in theological selfishness or metaphysical pride, speak evil of a philosophy which is too lofty and too simple, too humble and too generous, for the habit of their minds. The case is clear. The law of progress is conspicuously at work throughout human history. The only field of progress is now that of Positive Philosophy, under whatever name it may be known to the real students of every sect; and therefore must that philosophy be favourable to those virtues whose repression would be incompatible with progress.

The Positive Philosophy of Auguste

Comte

Introduction Chapter I

Account of The Aim of This Work.—View of The Nature and Importance of the Positive Philosophy.

A general statement of any system of philosophy may be either a sketch of a doctrine to be established or a summary of a doctrine already established. If greater value belongs to the last, the first is still important, as characterizing from its origin the subject to be treated. In a case like the present, where the proposed study is vast and hitherto indeterminate, it is especially important that the field of research should be marked out with all possible accuracy. For this purpose, I will glance at the considerations which have originated this work, and which will be fully elaborated in the course of it.

In order to understand the true value and character of the Positive Philosophy, we must talkie a brief general view of the progressive course of the human mind, regarded as a whole; for no conception can be understood otherwise shall through its history.

From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all directions, and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law, to which it is necessarily subject, find which has a solid foundation of proof, both in the acts of our organization and in our historical experience. The law is this:—that each of our leading concep- tions,—each branch of our knowledge,—passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the Theological, or fictitious; the Metaphysical, or abstract; and the Scientific, or positive. In other words, the human mind, by its nature, employs in its progress three methods of philosophizing, the character of which is essentially different, and even radically opposed: viz., the theological method, the metaphysical, and

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the positive. Hence arise three philosophies, or general systems of conceptions on the aggregate of phenomena, each of which excludes the others. The first is the necessary point of departure of the human understanding; and the third is its fixed and definitive state. The second is merely a state of transition.

In the.theological state, the human mind, seeking the essential nature of beings, the first and final causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects, —in short, Absolute knowledge,—supposes all phenomenato

be produced by the immediate action of supernatural beings. In the metaphysical state, which is only a modification of the first, the mind supposes, instead of supernatural beings, abstract forces, veritable entities (that is, personified abstractions) inherent in all beings, and capable of producing all phenomena. What is called the explanation of phenomena is, in this stage, a mere reference of each to its proper entity.

In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and the coituses of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws,—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance.

Reasoning and observation, duly combined, are the means of this knowledge. What is now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the establishment of a connection between single phenomena and some general facts, the number of which continually diminishes with the progress of science.

The Theological system arrived at the highest perfection of which it is capable when it substituted the providential action of a single Being for the varied operations of the numerous divinities which had been before imagined. In the same way, in the last stage of the Metaphysical system, men substitute one great entity (Nature) as the cause of all phenomena, instead of the multitude of entities at first supposed. In the same way, again, the ultimate perfection of the Positive so stem would be (if such perfection could be hoped for) to represent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general fact;—such as Gravitation, for instance.

The importance of the working of this general law will be established hereafter. At present, it must suffice to point out some of the grounds of it

There is no science which, having attained the positive stage, does not bear marks of having passed through the others. Some time since it was (whatever it might be) composed, as we can now perceive, of meta-

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physical abstractions; and, further back in the course of time, it took its form from theological conceptions. We shall have only too much occasion to see, as we proceed, that our most advanced sciences still bear very evident marks of the two earlier periods through which they have passed.

The progress of the individual mind is not only an illustration, but an indirect evidence of that of the general mind. The point of departure of the individual and of the race being the same, the phases of the mind of a man correspond to the epochs of the mind of the race. Now, each of us is aware, if he looks back upon his own history that he was a theologian in his childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a natural philosopher in his manhood. All men who are up to their age can verify this for themselves. Besides the observation of facts, we have theoretical reasons in support of this law.

The most important of these reasons arises from the necessity that always exists for some theory to which to refer our facts, combined with the near impossibility that, at the outset of human knowledge, men could have formed theories out of the observation of facts. All good intellects have repeated, since Bacon’s time, that there can be no real knowledge but that which is based on observed facts. This is incontestible, in our present advanced stage; but, if we look back to the primitive stage of human knowledge, we shall see that it must have been otherwise then. If it is true that every theory must be based upon observed facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory. Without such guidance, our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them: for the most part we could not even perceive them.

Thus, between the necessity of observing facts in order to form a theory, and having a theory in order to observe facts, the human mind would have been entangled in a vicious circle, but for the natural opening afforded by Theological conceptions. This is the fundamental reason for the theological character of the primitive philosophy. This necessity is confirmed by the perfect suitability of the theological philosophy to the earliest researches of the human mind. It is remarkable that the most inaccessible questions,—those of the nature of beings, and the origin and purpose of phenomena,—should be the first to occur in a primitive state, while those which are really within our reach are regarded as almost unworthy of serious study. The reason is evident enough:—that experience alone can teach us the measure of our pow-

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ers; and if men had not begun by an exaggerated estimate of what they can do, they would never have done all that they are capable of. Our organization requires this. At such a period there could have been no reception of a positive philosophy, whose function is to discover the laws of phenomena, and whose leading characteristic it is to regard as interdicted to human reason those sublime mysteries which theology explains, even to their minutest details, with the most attractive facility. It is just so under a practical view of the nature of the researches with which men first occupied themselves. Such inquiries offered the powerful charm of unlimited empire over the external world,—a world destined wholly for our use, and involved in every way with our existence. The theological philosophy presenting this view, administered exactly the stimulus necessary to incite the human mind to the irksome labour without which it could malice no progress. We can now scarcely conceive of such a state of things, our reason having become sufficiently mature to enter upon laborious scientific researches, without needing any such stimulus as wrought upon the imaginations of astrologers and alchemists. We have motive enough in the hope of discovering the laws of phenomena, with a view to the confirmation or rejection of a theory. But it could not be so in the earliest days; and it is to the chimeras of astrology and alchemy that we owe the long series of observations and experiments on which our positive science is based. Kepler felt this on behalf of astronomy and Berthollet on behalf of chemistry. Thus was a spontaneous philosophy, the theological, the only possible beginning, method, and provisional system, out of which the positive philosophy could grow. It is easy, after this, to perceive how Metaphysical methods and doctrines must have afforded the means of transition from the one to the other.

The human understanding, slow in its advance, could not step at once from the theological into the positive philosophy. The two are so radically opposed, that an intermediate system of conceptions has been necessary to render the transition possible. It is only in doing this, that Metaphysical conceptions have any utility whatever. In contemplating phenomena, men substitute for supernatural direction a corresponding entity. This entity may have been supposed to be derived from the supernatural action: but it is more easily lost sight of, leaving attention free for the facts themselves, till, at length, metaphysical agents have ceased to be anything more than the abstract names of phenomena. It is not easy to say by what other process than this our minds could have