Encyclopedia of Sociology Vol

causes will experience action as being extrinsically motivated.

Causality Orientations Theory. Intrinsic motivation is viewed as a basic ongoing motivational propensity of all individuals that directs activity unless it is blocked in some way (Deci and Ryan 1985). Major constraints on experiencing intrinsic motivation can include stable or transient individual differences in the ways that individuals make sense of events. The most important causal orientations for understanding autonomy are the autonomy orientation and the control orientation. Individuals experiencing an autonomy orientation do not feel their behavior to be controlled by external contingencies. Instead, the individuals’ experiences are ones of choice, flexibility, awareness of needs, effective accommodation to the environment, and responsiveness to available information. Such individuals are able to effectively seek out situations that allow them to experience autonomy, to use information in initiating action, and to be resilient in the face of difficulties. Only in an individual experiencing a ‘‘control orientation’’ does the tension between desired autonomy and controlling forces become salient and intrinsic motivation become reduced. In situations requiring action, such individuals experience feelings of pressure and anxiety, and action comes to be viewed as controlled by either internal factors not of their making (e.g., perceived obligations) or external forces (Deci and Ryan 1985). An individual’s causal orientation is important because failure to experience autonomy is associated with reduced functioning, poorer health, and increased psychopathology (Deci and Ryan 1987; Ryan et al. 1995).

Undermining Effects of Reward on Intrinsic Motivation. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are affected not only by individuals’ orientations toward explaining the causes of their actions, but also by the presence of external rewards or punishments for engaging in certain actions. Engaging in an intrinsically motivated activity means that it is the feelings of enjoyment and excitement that result from the activity that are rewarding. Presence of other rewards is unnecessary to such experiences (Deci and Ryan 1985). In fact, an important finding is that receiving rewards can be detrimental for behavior that is normally intrinsically motivated. Children or adults who begin receiving rewards for engaging in such behavior

may find motivation for that activity to become extrinsic in nature (Lepper and Greene 1978). Paradigmatic demonstrations of this phenomenon involve paying college students for performing enjoyable tasks such as solving puzzles and giving children a ribbon and gold star as a goodplayer award for playing with magic markers (Deci 1971; Lepper et al. 1973). Subsequent to receiving rewards, interest in the activity can be decreased once rewards are again absent. This decrease in task interest is thought to indicate a shift toward extrinsic motivation for performance of the task. Moreover, rewards can have similarly deleterious effects on tasks that require an individual to be creative.

Both the pervasiveness and the interpretation of these negative effects on task interest and creativity remain matters of heated debate (Eisenberger and Cameron 1996, 1998; Hennessey and Amabile 1998; Lepper 1998; Sansone and Harackiewicz 1998). There do, however, appear to be some reliable conditions under which tangible rewards such as money, candy, or gold stars decrease intrinsic motivation. Receiving expected rewards regardless of the quality of one’s performance leads participants to subsequently spend less time engaging in a task once the reward is removed.

Cognitive Evaluation Theory. The primary au- tonomy-based interpretation for reduced task interest comes from cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and Ryan 1985). Cognitive evaluation theory suggests that, to the extent that rewards are controlling, intrinsic motivation will be decreased. Controlling events are ones that make individuals feel pressured to behave in a certain way. The presence of controlling events decreases feelings of selfdetermination by leading perceivers to believe that they are acting in order to receive a desired outcome. For example, tangible rewards like money or physical awards that are given regardless of the quality of the work can lead an individual to view actions as being instrumental for getting a desired outcome, and thus as controlled by those rewards. But receiving rewards can also be informative, conveying that one is competent. Such feedback about performance increases intrinsic motivation. Thus, in some contexts the informational function of a reward may override the decrease in intrinsic motivation that results from its controlling function. This is particularly the case,

according to cognitive evaluation theory, for unexpected or intangible rewards such as praise. In addition, when receipt of a reward is contingent on performance, a tangible cue highly symbolic of one’s achievement can also be intrinsically motivating (Harackiewicz et al. 1984; Sansone and Harackiewicz 1998). Related research on creativity has been explained in terms of how rewards can orient the individual toward goal-relevant stimuli. For creativity tasks where one’s thinking needs to be divergent and less stimulus-bound, such a goalrelated focus can be counterproductive, reducing the cognitive flexibility and intense involvement in a task needed for producing novel solutions (Amabile 1983).

The findings regarding intrinsic and extrinsic motivation have important implications for the ideal socialization of members of a society (Ryan et al. 1997). One task of a society is appropriate socialization of its members, directing their behavior in productive avenues. In a sense, a major task of culture is to provide individuals with appropriate means of determining how their lives can contribute to a fuller development of humankind, offering as it were, an appropriate avenue for ‘‘heroism’’ (Becker 1971). Ryan and colleagues (1991, 1997) argue that creating individuals who are cooperative and not alienated from society requires that socializing agents provide opportunities for autonomy within a supportive context of belongingness. Behavior that is experienced as occurring either under social pressures or from internal forces of incompletely integrated, or introjected, societal values will not be experienced as autonomous. Successful internalization of societal values such that they result in intrinsically motivated behavior is thus ideal for effective functioning of a society.

Reactance Theory. A second theory that has implications for understanding decreased interest in a task after receiving controlling rewards is reactance theory. From this perspective, loss of autonomy, of ability to choose to engage in some action, means loss of freedom. Thus, when individuals begin to anticipate a reward for behavior that was previously driven solely by intrinsic motives, they may in some contexts come to see that reward as an attempt to impose on them some type of action-outcome contingency. They may feel a sense that the attempt is intended to restrict their

ability to freely engage or not engage in the activity at will. This loss of expected freedom induces a state of psychological tension known as reactance (Brehm 1993; Brehm and Brehm 1981). Reactance involves the experience of active, negative emotional states such as frustration and anger, and results in an individual’s engaging in active attempts to regain the lost freedoms. From this perspective, reduced interest in a task is not a result of declining intrinsic motivation per se, but is merely an expression of a general motivation to regain lost freedom of choice. It is important to note that defiant rebellion against controlling influences does not necessarily mean regaining freedom. Automatically withdrawing effort from activities that were previously pleasing means that one’s choices are being controlled in an oppositional way by those external influences (Deci and Ryan 1985).

AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF

CONTROL NEEDS

The recent conception of autonomy proposed by Deci and Ryan (1985) is similar in many ways to an earlier notion of the motivation to have effective interaction with one’s environment, effectance motivation (White 1959). White proposed that a variety of behaviors of the active organism, such as play, exploration, and active curiosity, can best be explained by proposing a need to engage in activities that lead to feelings of efficacy, and that allow the developing organism to become competent. Thus the notion of an effectance or mastery motive is closely related to a motive for autonomy in that both reflect a force that directs the organism toward increasing competence in managing the self and personal goals, or in managing one’s environment. Indeed, the need for autonomy, mastery, and a third motive, power (Winter 1973) can all be viewed as reflections of an organism’s need for personal control over various domains of their life (Marsh et al. 1998). Personal control involves a contingency between actions and outcomes, a sense of having in one’s repertoire actions that can increase the likelihood of getting desired outcomes. Thus needs for power reflect a need for control over the social environment, and needs for mastery reflect a need for control over the physical and nonsocial environment; autonomy reflects intrapersonal control needs.

From such a control motivation perspective, autonomy is reflected in controlling the self, regulating emotional responses, and making decisions regarding one’s actions. A key assumption of such an approach is that autonomy involves beliefs about contingency—notions about oneself as a causal force, consistent with deCharm’s (1968) notion of origins versus pawns. A particularly distinguishing feature of need for autonomy as a control motive is that it becomes defined in large part as reflecting a need to resist others’ controlling influence. From Deci and Ryan’s (1985) perspective, however, autonomy is about the choice over what action-outcome contingencies to explore, not about control per se. From their perspective, need for self-determination is quite independent of control needs; it is in a sense prior to control. Thus, if control needs are about whether the individual can have a shot at winning a game through his or her actions, autonomy is about having the choice of whether to enter the game— to decide whether to try to explore the contingencies, regardless of whether or not there are contingencies once the choice is made. Such need for autonomy is a proactive, ever-present force, not a reactive force that emerges in response to loss of intrapersonal control. In this way autonomy has an element much like early notions of mastery needs; effectance motivation was explicitly hypothesized to not be a deficit-based need and thus was viewed as dissimilar to tissue-deficit drives like hunger (White 1959).

However, the research on the effects of reward on intrinsic motivation makes it clear how sensitive the experience of autonomy is to deficits of autonomy. Autonomy is uniquely about freedom from control, in that having the freedom to explore contingencies in the world, to attend to intrinsic experiences of action rather than having to attend to the controlling features of a situation, is, in a real sense, about the ability to have control over oneself. In fact, individuals who have greater needs for autonomy show somewhat greater ability to detect another’s nonverbal displays in which affect and expression of dominance versus passivity are expressed; needs for power, in contrast, are uncorrelated with such skill (Marsh et al. 1999). Perhaps the nonverbal behavior of others is more informative to an individual with greater need for autonomy because the intentions of others might offer some threat to one’s own freedom. Thus,

considering autonomy within a context of control needs, and as potentially involving homeostatic processes (Pittman and Heller 1987), seems to have utility.

In general, though, understanding autonomy and its relationship to different domains of control needs, and understanding the effects of loss of autonomy, seem to be important factors not yet fully explored by social scientists. In particular, many of the cognitive processes that have been explored with loss of control in mastery domains have been less frequently explored in the domain of autonomy. Control motivation research demonstrates that individuals have strong tendencies toward biased perceptions that events are under their personal control, and that cognitive processes function to help maintain such biases. The extent to which autonomy-based action is similarly mediated by biased cognitive processes suggests important questions for future study.

Perhaps the most fundamental question not addressed in current research on autonomy harkens back to personality theorists’ beliefs that autonomy motives should be understood as standing in perpetual intrapsychic conflict with the need of the individual for surrender and communion with others. If such forces operate independently of one another, separate theories for autonomy and control and for belongingness processes are reasonable. On the other hand, early theorists may be correct in the belief that the desire for autonomy, control, and independence act in a continual creative conflict with the individual’s desire for social acceptance, integration, and union. From such a perspective, the tension may result in emergent phenomena not otherwise predicted by considering the needs independently of one another. Reexamining this dynamic tension may provide a useful next direction for developing a more complete picture of the impact of autonomy needs on the individual and on his or her connection with other individuals, important social groups, and society.

REFERENCES

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Brehm, J. W. 1993 ‘‘Control, Its Loss, and Psychological Reactance.’’ In G. Weary, F. Gleicher, and K. L. Marsh, eds., Control Motivation and Social Cognition. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Brehm, S., and J. W. Brehm 1981 Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and Control. New York: Academic Press.

deCharms, R. 1968 Personal Causation. New York: Academic Press.

Deci, E. L. 1971 ‘‘Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 18:105–115.

———, and R. M. Ryan 1985 Intrinsic Motivation and SelfDetermination in Human Behavior. New York: Plenum.

——— 1987 ‘‘The Support of Autonomy and the Control of Behavior.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53:1024–1037.

Eisenberger, R., and J. Cameron 1996 ‘‘Detrimental Effects of Reward: Reality or Myth?’’ American Psychologist 51:1153–1166.

——— 1998 ‘‘Reward, Intrinsic Interest, and Creativity: New Findings.’’ American Psychologist 53:676–679.

Harackiewicz, J. M., G. Manderlink, and C. Sansone 1984 ‘‘Rewarding Pinball Wizardry: Effects of Evaluation and Cue Value on Intrinsic Interest.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47:287–300.

Hennessey, B. A., and T. M. Amabile 1988 ‘‘Reward, Intrinsic Motivation, and Creativity.’’ American Psychologist 53:674.

Lepper, M. R. 1998 ‘‘A Whole Much Less than the Sum of its Parts.’’ American Psychologist 53:675–676.

———, and D. Greene 1978 The Hidden Costs of Rewards. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

———, and R. E. Nisbett 1973 ‘‘Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the ‘Overjustification’ Hypothesis.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 28:129–137.

Marsh, K. L., S. A. Nasco, D. Hilton, G. S. Bains, and W. M. Webb 1999 ‘‘Domain-Specific Control: Individual Differences in Motivations for Mastery, Power, and Autonomy.’’ Manuscript under review.

Pittman, T. S., and J. F. Heller 1987 ‘‘Social Motivation.’’

Annual Review of Psychology 38:461–489.

Rank, O. 1929 The Trauma of Birth. New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Ryan, R. M. 1991 ‘‘The Nature of the Self in Autonomy and Relatedness.’’ In J. Strauss and G. R. Goethals,

eds., The Self: Interdisciplinary Approaches. New York: Springer-Verlag.

———, J. Kuhl, and E. L. Deci 1997 ‘‘Nature and Autonomy: An Organizational View of Social and Neurobiological Aspects of Self-Regulation in Behavior and Development.’’ Development and Psychopathology 9:701–728.

Ryan, R. M., R. W. Plant, and S. O’Malley 1995 ‘‘Initial Motivations for Alcohol Treatment: Relations with Patient Characteristics, Treatment Involvement and Dropout.’’ Addictive Behaviors 20:279–297.

Sansone, C., and J. M. Harackiewicz 1998 ‘‘‘Reality’ is Complicated.’’ American Psychologist 53:673.

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Winter, D. G. 1973 The Power Motive. New York: Free Press.

KERRY L. MARSH

PERSONAL DEPENDENCY

Personal dependency is the tendency to seek support, security, reassurance, and guidance from outside the self. The object of dependency may be another person, a social unit (e.g., family, a religious group), or a symbolic belief system from which people receive positive outcomes, such as assistance, love, and/or the attainment of personal goals. The support requested can be physical (dependency on a caregiver by infants and persons who are very old, sick, or disabled), cognitive (a student’s reliance on his or her teacher), and/or emotional (reliance on another person for reassurance and love). A dependent relationship implies the existence of interpersonal bonding, commitment, involvement, obligation, and trust.

An analysis of social science literature clearly reveals that personal dependency has been conceptualized in either negative or positive terms. On the one hand, personal dependency has been equated with weakness, immaturity, and passivity, and it has been viewed as an obstacle to the development of an autonomous and mature person. On the another hand, personal dependency has been viewed as a basic human motivation, which accomplishes important adaptive functions. It seems to contribute to the process of coping with life adversities and to set the basis for the

formation of close relationships and social ties as well as for social cooperation and hierarchical social structures. In this article, I first present negative and positive conceptualizations of personal dependency. I then attempt to provide a more integrative conceptualization of dependency, in which its positive and negative aspects can coexist.

NEGATIVE VIEWS OF PERSONAL

DEPENDENCY

During the last century, several social science professionals have viewed personal dependency in adulthood as a sign of weakness and immaturity. For example, Bornstein (1993) defines personal dependency in terms of negatively valued beliefs and emotions. Dependency-related beliefs refer to mental representations of the self and the social world that justify the tendency to seek support from other persons in times of need. Specifically, they include the perception of the self as weak, helpless, and ineffectual, as well as the beliefs that other persons are powerful and have the ability and skills to solve life problems and to control the course and outcomes of environmental events. Dependency-related emotions include the arousal of anxiety and worry upon external demands to deal with life tasks in an independent manner as well as fears of criticism, rejection, and separation. According to Bornstein (1993), these beliefs and emotions detract from independence, reinforce dependency over the life span, and facilitate its generalization across different interpersonal situations and social settings.

The emphasis on the negative aspects of personal dependency seems to reflect Western societies’ values of independence, autonomy, and mastery. It also seems to reflect the view that mature, well-adjusted persons should attempt to cope with life tasks in an autonomous and self-directed way. As a result, the tendency to turn to others for support, assistance, and reassurance in times of need can be equated with immaturity, helplessness, and powerlessness, as well as with the failure to meet cultural expectations and standards. Moreover, it can be viewed as a risk factor for psychological problems, such as depression, anxiety, alcoholism, and eating disorders, as well as for negative social phenomena, such as loss of personal identity

and blind obedience to totalitarian leaders. In extreme cases, when people suffer from persistent and severe interpersonal or occupational problems, personal dependency is considered to be a specific type of diagnosable psychological disorder.

The negative view of dependency can be traced to early writings of Freud, who argued that dependency in adulthood consists of immature and infantile forms of behaviors. In his view, a dependent orientation toward life is related to gratifying and frustrating breast-feeding experiences during the first year of life, when infants’ survival completely depends on their mother’s goodwill. Abrupt weaning, frustrations related to rigid and insensitive feeding schedules, and/or the failure to end the nursing period are hypothesized to result in a failure to adequately deal with conflicts regarding dependency and autonomy. This failure is reflected in the arousal of anxiety every time one is required to act in an independent manner; the experience of serious doubts about one’s own ability to be an autonomous person; and the longing for the infantile, dependent relationship with the feeding mother. Problematic breast-feeding experiences are also hypothesized to lead people to believe that the solution for their problems is outside and that others can take care of them in the same way that their mothers fed them.

The problem with Freud’s ideas is that they are not supported by empirical findings (see Bornstein 1993, for a review). First, studies have failed to find a coherent and meaningful pattern of association between feeding experiences in infancy and self-reports of personal dependency in adulthood. Second, there is no strong evidence that personal dependency in adulthood is associated with mouthand food-related activities as well as with oral behaviors (e.g., thumbsucking). Third, mixed results have been found in studies assessing the association between personal dependency and psychological disorders that have an oral component, such as eating disorders, alcoholism, and tobacco addiction. However, although findings do not support Freud’s premise that dependency equals immaturity and infantilism, it still continues to exert a major influence in psychological writings.

A related approach to personal dependency can be found in object relation theories, which

emphasize the crucial role that the early childparent relationship plays in social and emotional development (Greenberg and Mitchell 1983). Like Freudian theory, these theories view events occurring during the first one or two years of life as critical for the development of personal dependency. However, unlike Freud, the proponents of object relations theories do not emphasize feeding experiences. Rather, they focus on the child’s relationship with his or her parents and the failure to resolve conflicts around nurture and closeness, on the one hand, and separation and autonomy, on the other. In these terms, personal dependency reflects an infantile desire to merge with other persons and to be cared for by them. Furthermore, it is related to the search for absolute love and enmeshed relationships, the use of psychotropic drugs, and the identification with strong leaders and highly cohesive groups.

One basic hypothesis derived from object relation theories is that parenting style during infancy and childhood may be critical for an understanding of the development of offspring’s personal dependency. Bornstein (1993) follows this idea and contends that overprotective and/or authoritarian parenting may create a vicious circle that increases the likelihood of offspring’s dependency. Specifically, overprotective and/or authoritarian parents may prevent their children from engaging in exploratory and trial-and-error activities that promote a sense of mastery and autonomy. As a result, these children may perceive themselves as weak and may tend to seek others’ help when confronted with life tasks. This support-seeking tendency may elicit others’ helping behaviors, which, in turn, may further reinforce personal dependency. Along this reasoning, personal dependency would be overtly expressed mainly when the other (e.g., a parent, a teacher) is perceived as a powerful authority, and may underlie the blind pursuit of strong and authoritarian leaders who can offer protection and help.

The contribution of parenting style to personal dependency has also been acknowledged in social learning theories, which focus on the type of behaviors that parents reinforce throughout childhood and adolescence (Rotter 1982). Specifically, children whose parents positively reinforce passive and dependent behaviors are hypothesized to become dependent adult persons. These children

may learn that dependent behaviors are adequate instrumental means for obtaining positive outcomes (e.g., love, esteem) from parents and that active and autonomous behaviors should be inhibited if they want to maintain a good relationship with parents. Social learning theories also hypothesize that this learning would be generalized across situations, leading people to behave in a dependent manner in a wide variety of social contexts. Like object relation theories, social learning theories suggest that overprotective and/or authoritarian parenting would lead to offspring’s dependency, because such parents may reinforce passive and dependent behaviors. However, social learning theories differ from object relation theories in that they view personal dependency as an active instrumental means for obtaining positive outcomes from authority figures.

In emphasizing parental reinforcement and learning processes, social learning theories also highlight the role that the learning of gender roles—the learning of cultural norms and expectations regarding feminine and masculine traits and behaviors—may play in the development of personal dependency (Mischell 1970). This is particularly noted in Western cultures, where the equation between dependency and femininity may lead parents to reinforce dependent behaviors among girls and to punish these behaviors in boys. In this way, parents may provide differential reinforcement for boys and girls, leading children to meet cultural expectations concerning the expression of dependency. However, one should recall that the ‘‘dependency = femininity’’ equation reflects Western societies’ norms and that other cultural contexts can produce different gender-role expectations and different patterns of parental reinforcement.

The negative aspects of dependency have been also emphasized by interpersonal theories of personality (e.g., Leary 1957). In these theories, dependency has been equated with personal characteristics of weaknesses, passivity, and helplessness. Moreover, it has been associated with suggestibility, compliance, and the adherence to others’ beliefs and interests as a means for obtaining love, approval, and support. Interpersonal theories also emphasize that dependency is associated with fear of negative evaluation and test anxiety, which, in turn, may further exacerbate dependency. These

worries may divert cognitive resources away from active, self-directed behaviors and may lead people to escape or avoid any situation that demands autonomy and independence.

Like psychoanalytic theories, interpersonal theories also suggest that personal dependency in adulthood increases the risk for psychological problems. In this context, studies have examined the association between self-reports of dependency, on the one hand, and depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and eating disorders, on the other. However, results are mixed. Whereas some studies have indeed found a positive association between self-reports of dependency and psychological disorders, other studies have failed to find such an association. Moreover, there is evidence that dependency may be an outcome rather than a cause of psychological disorders (Bornstein 1993). For examples, there are studies showing that the onset of depression and the resulting increase in helplessness and powerlessness feelings promote passive and dependent behavior. Accordingly, longitudinal studies have shown that the onset of alcoholism is followed by an increase in dependent behavior.

The above findings put into question the view that dependency is a negative personal characteristic. Rather, they may imply that dependent behavior reflects a cry for help, reassurance, and support in dealing with emotional and social problems. As such, dependent behavior may be an adaptive means for overcoming life difficulties with the help of others. In these cases, avoiding support seeking and maintaining a facade of autonomy and self-reliance may have detrimental consequences for people who really need help and support to overcome their predicaments.

POSITIVE VIEWS OF PERSONAL

DEPENDENCY

The positive sides of personal dependency have been emphasized by psychological and sociological theories that focus on the development and stability of social relations, contracts, and organizations. In terms of Kelley’s interdependence theory (1979)—the most influential theory on interpersonal relationships—the reliance of person on a partner for the satisfaction of his or her own needs is a basic requirement for the development and

stability of close and positive relationships. In fact, Kelley suggests that there can be no stable relationship when a person is unable or unwilling to rely on his or her partner. Dependency is the psychological glue that maintains a close relationship over time. Moreover, it seems to prevent people from moving toward alternative relationships.

Along the above reasoning, personal dependency is considered to be one core component of the experience of love and to be associated with other components of this phenomenon, such as commitment, intimacy, and trust. For example, theory and research have emphasized that a person’s dependency on a romantic partner precedes commitment to the relationship—precedes the intention to maintain the relationship in the future. Accordingly, dependency seems to play a critical role in the development of closeness and intimacy within love relationships. People who can rely on their partners for need satisfaction have been found to develop a sense of trust and confidence in their partner’s goodwill, which, in turn, may facilitate the taking of risks in the relationship and the sharing of intimate feelings and thoughts with the partner. As a result, people may strengthen their willingness to initiate and maintain intimate patterns of communication while developing a sense of togetherness with the partner.

Personal dependency has been also viewed to play a positive role in group dynamics as well as in the stability of hierarchical relationships within social organizations. In this context, personal dependency seems to precede a person’s willingness to participate in group activities and to collaborate with others in teamwork, mainly when others are at a higher rank in the organizational hierarchy. People who are unable or unwilling to rely on others for goal achievement and task completion may be reluctant to participate in teamwork, may prefer to work alone, and may react negatively to authority figures who threaten their independence. Only when people feel that they need support and guidance from others may they be positively oriented toward teamwork and authority figures. In fact, there is evidence that the level of dependency members of a group feel toward each other is a sign of group cohesion and a positive predictor of group effectiveness. In a broader perspective, personal dependency seems to be a prerequisite for the phylogenetic development of social ties and structures.

Theory and research have also highlighted the association between dependency and positive personal characteristics. First, research has shown that the equation between dependency and passivity is not always true. In fact, there are many situations in which dependency leads to active forms of behavior, such as attempts to outperform others in order to attract the attention of an authority figure. Second, positive associations have been found between dependency and sensitivity to interpersonal cues—the ability to decode and understand others’ messages. Third, there is evidence that personal dependency is related to healthpromotion behaviors, such as seeking of medical treatments and compliance with them, as well as to relationship-enhancing traits, such as sociability, self-disclosure, and cooperative orientation in social interactions.

Studies in the field of stress and coping have shown that people who seek support and guidance from others in times of need possess positive mental representations of the self and the social world. In these studies, the tendency to rely on support seeking as a coping strategy has been found to be related to the perception of the self as capable of coping with stressful events and environmental demands. This tendency has been also found to be associated with optimistic beliefs about distress management as well as about others’ ability and willingness to provide support and guidance.

Personal dependency has also been found to result in adaptive behavior. The tendency to seek support from others has been conceptualized as a basic behavioral strategy that people use in coping with life adversities. In Lazarus and Folkman’s model (1984), the most influential theory in the field of stress and coping, support seeking is considered to be one of the most frequently used coping strategies. More important, research has consistently found that reliance on this coping strategy leads to positive psychological and social outcomes. Specifically, people who cope with life problems by seeking support from others tend to feel better, to experience less distress, and to show fewer problems in social functioning than people who rely only on themselves. Moreover, the belief that one can depend on others in times of need has been found to facilitate social adjustment.

Studies in the field of stress and coping have also shown that a reluctance to seek support in

times of need has negative health and adjustment outcomes. People who rely exclusively on themselves in dealing with intense and persistent stressful events have been found to experience, in the long run, high levels of distress and serious problems in physical health and social functioning. These findings may reflect the fragile nature of the ‘‘pseudo-safe’’ world of a person who believes that he or she can deal alone with all life problems and does not need the help of others. It seems that the lack of others to depend upon leaves this person vulnerable and helpless in face of stressful events.

The adaptive advantage of personal dependency has been particularly emphasized in Bowlby’s attachment theory (1969). In his terms, human infants are born with a prewired repertoire of behaviors aimed at maintaining proximity to other persons and seeking their support in times of need. These behaviors seem to reflect a basic human motivation and to accomplish a crucial adaptive function—to guarantee the survival of the helpless infant by eliciting helping behaviors in parents. According to Bowlby, this motivation persists over the entire life span, even among mature and autonomous adults. In fact, Bowlby does not view dependency as a sign of immaturity and infantilism, but as a healthy motivation that facilitates the process of coping with life problems and the development of positive social ties.

According to Bowlby, the tendency to rely on others in times of need is an inborn affect regulation device, which is automatically activated upon the experience of distress. In these cases, other persons function as a ‘‘haven of safety’’ to which people can retreat for comfort and reassurance and as a ‘‘secure base’’ from which they can develop their unique personalities in a loving and approving atmosphere. As a result, the overt expression of dependency needs and behaviors may have beneficial effects on the process of distress management as well as on the individual’s psychological wellbeing.

Bowlby also proposes that actual experiences related to the expression of dependency needs exert tremendous influence on social and emotional development. On the one hand, interactions with significant others who are responsive to one’s dependency needs may lead to the experience of more and longer episodes of positive affect and the development of positive feelings

toward the world and the self. On the other hand, interactions with rejecting others may elicit chronic distress, serious doubts about others’ intentions, and problems around dependency-autonomy themes.

Along the above reasoning, actual experiences related to the expression of dependency needs may shape the way people cope with life adversities. Specifically, interactions with significant others who are responsive to one’s dependency needs set the basis for the construction of effective distress management strategies. People may find out that acknowledgment and display of distress elicits positive responses from significant others. They may also learn that they are capable of eliciting helping responses from others and that support seeking is an effective way of coping. In this way, the satisfaction of dependency needs would lead people to regulate affect by overtly expressing distress and engaging in active seeking of support.

Interestingly, Bowlby does not conceptualize dependency and autonomy as antagonistic motivations. Rather, he suggests that the satisfaction of dependency needs might facilitate the development of an autonomous person. In his terms, autonomous activities in infancy are activated when a caregiver satisfies infants’ dependency needs and when he or she is perceived as a ‘‘secure base’’ to which infants can retreat in case of danger. Thus, infants who can use the caregiver as a ‘‘secure base’’ can show a balance between dependency and autonomy. They can move away from the caregiver without being anxious about his or her availability, can return to him or her when danger arises, and can recommence autonomous activities (e.g., play, exploration) as the proximity to the caregiver is reestablished. Overall, the expression of dependency needs does not necessarily mean that the person cannot engage in autonomous behavior. Rather, the expression and satisfaction of these needs seems to set the basis for a confident and pleasurable development of autonomy.

AN INTEGRATIVE VIEW OF PERSONAL

DEPENDENCY

The above-reviewed literature clearly indicates that personal dependency may have both negative and positive implications for the individual and the society. The main question here is whether and how the negative and positive aspects of personal dependency can coexist. In other words, one should

attempt to present a more integrative view of personal dependency, which can explain how this phenomenon may be an adaptive device and at the same time may lead to maladjustment and social problems.

As noted earlier, Bowlby argues that personal dependency is a healthy human behavior and that the tendency to seek support from others has positive psychological and social effects. However, this healthy pattern of behavior can become dysfunctional upon the recurrent frustration of one’s cry for help. According to Bowlby, when people perceive significant others as nonresponsive to their dependency needs, they may learn that support seeking fails to bring the expected relief and that other defensive strategies should be developed. One of these strategies is a ‘‘fight’’ response, by which people attempt to compulsively elicit others’ love and support through controlling and clinging responses. That is, these persons seem to develop an overly dependent pattern of behavior. The problem with this strategy is that it may create an anxious focus around social relationships; doubts about one’s autonomy; anxious demands for proximity; fears of separation, rejection, and criticism; and inability to leave frustrating social interactions. As can be seen, this defensive strategy seems to result in all the negative consequences that psychoanalytic and social learning theories have linked to personal dependency.

Along the above reasoning, personal dependency per se is not a pathological sign of weakness and immaturity. Only when healthy dependency needs are frustrated and a person adopts an overly dependent defensive strategy is he or she caught in a vicious circle of anxiety, helplessness, maladjustment, and increasing dependency. In this view, psychoanalytic and social learning theories have in fact dealt with overdependency rather than with the normal expression of dependency needs. Moreover, most of the findings relating dependency to emotional and social problems have been obtained from self-report questionnaires that tap overdependency rather than the tendency to seek support from others in times of need. These questionnaires include items about fears of rejection, separation, and criticism; need for approval; and doubts about autonomy.

The above reasoning receives strong support in studies that focus on the interpersonal and

intrapersonal correlates of adult attachment styles. Shaver and Hazan (1993) define attachment styles as stable patterns of beliefs, emotions, and behaviors in social relationships, and divide them into three types: secure, avoidant, and preoccupied. The ‘‘secure’’ style is defined by feelings of comfort with dependent relationships as well as by the tendency to seek support from others. The ‘‘avoidant’’ style is defined by reluctance to depend on others, avoidance of close relationships, and an overemphasis on autonomy and self-reliance. The ‘‘preoccupied’’ style is defined by compulsive attempts to minimize distance from others via clinging behaviors and fears of rejection, separation, and criticism. Overall, these three styles can be organized along a dependency continuum, with the ‘‘avoidant’’ style reflecting underdependency, the ‘‘secure’’ style the normal expression of these needs, and the ‘‘preoccupied’’ style overdependency.

Studies in adult attachment styles have consistently documented the adaptive advantage of the normal expression of dependency needs, as manifested in the secure style. First, securely attached persons have been found to report on more positive interactions with parents than avoidant and preoccupied persons. Second, persons addressing the secure style have been found to show less distress in times of stress than persons who address either an avoidant or a preoccupied style. Third, secure persons have been found to have more positive and stable close relationships and to be more positively involved in social activities than avoidant and preoccupied persons. That is, the overt expression of dependency needs is related to positive personal and social outcomes. In contrast, either the inhibition of these needs or the adoption of an overly dependent pattern of behavior seems to have detrimental effects on psychological and social functioning.

In conclusion, the above line of thinking and findings emphasize the balance between dependency and autonomy needs. The overt expression of dependency needs in adulthood does not necessarily compete with or inhibit autonomy needs. Rather, as Bowlby suggests, the satisfaction of dependency needs may facilitate the expression of autonomy needs. In these cases, people can freely move back and forth between dependency and autonomy, can flexibly accommodate to social demands, and then can maintain an adequate level

of social adjustment and functioning. Only when this balance is disrupted, either among persons who overemphasize autonomy or among those who behave in an overly dependent manner, is adjustment at risk. In these cases, people may be unable and/or unwilling to flexibly adjust to the social world, in which they should act autonomously at same times and rely on others at other times.

Of course, a person’s balance between dependency and autonomy needs depends not only on psychological factors. Rather, it also results from cultural and societal norms, values, and expectations. In fact, this balance would be different in societies that emphasize collectivist values (e.g., acceptance of social roles, family maintenance, and security) and in societies that emphasize individualistic values (e.g., personal achievement, mastery, freedom, and autonomy). Theory and research should attempt to provide a better understanding of the interface between cultural norms and values, a person’s history of social interactions, and his or her expression of personal dependency. Moreover, they should throw away anachronistic and simplistic views of personal dependency and adopt a more integrative view of this basic human motivation.

REFERENCES

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Bowlby, J. 1969 Attachment and Loss: Attachment. New York: Basic Books.

Greenberg, J. R., and Mitchell, S. A. 1983 Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Kelley, H. H. 1979 Personal Relationships: Their Structure and Processes. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Lazarus, R. S., and S. Folkman 1984 Stress, Appraisal, and Coping. New York: Springer.

Leary, T. 1957 Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality. New

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Mischell, W. 1970 ‘‘Sex Typing and Socialization.’’ In P. H. Mussen, ed., Carmichael’s Manual of Child Psychology, 3rd ed. New York: Wiley.

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Shaver, P. R., and C. Hazan 1993 ‘‘Adult Romantic Attachment: Theory and Evidence.’’ In D. Perlman