Encyclopedia of Sociology Vol

These arrangements collapsed in 1992–1993. There were a number of reasons for this change. Under the pressure of global competition, Italian business owners grew weary of the high taxes and inefficient government produced by widespread corruption. The drive for European monetary union required Italy to reduce its huge budget deficit. The end of the Cold War made communist control less unthinkable (especially when the party renounced communism and renamed itself the Democratic Party of the Left).

It was a team of prosecutors investigating corruption in Milan’s construction industry who really rocked Italy’s political world. Led by Antonio Di Pietro (who now sits in Italy’s Senate and may be the next president), the so-called clean hands brigade demolished the Italian establishment during 1992–1994. Prosecutors exposed massive patronage, political awarding of contracts, and bribery. It became clear that organized crime had friends at the highest levels. Former Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, a Socialist, was convicted of corruption after he fled to Tunisia. Giulio Andreotti, a Christian Democrat who had served as prime minister seven times, is, as of this writing, on trial for being a member of the Mafia.

The corruption investigations touched even those who benefited from them. After the Italian party system collapsed in 1993, the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi led a conservative coalition to victory in the March 1994 elections. Berlusconi’s government collapsed when prosecutors announced that they were investigating him. In 1998, Berlusconi was convicted of bribing tax inspectors (although he was later acquitted of other charges), but he remains leader of his Forza Italia party.

Spain also has a long history of corruption and patronage. Governments have long relied on local notables to administer the law. While Francisco Franco strengthened the state during his long rule (1939–1975), he made appointments more on the basis of loyalty than competence. The return of democracy brought greater professionalism, but local patrons remain important. It was corruption on a national scale that grabbed the headlines in the 1990s. A series of scandals embarrassed the socialist government of Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, who led Spain from 1982 to 1996. Many observers attributed the corruption to the socialists’ arrogance after so many years in power. In

1991, Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra resigned after his brother Juan was accused of using party facilities for private gain. A series of scandals surrounded Socialist party finances. The heads of the Bank of Spain and the Civil Guard were besmirched by corruption. This wave of ‘‘sleaze’’ helped lead to the socialists’ defeat in 1996.

France has had many scandals throughout its history. Some have even threatened the stability of the regime. Conservatives opposed to the Republic used the Panama Canal scandal (1892–1993) and the Stavisky affair (1934) to attack the legitimacy of democratic government. Others have simply been embarrassing, as when it was revealed that President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had accepted diamonds from the infamous tyrant JeanBedel Bokassa, president of the Central African Republic and a longtime French client. Overall, the French tend to have a cynical view of government, accepting corruption and the abuse of power as the way the world works.

The ‘‘long presidency’’ of François Mitterand (1981–1995) included a series of scandals, many of them concerning the finances of Mitterand’s Socialist Party. Rising campaign costs forced socialists, who lacked conservatives’ constituency among business, to raise money in irregular ways. Contractors who sought business with socialist-gov- erned municipalities were told to contribute to party-controlled consultancies, which funneled the money to the national party. The exposure of this practice embarrassed the socialists, but they could plausibly claim that other parties engaged in similar schemes. The businessman Roger-Patrice Pelat, who was indicted for insider trading before his death in 1989, had questionable relationships with many politicians, including his close friend Mitterand and Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, who committed suicide in 1993 after it was revealed that Pelat had given him an interestfree loan.

Two other leading French politicians have come under fire in recent years. Alan Juppé, a conservative former prime minister, has been charged with obtaining fraudulent jobs for Gaullist party activists when he worked for then–Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, who is now president. Roland Dumas, a former foreign minister and chief of the Constitutional Court, is under investigation for his ties to a defense contractor, which hired his mistress and paid her a $9 million commission.

Greece is another southern European country notorious for corruption and clientelistic politics. The governments of Andreas Papandreou (1981– 1989, 1993–1996), longtime leader of the PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), were widely perceived as crooked and patronage ridden, but Papandreou himself was acquitted of embezzlement charges in 1992. Tax evasion is common, and the economy remains dependent upon state patronage and contracts.

Many of the countries of northern Europe have become bywords for clean government. The governments of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, in particular, are known for their honesty. A typical ‘‘scandal’’ in these countries would be a politician using party funds to pay for diapers for her baby. One major exception is Belgium, which is known as the ‘‘Italy of the North’’ for its corruption and cronyism. The government was shaken by a case of the pedophile murderer Marc Dutroux, who had conducted his activities in such a way that it appeared he had official protection. The 1991 murder of a Socialist Party boss remains unsolved, and many suspect the involvement of leading politicians and the Mafia. Willy Claes, former North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary general, was convicted in December 1998 of accepting a bribe from a defense contractor when he was economic affairs minister. Two other prominent Belgian politicians were also convicted.

Corruption was widespread in British politics during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms of 1854 established the modern British civil service, which is world renowned for its honesty. Indeed, many former British colonies, such as Singapore, have benefited from their reputation for sound administration. The conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) and John Major (1990– 1997) saw their share of scandals, notably some involving large donations to the Conservative Party by questionable characters. (The United Kingdom does not limit donations to parties, nor does it require them to be disclosed.) Years of one-party rule led to a certain degree of arrogance and selfsatisfaction, but little real corruption. While many observers attributed Major’s defeat in 1997 to ‘‘sleaze,’’ it appears that is just another way of saying, ‘‘The Tories had been in power for too long and it was time to give someone else a chance.’’

Germany is also known as a relatively corrup- tion-free country, although, contrary to popular belief, the Nazi regime was filled with petty graft and party patronage. In the 1980s, it was revealed that the Flick industrial group had made illegal donations to the major political parties, while this embarrassed the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982–1998), it never threatened its stability. More recently, there have been scandals about bribery in the construction industry and about the involvement of big-city police with the drug trade and prostitution. Probably the most serious threat is the large network of ex-commu- nists in the former East Germany, which has become known for favoritism and intimidation.

The most conspicuous European scandal of the late 1990s has concerned the European Commission, the governing body of the European Union. An internal audit, leaked to members of the European Parliament, revealed waste, corruption, and cronyism in many Euro-programs. It revealed that Edith Cresson, commissioner for research policy and a former French prime minister, had appointed her dentist to coordinate acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) research and had presided over a fraud-ridden job training program. In order to stem a parliamentary drive to censure or remove the commissioners, commission president Jacques Santer appointed the Committee of Independent Experts to investigate the audit’s charges. The panel produced a report that essentially found the allegations to be true. Faced with a parliamentary revolt, and with Cresson unwilling to quit alone, all twenty European Commissioners resigned in March 1999.

CORRUPTION IN EAST ASIA

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, East Asia has had the fastest-growing economy in the world, but the economic crisis of 1997–1998 exposed the vast corruption of some countries. Indonesia was the most conspicuous case. During his 1966–1998 reign, Suharto amassed a fortune that may reach into the tens of billions of dollars. His children enriched themselves by acting as middlemen between state-owned firms and contractors; serving as the Indonesian partners of many foreign investors; and acquiring interests in aviation, broadcasting, automobiles and many other industries. Businessmen close to Suharto, such

as industrialist Liem Sioe Liong and timber magnate Mohammed ‘‘Bob’’ Hasan, came to dominate the economy. As long as Indonesia kept growing, most citizens and businessmen accepted Suharto’s banditry. Indonesia’s economic and political collapse in 1998 led to demonstrations against his rule and to bloody riots in Jakarta, the capital. Suharto quit in May 1998; B. J. Habibie, his successor, found his associates implicated in a multi- million-dollar banking scandal. Abdurrahman Wahid, elected president in October 1999, announced that he would pardon Suharto should be ever be convicted of corruption.

The Philippines has a long history of corruption. A small group of families has long dominated Philippine politics, buying off their supporters through graft and patronage. Filipino culture emphasizes personal relationships, rather than formal institutions. As such, written law has little connection with the workings of the Philippine government. The Philippine civil service, police, and congress have particularly corrupt reputations. After independence in 1946, several Philippine presidents were known to be corrupt, especially Elpidio Quirino (1948–1953) and Carlos García (1957–1961). Ferdinand Marcos (1965– 1986) put them all to shame, especially after he declared martial law in 1972. Philippine Airlines became a private commuter line for the Marcos family. Marcos bullied wealthy families into giving up their holdings to his family and friends. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated that Marcos himself was worth $10 billion, but after Marcos fell from power, investigators were able to track down only a fraction of that sum. Despite her promises of a new era, the administration of Corazon Aquino (1986–1992) was also wracked with corruption. Fidel Ramos (1992–1996), however, built a reputation for honesty and presided over a period of prosperity.

Thailand is world renowned for its tolerance for drug trafficking and prostitution, and it is widely alleged that these businesses have allies in the government. The country also has a political culture dominated by patronage, bribery, vote buying, and crony capitalism. Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa (1995–1996) was particularly identified with these practices, but the crisis of 1997–1998 disrupted many of Thailand’s arrangements. The country has now adopted a more

democratic constitution and has banned vote buying and insider deals.

South Korea has a political system that concentrates power in the presidency. It is not surprising that corruption has been concentrated there, too. Park Chung-hee seized power in 1961, vowing to end the sleaze of South Korea’s early years. Park amassed enormous power over South Korea’s economy and government. While most observers agree that he mostly used that power to his country’s betterment, his dominance convinced many businessmen that they needed to donate to Park’s party if they wanted to win his favor. After Park was assassinated in 1979, Chun Doo Hwan assumed the presidency. There were rumors of corruption surrounding Chun, which were confirmed in 1996 when he and his successor, Roh Tae Woo, were convicted of corruption and sedition. Chun was sentenced to life in prison; Roh received seventeen years. Kim Young Sam, who succeeded Roh in 1993, had a clean image that was soiled when his son Kim Hyun Chul was convicted in 1997 of receiving bribes. The collapse of one of the nation’s leading conglomerates sparked charges that it had corrupt ties with Kim’s government.

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated Japanese politics from 1955 to 1993; it still leads most governing coalitions. On the international stage, it projected an image of serene competence. Behind the scenes, Japanese back rooms saw wheeling and dealing that would put any Chicago pol to shame. Kakuei Tanaka, prime minister from 1972 to 1974, ran a pork-barrel-fueled machine that dominated the LDP. Tanaka forced the government to extend the bullet train line into his mountainous home base, nearly bankrupting the national railroad in the process. In 1983, Tanaka was finally convicted of accepting bribes from the American aircraft manufacturer Lockheed, which had spread around $22 million among Japanese politicians in the 1970s. While the LDP’s rule was broken in 1993, it regained control in 1994, and by 1996 an old Tanaka ally, Ryutaro Hashimoto, was serving as prime minister. In recent years, scandals have rocked the Ministry of Finance, which wields great power over the Japanese economy. Finance officials have been accused of covering up banks’ financial troubles and of leaking sensitive information to bank executives.

CORRUPTION IN SOUTH ASIA

The nations of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) are all former British colonies that benefited from the United Kingdom’s common law tradition and bureaucratic honesty; but all have sunk into a morass of corruption. Pakistan is now considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Tax evasion is ubiquitous: only about half of assessed taxes are actually collected. Businessmen believe that they must pay government officials if they seek a public contract. Civil servants are poorly paid, and believe they must take bribes in order to survive. The two most recent prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto (1988–1990, 1993–1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1990– 1995, 1997–present), have presided over administrations rife with corruption. In April 1999, Bhutto and her husband were convicted of taking kickbacks on government contracts. They were each sentenced to five years in prison.

A recent book on India and Pakistan calls corruption in India ‘‘pervasive, systematic, structured, and graded . . . running from the bottom to the top of the political order.’’ The British gave India an honest civil service, but Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency (1975–1977) destroyed its integrity and morale by forcing bureaucrats to break the law. Now India’s estimated fifteen million civil servants shake down citizens for every service imaginable, from installing phone lines to permitting people to enter the country. Corrupt politicians hold power on a national scale. Jayalitha Jayaram, the notorious boss of Tamil Nadu state, brought down the government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee through her defection in April 1999. A 1996 corruption investigation discovered that Jayaram owned 10,000 saris and 350 pairs of shoes.

CORRUPTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East is a nation bereft of functioning democracies, save Israel and Turkey. The predominance of authoritarian regimes has created a situation ripe for corruption. The Saudi royal family has a reputation for corruption on a massive scale. It treats the national income as royal revenue and distributes it at whim. There are 7,000 royal princes, whom the Economist described as ‘‘lawless and hedonistic.’’ Not content with their

generous allowances, they collect huge commissions on foreign contracts and muscle in on private business. Public anger at royal corruption, particularly that of King Saud, fueled an Islamic fundamentalist movement for a time. Crown Prince Abdullah assumed management of the government in January 1996, and his honesty and ruthlessness have defused the threat from the opposition.

Egypt is world renowned for its bureaucratic corruption. Its one million civil servants are notoriously indolent and graft hungry. Bribes are necessary to engage in any government transaction. The government is unable to provide most public services, opening the door for Islamist groups to fill the void. Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria are also known for their corruption. In Algeria, years of corrupt rule by the military and the National Liberation Front fueled an Islamist revolt that has led to a savage civil war.

Turkey’s fragile democracy has been besieged by corruption. Its parties are far more concerned with seeking patronage and state contracts than with promoting ideological agendas. Former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller (1993–1996) has become vastly wealthy while in politics, and allegations of graft and cronyism have swirled about her. A staunch secularist, she nevertheless formed a coalition government with Islamic leader Necmetin Erbakan in 1996, because he promised to prevent an investigation of Ciller’s finances. She made a similar deal with Erbakan’s successor, Mesult Yilmaz, who had his own skeletons to hide. Yilmaz’s government finally fell in November 1998 because of continuing allegations about corruption. There have also been charges that the police are in league with gangsters, right-wing hit squads, and drug traffickers.

CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

With the possible exception of the former Soviet Union, sub-Saharan Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. Colonial rule left weak governments and few educated administrators. So- cialist-minded leaders created state-dominated economies that failed disastrously and offered numerous opportunities for graft. With arbitrary boundaries left over from colonial times, few states have developed a sense of ‘‘nationhood,’’ and political actors’ first loyalty is usually to their ethnic group.

‘‘Personal rulership’’ is perhaps the most common political system in Africa. The ruler has almost unlimited legal competence. He is not concerned with building a following among the general public; instead he attends to the needs of his more powerful supporters, usually in the military or in state-owned firms. But state power is too limited to implement any policy except pillage. Personal rulership tends to be corrupt and arbitrary, but also weak and unstable.

The most extreme form of personal rulership is what Max Weber called a ‘‘sultanistic’’ regime. Such a state has no claim to legitimacy, whether based on tradition, ideology, charisma, or social order. The ruler runs the state to benefit him and his allies. He treats the public treasury as an extension of his personal fortune. He sells import and export licenses to the highest bidders, and appoints his cronies to run state-owned firms where they can exploit their nation’s resources. Because the ruler’s whims (and those of his supporters) supersede the written law, there is no predictability to the state’s actions. This discourages private enterprise, since businessmen cannot know whether their property will be confiscated. The only path to success is through winning the ruler’s fickle favors. While sultanistic states rarely function well enough to collect taxes, that did not bother many African leaders, who had their own streams of revenue: exporting natural resources through state-owned firms (especially during the high-commodity-price 1970s) and collecting foreign aid from the Cold War rivals. The French have remained active in their former colonies and have propped up many an unsavory dictator.

Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) from 1965 to 1997, was a perfect example of a sultanistic ruler who treated the state as his personal property. The Economist (1997, p.21) described his rule as the ‘‘systematic theft of the state from top to bottom.’’ Mobutu accumulated a fortune that amounted between $4 and $9 billion. Bribes, kickbacks, the public treasury, the returns from Zaire’s mineral wealth, French and American aid—all went into Mobutu’s Swiss bank accounts. By the end of his reign, he owned nine villas in Belgium; a Brazilian coffee plantation; a mansion in Spain; property in several African cities; and estates in Portugal, Switzerland, and the French Riviera. He also owned

tens of thousands of bottles of wine bottled in the year of his birth.

Mobutu found Zaire a poor country—and left it destitute. In the name of Zairean nationalism, he seized expatriate-owned businesses in 1973 and gave them to his cronies, who promptly ran them into the ground. (Uganda’s Idi Amin did much the same thing at the same time with Asian-owned businesses, with the same results.) Zaire is worldrenowned for its mineral resources, including cobalt, diamonds and copper. Mobutu nationalized the mining industry—and wrecked it. Rather than paying them, Mobutu let his soldiers work for their money by robbing ordinary citizens. Pity the poor businessman trying to import goods into Zaire, for he had to pass a gauntlet of nine state agencies, all of them demanding bribes. The end of the Cold War meant that Mobutu’s Western allies would no longer subsidize his regime. By the mid-1990s, Mobutu’s government had stopped functioning, and a guerrilla uprising took root. With his army more interested in looting than in fighting, Mobutu fled the country in May 1997 and died soon after. By that point, Zaireans’ purchasing power was only one-fourth what it had been in the 1950s, when they still lived under Belgian rule. The Belgians left behind an excellent system of roads. By the 1990s, it had deteriorated to the point where it was no longer possible to drive across Zaire.

While Mobutu set an impressive standard for banditry, other African rulers did their best to keep up. Mali’s Moussa Traoré, Niger’s Gnassingbe Eyadema, Cameroon’s Paul Biya, and Gabon’s Omar Bongo are some of the more noteworthy kleptocrats who have misgoverned Africa over the past generation. Few have had the panache of Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic (1965–1979). Like Mobutu, Bokassa treated his land as his private domain. Unlike Mobutu, Bokassa went so far as to crown himself emperor in a ceremony modeled after Napoleon’s coronation. Through his control of the diamond trade, Bokassa accumulated a truly imperial fortune. His antics became an embarrassment to his French masters, who overthrew him after he personally led a massacre of children who were protesting the cost of school uniforms. The French spread a rumor that Bokassa ate his political opponents; distraught by this charge, Bokassa revealed that he had given

diamonds to leading French politicians, including then–President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.

Of all African countries, Nigeria is probably the most notorious for corruption. Bribery is universal and scamming seems to be the national pastime. With its vast reserves of petroleum, Nigeria experienced an economic boom during the 1970s oil crisis. The returns from that wealth mostly went to the military and to corrupt politicians. The nation’s schools, hospitals and roads are in dreadful condition. President Shehu Shagari’s administration (1979–1983) was so corrupt that the army overthrew him so they could get in on the action. More recently, Sani Abacha stole billions of dollars from the national treasury during his 1993– 1998 dictatorship. Abacha realized that distributing import licenses for fuel was a good way to reward his cronies. He allowed the nation’s oil refineries to deteriorate, forcing this oil-produc- ing nation to import gasoline, and thereby enriched his pals. Alas, poor Abacha did not get to enjoy his wealth for long: He died suddenly in June 1998, allegedly in the company of prostitutes. (Some have suggested that Abacha’s rivals poisoned his Viagra.)

CORRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA

While Latin America has not been pillaged as thoroughly as Africa, corruption is a serious problem in most countries in the region. Only Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have reputations for being relatively clean. Latin America’s corruption is rooted in its Spanish and Portuguese colonial past. Far from home, colonial bureaucrats were able to exploit their positions for profit, often treating their offices as their private possessions. Mercantilistic regulation meant that merchants and landowners often had to bribe officials in order to do business. Independence changed little. Hispanic traditions of paternalism meant extensive involvement by the state in the economy, which created great opportunities for bribery and smuggling. A foreign investment boom in the late nineteenth century strengthened local economies, but often primarily enriched a few leaders at the top. Nationalists attacked foreign investment, especially in the oil industry, and replaced it with state-owned firms, which frequently became deeply corrupt. The domestic private sector remained underdeveloped and dependent on the state.

Much of Latin America’s corruption has swirled about the various strongmen who have held power over the years. Alfredo Stroessner, who dominated Paraguay from 1954 to 1989, turned his country into a gangster’s paradise. Nazi war criminals and international drug traffickers flocked to live under Stroessner’s protection. Stroessner treated Paraguay’s government as his personal fiefdom, distributing patronage to his supporters and providing few services to ordinary citizens. Stroessner ensured his longevity by spreading the graft around. High tariffs in neighboring Argentina and Brazil spawned a thriving smuggling trade. Many military officers became millionaires through this trade, buying Rolls-Royces and building mansions. Eventually, the armed forces were wholly funded by the smuggling of cigarettes, whiskey, cocaine, and heroin. The costs of the vast Itaipú hydroelectric project mushroomed from a 1973 estimate of $2 billion to a final figure of $21 billion in 1991. Much of the overrun appears to have gone into officials’ pockets through kickbacks and bribery.

Venezuela saw a series of caudillos who made huge fortunes off the nation’s oil wealth. General Juan Vicente Gomez (1910–1935) accumulated $200 million and became the nation’s largest landowner. Major Marcos Pérez Jiménez did even better during his short reign (1951–1957), building a fortune of more than $250 million. The Somoza clan ruled Nicaragua from 1936 to 1979, dominating the economy and stashing away tens of millions of dollars. Haiti has had scarcely one uncorrupt leader in its entire history, but the Duvaliers (François 1957–1971; Jean-Claude 1971–1986) stand out even in that wretched lot. When JeanClaude fled Haiti in 1986, he was said to be worth $800 million. Fulgencio Batista, president of Cuba from 1940 to 1944 and from 1952 to 1958, accumulated a fortune of between $100 and $300 million. Rafael Trujillo treated the Dominican Republic as his personal fiefdom during his 1930– 1961 reign. At one point, Trujillo acquired the country’s only shoe factory and then forbade Dominicans to go barefoot. Visitors to Santo Domingo noted that the country’s poverty must be exaggerated: After all, everyone wore shoes! Trujillo’s practice of requiring a 10 percent bribe on every governmental transaction helped him fill his bank accounts with up to $500 million.

While presidential corruption is a long tradition in Latin America, a newer plague is infecting

states from the Rio Grande to the Andes: drug trafficking. Norteamericanos’ insatiable appetite for cocaine, marijuana, and heroin (and their government’s insistence on maintaining the ban on such substances) is undermining political stability in several Latin American countries. Cocaine cartels have been a fixture in Colombia since the 1970s. In the 1980s, the Medellín cartel threatened the stability of the Colombian government. More recently, it was revealed that the Calí cartel had partially funded the presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper (1994–1998). The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), guerrillas funded by the drug trade, now control much of the country. Many observers fear that Colombia will become the hemisphere’s first ‘‘narco-state.’’

However, Mexico may get there first. Because of the extensive border it shares with the United States, Mexico has long been an ideal location for smugglers. When the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) increased surveillance in South Florida and the Caribbean during the late 1980s, the cocaine trade moved into Mexico. Since then the drug trade has boomed in Mexico, corrupting nearly every area of the Mexican government. Even General Jesús Gutierrez Rebollo, who was leading Mexico’s war on drugs, was arrested for accepting bribes from a major drug trafficker. The Mexican police are universally believed to be corrupt. State governors, army officers, party lead- ers—the drug traffickers have ties to them all.

Several leaders have made their countries havens for the drug trade. The most famous, of course, is Manuel Antonio Noriega, who dominated Panama from 1983 to 1989. An American invasion brought him to the United States, where he now serves a sentence for drug trafficking and racketeering. Vinicio Cerezo, president of Guatemala from 1985 to 1990, was widely suspected of being friendly to the drug trade. For a time during the 1980s, Bolivia was run by a group of military officers known as the ‘‘cocaine colonels.’’

Some of the larger nations in Latin America have developed large, clientelistic political party machines. Probably the most famous is Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has (under different names) dominated Mexican politics since 1929. Since then, the PRI has won every presidential elections and most state ones, often

fraudulently. Since the 1980s, however, the National Action Party (PAN) and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) have become serious competitors for power. The PRI’s influence permeates Mexican society through corporatist labor and business organizations. PRI patronage dominates many institutions. Mexico’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos, is notoriously corrupt. Mexico has a long history of presidents who retired wealthy. José Lopez Portillo, president from 1976 to 1982, parlayed the oil boom of those years into a fortune of at least $5 billion. Carlos Salinas de Gortari (president, 1988–1994) moved to Ireland under widespread suspicion of massive corruption. His brother, Raul, was later convicted of arranging the murder of a prominent PRI politician. While Salinas privatized many of Mexico’s state-owned firms, thereby opening up its economy, some of these companies went to PRI allies under suspicious circumstances.

From 1958 to 1998, two political parties dominated Venezuela in close cooperation. Vast oil wealth provided the necessary resources for patronage (a country of 22 million has 1.3 million government employees) and subsidies. The state nationalized many industries, providing more opportunities for patronage and graft, but also leaving the private sector weak and dependent. During the boom of the 1970s, politicians could indulge their penchant for cronyism and corruption. The decline in oil prices in the 1980s diminished the parties’ ability to mollify dissent. Jaime Lusinchi, president from 1983 to 1988, had to remain in exile for several years to avoid prosecution for misuse of state property. Carlos Andres Pérez, a fixture in Venezuelan politics since the 1950s and twice president (1974–1979, 1988–1993), was impeached in 1993 for abuse of public funds. Hugo Chavez, who had led an attempted coup d’état against Pérez, was elected president in 1998 without the support of the major parties.

Brazil lacks strong political parties, but it does not lack for patronage. Especially in rural areas, there is a tradition of machine politics dominated by local elites who use public resources to win mass support. President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992) emerged from this background. While other Brazilian presidents had corrupt reputations, such as Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1956–1962) and José Sarney (1985–1990), Collor

became the first president to be impeached by Congress. He resigned before he could be removed from office. Corruption under the Collor regime included overpricing on government contracts, rigging public bidding, insider deals, and illegal fundraising. Collor’s campaign treasurer, Paulo César Farias, collected $2 billion in kickbacks from leading contractors. Collor himself spent $2.5 million on a garden at his home. One corrupt Collor ally in the Brazilian Congress claimed his wealth came from winning the lottery 333 times; he used the lottery as a means of laundering his corrupt wealth. Some observers argued the Collor era’s corruption stemmed from changes in Brazil’s electoral law that made it more difficult for the president to form stable coalitions in Congress. Brazil’s economic crisis reduced the public resources available for bargaining, forcing Collor to turn to private sources.

CORRUPTION IN COMMUNIST AND POST-

COMMUNIST STATES

Nowhere in the world does corruption pervade society more thoroughly than in communist and post-communist states. The absolute command of resources that characterizes communist states, and many post-communist states, makes them perfect loci for massive corruption. Under Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, terror kept corruption from getting out of line. As communist states aged, corruption became more flagrant. In the USSR, the regime of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982) became a synonym for graft and inefficiency. Almost all Communist Party officials took bribes; most exploited their offices for all the privileges they were worth. Organized crime, which has a centu- ries-old history in Russia, established close ties with party leaders. Indeed, the black market often was all that kept the USSR from collapsing. Managers of state factories and farms had to be corrupt to survive. They lacked the material necessary to meet their goals, so they bribed officials to approve their production. Ordinary citizens had to bribe, too, in order to get consumer goods, medical care, and housing.

Other communist countries featured extensive corruption that came to light after the revolution of 1989–1991. Exposure of the lavish lifestyles

of the East German elite—who had always preached Marxist simplicity—led to massive demonstrations and helped trigger the end of the communist regime. The leaders of Bulgaria and Romania have also been revealed to be corrupt.

The communist era bequeathed a legacy that made massive corruption inevitable in most postcommunist countries: a contempt for written law, a complete lack of protections for private property, a cynical public, an arrogant officialdom, a state-dominated economy, an absence of any institutions independent of the state. Some post-com- munist states made the transition relatively easily and with relatively little corruption: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and the Baltic states. But the states of the former USSR (with the exception of the Baltics) have traveled a rockier path that has mostly led in to a swamp of corruption.

When Russia privatized many of its state firms in 1992, the bulk of them went to former communist apparatchiks, ex-KGB agents, mafiya leaders, and a few well-connected businessmen. These ‘‘oligarchs’’ generally paid bargain-basement prices. They have dominated Russian politics in the post-communist era and have supplied crucial support for President Boris Yeltsin. The crash of the ruble in the summer of 1998 damaged both their political credibility and their economic clout. Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is widely believed to have made a multi-billion-dollar fortune from the privatization of the state natural gas monopoly, Gazprom—one of the few Sovietera companies that makes something that anybody wants. Allegations of massive corruption have swirled about former Finance Minister Anatoly Chubais, once the great hope of reform.

Paid poorly or not at all, military officers have turned to selling their own equipment. During the conflict in Chechnya, some Russian soldiers actually sold weapons to the Chechen separatists. Officers often would rather smuggle than perform their military duties. Some even sell nuclear material or chemical weaponry to rogue states. Customs officials are so corrupt and obstreperous that the U.S. government actually trains Russian businessmen in techniques for avoiding them.

Despite all the talk of Russian capitalism, the state still dominates the economy. Most Russians

still work for state firms. Businessmen must obtain licenses for most activities, which creates great opportunity for extortion. More important, Russia has not created the kind of legal system necessary for private enterprise to flourish. With few laws to govern the emerging capitalist economy, bureaucrats can take away a company’s assets at a whim. With their property at the mercy of corrupt officials, even honest businessmen must bribe to stay afloat. There is little tradition of respecting private property in Russia. Even under the czars, all land belonged to the sovereign; even the wealthiest landowner was legally a tenant.

Taking advantage of this time of troubles, organized crime has taken over much of the Russian economy, with the help of their old communist and Komitet Gosudarstvennos Bezopasnoti (Committee for State Security) (KGB) allies. The police and other law enforcement agencies are underpaid, undermanned, and demoralized. With domination of their home territory assured, Russian gangsters are now spreading their activities worldwide.

Other post-communist states have their own patterns of massive corruption. Foreign investors have shied away from Ukraine, despite its rich farmland and modern factories, because its allencompassing graft and labyrinthine bureaucracy makes doing business almost impossible. As in Russia, former communist officials and mafiya gangsters dominate the economy. Ex-communists made Bulgaria and Romania bywords for corruption until the voters booted them out.

China has moved toward a market economy while retaining the Communist Party’s monopoly on political power. This has created many opportunities for corruption. Party leaders have plundered state firms, received state loans, and embezzled state funds. The People’s Liberation Army has entered a variety of businesses, some legal, some not. The children of communist leaders—the socalled ‘‘princelings’’—have used their positions to build fortunes. Some observers have argued that corruption has smoothed the transition to capitalism by circumventing bureaucratic rules. It is true that corruption has been most visible in the fastestgrowing parts of China, especially in the southern province of Guangdong, where it may well have opened doors that strict legality would have kept shut. Corruption may now be harming commerce.

Like Russia, China lacks a system of property law, so businessmen remain at the mercy of officialdom and cannot settle their disputes in court. They must instead rely on bribery and guangxi (connections), which often translates into giving local bosses a cut of their profits. Foreign investors are losing patience. There are also signs that corruption is impairing governance. During the Yangtze River floods of the summer of 1998, water washed away many ‘‘bean-curd’’ dams and bridges. Officials had embezzled the money that would have strengthened these structures. Premier Zhu Rongji has used these disasters to justify his current anticorruption campaign.

North Korea has not moved away from communism one bit, so there is no private sector to shake down. Instead, the state itself has become a criminal enterprise. With its economy in ruins, North Korea has become a ‘‘gangster state’’ that sells narcotics and counterfeit money around the world. It can no longer pay its diplomats, so they support themselves by smuggling. North Korea’s fake $100 bills are so convincing that they led the United States to redesign its currency. To fuel its drug trade, the state runs its own methamphetamine factories and opium poppy farms.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

The global trend toward democracy and capitalism may decrease corruption in the long term, but in the short term it may increase the perception of corruption. The openness brought by democracy allows for greater disclosures of official malfeasance. Graft that would have remained secret under an authoritarian regime instead comes out, perhaps damaging the public’s opinion of politicians. While capitalism reduces the state’s role in the economy, thereby decreasing the opportunity for officials to enrich themselves, the privatization schemes necessary for the transition to free markets often become a bonanza for those in power.

There are several attempts to fight corruption on an international level. Transparency International, founded in 1993, organizes anticorruption efforts across the world. Its annual survey of perceptions of corruption has embarrassed many graftridden countries. Transparency International now has chapters in seventy countries. In 1997, twentynine members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) signed

the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. This accord, which went into effect in February 1999, forbids the bribery of foreign executive, legislative, and judicial officials. Countries that signed the accord had to agree to punish offenders severely, to help each other prosecute offenders, and to encourage the wider use of sound accounting and auditing practices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank now often condition their loans on steps to reduce corruption and ‘‘crony capitalism.’’ In 1997, the World Bank established a comprehensive anticorruption program.

REFERENCES

Elazar, Daniel J. 1984 American Federalism: A View from the Stars, 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Elliott, Kimberly Ann (ed.) 1997 Corruption and the Global Economy. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

Ford, Henry Jones 1904 ‘‘Municipal Corruption.’’ Political Science Quarterly 19:673–686.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J., Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine (eds.) 1989 Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968 Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Johnston, Michael 1982 Political Corruption and Public Policy in America. Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole.

Little, Walter, and Eduardo Posada-Carbó (eds.) 1996

Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America. New York: St. Martin’s.

Key, V. O., Jr. 1936 The Techniques of Political Graft in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mauro, Paolo 1997 Why Worry about Corruption? Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

Noonan, John T., Jr. 1984 Bribes. New York: Macmillan.

Nye, Joseph S. 1967 ‘‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.’’ American Political Science Review 66 (June):417.

Sabato, Larry J., and Glenn R. Simpson 1996 Dirty Little Secrets: The Persistence of Corruption in American Politics. New York: Times Books.

Steffens, Lincoln. (1904) 1968 The Shame of the Cities. New York: Hill & Wany.

‘‘The Last Days of Mobutu.’’ 1997 The Economist March 22: 21.

RICHARD MCGRATH SKINNER

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL

CORRECTNESS

While the term political correctness (hereafter, PC) entered common parlance only in the mid-1990s and may soon lose its popularity, the phenomenon to which it refers, namely ideological conformity with the views of those in power or in fashion, is millenia old. To have PC, there must be ideology, and ideology developed with the formation of states. To the extent that all states use violence or the threat thereof to serve the interests of the few who control the state by extracting resources from the many who do not, states always face a problem of legitimacy. If they are to minimize their use of coercive violence to extract surplus production, states must try to convince their subjects that the state serves the interests not only of the ruling class but of the society as a whole. Such is the role of ideology, whether religious or secular.

Until the French Revolution, most states tried to legitimate themselves by identifying themselves with a religion, for instance, Confucianism in China, various branches of Christianity in Europe, and Islam from Morocco to Indonesia. In these ‘‘premodern’’ states, PC was virtually synonymous with religious orthodoxy, as defined by the political and religious elites in control. It was enforced by sanctions ranging from execution, torture, and expulsion to expropriation, ostracism, disfranchisement, discrimination, and segregation. In the late eighteenth century, the American and French revolutions abruptly shifted the onus of state legitimation from religious orthodoxy to a secular ideology of ‘‘liberty, equality, fraternity.’’ This ideology was, however, widely at variance with the structure of highly stratified societies (such as the United States, a slave society) and the practice of coercive states that were often democratic in name only. The bourgeois liberal ideology of the French Revolution gradually spread to much of the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, briefly challenged by two large countermovements, one reactionary (fascism), one radical (Marxism). Both challenges collapsed, fascism after a quarter-century, in mid-twentieth century, and Marxism in three-quarters of a century, some forty years later.