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self-actualization is a motive that encourages the person to maximize capabilities and talents. It is hypothesized that growth motivation is related to positive mental health. Rather than meeting basic human needs, self-actualization implies movement toward higher goals. This dimension of positive mental health also implies an investment in liv- ing—a concern with other people and one’s environment, rather than a primary focus on satisfying one’s own needs.

3.The person with positive mental health has a balance of psychic forces, a unified outlook on life, and resistance to stress. Psychoanalysts view integration as the balance of the id, the ego, and the superego. This balance is viewed as changeable, with flexibility as the desired end result. Positive mental health refers to integration at the cognitive level, which implies a unifying philosophy of life that shapes feelings and behaviors. Finally, resistance to stress characterizes the integrated person. The mentally healthy person can adapt to stress without deteriorating. Everyone experiences anxiety when encountering a stressful situation. A mentally healthy response to anxiety and stress suggests some tolerance of tension, ambiguity, and frustration.

4.Autonomy refers to self-determination and independence in decision making. The concept suggests that the person with positive mental health is self-directed and self-controlled. The individual acts independently of the outside world; behavior is not dictated by environmental circumstances.

Jahoda points out that some authors have a different interpretation of autonomy. Autonomy may be defined as having freedom of choice about conforming to societal norms. This perspective implies that the person is not independent of the environment, but does have free choice to decide how to respond to societal demands.

5. ‘‘As a rule, the perception of reality is called mentally healthy when what the individual sees corresponds to what is actually there’’ (Jahoda 1958, p. 49). Mentally healthy reality perception includes perception free from need distortion. A mentally healthy person views the world without distortions, fitting the perception to objective cues that are present, and does not reject evidence because it does not fit his or her wishes or needs.

Jahoda argues that this dimension of positive mental health implies the ability to perceive others in an empathetic manner. This social sensitivity enables a healthy person to put himself or herself in another person’s place and anticipate that person’s behavior in a given social situation.

6. Mastery of the environment refers to achieving success in some social roles and appropriate function in those roles. Positive mental health also includes the ability to have positive affective interpersonal relations. The social roles involved in environmental mastery may include sexual partner, parent, and worker. Environmental mastery suggests the ability to adapt, adjust, and solve problems in an efficient manner.

OTHER DEFINITIONS OF POSITIVE

MENTAL HEALTH

Jourard and Landsman propose similar criteria for positive mental health: positive self-regard, ability to care about others, ability to care about the natural world, openness to new ideas and to people, creativity, ability to work productively, ability to love, and realistic perception of self (1980, p. 131).

Jensen and Bergin (1988) conducted a nationwide survey of 425 professional therapists (clinical psychologists, marriage and family therapists, social workers, and psychiatrists) to determine values associated with mental health. Eight themes were identified as important for a positive, mentally healthy lifestyle: (1) competent perception and expression of feelings (sensitivity, honesty, openness with others); (2) freedom/autonomy/responsibility (self-control, appropriate feelings of guilt, responsibility for one’s actions, increasing one’s alternatives at a choice point); (3) integration, coping, and work (effective coping strategies, work satisfaction, striving to achieve); (4) self-aware- ness/growth (awareness of potential, self-disci- pline); (5) human relatedness/interpersonal and family commitment (ability to give and receive affection, faithfulness in marriage, commitment to family needs, self-sacrifice); (6) self-maintenance/ physical fitness (healthful habits, self-discipline in use of alcohol, drugs, tobacco); (7) mature values (purpose for living, having principles and ideals); and (8) forgiveness (making restitution, forgiving

others) (Jensen and Bergin 1988, p. 292). They found a high level of consensus among the practitioners. Many of these values are consistent with the six approaches identified by Jahoda in 1958.

ILLUSIONS AND POSITIVE MENTAL

HEALTH

The validity of one of the components of positive mental health has been questioned (Snyder 1989). Is accurate reality perception the hallmark of positive mental health? Taylor and Brown argue that ‘‘certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well being’’ (1988, p. 193). They explain that mentally healthy persons have an unrealistic positive self-evaluation. Normal individuals are more aware of their strengths and less aware of their weaknesses, perceiving themselves as better than the average person and viewing themselves more positively than others see them.

Another illusion held by mentally healthy persons is an exaggerated sense of self-control. Taylor and Brown (1988) cite evidence that depressed individuals are more likely to have realistic perceptions of personal control than are nondepressed persons. Positive illusions of personal control over the environment, self-worth, and hopefulness about the future imply mental health, and these illusions enable people to function in an adaptive manner.

According to Taylor and Brown (1988), illusions can promote several criteria of mental health, including happiness or contentment, the ability to care for others, and the capacity for intellectually creative and productive work. While mentally healthy people learn from negative experiences, their illusions help them to cope with stresses and strains (Taylor et al. 1989).

Taylor and Brown conclude, ‘‘the mentally healthy person appears to have the enviable capacity to distort reality in a direction that enhances self-esteem, maintains beliefs in personal efficacy, and promotes an optimistic view of the future’’ (1988, p. 204).

THE ROLE OF UNDERLYING VALUE

ASSUMPTIONS

Jahoda (1980) argues that the definition of positive mental health depends upon underlying value

assumptions. Schwartz and Link explain, ‘‘What is viewed as good and functional is often dependent on who is doing the viewing and what value hierarchy is being applied’’ (1991, p. 240). The definition of positive mental health varies across societies. In addition, there may be variance across social groups within one society (e.g., social class, gender, race, and ethnicity). It is also the case that the definition of positive mental health may be a function of the situation.

Different societies have their own definition of positive mental health. In some societies, a mentally healthy individual is supposed to be autonomous, while in other societies, the mentally healthy person is expected to be compliant, conforming to particular rules imposed by others.

Variance across social groups within one society is illustrated by evidence that there are different standards of positive mental health for men and women. Broverman et al. (1981) report sex role stereotypes in the clinical judgments of mental health among seventy-nine psychotherapists. The therapists were asked to identify the characteristics that portrayed healthy, mature, and socially competent adults. Broverman et al. found ‘‘that healthy women differ from healthy men by being more submissive; less independent; less adventurous; more easily influenced; less aggressive; less competitive’’ (1981, p. 92).

The definition of positive mental health is situational. While a particular behavior is mentally healthy in one situation, it may represent mentally ill behavior in another situation. For example, behavior in a life-threatening situation may be defined as adaptive, given the stresses of the environment. In normal everyday life the same behavior may be defined as bizarre. This observation leads Foote and Cottrell to ask, ‘‘What are the psychologically relevant attributes of an environment which permit the manifestations of psychologically healthy behavior?’’ (1959, p. 44).

Finally, according to Jahoda (1988), the definition of positive mental health is also influenced by the following four assumptions: (1) the criteria for judging health and illness are debatable; (2) neither mental illness nor mental health can be defined by the absence of the other; (3) there are degrees of mental health; and (4) a low level of mental health is not synonymous with mental illness.

NORMALITY OR POSITIVE MENTAL

HEALTH?

There is continued debate on the definition of and relationship between normality and positive mental health. There is general agreement among researchers who study normatology that the definition of psychopathology is more precise than the definition of normal behavior (Offer and Sabshin 1991; Strack and Lorr 1997). While psychiatrists have developed sets of very specific criteria for defining mental illness (American Psychiatric Association 1994), there are no set criteria for defining either normal behavior or positive mental health. As is the case for the definition of positive mental health, the determination of normality varies across societies, subgroups within one society, and situations. What is normal (or positive mental health) in one time and place is abnormal (or mentally ill) in another. Both concepts are fluid in nature. Additional research is needed to understand how the definitions of positive mental health and normality are created. What are the underlying assumptions of these definitions, and how do they vary across societies and situations?

While normality implies the absence of psychopathology, positive mental health goes beyond normality. Researchers agree that positive mental health is more than the absence of mental illness; it represents the enhancement of human potential. Although a person may not have symptoms of mental illness, he or she may not have positive mental health, especially in the absence of selfconfidence, self-actualization, integration, autonomy, reality perception, and environmental mastery. To have positive mental health implies fulfilling one’s potential to the fullest. One might argue that positive mental health is a moving target, representing goals that are established, evaluated, and then revised as a person’s circumstance change. The concept of positive mental health is utopian. While many strive to achieve positive mental health, only a few fulfill the goal of maximizing their potential.

REFERENCES

American Psychiatric Association 1994 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed. Washington: American Psychiatric Association.

Broverman, Inge K., S. R. Vogel, D. M. Broverman, F. E. Clarkson, P. S. Rosenkranz 1981 ‘‘Sex-Role Stereotypes and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health.’’ In Elizabeth Howell and Marjorie Bayes, eds., Women and Mental Health. New York: Basic Books.

Foote, Nelson N., and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr. 1959

Identity and Interpersonal Competence: A New Direction in Family Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jahoda, Marie 1958 Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health. New York: Basic Books.

———1980 Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health, rev. ed. New York: Arno.

———1988 ‘‘Economic Recession and Mental Health: Some Conceptual Issues.’’ Journal of Social Issues 44:13–23.

Jensen, Jay P., and Allen E. Bergin 1988 ‘‘Mental Health Values of Professional Therapists: A National Interdisciplinary Survey.’’ Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 19:290–297.

Jourard, S. M., and T. Landsman 1980 Healthy Personality: An Approach from the Viewpoint of Humanistic Psychology, 4th ed. New York: Macmillan.

Maslow, Abraham H. 1954 Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper and Row.

Offer, Daniel, and Melvin Sabshin (eds.) 1991 The Diversity of Normal Behavior: Further Contributions to Normatology. New York: Basic Books.

Schwartz, Sharon, and Bruce G. Link 1991 ‘‘Sociological Perspectives on Mental Health: An Integrative Approach.’’ In Daniel Offer and Melvin Sabshin, eds.,

The Diversity of Normal Behavior: Further Contributions to Normatology. New York: Basic Books.

Snyder, C. R. 1989 ‘‘Reality Negotiation: From Excuses to Hope and Beyond.’’ Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 8:130–157.

Strack, Stephen, and Maurice Lorr 1997 ‘‘Invited Essay: The Challenge of Differentiating Normal and Disordered Personality.’’ Journal of Personality Disorders

11:105–122.

Taylor, Shelley, and Jonathan Brown 1988 ‘‘Illusion and Well Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health.’’ Psychological Bulletin 103:193–210.

Taylor, Shelley, Rebecca L. Collins, Laurie A. Skokan, and Lisa G. Aspinwall 1989 ‘‘Maintaining Positive Illusions in the Face of Negative Information: Getting the Facts without Letting Them Get to You.’’

Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 8:114–129.

JANET HANKIN

POSITIVISM

The concept of ‘‘positivism’’ was originally used to denote the scientific study of social phenomena, but today the term positivism has become vague. Most often, it is used as a pejorative smear for certain kinds of intellectual activity in the social sciences, sociology in particular. Most frequently, at least within sociology, positivism is associated with such undesirable states as ‘‘raw empiricism,’’ ‘‘mindless quantification,’’ ‘‘antihumanism,’’ ‘‘legitimation of the status quo,’’ and ‘‘scientific pretentiousness.’’ With few exceptions (e.g., Turner 1985), sociologists are unwilling to label themselves ‘‘positivists.’’ Yet, the titular founder of sociology—Auguste Comte—used this label as a rallying cry for developing formal and abstract theory that could still be used to remake society; so, the current use of the term does not correspond to its original meaning. If anything, the term connotes almost the exact opposite of Comte’s vision (1830–1842). It is proper, therefore, to review Comte’s original conception of positivism and its use in early sociology, and then we can discover how and why the meaning of positivism changed.

In Cours de philosophie positive, Comte began by asserting that ‘‘the first characteristic of Positive Philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as subject to natural Laws’’ (1830–1842, p. 5). Moreover, he emphasized that ‘‘research into what are called causes, whether first or final,’’ is ‘‘in vain’’ (1830–1842, p. 6); and by the time he was well into

Cours de philosophie positive, he stressed that a ‘‘great hindrance to the use of observation is the empiricism which is introduced into it by those who . . . would interdict the use of any theory whatever’’ because ‘‘no real observation of any kind of phenomena is possible, except in as far as it is first directed, and finally interpreted, by some theory’’ (1830–1842, p. 242). Rather, the goal of positivistic sociology is to ‘‘pursue an accurate discovery of . . . Laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number,’’ and ‘‘our real business is to analyze accurately the circumstance of phenomena, to connote them by natural relations of succession and resemblance’’ (1830– 1842, p. 6). Comte’s exemplar for this advocacy was Newton’s law of gravitation, an affirmation of his early preference to label sociology as ‘‘social physics.’’ Moreover, such laws were to be used to

reconstruct society; and while Comte went off the deep end on this point, proclaiming himself, late in his career, to be the ‘‘high priest of humanity’’ (Comte 1851–1854), it is difficult to see Comte’s positivism as antihumanistic, as conservative, or as legitimating the status quo.

How, then, did Comte get turned on his head? The answer to this question cannot be found in nineteenth-century sociology, for the most positivistic sociologists of this period—Herbert Spencer (1874–1896) and Émile Durkheim ([1893] 1947; [1895] 1934)—could hardly be accused of ‘‘raw’’ and ‘‘mindless’’ empiricism, nor could they in the context of their times be considered antihumanistic, conservative, and apologists for the status quo (the label ‘‘conservative’’ for these thinkers is imposed retrospectively, through the refraction of contemporary eyeglasses). Moreover, early American soci- ologists—Albion Small, Frank Lester Ward, Robert Park, William Graham Sumner, and even the father of statistical methods and empiricism in American sociology, Franklin Giddings—all advocated Comtean and Spencerian positivism before World War I. Thus, the answer to this question is to be found in the natural sciences, particularly in a group of scientist-philosophers who are sometimes grouped under the rubric ‘‘the Vienna Circle,’’ despite the fact that several intellectual generations of very different thinkers were part of this circle.

Before the ‘‘circle’’ was evident, the nature of the issues was anticipated by Ernst Mach (1893), who argued that the best theory employs a minimum of variables and does not speculate on unobservable processes and forces. Mach emphasized reliance on immediate sense data, rejecting all speculation about causes and mechanisms to explain observed relations among variables. Indeed, he rejected all conceptions of the universe as being regulated by ‘‘natural laws’’ and insisted that theory represent mathematical descriptions of relations among observable variables. Although Mach was not a member of the Vienna Circle, his ideas framed the issues for those who are more closely identified with this group. Yet, his ideas did not dictate their resolution. Many in the Vienna Circle were concerned primarily with logic and systems of formal thought, almost to the exclusion of observation (or, at least, to the point of subordinating it to their primary concerns). A split thus developed in the Vienna Circle over the relative

emphasis on empirical observation and systems of logic; a radical faction emphasized that truth can be ‘‘measured solely by logical coherence of statements’’ (which had been reduced to mathematics), whereas a more moderate group insisted that there is a ‘‘material truth of observation’’ supplementing ‘‘formal truths’’ (Johnston 1983, p. 189). Karl Popper, who was a somewhat marginal figure in the Vienna Circle of the 1930s, is perhaps the best-known mediator of this split, for he clearly tried to keep the two points of emphasis together. But even here the reconciliation is somewhat negative (Popper 1959, 1969): A formal theory can never be proved, only disproved; and so, data are to be used to mount assaults on abstract theories from which empirical hypotheses and predictions are formally ‘‘deduced.’’

Why did the philosopher-scientists in the Vienna Circle have any impact on sociology, especially American sociology? In Europe, of course, sociology had always been firmly anchored in philosophy, but in American sociology during the 1920s and 1930s, the rise of quantitative sociology was accelerating as the students of Franklin Giddings assumed key positions in academia and as Comtean and Spencerian sociology became a distant memory. (It should be noted, however, that Marx, Weber, and Durkheim had yet to have much impact on American sociology in the late 1920s or early 1930s.) But American sociology was concerned with its status as science and, hence, was receptive to philosophical arguments that could legitimate its scientific aspirations (Turner and Turner 1990). Mach was appealing because his advocacy legitimated statistical analysis of empirical regularities as variables; and Popper was to win converts with his uneasy reconciliation of observation and abstract theory. Both legitimated variable analyses; and for American sociologists in the 1930s and later from the 1940s through the early 1960s, this meant sampling, scaling, statistically aggregating, and analyzing empirical ‘‘observations.’’ Members of the Vienna circle had even developed an appealing terminology, logical positivism, to describe this relation between theory (abstract statements organized by a formal calculus) and research (quantitative data for testing hypotheses logically deduced from abstract statements). The wartime migration of key figures in the late Vienna Circle to the United States no doubt increased their impact on the social sciences in the United States (despite the

fact that the ‘‘logical’’ part of this new label for ‘‘positivism’’ was redundant in Comte’s original formulation). But logical positivism legitimated American empiricism in this sense: The quantitative data could be used to ‘‘test’’ theories, and so it was important to improve upon methods of gathering data and analyzing methodologies in order to realize this lofty goal. Along the way, the connection of theory and research was mysteriously lost, and positivism became increasingly associated with empiricism and quantification, per se.

There was a brief and highly visible effort, reaching a peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to revive the ‘‘logical’’ side of positivism by explaining to sociologists the process of ‘‘theory construction.’’ Indeed, numerous texts on theory construction were produced (e.g., Zetterberg 1965; Dubin 1969; Blalock 1969; Reynolds 1971; Gibbs 1972; Hage 1972), but the somewhat mechanical, cookbook quality of these texts won few converts, and so the empiricist connotations of positivism were never successfully reconnected to abstract theory. Even the rather odd academic alliance of functional theory with quantitative sociology—for example, Merton and Lazarsfeld at Columbia and Parsons and Stouffer at Harvard—was unsuccessful in merging theory and research, once again leaving positivism to denote quantitative research divorced from theory.

Other intellectual events, anticipated by various figures of the Vienna Circle, created a new skepticism and cynicism about the capacity to develop ‘‘objective’’ science, especially social science. This skepticism stressed the arbitrary nature of symbols and signs and hence their capacity to represent and denote the universe independently of the context in which such signs are produced and used. Such thinking was supplemented by Kuhn’s landmark work (1970) and by the sociology of science’s emphasis (e.g., Whitley 1984) on the politico-organizational dynamics distorting the idealized theory-data connection as advocated by Popper (1969). Out of all this ferment, a new label increasingly began to appear: postpositivism. This label appears to mean somewhat different things to varying audiences, but it connotes that Comte’s original vision and Popper’s effort to sustain the connection between empirical observations and theory are things of the past—just as ‘‘rationalism’’ and ‘‘modernity’’ are giving away to ‘‘postmodernism.’’ Thus, one hears about a

‘‘postpositivist’’ philosophy of science, which, despite the vagueness and diversity of usages for this label, is intended to signal the death of positivism. Curiously, this postpositivism is meant as an obituary for the older Comtean positivism or its resurrection as logical positivism by the Vienna Circle, where abstract logic and observation were more happily joined together.

The result is that the term ‘‘positivism’’ no longer has a clear referent, but it is evident that, for many, being a positivist is not a good thing. It is unlikely, then, that ‘‘positivism’’ will ever be an unambiguous and neutral term for sociological activity revolving around the formulation and testing of theory and the use of plausible theories for social engineering (or in more muted form, for ‘‘sociological practice’’). Other labels are likely to be employed in light of the negative connotations of positivism in an intellectual climate dominated by ‘‘post-isms.’’

Despite this apparent eclipse of positivism by various post-isms, positivistic sociology remains a vibrant activity, albeit by other names. Because of the pejorative use of the label ‘‘positivism,’’ few are willing to embrace it, but many practice positivistic sociology. What, then, are the main tenets of positivism? This question can be answered under ten general points.

First, positivism assumes that there is a ‘‘real world’’ that can be studied scientifically. The social world is not an illusion, or a total fabrication of sociologists’ imaginations. It is there; it has properties amenable to investigation.

Second, positivism assumes that there are fundamental properties of the social universe that are always operative when people act, interact, and organize. While the properties can manifest themselves in a wide variety of forms in varying contexts, they nonetheless exist; and they are what drive the dynamics of the social universe. The goal of positivism is to uncover these fundamental properties, to see how they work, to develop theories on their operation, and to test these theories with systematically collected data.

Third, the theories developed by positivists should strive for some degree of formality. The making of formal statements need not invoke mathematics or some other system of formal argument; rather, all that is necessary is that concepts

denoting processes be explicitly defined and that relations among concepts be stated clearly. These goals can be met with ordinary language, although if they can be converted into mathematics, this is seen by most positivists as useful though not absolutely necessary.

Fourth, in defining concepts formally, these definitions should denote aspects of the social universe such that what is encompassed by the concept is clear and, equally important, what is not is also explicit. In stating relations among concepts denoting fundamental properties of the social world, these relations can be stated in three basic ways. One is functional (in the mathematical sense), whereby variation in one concept is seen to be related to another (e.g., the level of differentiation in a population is a positive function of its size). A second way to state relations is through analytical models that specify the direct, indirect, and reverse causal effects among those forces of the universe that are seen as connected. A third procedure is historical in which events at earlier points in time are seen to cause directly, or in combination with other events, an outcome. A fourth, though less desirable (and at best, preliminary), procedure is to find the place of particular forces in an abstract category system that juxtaposes phenomena (e.g., the periodic table in chemistry or Parsonian four-functions analysis).

Fifth, the goal of all positivistic theories statements is parsimony. Reducing theories to their simplest form is always desired, whether this be a simple equation, an analytical model, a historical sequence of cause, or even a simple set of categories.

Sixth, at the same time that statements move toward parsimony, they should become ever more abstract and should seek to explain as large a portion of reality as is possible. The goal is always to explain as much of the social universe with as few principles and models as can do justice to the dynamics of the social world.

Seventh, all theoretical statements must be testable, at least in principle. Some statements can be tested directly with existing methodologies; others must be transformed (e.g., from deductions to hypotheses); and still others may have to wait for new methodologies or for specific classes of events to occur. The critical criterion is that theories be testable, now or in the future.

They must suggest by their formulation ways of operationalization.

Eighth, theories can be tested by all relevant methods: historical, comparative, experimental, survey, observational, and even simulational. No one method identifies positivism; all are useful in assessing the plausibility of theories.

Ninth, tests must always be used to assess the plausibility of theories. When tests do not support the theory, the theory must be rejected and/or revised.

Tenth, theories that remain plausible constitute, for the time being, the best explanations of the social universe. And the more theories remain plausible, the more they are made parsimonious, and the more new theories are developed to explain what has not yet been explained, the more knowledge of the nature and operative dynamics of the social universe accumulates.

——— 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson.

Reynolds, Paul Davidson 1971 A Primer in Theory Construction. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Spencer, Herbert 1874–1896 The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols. New York: Appleton.

Turner, Jonathan H. 1985 ‘‘In Defense of Positivism.’’

Sociological Theory 3:24–30.

Turner, Stephen Park, and Jonathan H. Turner 1990

The Impossible Science: An Institutional Analysis of American Sociology. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.

Whitley, Richard 1984 The Intellectual and Social Organization of the Sciences. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zetterberg, Hans L. 1965 On Theory and Verification in Sociology, 3rd ed. New York: Bedminster Press.

JONATHAN H. TURNER

REFERENCES

Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. 1969 Theory Construction: From

Verbal to Mathematical Formulations. Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Comte, Auguste 1830–1842 Cours de philosophie positive: Les Préliminaires géneraux et la philosophie mathématique. Paris: Bachelier.

——— 1851–1854 Système de politique: ou, traite de sociologie, instituant la religion de l’humanite. Paris: L. Mathias.

Dubin, Robert 1969 Theory Building. New York: Free Press.

Durkheim, Emile (1895) 1934 The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: Free Press.

——— (1893) 1947 The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press.

Gibbs, Jack 1972 Sociological Theory Construction. Hinsdale,

Ill.: Dryden Press.

Hage, Jerald 1972 Techniques and Problems of Theory Construction in Sociology. New York: John Wiley.

Johnston, William M. 1983 The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History 1848–1938. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kuhn, Thomas 1970 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mach, Ernst 1893 The Science of Mechanics, trans. T. J. McCormack. La Salle, Ill: Open Court.

Popper, Karl 1969 Conjectures and Refutations. London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul.

POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Postindustrial society is a concept used to characterize the structure, dynamics, and possible future of advanced industrial societies. Like the more recent concepts of postmodern and radically modern society, the concept of postindustrial society attempts to make sense of the substantial changes experienced by advanced industrial societies since the end of World War II. In providing a depiction of the character and future of these societies, analyses usually attempt to shape the futures they describe. Such efforts illustrate an awareness among sociologists of the ‘‘reflexive’’ character of much social science—that is, an awareness that analyses of society become elements of the social world that have the potential to shape the future.

Social analysts have long been aware of the potential effects of their ideas, at times engaging in work precisely because it may have an effect on the future through such mechanisms as social engineering, social movements, and the application of technology. The nineteenth-century theorists of ‘‘industrial’’ society, like postindustrial theorists a century later, tried to make sense of the diverse changes surrounding them, oftentimes in an effort to help shape the future. In the early nineteenth century, Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon attempted to provide an image of what was then a barely emerging industrial society, an image he hoped

would enable scientists and industrialists to see the crucial roles they were to play in a society consciously directed by scientific knowledge. Similarly, in the mid-nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels were outlining the characteristics of industrial capitalism, including the revolutionary role of the proletariat, when the factory system in England was still in its infancy, and the workforce ‘‘was still heavily concentrated in agriculture and domestic service, with the remainder mostly employed in the old craft industries.’’ (Kumar 1978, p. 133) Although theorists of industrial society may not have been fully correct in all areas, their recognition of some major correlates of industrialization provided a surprisingly accurate portrait of a form of society qualitatively different from prior modes of human organization. The emerging industrial society was one that increasingly utilized technology and machinery for work; a society with substantial increases in communications, transportation, markets, and income; a society within which urbanism became a way of life, and the division of labor became increasingly complex; a society marked by an increasing role for the state, and bureaucratization in government and the economy; and a society marked by increasing secularization and rationalization.

The concept of postindustrial society indicates significant changes in some of these central characteristics of industrial society. In probably the earliest use of the concept, the Guild Socialist Arthur Penty (1917) called for development of a postindustrial state that reversed key characteristics of industrial society. Penty called for development of a mode of organization reflecting the artisan workshop, in which work, leisure, and family would be once again brought together. Although Penty may have been the first to use the concept of postindustrial society, it was not until the 1960s that the concept took on its present character, focusing on quantitative changes separating postindustrial from industrial society. Interest in the future, and in postindustrial society, developed at this time as a response to the dramatic changes occurring in advanced industrial societies. These changes included the technological and organizational expansion accompanying economic growth in the post–World War II era, the expansion of the welfare state and an increased concern over the dark side of industrialism. An array of terms emerged to characterize the social

milieu of advanced industrial societies, including the technocratic era (Brzezinski 1970), service class society (Dahrendorf 1967), personal service society (Halmos 1970), postscarcity society (Bookchin 1971), posteconomic society (Kahn and Wiener 1967), knowledge society (Drucker 1969), postmodern society (Etzioni 1968), and postindustrial society (Touraine 1971; Richta et al. 1969). Although differing in focus, the analyses overlapped considerably with Daniel Bell’s work on postindustrial society (1973, 1989), which has been considered the best known and most complete analysis (Kumar 1978). Thus, the following effort to characterize postindustrial society uses Bell’s analysis as the organizing framework. This is followed by an examination of the related concepts of postmodern and radically modern society.

CHARACTERISTICS OF POSTINDUSTRIAL

SOCIETY

For analytical purposes Bell divides society into three parts: social structure, culture, and the polity. The concept of postindustrial society focuses primarily on changes in social structure, that is, changes in the economy, in technology, and in occupational structure. Although the social structure, polity, and culture may influence one another, it is not assumed there is a harmonious relation between the three. In fact, changes in any one may pose problems for the others (Bell 1976).

Bell’s depiction of postindustrial society (1973, 1989) focuses on two dimensions: the centrality of codified theoretical knowledge, and the expansion of the service sector, especially professional and human services. The centrality of theoretical knowledge is viewed as the most important dimension, or axial principle, of postindustrial society. The institutions that most embody this dimension are the university and the research institute. In postindustrial society major innovations are more a product of the application of theoretical knowledge (e.g., Albert Einstein’s discussion of the photoelectric effect for the development of lasers, holography, photonics), than the product of persons skilled in the use of equipment (e.g., Alexander Graham Bell and Thomas Edison). The use of theoretical knowledge increases the importance of advanced education, reflected in substantial enrollments in colleges and universities, as well as substantial numbers of scientists, engineers, and

persons with advanced degrees. For example, between 1939 and 1964, as the United States moved from an industrial to a postindustrial society, the number of scientists and engineers increased over fivefold, from 263,000 to 1,475,000 (Bell 1973). Relatedly, the percentage of 20to 24-year-olds studying for college degrees went from 4 percent in 1900 to 15 percent in 1940, 26 percent in 1950, and 34 percent in 1960 (estimated from Bell 1973, table 3–4). Related estimates show tertiary enrollment rates going from 32 percent in 1960 to 56 percent in 1980 and 81 percent in 1993 (World Bank 1980, 1997). Accompanying the importance of science and theoretical knowledge is an occupational structure in which more persons are involved in services, with professional and helping services especially important. This includes increased employment in education, science, and engineering, which is a natural consequence of a society committed to science and education. It also includes expansion of the number of whitecollar workers and professionals in government and the helping services, resulting from an expanded welfare state and increased attention to health care. Such trends are illustrated in the following data (Table 1) on employment trends in the percentage of the workforce in white-collar and professional occupations in the United States, and in seventeen developed countries (twelve western European countries, plus Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Israel) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 1998; ILO 1965–1988, 1997). Also included are related data for agriculture, mining, and manufacturing for the United States.

Increased employment in white-collar and professional occupations occurs largely at the expense of agricultural employment and, to a lesser extent, of manufacturing employment. The economic dynamic behind such changes consists of shifts in relative demand toward services as disposable income increases (Clark 1960), and to the greater responsiveness of agriculture and manufacturing to technical innovation (Fuchs 1968). As incomes rise, the percentage of total income used for food and agricultural products declines, and the need for basic manufactured products is more easily met. Thus, relative demand for health, education, and an array of other services may increase. At the same time, technical innovations increase productivity in agriculture and manufacturing, lowering the demand for labor in these sectors. However,

technical change is less able to displace workers in services, even though technical advances aid productivity. This is most clearly seen in health care, where technical change may increase the services available and the need for personnel to provide new services. Thus, economic and technical developments shift relative consumer demand and labor toward services. Such economic dynamics point out that development of an increasingly serviceoriented postindustrial economy does not mean agriculture and manufacturing are ignored (Cohen and Zysman 1987). It means that technology takes over much of what people formerly did, and shifts productive efforts and labor toward services.

Accompanying the rising importance of theoretical knowledge and the service sector are several other changes. These include changes in women’s roles, especially increased participation in the formal labor force. Additionally, the class structure of postindustrial society comes to increasingly center around education and technical expertise, creating possible tensions between expertise and populist sentiments. New political issues and attitudes concerned with the environment and quality of life move onto the political agenda (Ingelhart 1977; Lipset 1976). Technocratic rule may begin to take hold in organizations, and confront the problem of rationalized means becoming ends. Corporations may come under pressure to take into account objectives other than profit maximization. Efforts at social planning increase, and confront the problem of establishing a rational calculus for maximizing benefits throughout the society. The society becomes more politicized and conflictive as citizenship expands and groups seek a place in the polity.

Such conditions provide the basis for changes in consciousness and cosmology, as individuals confront a world of information and expanding specialized knowledge. The world becomes less one in which the individual interacts with nature and machines, and more one of persons interacting with persons. The reciprocal consciousness of self and other becomes increasingly important in defining the world. The culture may come to show contradictions between values of self-restraint, discipline, and work as a calling, on the one hand, and emerging postindustrial values of consumption and the negation of traditional bourgeoisie life, on the other (Bell 1976).

The image of postindustrial society provided by Bell and other social analysts is one in which technological advances have made possible development of a society characterized by the expansion and use of theoretical knowledge, and the concomitant expansion of white-collar and especially professional employment. A commitment to human welfare and social planning facilitates expansion of the welfare state and human services, further increasing white-collar and professional employment. Yet, such a society is not without tensions and conflict, both within the social structure and between the social structure, polity, and culture. It is by pointing out such tensions and problems that postindustrial theorists attempt not only to describe the present and the future but also to shape the future. In one of the more recent contributions to the postindustrial literature, Fred Block is clear about the role social analysis plays in shaping the future. He points out that ‘‘[social theory] has real consequences, because individuals cannot do without some kind of conception of the type of society in which [they] live’’ (Block 1990, p. 2). Block’s book represents a return to the analysis of postindustrial society after a brief hiatus during the 1980s that Block attributes to the breakdown of mainstream and leftist social theory, and the reemergence of a tradition of economic liberalism quiescent since the Great Depression. Block’s analysis carries forward the focus of prior postindustrial theory on social structure, yet gives scant attention to the role of codified theoretical knowledge, the university and professional groups. Instead, Block looks at key aspects of the changing postindustrial economy of the United States in an effort to develop alternative possibilities for the future. He notes that a postindustrial economy utilizing advanced technology, and having a substantial service sector, would be most productive if it kept some distance from the dictates of classical

economic theory. Specifically, productivity is likely enhanced by: (1) relatively low levels of marketness, allowing for greater predictability and more accurate information; (2) labor relations emphasizing cooperation between labor and management, since skilled labor in technologically sophisticated industries and the professions has substantial knowledge and is expensive to replace; (3) treating capital not merely as a physical asset, but as part of a productive process that includes the organization of persons working with capital; (4) developing measures of economic well-being that incorporate positive and negative utilities currently excluded from measures like gross national product (e.g., child care and pollution as positive and negative utilities); and (5) using various hybrid forms of market, state, and other regulatory mechanisms to enhance quality growth.

Block’s work provides a useful extension of postindustrial theory into the more traditional economic domains of labor, capital, and measured economic output. The book may represent a revival of analyses of postindustrial society, perhaps under the alternative concept of postmodern society. However, before considering the notion of postmodern society, some criticisms of the concept of postindustrial society need to be mentioned. Much of the critical literature focuses on Bell’s work, since it is viewed as one of the best expressions of postindustrial theory. One criticism of postindustrial theory is that it overemphasizes the role of theoretical knowledge in decision making. Although critics acknowledge that formal knowledge is more important than ever before, they contend that technical experts and scientific knowledge have not come to play the central role in decision making in government or corporations that postindustrial theorists said they would. Within government, political dynamics of the industrial era persist, and within the corporation ‘‘the expert