Encyclopedia of Sociology Vol

Reasons Offered for Abortion

Health concerns (e.g., severe hyperemesis)

Change in circumstances since conception:

Abandonment by partner or family

Change in finances or social situation

Illness of other family member

Abnormal pregnancy

Exposure to teratogen

Table 2

abortion since 1986, but has had to overcome numerous political roadblocks in the United States. Mifepristone, a different class of medication from methotrexate, blocks progesterone hormone binding sites. It requires use of a second drug, a prostaglandin drug such as misoprostol, several days later to expel the pregnancy. In contrast to methotrexate, 75 percent of women abort within 2 days, and 90–95 percent abort within 1 week. Mifepristone can be used up to 7 to 9 menstrual weeks depending on the selection of the second drug.

After 7 to 9 menstrual weeks, suction curettage is the main technique. At the end of the first trimester and in second trimester, opening the cervix sufficiently becomes more challenging. Osmotic dilators are used over several hours or several days; osmotic dilators are placed in the cervix, where they absorb water and swell. Preparation for abortion in the midand late second trimester may take several days. Surgical procedures, often called dilatation and evacuation (D&E), are variations of early pregnancy techniques using suction and extraction instruments. After 16 weeks, medical (induction) techniques can be used to induce labor. All the agents—prostaglandin, oxytocin, and saline—are unpredictable, may take several hours to several days, and may involve a curettage to remove placenta if it is not completely expelled. Hospitalization is the rule, and therefore induction techniques are more costly than surgical techniques in an out-patient setting.

Legal abortion has very few serious complications. Term pregnancy has a death rate at least ten times higher than first-trimester abortion (10–12 deaths per 100,000 versus 0. 5–1.0 deaths per 100,000 women in the United States) (Berg et al.

1996; Paul et al. 1999), and a morbidity rate (serious medical outcomes such as major operations) hundreds of times higher. There is virtually no situation in which it is safer for a woman to continue a pregnancy than to abort a pregnancy, although there are sometimes situations in which abortion should be delayed briefly. However, abortion is safest if it is performed early (Gold 1990; Paul et al. 1999). Early abortion by suction curettage does not have an effect on future fertility. Abortion itself is not associated with adverse psychological sequelae; unwanted pregnancy may have adverse associations regardless of whether the pregnancy is aborted or continued. In second trimester the medical risks are higher than in first trimester (Paul et al. 1999).

It is difficult to ascertain the numbers and types of abortions performed in the United States. In most states abortion is a reportable procedure; however, many procedures are not reported, probably for reasons of confidentiality of both provider and patient (Fu et al. 1998). Some abortions may be misclassified as treatment of a spontaneous abortion, since the suction procedure is identical; or the reverse may be true. In hospitals, some induced abortions may be classified as spontaneous abortion. The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates abortion procedures using both governmental and nongovernmental sources. The CDC also publishes ‘‘Abortion Surveillance’’ as a supplement to Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Review. Small variations in abortion rates may be related to reporting and surveillance issues as well as varying rates of pregnancy and abortion.

Currently, early medical abortion accounts for fewer than 1 percent of all abortions in the United States, as methotrexate is the only agent available. In other countries, medical abortion may account for up to a third of all abortion procedures. In France, half of all women seeking abortion request abortion early enough to be eligible for medical abortion, and two-thirds of them choose medical abortion. This shift to medical abortion in France has been accompanied by a shift to earlier abortion in general, while overall abortion rates have remained the same (Paul et al. 1999). Medical abortion is highly acceptable to women in many countries. Acceptability studies consistently estimate that 60–80 percent of women would choose medical abortion over surgical abortion were it available (Winikoff 1994).

However, despite the preference for medical abortion over surgical abortion, surgical abortion remains the only method available to most women, if they have access to any method at all. In the United States the number of abortion providers has dropped over the last two decades. Abortion is available in a minority of counties in the United States, most of them in urban areas (Lichter et al. 1998). The majority of abortion procedures take place in free-standing medical facilities, many of them primarily devoted to abortion provision (Henshaw 1998b). Planned Parenthood clinics provide about 12 percent of all abortions. About 10 percent of abortions occur in hospitals or hospitalaffiliated clinics. At least 5 percent of abortions occur in doctors’ offices that are not identified as providing primarily abortion-related care.

Most physicians providing abortions in the United States are obstetrician-gynecologists, but other physicians provide abortions. Only about a third of gynecologists provide abortions, so most women needing abortion are referred to an unfamiliar caregiver. First-trimester abortions are also provided in several states by physicians’ assistants (PAs) and midwives. Most states have ‘‘physicianonly’’ statutes that limit the provision of abortion to physicians. However, these statutes were written before the increase in utilization of advanced practice nurses, such as midwives, and ‘‘physician extenders,’’ such as PAs, who currently perform other procedures of comparable complexity and skill (Freedman et al. 1986). In a few countries (e.g., Bangladesh) midwives provide most abortion services.

Costs for abortions range form several hundred dollars for a first-trimester procedure in an office or clinic setting, to thousands of dollars for procedures performed in hospitals. Many insurance policies cover abortion, although reimbursement rates vary. Some forms of insurance do not cover abortion at all, for example, insurance provided to U.S. federal employees. Publicly funded insurance for indigent women covers ‘‘medically indicated’’ abortions in some states but not others. Finally, many women requesting abortion do not have any insurance at all, most commonly because their employment does not provide insurance. Women who need specialized procedures because of underlying medical illnesses may have additional barriers; there are several states in which no hospital will allow an abortion to be performed.

In the United States the majority of people polled supported the availability of abortion, but many were in favor of some restrictions. Parental consent laws for minors have been passed in nearly half the states. Any such law must contain a ‘‘judicial bypass’’ to be considered constitutional, so that minors can petition a judge if they cannot tell a parent (Paul et al. 1999). In practice, most minors do involve a parent with or without parental consent laws. The main effect of such laws is to delay abortion for those minors without good family support.

In the United States there is a vocal and wellfunded minority with the goal of criminalizing abortion. Mandatory waiting periods and mandatory consent processes have also been passed. These increase the amount of time and expense necessary for a woman to obtain an abortion, particularly where there are few providers. Other quasi-legal attempts to decrease abortion include passage of laws that are either unenforceable or unconstitutional. These include restrictions on the type of facility that can perform abortion and ‘‘partial-birth abortion’’ laws. The resulting legal challenges are expensive, and this tactic can be considered a sustained economic assault (Reproductive Freedom News 1999). Antiabortion groups in the United States have been increasingly involved in terrorist activities, including harassment, arson, violence, and even murder. Several thousand incidents or harassment and arson are reported annually to the National Abortion Federation (National Abortion Federation 1999).

Abortion is generally legal in most European countries and in much of Asia, but is illegal in most of South America and Africa (WHO 1998b). The effect of government-sanctioned denial of abortion rights is not to decrease the number of abortions significantly. Abortion rates are correlated with multiple factors such as patterns of sexual activity, type of contraceptive use, desired family size, and tolerance of unwanted pregnancy. In the United States it has been estimated that the number of abortions performed annually before widespread legalization was 600,000 to 1.2 million per year (Gold 1990). The number reported the first year after legalization was 615,831 (Koonin et al. 1996). The effect of criminalizing abortion is to delay abortion for some women and to make it riskier for almost all women, resulting in increased

death rates (Population Reports 1997). As an example, after abortion was criminalized in Romania, the death rate from abortions quintupled; while maternal mortality doubled (WHO 1998b). In South American and East Africa, the rates of illegal abortion are similar, about 35 per 1,000 women of childbearing age, but death rates are dissimilar (0.3 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively, of women undergoing abortion), related to underlying health status and access to postabortion care (WHO 1998b).

Increases in the provision of contraceptive services are associated with decreases in abortion rates (Henshaw et al. 1999; Estrin 1999). However, the United States has consistently refused to fund contraceptive services adequately, particularly services in developing countries, because of right-wing political pressure (Alan Guttmacher Institute 1996).

Pregnancy carries an intrinsic risk to women’s health, which can be minimized by appropriate medical care to women who are in good health to start. Family planning is essential to women’s health during pregnancy, and essential to the health of their infants. Women who do not want to be pregnant will risk health and life to end the pregnancy. Denying or criminalizing abortion care results in additional health risks for women while diverting health resources that could be used for maternity services for other women.

REFERENCES

Affonso, Dyanne D., Chong-Yeu Lui-Chang, and Linda J. Mayberry 1997 ‘‘Worry: Conceptual Dimensions and Relevance to Childbearing Women.’’ Health Care for Women International 20:227–236.

Alan Guttmacher Institute 1994 Uneven and Unequal: Insurance Coverage and Reproductive Health Services. New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute.

———1996 Endangered: U.S. Aid for Family Planning Overseas. New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute.

———1997 Family Planning Improves Child Survival and Health. New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute.

———1999 Teenage Pregnancy: Overall Trends and State- by-State Information. New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute (April).

American Academy of Pediatrics and American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1997 Guidelines for Perinatal Care, 4th ed. Elk Grove Village, Ill.: AAP.

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1992 Fetal and Neonatal Neurologic Injury. Technical Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: ACOG.

———1995a Committee Opinion: Perinatal and Infant Mortality Statistics. Washington, D.C.: ACOG.

———1995b Domestic Violence. Washington, D.C.: ACOG

———1998 Committee Opinion: Vitamin A Supplementation during Pregnancy. Washington, D.C.: ACOG.

Berg, Cynthia J., Hani K. Atrash, Lisa M. Koonin, and Myra Tucker 1996 ‘‘Pregnancy-Related Mortality in the United States, 1987–1990.’’ Obstetrics and Gyneclogy 88:161–167.

Crane, James P., Michael L. LeFevre, Renee C. Winborn, Joni K. Evans, Bernard G. Ewigman, Raymond P. Bain, Frederic P. Frigoletto, Donald McNellis, and the RADIUS Study Group 1994 ‘‘A Randomized Trial of Prenatal Ultrasonographic Screening: Impact on the Detection, Management, and Outcome of Anomalous Fetuses.’’ American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 171:382–399.

Butler, Jane, Barbara Abrams, Jennifer Parker, James M. Roberts, and Russell K. Laros 1993 ‘‘Supportive Nurse-Midwife Care is Associated with a Reduced Incidence of Cesarean Section.’’ American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 168:1407–1413.

Cunningham, E. Gary, Paul C. MacDonald, Norman F. Gant, Kenneth J. Leveno, Larry C. Gilstrap, Gary D. V. Hankins, and Steven L. Clark 1997 Williams Obstetrics, 20th ed. Stamford, Conn.: Appleton and Lange.

Czeizel, Andrew E., and Istvan Dudas 1992 ‘‘Prevention of the First Occurrence of Neural-Tube Defects by Periconceptional Vitamin Supplementation.’’ New England Journal of Medicine 327:1832–1835.

Estrin, D. J. 1999 ‘‘In Three Former Soviet States, Rates of Abortion Are Declining as Contraceptive Prevalence Increases.’’ International Family Planning Perspectives 25:49–50.

Fraser, Alison M., John E. Brockert, and R. H. Ward 1995 ‘‘Association of Young Maternal Age with Adverse Reproductive Outcomes.’’ New England Journal of Medicine 332:1113–1117.

Freedman, Mary Anne, David A. Jillson, Roberta R. Coffin, and Lloyd F. Novick 1986 ‘‘Comparison of Complication Rates in First Trimester Abortions Performed by Physician Assistants and Physicians.’’

American Journal of Public Health 76:550–554.

Fu, Haishan, Jacqueline E. Darroch, Stanley K. Henshaw, and Elizabeth Kolb 1998 ‘‘Measuring the Extent of Abortion Underreporting in the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth.’’ Family Planning Perspectives

30:128–133, 138.

Gabbe, S., J. R. Niebyl, and J. L. Simpson 1996 Obstetrics: Normal and Problem Pregnancies, 3rd ed. New York: Churchill-Livingston.

Gold, Rachel Benson 1990 Abortion and Women’s Health. New York: Alan Guttmacher Institute.

Henshaw, Stanley K. 1998a ‘‘Unintended Pregnancy in the United States.’’ Family Planning Perspectives

30:24–29, 46.

——— 1998b ‘‘Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States, 1995–1996.’’ Family Planning Perspectives 30:263–270, 287.

———, Susheela Singh, and Taylor Haas 1999 ‘‘Recent Trends in Abortion Rates Worldwide.’’ International Family Planning Perspectives 25:44–48.

Higby, Kenneth, Elly M. J. Xenakis, and Carl J. Pauerstein 1993 ‘‘Do Tocolytic Agents Stop Preterm Labor? A Critical and Comprehensive Review of Efficacy and Safety.’’ American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology

168:1247–1259.

Horton, Jacqueline A. (ed.) 1995 The Women’s Health Data Book, A Profile of Women’s Health in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Jacobs Institute of Women’s Health.

——— 1998 State Profiles of Women’s Health. Washington, D.C.: Jacobs Institute of Women’s Health.

Koonin, Lisa M., Jack C. Smith, Merrell Ramick, and Clarice A. Green 1996 ‘‘Abortion Surveillance—Unit- ed States, 1992.’’ Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Review, vol. 45, supp. 3. Atlanta, Ga.: Center for Disease Control.

Reproductive Freedom News 1999 Anti-Abortion Legislature Swamps Choice Activists. New York: Center for Law and Reproductive Policy (May).

Rooks, Judith S. 1997 Midwifery and Childbirth in America. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press.

Rosen, Mortimer G., and Janet C. Dickinson 1992 ‘‘The Incidence of Cerebral Palsy.’’ American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology 167:417–423.

Rosenberg, Irwin H. 1992 ‘‘Folic Acid and Neutral-Tube Defects—Time for Action?’’ New England Journal of Medicine 327:1875–1877.

Swiss, S. 1993 ‘‘Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective.’’ Journal of the American Medical Association 270:612–615.

Taylor, Paul (ed.) 1980 ‘‘Parent-Infant Relationships.’’ New York: Grune and Stratton.

Wallace, H. M., R. P. Nelson, and P. J. Sweeney 1994

Maternal and Child Health Practices, 4th ed. Oakland, Calif.: Third Party.

Winikoff, Beverly 1994 Acceptability of First Trimester Medical Abortion. New York: Population Council.

World Health Organization, Division of Reproductive Health 1998a Postpartum Care of the Mother and Newborn: A Practical Guide. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO.

——— 1998b Unsafe Abortion, 3rd ed. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO.

LYNN BORGOTTA

Lichter, Daniel T., Diane K. McLaughlin, and David C. Ribar 1998 ‘‘State Abortion Policy, Geographic Access to Abortion Providers and Changing Family Formation.’’ Family Planning Perspectives 30:281–287.

National Abortion Federation 1999 ‘‘Clinic Support Update.’’ Washington, D.C.: NAF (April).

National Center for Health Statistics 1999 Births: Final Data for 1997. Atlanta, Ga.: Center for Disease Control and Prevention.

O’Connor, M. L. 1998 ‘‘Home Nurse Visits from Pregnancy until Child’s Second Birthday Have Sustained Benefits for Mother and Child.’’ Family Planning Perspectives 30:47–48.

Paul, Maureen, E. Steve Lichtenberg, Lynn Borgatta, David A. Grimes, and Phillip G. Stubblefield 1999 A Clinician’s Guide to Medical and Surgical Abortion. New York: Churchill-Livingston.

Population Reports 1997 Caring for Postabortion Complications: Saving Women’s Lives. Baltimore, Md.: Population Information Center (September).

PREJUDICE

Gordon Allport, in his classic The Nature of Prejudice, defined prejudice as ‘‘an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization’’ (1954, p. 9). This phrasing neatly captures the notion that both inaccurate beliefs and negative feelings are implicated in prejudice. To these ‘‘cognitive’’ and ‘‘affective’’ dimensions of prejudice, some analysts add ‘‘conative,’’ referring to action orientation (Klineberg 1972) and prescription (Harding et al. 1969). Allport’s circumspection on the conative implications of prejudice—he said ‘‘(prejudice) may be felt or expressed’’ (1954, p. 9)—foreshad- owed our growing understanding that the correspondence of behavior with cognitions and feelings is uncertain, a research issue in its own right (Schuman and Johnson 1976).

Racial and ethnic prejudice was Allport’s primary interest. Emerging social issues have brought

expanded attention to other forms of prejudice— against women, the elderly, handicapped persons, AIDS patients, and others. This discussion will focus on racial prejudice among white Americans, in the expectation that parallels and points of contrast will continue to make race relations research relevant to other forms of prejudice.

TRENDS AND PATTERNS

For many years, derogatory stereotypes, blatant aversion to interracial contact, and opposition in principle to racial equality were seen as the central manifestations of race prejudice, virtually defining the social science view of the problem. Indicators of these beliefs and feelings show a clear positive trend (Jaynes and Williams 1989; Schuman et al. 1997). White Americans’ belief in the innate intellectual inferiority of blacks declined from 53 percent in 1942 to about 20 percent in the 1960s, when the question was discontinued in major national surveys. The percentage of whites who said it would make no difference to them if a Negro of equal social status moved into their block rose from 36 percent to 85 percent between 1942 and 1972. White opinion that blacks should have ‘‘as good a chance as white people to get any kind of job’’ climbed from 45 percent in 1944 to 97 percent in 1972. Thomas Smith and Paul Sheatsley sum up this picture without equivocation: ‘‘Looking over this forty-year span, we are struck by the steady, massive growth in racial tolerance’’ (1984, p. 14).

Recurrent outbursts of overt racial hostility and public acts of discrimination (Feagin 1991) serve as unfortunate reminders that some white Americans still cling to blatant prejudice. More importantly, even the majority of whites, those on whom Smith and Sheatsley focus, appear unambiguously tolerant only if attention is confined to such traditional survey indicators as those described above. A confluence of developments has broadened the study of race prejudice and transformed our understanding of white racial attitudes. First, evidence of widespread, subtle prejudice has been revealed in research using disguised, ‘‘nonreactive’’ methods. Second, ‘‘social cognition’’ scholarship, paramount for two decades in the psychological wing of social psychology, has been powerfully

applied to intergroup relations. Recent scholarship is broadened and balanced by its acknowledgment of the crucial role of affect along with cognition. Third, evolution of the struggle for racial equality in the United States has shifted attention to a new domain of racial policy-related beliefs and feelings. These perspectives provide ample evidence that white racial prejudice is not a thing of the past, but exists today in complex forms that have yet to be thoroughly charted.

Evidence from ‘‘Nonreactive’’ Studies. Given the clear dominance of ‘‘liberal’’ racial norms evinced in public opinion data, it might be expected that needs for social acceptability and selfesteem would lead many whites to withhold evidence of negative racial feelings and cognitions whenever possible. Disguised, ‘‘nonreactive’’ research (Webb 1981) provides substantial evidence that, indeed, traditional survey approaches underestimate negative racial feeling. Field experiments reveal that whites often provide less help to victims who are black (Crosby et al. 1980), sometimes redefining the situation so as to justify their lack of response (Gaertner 1976). Such elements of nonverbal behavior as voice tone (Weitz 1972) and seating proximity (Word et al. 1974) have been found to reveal negative racial feelings and avoidance. Recent reaction time and word completion studies similarly document the existence of ‘‘implicit’’ racial prejudice among many whites who score low on self-reported ‘‘explicit’’ prejudice (Dovidio et al. 1997). Thus, accumulating American evidence reveals that ‘‘microaggressions’’ (Pettigrew 1989) often accompany self-portrayals of liberalism. Parallel research in western Europe has uncovered similar forms of microaggression against that continent’s new immigrant minorities (Den Uyl et al. 1986; Klink and Wagner 1999; Sissons 1981).

Social Cognition Perspectives, Now Acknowledging the Role of Affect. In recognizing aspects of prejudice as predictable outgrowths of ‘‘natural’’ cognitive processes, Allport (1954) was ahead of his time. A wave of social cognition research on intergroup relations was set in motion by Henri Tajfel (1969), who demonstrated that mere catego- rization—of physical objects or of people—en- courages exaggerated perception of intragroup homogeneity and intergroup difference. Even in

‘‘minimal groups’’ arbitrarily created in psychology laboratories, these effects of social categorization are often accompanied by ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Brewer 1979, 1991; Hamilton 1979). Accumulating evidence of the negative consequences of ingroup/outgroup categorization has spurred research aimed at identifying conditions of intergroup contact that are likely to decrease category salience and promote ‘‘individuation’’ or ‘‘decategorization’’ (Brewer and Miller 1988; Wilder 1978), or at least to reduce the negativity of outgroup stereotypes (Rothbart and John 1985; Wilder 1984). Recent attention to the role of motivation in guiding cognition (Fiske 1998) contributes to this effort.

The study of attributional processes (Heider 1958) also has been usefully applied to intergroup relations, calling attention to such issues as whether white perceivers believe that black economic hardship results from discrimination or lack of effort. Research evidence has linked stereotypic thinking to attributions of outgroup behavior (David L. Hamilton 1979). Specific predictions are developed in Pettigrew’s discussion of the ‘‘ultimate attributional error’’ (1979a), the tendency to hold outgroups personally responsible for their failures, but to ‘‘discount’’ their responsibility for successes, attributing successes to such factors as luck or unfair advantage.

The intense research scrutiny given cognitive factors meant that the critical affective component of prejudice was often ignored. That imbalance is being corrected. The 1993 publication of Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping, edited by Mackie and Hamilton (1993), marked the dramatic shift in emphasis in social psychology. Varied research, from American laboratory experimentation (Stangor et al. 1991; Dovidio et al. 1989) to European surveys (Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), demonstrates that emotional factors not only are central to intergroup prejudice but have special characteristics of their own and are highly predictive of policy attitudes. One attempt at synthesis outlines a tripartite conception of prejudice as stereotypes, affect, and ‘‘symbolic beliefs’’ (Esses et al. 1993; Zanna 1994).

Expanding the Racial Attitude Domain to Policy Views. Over the past twenty-five years, evolution in the struggle for racial equality has brought new complexity to the public debate about racial

issues. Notions that barriers to black equality consist solely of white hostility and aversion, and formal denial of rights, now appear naive. Advocates insist that structural barriers far more complex and far more pervasive than formal denial of access prevent actual desegregation and equality of opportunity, making questions about acceptance by white individuals a moot point for millions of black Americans.

In the current era of U.S. race relations, traditional manifestations of race prejudice recede in relevance, and different forms of race-related belief and feeling take center stage—reactions to agitation for change, recognition and interpretation of continuing inequality, and support for proposed remedies. By all indications, such white ‘‘perceptions, explanations, and prescriptions’’ (Apostle et al. 1983, p. 18) show far less consensus and support for racial change than appeared in traditional race survey data. Asked about specific policies and programs designed to increase racial equality—fair housing guarantees, school desegregation plans, affirmative action in hiring and college admission—white Americans show substantially less support than they voice for racial equality in principle (Pettigrew 1979b; Schuman et al. 1997). Many white Americans exaggerate recent black gains and benefits of affirmative action (Steeh and Krysan 1996) and underestimate the remaining inequality (Kluegel and Smith 1982). There is substantial white resentment of black activism and perceived progress (Bobo 1988a; Schuman et al. 1997).

Attribution research in social psychology and earlier societal analyses (Ryan 1971; Feagin 1975) converge with recent studies of racial policy opinion to tell a clear story: Whites explain the economic plight of black Americans more often as the result of such ‘‘individualistic’’ factors as lack of motivation than in terms of such ‘‘structural’’ factors as discrimination (Apostle et al. 1983; Kluegel and Smith 1986). In addition, individualistic attributions along with denial of discrimination are linked to a variety of policy-relevant beliefs and opinions, including opposition to affirmative action (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kluegel and Smith 1983, 1986).

CHARACTERIZATIONS OF WHITE RACIAL

ATTITUDES

Efforts to characterize the complex pattern of racial attitudes held by white Americans emphasize an array of themes, as discussed below.

‘‘Natural’’ Cognitive Processing. As noted earlier, social cognition analyses claim that a substantial part of the racial prejudice once thought to have sociocultural or psychodynamic roots actually stems from ordinary cognitive processing, particularly categorization (David L. Hamilton 1979). Social cognition portrayals increasingly acknowledge motivational and social influences (David A. Hamilton and Tina K. Trolier 1986; Fiske 1987, 1998). And there are recent powerful calls to acknowledge the joint influence on prejudice of cognition and affect (Esses et al. 1993; Pettigrew 1997; Smith 1993).

Strain Between Individualism and Egalitarianism. Current racial policy issues are said to pull whites between two cherished American values, individualism and egalitarianism (Lipset and Schneider 1978). Qualified support for social programs exists, in this view, because egalitarian sentiments prevail only until a proposal challenges individualistic values.

Ambivalence. Adding psychodynamic flavor to the individualism/egalitarianism value strain idea, some analysts describe current white feelings as an ambivalence that produces an unpredictable mix of amplified positive and negative responses (Katz et al. 1986).

‘‘Aversive’’ Racism. A desire to avoid interracial contact, muted negative feeling, and egalitarian self-concept are the mix Kovel (1970) characterized as aversive racism. The outcome is avoidance of positive interracial behavior when the situation can be defined to permit it, and expression of negative feelings when there are ostensible nonracial justifications (Gaertner 1976; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986).

‘‘Symbolic’’ or ‘‘Modern’’ Racism and ‘‘Racial Resentment.’’ Antiblack affect instilled by childhood socialization and the sense that racial change threatens fondly held individualistic values, not self-interest, are claimed as the twin foundations of Sears’s ‘‘symbolic’’ racism (1988). ‘‘Modern’’

racism contains the added ingredient of denying continuing racial inequality (McConahay 1986). ‘‘Racial resentment’’ (Kinder and Sanders 1996) is a recent addition to this family of ‘‘new racism’’ constructs. The label serves as a reminder that whatever the roots of new racism, a primary manifestation is anger that blacks’ gains have exceeded their entitlement.

‘‘Subtle’’ Prejudice. Using probability survey data from western Europe, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) developed scales for both blatant and subtle prejudice that proved highly predictive of attitudes toward immigrants across four nations, six target outgroups, and seven samples. Their conception of subtle prejudice contains three components: perceived threat to traditional values (similar to symbolic racism), exaggeration of intergroup differences, and the absence of positive affect (admiration and sympathy) for the outgroup. Rejecting the claims of Sniderman and his colleagues (1991), Meertens and Pettigrew (1997) demonstrate that their subtle prejudice is distinctly different from political conservatism.

‘‘Dominant Stratification Ideology.’’ A belief that opportunity is plentiful and equally distributed, and thus effort is economically rewarded and economic failure is deserved—these compose the ‘‘dominant stratification ideology’’ (Huber and Form 1973; Kluegel and Smith 1986), a sociological elaboration on the individualism theme. Although personal status and strands of American ‘‘social liberalism’’ also play a role, unyielding adherence to this American ‘‘dominant ideology’’ is portrayed as a major impediment to public support for redistributional claims in general, and to calls for racial change in particular (Kluegel and Smith 1986). On a backdrop of ignorance bred of social segregation, whites’ own experiences of economic success work to prevent recognition of the continuing barriers to full opportunity for black Americans (Kluegel 1985).

Self-Interest. Collective self-interest is sometimes identified as the primary basis of whites’ interracial beliefs and feelings (Jackman 1994; Wellman 1993). If zero-sum assumptions prevail, redistribution in favor of blacks will be seen as a losing proposition to whites. Self-interest is at the heart of what Bobo (1988b) called an ‘‘ideology of bounded racial change’’ and what Bobo and colleagues (1997) have dubbed ‘‘laissez-faire racism’’: White

acceptance of racial change and efforts to promote it end when continued change is perceived to threaten the well-being of whites.

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR MODERN

PREJUDICE

When the lessons from cognitive social psychology are counterposed with those from other perspectives on modern race prejudice, an apparent dilemma is revealed. Though social cognition findings indicate that category salience can promote stereotype change under some circumstances (Cook 1984; Pettigrew 1998), much of the cognitive literature insists that categorization is a central contributor to race prejudice and negative race relations: Color consciousness is often portrayed as an evil, color blindness the ideal. From other scholars of modern prejudice, the analysis and prescription are nearly a mirror image of this view. Color blindness is said to impede forthright problem solving in desegregated institutions (Schofield 1986); to represent ignorance of the structural barriers faced by black Americans (Kluegel 1985); and to be used as a weapon by those opposing black claims of collective rights (Jackman and Muha 1984; Omi and Winant 1986). The solution implied or stated by these analysts is for whites to adopt a color consciousness that fully acknowledges the historical impact of racial subordination and the continuing liabilities of direct and indirect discrimination. The two streams of advice present this challenge: How to promote a racial understanding in the white public that minimizes the psychological liabilities of ingroup/outgroup categorization while acknowledging the full sociological implications of the past and continuing color line.

(SEE ALSO: Discrimination)

REFERENCES

Allport, Gordon 1954 The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Apostle, Richard A., Charles Y. Glock, Thomas Piazza, and Marijean Suelzle 1983 The Anatomy of Racial Attitudes. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bobo, Lawrence 1988a ‘‘Attitudes toward the Black Political Movement: Trends, Meaning, and Effects on Racial Policy Preferences.’’ Social Psychology Quarterly 51:287–302.

——— 1988b ‘‘Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes.’’ In Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism. New York: Plenum.

———, and James R. Kluegel 1993 ‘‘Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest, Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitude?’’ American Sociological Review

58:443–464.

———, and Ryan A. Smith 1997 ‘‘Laissez Faire Racism: The Crystallization of a ‘Kinder Gentler’ Anti-Black Ideology.’’ In Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin, eds., Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change. Greenwood, Conn.: Praeger.

Brewer, Marilynn B. 1979 ‘‘Ingroup Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis.’’ Psychological Bulletin 86:307–324.

——— 1991 ‘‘The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17:475–482.

———, and Norman Miller 1988 ‘‘Contact and Cooperation: When Do They Work?’’ In Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism. New York: Plenum.

Cook, Stuart W. 1984 ‘‘Cooperative Interaction in Multiethnic Contexts.’’ In Norman Miller and Marilynn B. Brewer, eds., Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation. New York: Academic.

Crosby, Faye J., Stephanie Bromley, and Leonard Saxe 1980 ‘‘Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review.’’

Psychological Bulletin 87:546–563.

Den Uyl, Roger, C. E. Choenni, and Frank Bovenkerk 1986 ‘‘Mag Het Ook Een Buitenlander Wezen? Discriminatie Bij Uitzendburo’s.’’ Utrecht, The Netherlands: National Bureau against Racism.

Dovidio, John F., Kerry Kawakami, Craig Johnson, Brenda Johnson, and Adaiah Howard 1997 ‘‘On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Processes.’’

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:510–540.

Dovidio, John F., Jeffrey Mann, and Samuel L. Gaertner 1989 ‘‘Resistance to Affirmative Action: The Implications of Aversive Racism.’’ In Faye J. Crosby and Fletcher A. Blanchard, eds., Affirmative Action in Perspective. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Esses, Victoria M., Geoffrey Haddock, and Mark P. Zanna 1993 In Diane M. Mackie and David L. Hamilton, eds., Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception. San Diego, Calif.: Academic.

Feagin, Joe R. 1975 Subordinating the Poor. Englewood

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

——— 1991 ‘‘The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places.’’ American Sociological Review 56:101–116.

Fiske, Susan T. 1987 ‘‘On the Road: Comment on the Cognitive Stereotyping Literature in Pettigrew and Martin.’’ Journal of Social Issues 43:113–118.

——— 1998 ‘‘Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination. In Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey, eds., The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gaertner, Samuel L. 1976 ‘‘Nonreactive Measures in Racial Attitude Research: A Focus on ‘Liberals.’’’ In Phyllis A. Katz, ed., Toward the Elimination of Racism. New York: Pergamon.

———, and John F. Dovidio 1986 ‘‘The Aversive Form of Racism.’’ In John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, eds., Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. Orlando, Fla.: Academic.

Hamilton, David A., and Tina K. Trolier 1986 ‘‘Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive Approach.’’ In Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism. New York: Plenum.

Hamilton, David L. 1997 ‘‘A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping.’’ In Leonard Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 12. New York: Academic.

Harding, John, Harold Proshansky, Bernard Kutner, and Isador Chein 1969 ‘‘Prejudice and Intergroup Relations.’’ In Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, Volume V, 2nd ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Heider, Fritz 1958 The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: John Wiley.

Huber, Joan, and William H. Form 1973 Income and Ideology. New York: Free Press.

Jackman, Mary R. 1994 The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations. Los Angeles, Calif.: University of California Press.

———, and Michael J. Muha 1984 ‘‘Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement?’’ American Sociological Review 49:751–769.

Jaynes, David Gerald, and Robin M. Williams, Jr. 1989 A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Katz, Irwin, Joyce Wackenhut, and R. Glen Hass 1986 ‘‘Racial Ambivalence, Value Duality, and Behavior.’’ In John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, eds.,

Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. Orlando, Fla.: Academic.

Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders 1996 Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Klineberg, Otto 1972 ‘‘Prejudice. The Concept.’’ In David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, reprint ed. New York: Macmillan Free Press.

Klink, Andreas, and Ulrich Wagner 1999 ‘‘Discrimination against Ethnic Minorities in Germany: Going Back to the Field.’’ Journal of Applied Social Psychology

29:402–423.

Kluegel, James R. 1985 ‘‘If There Isn’t a Problem, You Don’t Need a Solution.’’ American Behavioral Scientist

28:761–784.

———, and Eliot R. Smith 1982 ‘‘Whites’ Beliefs about Blacks’ Opportunity.’’ American Sociological Review

47:518–532.

———1983 ‘‘Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites’ Views.’’ Social Forces 61:797–824.

———1986 Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ Views of What Is and What Ought to Be. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Kovel, Joel 1970 White Racism: A Psychohistory. New

York: Pantheon.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and William Schneider 1978 ‘‘The Bakke Case: How Would It Be Decided at the Bar of Public Opinion?’’ Public Opinion 1:38–44.

McConahay, John B. 1986 ‘‘Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale.’’ In John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, eds., Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press.

Mackie, Diane M., and David L. Hamilton (eds.) 1993

Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception. San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press.

Meertens, Roel W., and Thomas F. Pettigrew 1997 ‘‘Is Subtle Prejudice Really Prejudice?’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 6:54–71.

Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant 1986 Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s to the 1980s. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1979a ‘‘The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice.’’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 5:461–476.

———1979b ‘‘Racial Change and Social Policy.’’ Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

441:114–131.

———1989 ‘‘The Nature of Modern Racism.’’ Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale 2:291–305.

———1997 ‘‘The Affective Component of Prejudice: Results from Western Europe.’’ In Steven A. Tuch and Jack K. Martin, eds., Racial Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

———1998 ‘‘Intergroup Contact Theory.’’ Annual Review of Psychology 49:65–85.

———, and Roel W. Meertens 1995 ‘‘Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe.’’ European Journal of Social Psychology 25:57–75.

Rothbart, Myron, and Oliver P. John 1985 ‘‘Social Categorization and Behavioral Episodes: A Cognitive Analysis of the Effects of Intergroup Contact.’’ Journal of Social Issues 41:81–104.

Ryan, William 1971 Blaming the Victim. New York: Vintage.

Schofield, Janet Ward 1986 ‘‘Causes and Consequences of the Colorblind Perspective.’’ In John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, eds., Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism. Orlando, Fla.: Academic.

Schuman, Howard, and Michael P. Johnson 1976 ‘‘Attitudes and Behavior.’’ Annual Review of Sociology

2:161–207.

Schuman, Howard, Charlotte Steeh, Lawrence Bobo, and Maria Krysan 1997 Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Sears, David O. 1988 ‘‘Symbolic Racism.’’ In Phyllis A. Katz and Dalmas A. Taylor, eds., Eliminating Racism. New York: Plenum Press.

Sissons, Mary 1981 ‘‘Race, Sex and Helping Behavior.’’

British Journal of Social Psychology 20:285–292.

Smith, Eliot R. 1993 ‘‘Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice.’’ In Diane M. Mackie and David L. Hamilton, eds.,

Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception. San Diego, Calif: Academic.

Smith, Thomas W., and Paul B. Sheatsley 1984 ‘‘American Attitudes toward Race Relations.’’ Public Opinion 6:14–15, 50–53.

Sniderman, Paul M., Thomas Piazza, Philip E. Tetlock, and Ann Kendrick 1991 ‘‘The New Racism.’’ American Journal of Political Science 35:423–447.

Stangor, Charles, Sullivan, Linda A., and Thomas E. Ford 1991 ‘‘Affective and Cognitive Determinants of Prejudice.’’ Social Cognition 9:359–380.

Steeh, Charlotte, and Maria Krysan 1996 ‘‘The Polls— Trends: Affirmative Action and the Public, 1970– 1995.’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 60:128–158.

Tajfel, Henri 1969 ‘‘Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice.’’

Journal of Social Issues 4:79–97.

Webb, Eugene J. 1981 Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Wellman, David T. 1993 Portraits of White Racism, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weitz, Shirley 1972 ‘‘Attitude, Voice, and Behavior: A Repressed Affect Model of Interracial Interaction.’’

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32:857–864.

Wilder, David A. 1978 ‘‘Reduction of Intergroup Discrimination Through Individuation of the OutGroup.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

36:1361–1374.

——— 1984 ‘‘Intergroup Contact: The Typical Member and the Exception to the Rule.’’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 20:177–194.

Word, Carl O., Mark P. Zanna, and Joel Cooper 1974 ‘‘The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction.’’ Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 10:109–120.

Zanna, Mark P. 1994 ‘‘On the Nature of Prejudice.’’

Canadian Psychology 31:11–23.

MARYLEE C. TAYLOR

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW

PROBABILITY THEORY

Sociologists, as much as researchers in any field perhaps, use a variety of approaches in the investigation of their subject matter. Quite successful and important are the historical and exegetical approaches and those in the traditions of anthropology and philosophy. Also of great importance are the systematic approaches that use mathematical models. Here the social investigator proposes a model, a mathematical depiction of social phenomena. A successful mathematical model can be very powerful, providing not only confidence in the theory from which the model was derived, giving us an explanation of the phenomena, but producing as well a method for predicting, giving us a practical means for controlling or affecting the social phenomena.

The social mathematical model is first of all a description of the relationship of the properties of social objects—groups, states, institutions, organizations, even people. If the model is derived from a theory, or if it contains features implied by a theory, and if the model fits data (i.e., has been found to satisfy some criterion of performance), the model can in addition be regarded as evidence to support that theory. In this case we can think of