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and his knowledge are, for the most part, embedded in the corporate bureaucracy’’ (Cohen and Zysman 1987, p. 260). Also, critics point out that while there may be more scientists, more persons with advanced education, and more money spent on research and development, these may be only tenuously related to increases in the amount and effective use of theoretical knowledge (Kumar 1978).

Critics also question the attention given by postindustrial theorists to the service sector, and to white-collar and professional work. As with theoretical knowledge, critics agree the service sector has grown, yet question the focus of postindustrial theorists. Critics remind us that the service sector has always been a major segment of preindustrial and industrial society (Hartwell 1973), that most service employment is in low-skilled, low-paid work, and that increases in white-collar and professional employment are a consequence of dynamics embedded in industrial society. Relatedly, most of the increases in white-collar and professional employment are in clerical positions and jobs like teaching and nursing, jobs that carry less autonomy and income than traditional professional occupations. Perhaps most important, critics argue that a focus on the service sector fails to adequately acknowledge the key role that manufacturing would play in a postindustrial economy, including the dependence of the service sector on a dynamic manufacturing sector (Cohen and Zysman 1987).

One response to these and other criticisms (e.g., see Ritzer 1989; Frankel 1987) would be to point out that postindustrial theory often acknowledged points made by critics, such as the fact that the political order could check trends in the economy; that the bulk of services are in low-skilled, lowpaid labor; and that a sophisticated and dynamic manufacturing sector is important for an economy as large as that of the United States. Postindustrial theory merely chose to focus on other developments that may hold insights into the future of advanced industrial society. A related response to criticisms is to point out that critics have frequently acknowledged the validity of postindustrial claims of an increasing role for formal and theoretical knowledge, the increasing importance of technical developments in information processing, and the rise of a service sector with a good number of white-collar and professional workers. The points of contention between postindustrial theory and

its critics appear to center on the general portrait of society provided by postindustrial theorists: Is this society best seen as a new type of society, or as a logical extension of advancing industrialization (Kumar 1978; 1988; 1995; Ritzer 1989; Giddens 1990)? Also, what are the implications of this image of society, not only for describing the present and future, but for shaping both?

POSTMODERN SOCIETY

Recent discussions of the character and future of advanced industrial societies have been framed within the concept of postmodern society. Although the variety of work dealing with postmodern society makes a clear definition difficult (Smart 1990; Kumar 1995), it seems reasonable to say postmodern society differs from postindustrial society in having the more nebulous reference point of a type of society coming after ‘‘modern’’ society. Whereas studies of postindustrial society understandably give substantial attention to technical and economic factors, studies of postmodern society broaden the focus to bring political and especially cultural phenomenon more to the center of analysis (Kumar 1995). This shift in focus helps explain why analyses of the cultural dynamics of postindustrial society are frequently considered in terms of the dynamics of postmodern society (e.g., Baudrillard 1983), and why studies of the economic characteristics of postmodern society look very much like studies of postindustrialism (e.g., Clegg 1990). For many authors, postmodernism is the culture of a postindustrial society (e.g., Lyotard 1984; Lash 1990; Jameson 1992; Mandel 1978).

Analyses of postmodern society may differ from postindustrial analyses not only in substantive focus, but also in basic presuppositions regarding the nature of social reality. While studies of postmodern society can reflect a standard social science framework, what has come to be called postmodern theory often includes a critique of science that undermines traditional social scientific inquiry (Turner 1998; Bogard 1990). Although the central tenants of postmodern theory are still unclear (Smart 1990; Ritzer 1997; Rosenau 1992), it is possible to note some major themes. Reflecting the influence of literary criticism, postmodern theory often views ‘‘social and cultural reality, and

the social sciences themselves [as] linguistic constructions’’ (Brown 1990, p. 188). Authoritative images of what is real are seen to emerge through rhetorical processes in which ‘‘people establish repertoires of categories by which certain aspects of what is to be the case are fixed, focused, or forbidden’’ (Brown 1990, p. 191). Postmodern theory critiques the notion that signs and symbols adequately capture reality, and posits that signs and symbols are the only reality we truly know (Brown 1987). The reality of the social world described by social scientists is viewed as inseparable from the discourse through which social scientists come to signify some descriptions of the world as more legitimate than others (Lemert 1990). The traditional hierarchy in which reality occupies a privileged status separate from the symbols used to describe it is broken down, or deconstructed. The deconstruction project of postmodern theory not only critiques the separation of reality from symbols describing it, but also critiques other hierarchies, such as those separating expert knowledge from common knowledge, and high culture from low. The project even moves to deconstruct the very possibility of a generalizing social science, and the idea of a social world (Foucault 1980; Baudrillard 1983). In such bold forms a postmodern sociology becomes a contradiction in terms, undermining its own basis for existence (J. H. Turner 1998; B. Turner 1990; Smart 1990; Bauman 1988). However, although a postmodern sociology may be difficult to establish, a sociology of postmodernism that examines postmodern society, and draws from postmodern theory, is possible.

Attempts to characterize postmodern society reflect the contributions of postmodern theory, as well as more conventional sociological approaches. From postmodern theory comes a view of postmodern society as a technologically sophisticated high-speed society, with access to vast amounts of information, and fascinated by consumer goods and media images. Mass consumption of goods and information is seen as facilitating a breakdown of hierarchies of taste, and development of an explicit populism. Technology and speed blur lines separating reality from simulation, as television, videos, movies, advertising, and computer models provide simulations of reality more real than real. People may realize this hyperreality is simulation, yet be fascinated by it, and come to

make it part of their lives, thus transforming much of reality into simulation (Baudrillard 1983). Under such conditions history comes to have little meaning, and the fast-paced present becomes increasingly important. People may attempt to come to grips with such a world, but the world comes to undermine major assumptions, or grand narratives, of rationality and progress, thus generating a sense of exhaustion (Lyotard 1984). An acute sense of self-consciousness and unease may develop, as ‘‘the current age stumbles upon the very transvaluation of Western values and vocabularies that Nietche urged more than a century ago’’ (Baker 1990, p. 232).

Views of postmodern society from more conventional social science frameworks echo some of these themes. For example, both Daniel Bell (1976) and Christopher Lasch (1979) point to the development of cultural themes in postindustrial society emphasizing consumption and personal gratification at the expense of themes emphasizing selfrestraint, work, commitment, and a sense of historical connection and continuity. In a Marxist analysis, Fredric Jameson (1984) points to the loss of a sense of historical connection in the consum- er-oriented world of late capitalism.

One productive approach to postmodern society starts from the assumption that a central process defining modern society is differentiation. Thus, the type of society coming after modern society is viewed as reversing this process. The process of de-differentiation is illustrated in the cultural arena in the conflation of high and popular culture noted above, as well as the general deconstruction project of postmodernist theory (see also Lash 1988). Within the economic arena de-differentiation appears in the reversal of the processes of bureaucratization and the division of labor characteristic of the assembly line (Clegg 1990). Such trends have been viewed as part of the changing character of production in the world economy since 1960, and have been examined under such terms as the second industrial divide (Piore and Sable 1984), or the emergence of disorganized capitalism (Lash and Urry 1987). The changes frequently include a shift to smaller organizations or subunits of organizations, a less formalized and more flexible division of labor, increased variation in the character of products, more decentralized managerial structures, and the use of computers. Such organizations are engaged

in services, information processing, or production using computer controlled flexible production techniques (Burris 1989; Heyderbrand 1989; Clegg 1990). The postbureaucratic character of these organizations is made possible by computers that do routine tasks, as well as by the need to respond flexibly to diverse clientele and markets, and the sophisticated capabilities of employees that operate complex manufacturing equipment and provide professional services.

Although postmodern production techniques and organizations are becoming more prominent and important in advanced industrial societies, they may express themselves in different ways and do not eclipse other forms of production and organization. Low-skilled tasks in manufacturing and services will likely compose a substantial segment of the workforce far into the future, creating the possibility of increased variation in skill and income in postmodern society. Also, postmodern organizations can vary substantially among themselves. For example, Clegg (1990) argues that Japan and Sweden stand as alternative expressions of postmodernist futures. Sweden provides the more optimistic democratic scenario with fairly broad representational rights of workers in organizations. Japan represents a less optimistic view with an enclave of privileged workers formed on exclusive principles of social identity, such as gender, ethnicity, and age.

RADICALLY MODERN SOCIETY

Much as critics of the concept of postindustrial society pointed out that postindustrial trends were best seen as the logical extension of major characteristics of industrial society, so Anthony Giddens (1990) has questioned the notion that postmodern trends actually represent a break with modern society. Giddens acknowledges current trends of complexity and widespread change accompanied by lack of a clear sense of progress, and would also likely admit to trends of de-differentiation in some organizations. However, Giddens does not see this as constituting postmodernity. Instead he refers to such trends as characterizing radically modern societies, for these societies represent the logical extension of three essential characteristics of modernity. The first characteristic is an increase in complexity, as the major processes of industrialization, class formation, and rationalization proceed

apace and shape one another. The second key element of modernity is the separation of much of what humans experience as social reality from concrete instances of time and space. Thus, money represents an element of social reality that designates a mechanism of exchange not bound to any specific instance of exchange. Even more abstractly, experts and expert systems represent specialized knowledge that may be called upon for a variety of purposes at a number of times and places. Science is one of the clearer expressions of such knowledge, with its esoteric and changing images of the character of the natural and physical universe. As societies become more modern, humans are viewed as increasingly experiencing the world through such abstract, or ‘‘disembedded,’’ categories as money, expertise, and science. Realization of the disembedded nature of social life helps facilitate development of the third characteristic of modernity, its reflexivity. As noted earlier, reflexivity refers to the fact that efforts and information used to understand social reality become part of reality, and thus help shape the present and the future. According to Giddens, awareness of reflexivity is not confined to social scientists, but is embedded in the nature of modernity. Modern societies generate theories of what they are, which become important constitutive elements that shape society, including the future character of theories. All three of the characteristics of modernity find expression in each of four interrelated institutional complexes: capitalism, the nation-state, the military, and industrialization. Thus, radically modern societies are those in which major institutions are highly complex, abstract or disembedded, and reflexive. Such societies will be more difficult for individuals to concretely understand; will require substantial amounts of ‘‘trust’’ in abstract and expert systems; and will generate high levels of self-consciousness, as persons seek to use personal resources to more reflexively construct personal identity and meaning. Thus, radically modern societies may produce the unease and sense of powerlessness that some postmodern theorists see in postmodern societies. By avoiding the concept of postmodern society, Giddens is able to illustrate how current trends are part of the logic of modernity, and is able to provide a view of the future more optimistic than the view of some postmodern theorists by underscoring the reflexive and transformative power of ideas and action.

POSTMODERN SOCIETY AND THE

WORLD SYSTEM

Most analyses of postindustrial, postmodern, and radically modern societies carry with them a view of societal change occurring within an increasingly interconnected world system. Giddens is quite explicit in this regard, pointing out how the complexity, abstractness, and reflexive character of modernity moves beyond the nation-state to become a world-level phenomenon (1990). This is most clearly expressed in the development of a world capitalist system, a nation-state system, a world military order, and an international division of labor. Although Giddens does not systematically consider the dynamics of these aspects of the world system in discussing radical modernity, his conceptualization is a useful reminder of the possible utility of considering multiple dimensions of the world system in efforts to understand postmodern societies. As the review of postindustrial and postmodern literature suggested, most analyses consider the role of the world system in terms of economic exchanges (Bell 1989), new technologies, and new modes of economic organization (Piore and Sable 1984; Lash and Urry 1987; Clegg 1990).

Recently, analysts have drawn increasing attention to cultural dimensions of the world system (e.g., Featherstone 1990; Boli and Thomas 1997), pointing out how themes associated with modern, postmodern, and postindustrial society have become elements of an emerging world culture (Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer 1991; Smith 1990; Robertson 1989, 1990). Giddens touched on these themes when he noted how the abstract and reflexive character of modernity has become a global phenomenon, making theories of modernity part of contemporary culture. Meyer (1980, 1991) and others (Meyer et al. 1997) also note the role that ideologies of modernity and postindustrialism may play in the contemporary world, pointing out how rationalized conceptions of modern society, including social scientific discourse, have become part of a contemporary world cultural framework. For example, modern images of society that view economic development, national integration, and personal and societal progress as the product of individuals with specialized knowledge are said to have become a world-level assumption, and generated expansion of educational enrollments between 1950 and 1970 (Meyer et al. 1977; Boli and

Ramirez 1986; Fiala and Lanford 1987). Relatedly, postindustrial images of the role of specialized knowledge in society are viewed as an important factor affecting the worldwide expansion of higher education and professional employment in the post–World War II era (Meyer and Hannan 1979). Such images may account for part of the increase from 3.7 percent to 9.2 percent between 1960 and 1990 in the percentage of the labor force employed in professional occupations among twentytwo developing countries, a significant increase considering the substantial population and laborforce growth during this period. This contrasts with the increase from 6.1 percent to 18.5 percent for the seventeen developed countries reported earlier, and with the increase from 10.8 percent to 16.5 percent for the United States. While economic growth may account for some of these increases in professional employment, the substantial expansion for developing countries, especially compared to the United States, indicates other variables likely play a role. It seems plausible that postindustrial images regarding the importance of specialized knowledge and personnel may have an effect.

CONCLUSION

Efforts to understand the character and future of advanced industrial societies in the latter half of the twentieth century have been done under the rubric of at least three major concepts. The concept of postindustrial society focused attention on social structural or economic dimensions of society, especially the changing character of technology, knowledge, occupations, and the market. The concept of postmodern society continued to bring attention to structural and economic aspects of society, yet gave increased attention to political, cultural, and psychological dimensions, at times with an explicit critique of standard social science methodology. The concept of radically modern society underscored the links between contemporary changes and the basic dynamics of modernity, while introducing the useful idea that radically modern societies are characterized by high levels of abstractness and reflexivity. Each of the three concepts acknowledges that changes are occurring within an increasingly interconnected world system.

The current review clearly illustrates the reflexive character of much social science. In

postindustrial theory this was largely a recognition that formal scientific knowledge may shape the future. In postmodern theory, and especially in radically modern theory, this reflexivity also became part of the culture itself, affecting the consciousness of much of the population. This creates a vastly more complex image of society, with a diverse array of possible futures, and may account for the unease postmodern theory sees as characterizing postmodern society.

While work on postmodern and radically modern society offers insightful ideas, most empirical research has been done on postindustrial society, and economic aspects of postmodern society. Future studies should attempt to examine some of the major elements of postmodern and radically modern approaches, as well as continue to clarify areas of ambiguity within postindustrial theory. For example, within the postindustrial framework, attention should be given to understanding the influence of various segments of a knowledge class on specific institutions in society, and to trying to explain national variation in the expansion of various types of service employment.

Within the postmodernist framework, it would be informative to assess claims of pessimism, selfconsciousness, and declines of grand narratives, noting their variation across social groups and societies. Examination of variation across time and space in the way individuals, communities, and societies experience exposure to media might help clarify the provocative hypothesis of the increasing salience of simulation in social life. Efforts to rethink extant research in terms of the simulation hypothesis could also prove informative.

Drawing from the view of radically modern societies, it would be useful to examine the idea that modern cultures increasingly incorporate reflexive elements. Analysis of the changing role of evaluation studies, news presentations and commentaries, and economic projections and predictions could help clarify the developing reflexive character of human societies.

Last, to assess hypotheses regarding the effects of world cultural themes, research could examine the effects of an ideology of specialized knowledge and expertise on expansion of professional employment. The data presented above suggest the plausibility of such an effect, yet do not offer firm support.

Issues such as those above are but a few of the avenues of research that may help provide a clearer image of the character and future of advanced industrial societies. In posing the issues, and in providing answers, social science will likely help shape the future it describes.

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ROBERT FIALA

POSTMODERNISM

In 1959, C. Wright Mills speculated that ‘‘the Modern Age is being succeeded by a post-modern period’’ in which assumptions about the coherence of the Enlightenment values of scientific rationality and political freedom were being challenged (1959, p. 166). Critical theorists had earlier speculated about how the revolutionary potential

of the urban laboring classes of the nineteenth century was co-opted by the shift to a postindustrial twentieth-century society, a society characterized by mass consumerism and war economies. The characteristics of postindustrial societies were explored more recently in Daniel Bell’s analysis of contemporary capitalism (1976). In the modern information societies, Bell argues that the class forces that drove nineteenth-century social change have been replaced by new processes. Under welfare capitalist states, scientists, technicians, managers, and bureaucrats formulate social tensions as administrative and technical issues based on political consensus. For Bell, postindustrial societies with their information bases hold the key to social harmony and the end of misery.

Alain Touraine’s view (1984) is different. He also stresses how class antagonism has changed under welfare capitalism, but for Touraine the information managers, guided by technological thinking, tend to ‘‘steer the entire social order toward the perfectly programmed society, the ultimate technocratic prison’’ (Baum 1990, p. 5). Touraine also writes that the categories of basic sociological analysis have become out of touch with changes in contemporary societies. In particular, he rejects the modernist supposition of evolutionary progress over time, culminating in what he calls ‘‘the impoverishing homogeneity of modern civilization’’ (Touraine 1984, p. 38), the sociologist’s conception of the national states as units of analysis, and the gradual expunging of the cultural diversity of traditional societies. The collapse of modernism arises from a failure of sociology to keep abreast of the developing autonomy of cultural products, the globalization of capital, and the rise of new forms of social control and of public resistance to them. In this analysis, ‘‘the crisis of modernity . . . is not all-encompassing . . .

the crisis in modernity is not considered to be total or terminal but limited in scope, if deep’’ (Smart 1990, p. 408). Though Bell and Touraine have been associated with critiques of postindustrial societies, the meaning of ‘‘postmodernism’’ has become far more radical, and draws on earlier sources.

De Saussure’s ‘‘structural’’ theory of linguistics (1959) distinguished the ‘‘sign’’ from the ‘‘signified’’ and developed a science based on the discovery that symbolic systems might have formal properties that were unrelated to the meanings of

the objects they signified but that might hold across different systems of symbols. The system for describing, for example, the animal kingdom and the protocols for siting teepees might reflect the same logic—without any inherent equivalence to the things they described or organized (Giddens 1987). ‘‘Poststructuralism’’ deepened this disinterest in the signified objects by dismissing any link binding words/symbols to things. Things were only the hypostatizations of language. All analysis was ‘‘deconstruction,’’ or unmasking of phenomena in terms of their underlying rhetorical conventions. For poststructuralists, texts only pointed to other texts. The world was viewed as an intertwining of systems of representation without any derivation from or basis within ‘‘terra firma.’’ Everything became text—including violent speech and violent symbolic acts such as incest, war, or spousal abuse.

The postmodern twist is the application of the linguistic implications of poststructuralism to the three core principles connecting contemporary civilizations with the project of the Enlightenment: scientific knowledge (Truth), aesthetics (Beauty), and morality (the Good). The Enlightenment pro- ject—‘‘modernism’’—refers to the rise of the Age of Reason. It was characterized by the gradual shift away from religious sensibilities and to scientific objectivity, the rational exploitation of nature for human needs, the perspectival representation of nature in art and humanistic truth in fiction, and the struggle for a humane society. Modernism was realist in its epistemology and progressive in its politics. Truth could be attained—particularly with scientific advances. Beauty could be distinguished from trash. Humanism could nurture moral conduct and decent conditions of life. And history was purposive and progressive.

Postmodernism is the sensibility that arises when the credibility of these ‘‘master narratives’’ is questioned. The postmodern period, as described by Lyotard (1984) and Baudrillard (1983), is the one we now confront. Though it is often dated as a creature of the post–World War II period, it is thought only to have become generalized with mass consumerism in the age of electronics and to have been initiated by dramatic changes in contemporary capitalism. Capitalism has ushered in global communication and exchange, and has created a self-sustaining cybernetic system that almost

completely transcends the ability of individual governments to control their directions and objectives. As a result, postmodernity is sometimes referred to as posthistorical society in the sense that the mission or sense of purpose that guided nation-states in the past through events such as the French Revolution has been overtaken by global consumerism. The view of history as a struggle for the gradual liberation of humanity and progressive evolution of more humane societies is dismissed by Lyotard as mythic. In addition, the transcendence of communities by electronic representations makes the idea of ‘‘the social’’ purely illusory (Bogard 1990). The objectivity of societies, nation-states, communities, and history is viewed only as ‘‘narratives’’ or ‘‘simulacra’’ (Baudrillard 1983). Referents disappear in favor of a world of simulations, models, performatives, and codes— in short, ‘‘information’’ (broadly conceived), which becomes the predominant phenomenon of exchange among the masses through the mass media.

One of the important theoretical aspects of the postmodernist position is its explicit rejection of Marxism in general and Habermas’ theorizing about creating a rational society through communicative competence. Where Habermas (1973, p. 105) speculates that a rational community might be able to ‘‘arrive at the conviction that in the given circumstances the proposed norms are ‘right,’’’ Lyotard rejects the myth of reason behind the Habermasian project. The project implies that there is a correct moral and scientific standard to which communities ought to aspire. Enforcement of such standards valorize conformity and, as witnessed in the fascist European states in the 1920s and 1930s, promote terrorism to extract it. This introduces a tension within postmodernism that has not been worked through (Frank 1990). On the positive side, the supposition of ‘‘multivocality’’ in scientific and moral discourse promotes the ‘‘excavation’’ of minority voices and minority experiences which have been occluded in ‘‘master’’ modernist ways of thinking. Every point of view can be heard, none can be privileged. On the other side, postmodernism seems ill equipped to distinguish between any particular moral or objective position and any other, including the fascist discourse that is associated with modernism. Choosing between Holocaust history and Holocaust denial would seem in principle to be a matter of rhetorical preference—which is clearly nihilistic.

When we move away from epistemology to postmodernity’s impact on art and architecture, the situation is different. Postmodernism celebrates a rejection of hegemonic traditions and styles by mixing elements from competing schools and by bringing the rim of representation into focus as an organic element of the depiction. Novels exploit the discontinuities in perspective and the fragmentations in contemporary society. In architecture, postmodernism represents a repudiation of high-density (‘‘efficient’’) functionality based on centralized city planning with an emphasis on no-frill construction. Decentralized planning emphasizes collage and eclecticism and the development of spaces to heighten aesthetic possibilities (Harvey 1989). The globalization of experience encourages such exchanges and experimentation. However, the replacement of ‘‘efficient’’ spaces like public housing, with their brutalizing side effects, with more particularistic designs is part of the emancipatory interest of modernity— so that at least here, postmodernity is still part and parcel of the Enlightenment. This raises three questions.

First, to what extent has the case been made that the changes in capitalism during the past two decades have been so profound as to represent a destruction of modernist society and a disappearance of history and ‘‘the social’’ (i.e., real face-to- face community)? Some critics dispute the claim (Baum 1990); others point out that Baudrillard’s evidence is unconvincing since his own postmodern manner of exposition is self-consciously rhetorical, inflationary, and, consistent with the idiom, only one possible reading of recent history (Smart 1990). Second, if we have no careful (i.e., modernist) analysis of the factors that have contributed to the demise of our confidence in the ‘‘master narratives’’ of modernism, would it not seem to be impossible to discern which ones have been shaken, and how seriously our confidence in them has been eroded? Skepticism is insufficient. Finally, under these circumstances, is it not predictable that there is no consensus about the meaning of postmodernism? Arguably this dissensus is inherent in the perspective. For Baudrillard (1983), postmodernism spells the end of sociology (and other modernist subjects); for Bauman (1988), it is simply a new topic—a sociology of postmodernism, but not a postmodern sociology. For Brown (1990), it is an opportunity to rethink the continuing

relevance of the role of rhetoric in politics and science in order to employ knowledge in guiding human conduct. Under these circumstances, the proclamation of the death of modernism would seem premature.

Over the past decade two debates have emerged which raise questions about the postmodern project and which deal respectively with the issues of

(1) epistemology, or the postmodern struggle with truth and the special standing of the natural sciences, and (2) of morality and the struggle to define and achieve the ‘‘good society’’ within democratic politics.

The first issue is raised by the famous hoax perpetrated by Alan Sokal, professor of physics at New York University, a left-leaning radical who taught math in Nicaragua under the rule of the Sandanistas. His ‘‘transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity’’ was a spoof of the pretentious claims about science running through the leading figures of the French intellectual establishment— Derrida, Lacan, and Lyotard—spiked, according to Sokal, with the usual nonsensical and impenetrable jargon and buzzwords (Sokal 1996b). The parody was published in a special issue of Social Text designed by the editors to rebuke the criticisms of their antiscientific agenda by leading scientists. Sokal published an exposé at the same time in Lingua Franca (1996a). The hoax ignited a storm of criticism on both sides which some have referred to as ‘‘the science wars’’ (Natoli 1997, pp. 115 ff.; Kingwell 1999). The hoax continues to provoke debate today (see http://www.physics.nyu.edu/ faculty/sokal/index.html). Although Sokal abused the good faith of the editors of a journal in a humanities discipline, he justified his behavior by reference to the naïveté of those editors, whose credentials could scarely permit them to draw the conclusions about the purely rhetorical foundations of science or to discredit centuries of scientific progress. Yet in neither side was the ‘‘demonstration’’ definitive. The validity of the scientific method is neither established by the hoax, nor rubbished by what Richard Dawkins writing in Nature dubbed ‘‘the vacuous rhetoric of montebanks and charlatans’’ on the Left Bank (1988, p. 141). Nor is it undermined on this side of the Atlantic by Steven Seidman’s claims in Contested Knowledge that the scientific community in eighteenth-cen- tury Europe prevailed over aristocracy and the

Church because it provided the forces of liberalism with a convenient but essentially vacuous cudgel with which to rout the older order: ‘‘Is the claim that only science ensures true knowledge . . . not merely another ruse on the part of a rising social elite wishing to legitimate their own aspirations for privilege? . . . [S]cience, just like religion, rests upon a series of assumptions that cannot be scientifically proven . . . Enlightenment science is as weak a guarantor of truth as religion.’’ (1994, p. 24). Science for Seidman and the other postmodernists is just faith in a secular vein without any special epistemological leverage. The proponents of the Enlightenment were simply replacing priests with scientists, and religion with another form of superstition. Sokal and Bricmont’s Fashionable Nonsense (1998) calls the postmodernists’ bluff on such charges. At this point, it is premature to draw conclusions about the future of this controversy. Suffice it to say for the time being that poetry and physics should be cataloged separately.

On the issue of morality and everyday politics, John O’Neill’s The Poverty of Posmodernism takes a similarly critical view of ‘‘the academic trendiness’’ of advocates of cynicism and fragmentation who have forsaken humanism and the critique of social injustice as part of the postmodern turn. ‘‘Today we are told to jettison the old-fashioned belief in unique values . . . we are wholly ruled by prejudice and politics . . . we are asked to believe that human beings are now so speciated by gender and race— though we are silent about class—that there can be no universal knowledge, politics, or morality.’’ As O’Neill stresses, ‘‘these ideas have not grown up among the masses who have sickened of the injustices and exploitation that grinds their life . . . it is not these people who have abandoned idealism, universalism, truth and justice. It is those who already enjoy these things who have denounced them on behalf of the others’’ (1995, p. 1)—the new ‘‘illiterati’’ of the simulacrum, the Disney World theorists and the esthetes of the radically chic. ‘‘Too much of the world still starves, dies young and is wasted by systematic greed and evil for anyone to write the obituaries of philosophy, ideology and humanism’’ (p. 196). O’Neill argues that there are good philosophical foundations in the phenomenology of everyday life, the transcendental instinct of reason to fasten on the contradictions of existence, and commonsense scepticism

to keep alive the distinction between truth and falsity, freedom and slavery, and justice and injustice. The idea that political discourse has been reduced to mere perspective, that there is nothing outside language or that there is no ‘‘extratextuality’’ deny the vision of history and community, and exhaust culture with cultural industry, communication with fashion. ‘‘The claim that there are no longer any grand stories capable of under-writing common sense . . . gives comfort only to those who lack community at any level of society other than intellectual fashion’’ (p. 198). O’Neill’s own inspiration for criticizing the antirationalism of postmodernism is founded on what he describes as the tension between language and vision, between elites and masses, between reality and possibility. The static linguisticality of postmodernism is a trap, an illusion. The current celebration of relativism by what used to be the progressive left is not only ill founded but politically nihilistic. It valorizes only minoritarianism while leaving unexamined the consequences of globalization and the dismantling of the welfare state by the political right. That state, with all its blemishes, has been an achievement in which civic democracy took root, in which politics was driven in part for reasons other than naked self-interest. In his vision, O’Neill says that postmodernism undermines our sense of cultural debt to the past and removes the duty which each generation has to pass on what it has learned to the future. ‘‘Those of us who own knowledge, who enjoy literacy, health, self-respect and social status have chosen to rage against our own gifts rather than to fight for their enlargement in the general public. We have chosen to invalidate our science, to psychiatrize our arts, to vulgarize our culture, to make it unusable and undesirable by those who have yet to know it. We honour no legacy. We receive no gifts. We hand on nothing’’ (1995, p. 2). Yet if O’Neill’s critique of antirationalism is sound, all this changes and his self-flagellation is premature.

The moral and epistemological concerns of O’Neill and Sokal are quite different from the critiques of commodity esthetics in George Ritzer’s

The McDonaldization of Society, which provides a useful point of comparison. Following Weber’s insight about the intrusiveness of rationalization, Ritzer shows how the McDonald fast-food franchise led to a widespread adoption of commodity