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by the choice of an appropriate response, and finally the individual must enact the chosen response behaviorally.

A revision of the model (Crick and Dodge 1994) highlighted the role of arousal regulation, especially between the steps of cue interpretation and generation of strategies. This means that the emotions experienced by the individual may influence the goals and responses generated, and eventually chosen. Thus, the social information processing model focuses on the intrapersonal processes that underlie interpersonal conflict resolution.

Interpersonal Negotiation Strategies Model.

The interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS) model (Selman and Demorest 1984; Yeats et al. 1990) draws from both the cognitive-developmental and the information-processing perspectives. It predicts that cognitive development is accompanied by an increased sophistication in the ability to coordinate the social perspective of the self and the other. Three factors implicated in the choice of an interpersonal negotiation strategy determine the developmental level of the strategy—the understanding of the self’s and the other’s perspective, the purpose of the strategy, and the affective control, or the way in which individuals understand and balance the affective disequilibrium. A fourth factor, the orientation, determines the type of strategy that the individual uses, namely, selftransforming or other-transforming. Children move through four developmental levels of social perspective taking—undifferentiated/egocentric, differentiated/subjective, self-reflective/reciprocal, and third-person/mutual. At the undifferentiated/egocentric level, children are not able to differentiate between the thoughts and feelings of self and the other. Their strategies, therefore, tend to be unreflective and impulsive, using either force or obedience. The differentiated/subjective level is characterized by the recognition that different persons have different perspectives on the situation. However, children understand the perspectives only from one person’s point of view. The next level, called the self-reflective/reciprocal level, is the level at which a child is able to mentally step outside the self and take the other person’s perspective. Children also understand that people’s actions do not have to reflect their thoughts and feelings. Finally, at the third-person/mutual level, the individual is truly able to take a third-person

perspective and understand the situation in terms of mutual goals.

One of the strengths of this model is that it views interpersonal negotiation strategies in an interpersonal context, juxtaposing the understanding of the self in relation to the other. However, the focus remains on the individual, not on the interpersonal process of conflict resolution.

FACTORS RELATED TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES

Age. There appear to be developmental trends in the use of certain conflict resolution strategies. In the case of aggression as a strategy, the evidence is somewhat contradictory, especially during preschool years. Some findings indicate the use of aggression (Dawe 1934), while others indicate a predominant use of insistence and rare use of aggression (Laursen and Hartup 1989). Overall, the use of power assertion decreases with age and the use of compromise increases with age. The use of compromise, however, may be restricted to hypothetical situations (Laursen and Collins 1994). Thus, adolescents may offer compromise as a solution to hypothetical situations but may report using disengagement as often as compromise (Collins and Laursen 1992). For example, a study of conflict occurring in family talk (Vuchinich 1990) revealed that adolescents are more likely to use standoff (disengagement from the conflict) or withdrawal (physical disengagement from the situation). The use of disengagement may be evident as early as middle childhood (Joshi 1997). Also, the use of compromise may emerge during middle childhood (Joshi 1998). Longitudinal studies are needed to confirm developmental patterns evinced by cross-sectional studies.

Gender. The clearest gender differences are in the use of aggression, with girls being less likely to use physical aggression than boys. During middle childhood, girls may be more likely to end conflicts with friends with disengagement (Joshi 1997). Using the INS framework, an investigation of adolescents reporting hard-drug use suggested that boys are more likely to use other-transforming strategies, whereas girls use both self-transforming as well as other-transforming strategies (Leadbeater et al. 1989). Overall there appear to be no clear gender differences other than in the use of aggression.

The Relationship. The relationship as the context of the conflict is another factor that influences how the conflict is resolved. Relationships that are defined by kinship norms may be considered by individuals as a ‘‘safer’’ context in which to disagree and argue, since there is no immediate threat of dissolution of the relationships (Berscheid 1985; Laursen 1993). Thus, adolescents may be more likely to use compromise with friends than with adult family members (Laursen and Collins 1994). Another dimension along which relationships vary is the distribution of power. Peer relationships are more egalitarian, while a hierarchy typifies parent–child relationships (Maccoby and Martin 1983). We could, therefore, hypothesize that children are more likely to use negotiation and compromise with peers than with parents. How does the resolution of conflict differ between peers and between parents and children?

CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITH PEERS

Research on conflict resolution with peers reveals some general patterns. In one of the earliest observational studies on conflict resolution, Dawe (1934) found that in naturally occurring conflicts in 2- to 5-year-olds, the use of aggression increased with age. Aggression was expressed in behaviors such as pushing, pulling, and striking. Talking during conflict also increased with age. Children resolved most conflicts themselves. When preschoolers’ conversations were examined, Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) found that children used verbal strategies such as insistence and repetition, reasoning, and asking for explanations. Subsequent observations of preschoolers (Killen and Turiel 1991) indicated that in a natural setting as well as a lab setting, children ended more conflicts without active resolutions. Laursen and Hartup (1989) found somewhat similar results from their observations of preschoolers. Insistence was the most frequently used strategy, negotiation and aggression were rarely used, and most conflicts were resolved without adult intervention.

At an older age (7 years), children report using predominantly direct strategies (50 percent), such as leaving the scene of interaction, using physical force, or getting help from a third person (Shantz 1993). About 28 percent of the strategies reported were conventional, such as saying ‘‘please’’ or

apologizing, and about 20 percent of the strategies used involved reasoning and/or compromise. As mentioned earlier, the use of compromise increases during adolescence but may be restricted to hypothetical situations.

CONFLICT BETWEEN FRIENDS AND

NONFRIENDS

Children, at least until middle childhood, may not be able to understand that friendships can be both supportive and conflictual (Berndt and Perry 1986). Conflict between friends and nonfriends does appear to proceed differently, especially the strategies used to resolve the conflict. An observational study (Hartup et al. 1988) of young children (approximately 3.5 years to 5.5 years of age) revealed that the frequency with which children used disengagement strategies, such as mutual turning away, was greater with friends than with nonfriends. This resulted in different outcomes, with equality occurring with greater frequency with friends than with nonfriends. Also, conflict with friends was more intense than conflict with nonfriends.

In another study, Hartup and colleagues (1993) found that 9- and 10-year-olds showed differences in management of conflict with friends and nonfriends in a closed-field situation, that is, ‘‘a situation in which the children cannot choose with whom, what and where their interaction will occur and how long their interaction will last’’ (p. 446). Children in a dyad were taught conflicting versions of a board game. In this situation, friends disagreed more frequently than nonfriends, and their disagreements lasted longer. Conflict resolution per se was not a focus of the study.

Regarding conflict resolution strategies specifically, young adolescents aged 11 to 14 years showed a greater skill at generating alternatives for resolving conflicts by reacting to hypothetical situations with friends than with nonfriends (Caplan et al. 1991). Similarly, in another study investigating differences in conflict resolution strategies used with friends and acquaintances, Vespo and Caplan (1993) found that children were more likely to use conciliatory gestures with friends than with acquaintances.

At least three reasons can contribute to differences in young adolescents’ conflict resolution skills with friends and nonfriends (Caplan et al.

1991). First, friendship is characterized by intimacy and tolerance. Second, children learn and practice conflict resolution in the context of friendship. Third, friendships shape young adolescents’ understanding of conflict and expectations regarding outcome (p. 105).

Thus, no clear patterns emerge regarding developmental changes in conflict resolution strategies, except for a decline in the use of aggression. Perhaps individuals use a range of strategies depending on contextual factors, such as the issue of the conflict. Whether this is true is an important question that needs to be answered. Research has indicated that children who are able to resolve conflicts skillfully are more likely to be socially better adjusted (Asher et al. 1982). Theoretically, the use of compromise is considered both desirable and developmentally more sophisticated. How is it, then, that compromise is not one of the strategies frequently used until adolescence? Skillful conflict resolution may be more a matter of the using a strategy more appropriate for a particular conflict than of using a particular conflict resolution strategy.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION WITHIN THE

FAMILY

The context of family relationships is a powerful influence in the development of social skills. Interactions with different family members foster the development of the ability to understand others’ feelings (Dunn 1988). During the second year of life, children begin to get into conflict with their parents and siblings with increased intensity and frequency (Dunn and Slomkowski 1992). During the elementary school years, children are most likely to use assertion or insistence at the beginning of a conflict and end the conflict with submission (Joshi 1997). As noted earlier, adolescents may use standoff or withdrawal in their conflicts with parents and siblings (Vuchinich 1990). There is a need for replication of these findings to trace developmental trends, if any, in the use of conflict resolution strategies with family members.

While individuals might use different strategies to resolve conflicts in different relationships, it could be argued that conflict resolution skills learned in the family may transfer to other contexts. Every relationship is embedded in a network of relationships, and thus it must affect and be

affected by other relationships (Hartup and Laursen 1991; Hinde 1981; Lewis et al. 1984). How does conflict resolution in one context relate to conflict resolution in another?

LINKAGES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

BETWEEN CONTEXTS

Studies indicate that patterns of interactions with parents serve as models for children that they can use with peers (Parke et al. 1992). The level of conflict in the family was found to be predictive of adjustment in school (Tesser et al. 1989). Most of the research related to conflict resolution between parents and children uses parental disciplinary style as the indicator of parents’ conflict resolution strategies with children. Also, these studies are conducted within the social information processing framework. Overall, the findings indicate that children who experience power-assertive styles of discipline are likely to misinterpret social cues and use ineffective conflict resolution strategies (Dodge et al. 1990; Hart et al. 1990; Weiss et al. 1992). However, these studies examine conflict resolution at a more general level, with some emphasis on aggression. When the correspondence between the conflict resolution strategies parents use with children and strategies that children use with peers is examined, some interesting findings are revealed (Joshi 1997). First, parents use different strategies depending on the issue of the conflict. Second, both children and parents use more than one strategy to resolve conflict. For example, a child may use assertion to begin with and then resort to reasoning, and if the conflict does not get resolved, eventually withdraw from the conflict. The use of multiple strategies makes the one-on- one mapping of conflict resolution strategies used in two contexts a difficult task. The one correspondence that was found was between the last strategy that mothers used with children and the last strategy that children used with peers. Specifically, children who used reasoning as the last strategy with a friend had mothers who used reasoning as a last strategy with them (Joshi 1997).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH

AND THEORY

One of the features of the research and theory in the area of interpersonal conflict resolution, at

least during childhood and adolescence, is that it focuses more on intraindividual processes than it does on interindividual processes. We still need more research on how individuals involved in a conflict situation influence each other’s behavior. The risk of focusing on the individual lies in its inevitable outcome—that the strategy that the person uses comes to be denoted as the person’s attribute, which is a stable characteristic. If we know that individuals may use different strategies in different conflict situations, and that they use a combination of strategies, then it would be erroneous to describe conflict resolution styles in terms of single strategies. Thus, the important variables that need to be examined along with conflict resolution strategies are the issue of the conflict, the relationship between the individuals, and the strategies of the other individual.

The conceptualization of interpersonal conflict resolution as a process will be better accomplished by measurement that reflects process. Therefore, interpersonal interactions must be characterized by the assessment of the behavior of one person as contingent on the behavior of the other person. This would require the development of newer models that would predict individual behavior in conflict based on the aforementioned contextual variables.

Besides achieving the goal of depicting conflict resolution with greater accuracy, the study of contextual variables will help us better understand what exactly constitutes general conflict resolution skills. This knowledge will be particularly useful in planning interventions for individuals who find interpersonal conflict situations challenging.

REFERENCES

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Developmental Psychology 22(5):640–648.

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Collins, W. A., and B. Laursen 1992 ‘‘Conflict and Relationships During Adolescence.’’ In C. U. Shantz and W. W. Hartup, eds., Conflict in Child and Adolescent Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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———, and C. Slomkowski 1992 ‘‘Conflict and the Development of Social Understanding.’’ In C. U. Shantz and W. W. Hartup, eds., Conflict in Child and Adolescent Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Garvey, C., and Shantz, C. U. 1992 ‘‘Conflict Talk: Approaches to Adversative Discourse.’’ In C. U. Shantz and W. W. Hartup, eds., Conflict in Child and Adolescent Development. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Hart, C. H., G. W. Ladd, and B. R. Burleson 1990 ‘‘Children’s Expectations of the Outcomes of Social Strategies: Relations with Sociometric Status and Maternal Disciplinary Styles.’’ Child Development 61:127–137.

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Hartup, W. W., and B. Laursen 1991. ‘‘Relationships as Developmental Contexts.’’ In R. Cohen and A. W. Siegel, eds., Context and Development. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Hartup, W. W., B. Laursen, M. I. Stewart, and A. Eastenson 1988 ‘‘Conflict and the Friendship Relations of Young Children.’’ Child Development 59:1590–1600.

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Personal Relationships: Studying Interpersonal Relationships. London: Academic Press.

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——— 1998 ‘‘On the Brink? Some Initial Findings on the Beginnings of the Use of Compromise in Interpersonal Conflict.’’ Poster presented at the meeting of the Society for Research on Adolescence, San Diego.

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Laursen, B. 1993 ‘‘The Perceived Impact of Conflict on Adolescent Relationships.’’ Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 39(4):535–550.

———, and W. A. Collins 1994 ‘‘Interpersonal Conflict During Adolescence.’’ Psychological Bulletin 155(2):197–209.

———, and W. W. Hartup 1989 ‘‘The Dynamics of Preschool Children’s Conflicts.’’ Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 35(3):281–297.

Leadbeater, B. J., I. Hellner, J. P. Allen, and J. L. Aber 1989 ‘‘Assessment of Interpersonal Negotiation Strategies in Youth Engaged in Problem Behaviors.’’ Developmental Psychology 25(3):465–472.

Lewis, M., C. Feiring, and M. Kotsonis 1984 ‘‘The Social Network of the Young Child: A Developmental Perspective.’’ In M. Lewis, ed., Beyond the Dyad. New York: Plenum Press.

Maccoby, E. E., and J. A. Martin 1983 ‘‘Socialization in the Context of the Family: Parent–Child Interaction. In P. H. Mussen (series ed.) and E. M. Hetherington (vol. ed.), Handbook of Child Psychology: Vol. 4. Socialization, Personality, and Social Development. New York: Wiley.

Parke, R. D., J. Cassidy, V. M. Burks, J. L. Carson, and L. Boyum, 1992 ‘‘Familial Contribution to Peer Competence Among Young Children: The Role of Interactive and Affective Processes.’’ In R. D. Parke and G. W. Ladd, eds., Family–Peer Relationships: Modes of Linkages. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.

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———(1996). ‘‘Introduction.’’ Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 42(1):iii–vii.

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Weiss, B., K. A. Dodge, J. E. Bates, and G. S. Pettit 1992 ‘‘Some Consequences of Early Harsh Discipline: Child Aggression and a Maladaptive Social Information Processing Style.’’ Child Development 63:1321–1335.

Yeats, K. W., L. H. Schultz, and R. L. Selman 1990 ‘‘Bridging the Gaps in Child-Clinical Assessment: Toward the Application of Social-Cognitive Developmental Theory. Clinical Psychology Review 10:567–588.

ANUPAMA JOSHI

INTERPERSONAL POWER

In its broadest sense, interpersonal power refers to any cause of any change in the behavior of one actor, B, which can be attributed to the effect of another actor, A. It sometimes refers to the capacity to cause such change (Weber [1918] 1968), sometimes to actual use of that capacity (Dahl 1957; Simon 1953) but always to overcoming the ‘‘resistance’’ of B (Weber [1918] 1968), hence causing B to do something B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957). Interpersonal power is therefore

the power of one individual ‘‘over’’ another as opposed to an individual’s power to do something, the capacity of an actor to attain some goal (as in Russell 1938). ‘‘Power over’’ always implies a relation between two actors rather than referring to an attribute of an actor. It is sometimes thought of as ‘‘micro’’ power and contrasts with ‘‘power to,’’ which is attributed to collectives (Hawley 1963; Parsons 1963) and is thought of as ‘‘systemic’’ or ‘‘macro’’ power.

Adequate description of a power relation will typically refer to: (1) the bases of power (the bases of A’s power over B are the resources that are possessed by A that are instrumental to the goals of B); (2) the means of power (the ways in which A uses these resources to change the behavior of B);

(3) the strength of power (the costs to B if B does not comply with demands by A); (4) the costs of power (the costs of A of having to exercise power over B); (5) the amount of power (the extent to which A is able to get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done); (6) the scope of power (the acts with respect to which the amount of A’s power over B is greater than zero); and (7) the domain of power (the persons over whom the amount of A’s power is greater than zero). However, there is a great deal of disagreement over which of these constitute power and what kinds of bases, means, costs, and particularly compliance the word covers.

CONCEPTS OF POWER

In his work on power, Simon (1953) treats the effects rather than the causes of power and covers by the one word a whole family of concepts describing the effects of all the human causes of human conduct. Force, power, influence, authority, and manipulation all have a strong family resemblance to each other, and Dahl (1957), March (1955), and Simon (1953) have all treated them as one process. But French and Raven (1959) have pointed out important ways in which the dynamics of different kinds of power differ, and March (1966) has shown compellingly that treating them all as one unitary process leads only to a dead end.

The laws of force, for example, differ in a fundamental way from the laws governing power. In using force, A does not require B to choose between compliance or noncompliance. A kills B,

imprisons B, drags B, wrestles B to the ground, but does not require choice by B. Threat of force requires a choice, but threat of force is a different process (Goode 1972). A threat may be futile if B has decided to die for a cause; the threat may not accomplish its purpose. Actual force will accomplish its purpose whether B chooses to comply or not. It simply removes B as a factor opposed to A’s wishes.

Like force, manipulation does not require that B choose between complying or not complying with the wishes of A. A may control B by controlling the information at B’s disposal, by preventing certain choices being open to B, or by activating motives of B known to lead B to do what A wants. In some sense, B may be said to make choices (hence the difference from force), but A does not require B to choose between compliance and noncompliance. A controls the conditions that govern how B analyzes the choice to be made.

Although there are more than one narrow senses of the term power, all are distinguished from force and manipulation by the fact that power involves a choice by B between compliance and noncompliance. But this is true also of influence and authority. What distinguishes power is that it involves external sanctions. In Blau (1964) B is coerced to do something, X, by threat of a penalty for noncompliance. In Festinger (1953), B is induced to do X by a promise of reward for compliance or coerced to do X by threat of a penalty for noncompliance. Both rewards and penalties are external to the actor. They make no internal change, no change in the actor’s state of mind. B does not change views privately, even if B conforms publicly. Influence, on the other hand, persuades B that X is right according to B’s own interests; hence B complies privately as well as publicly. Compliance is willing in the case of influence, ‘‘forced’’ (Festinger 1953) in the case of power. If compliance were not observable to A, B would still comply in the case of influence but would not in the case of power. Hence, power is highly dependent on observability, but influence is not (French and Raven 1959).

Authority differs from both: It refers to a claim by A, accepted by B, that A has a legitimate right to expect compliance by B, even if compliance runs counter to B’s own preferences (Barnard 1938). It differs from influence because whether B likes or does not like X is irrelevant. It differs from power

in that B is expected to comply (and, if B accepts A’s authority, does comply) because it is right, not because it is expedient. If B accepts A’s legitimate authority, then B complies with A’s commands whether compliance is observable to A or not. Furthermore, the power that legitimate authority makes possible has different effects because it is legitimate. Power exercised outside the scope of legitimate authority creates ‘‘reactance’’ (Brehm 1966), but power exercised inside the scope of legitimate authority does not (French and Raven 1959).

French and Raven (1959) also distinguish reward from punishment power and hence inducement from coercion. Coercion causes reactance; inducement does not. But they are so indissolubly connected that it becomes difficult to treat them as distinct processes. A reward forgone is a cost, and a penalty forgone is a reward. Hence, withholding a reward is equivalent to imposing a penalty, and withholding a penalty is equivalent to giving a reward. In order to distinguish the two, one would have to be able to separate giving something from withholding something. This might be possible in principle, but not in the case of power. Power depends on the contingency of sanctions; that is, A must be able to give or withhold something, depending on whether B does not comply. It is difficult to have one without the other. Thus, probably the most satisfactory concept of interpersonal power is Festinger’s forced compliance (1953), compliance that is public but not private, caused either by threat of penalty or promise of reward.

This still leaves the question of whether power is potential or actual. Weber ([1918] 1968) emphasized the capacity of one actor to overcome the resistance of another whether or not the capacity is actually used. Simon (1953) and Dahl (1957) have objected to making inferences from a potential that might or might not actually be used. Research in fact consistently shows that not all potential power is used (see below), and Dahl in particular has argued that power has an effect only if used. On the other hand, Friedrich (1937) has argued that B might comply with the preferences of A because of anticipated reward or punishment, even if A says or does nothing that overtly demands compliance by B. Bachrach and Baratz (1963) go further and argue that certain kinds of acts that involve B doing nothing (nondecisions) occur without B even needing to know what A will

do, simply because B knows what A could do (a hypothesis confirmed by Zelditch and Ford, 1994). Both arguments imply that sheer existence of potential power has an effect whether used or not. The effect does not even have to be intended.

The issue of intentionality is another of the disputed questions in conceptualizing power, but not only can potential power have an effect without being used, there are even theories, such as those of Cartwright (1959) and Emerson (1962, 1972), in which ‘‘use’’ of power occurs without necessarily being intended by anyone.

The dispute over potential versus actual power refers more to causes, the dispute over broad versus narrow concepts of power more to effects. Thus, another ambiguity of power is whether one is referring to causes, effects, or the process relating the two.

THE CAUSAL APPROACH TO POWER

As process, power most typically refers to an exchange of ‘‘resources’’ (characteristics or objects instrumental to the attainment of goals). The only exception is the ‘‘causal’’ approach to power. Simon (1953) pointed out the similarity between the concept of ‘‘power over’’ and causality, leading to a longstanding tradition in which the former is defined in terms of the latter (as in Dahl 1957; Nagel 1975). But this led to so many difficulties that March (1966) concluded that the concept of power was superfluous. Although Nagel (1975) attempted to give the concept more explanatory power by narrowing it (to the effects of A’s preferences on B), this led to little further advance, possibly because causal modeling gives one little insight into the process relating causes to effects.

But ‘‘process’’ theories themselves divide into four types: field theory; rational choice, or decision, theories of exchange; behavioral exchange theory; and a neo-Weberian ‘‘resistance’’ theory of exchange.

THE FIELD THEORY OF POWER

In field theory, power is the ability to activate forces in the life space of another in the direction of X (Cartwright 1959). The capacity to activate such forces depends on the motive base of B,

thought of as a tension system, which, when activated by A, produces a vectored force that reduces the tension. Thus, power depends on the needs of B as much as on the wishes of A. It was this approach that gave rise to the concept of a ‘‘resource’’: Transferable resources give rise to power. But use of power by A faces not only opposing forces leading B away from X but also resistance due to the exercise of power itself. (This resistance was later termed reactance by Brehm 1966 to distinguish it from resistance due to B’s dislike of doing X itself.) A’s ‘‘control’’ over B is the outcome of the opposing forces acting on B. Thus, the outcome of the reduction of tension in the force field is distinguished from A’s power in a manner corresponding to the distinction between actual versus potential power. In field theory, therefore, success— that is, actual compliance by B—is not the measure of A’s power since there are many forces other than A affecting B’s behavior.

Field theory, like the causal approach to power, treats the whole family of power concepts as power, excluding only physical force. But research in this tradition was much concerned with differences between different types of power, including reward power, punishment power, expert power, legitimate power, and referent power (power arising from B’s attraction to A, which causes a desire to be similar to A). It was found that both reward and punishment power depend on A’s ability to observe B’s behavior, while the other forms of power do not. Coercion increased but reward decreased reactance. Legitimacy normatively constrained power so that using it outside its legitimate scope reduced its effect. Use of coercion when it is legitimate decreased reactance, while use of rewards when they are not legitimate increased reactance (French and Raven 1959). Because of reactance, use of coercion depends on restraints that prevent B from leaving the field.

EXCHANGE THEORIES OF POWER

The most important difference between field theory and exchange theories is that in the latter alternatives become the most important factor in the analysis of power. The reason is that, assuming voluntary relations, an actor may do things that she or he would prefer not to do because they are nevertheless preferable to any available alternative. Thus, an abused wife may not leave her

husband because separation or divorce are either even less desirable or even more costly. But exchange theories themselves come in three somewhat distinct forms: rational choice, or decision, theory; behavioral exchange theory; and resistance theory.

Rational Choice Theories of Exchange and Power. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) offer perhaps the earliest rational choice model of the exchange process applied to power. They treat all interaction by analogy to the exchange of goods and services, each actor’s participation in exchange being determined by choice among alternatives, the outcomes of which are characterized by their rewards and costs. Rewards are simply the positive values, costs the negative values, associated with the consequences of choosing an alternative. The value that results from the algebraic sum of rewards and costs is the payoff for a given act. Given interaction between two actors, A and B, payoffs are a joint function of the choices made by each. A matrix of joint payoffs for alternative actions by A and B formulates the conditions determining interaction between the two, in particular whether a relation forms and persists. Thibaut and Kelley treat payoffs in terms of their subjective value for the actors, hence in terms of their ‘‘utility’’ (although they do not use the term). In general, actors are assumed to maximize utility and continue in a relation only if for each actor a course of action is better than the best available alternative.

Thibaut and Kelley deal largely with stable relations rather than with particular acts. Power in a relation arises out of the ‘‘dependence’’ of the actors on each other. It can take either (or both) of two forms: A may be able to control the outcomes of B independently of any act by B, hence controlling B’s fate, or A may be able to make rewards and costs contingent on B’s behavior, hence controlling B’s behavior. But an important principle of the theory is that control of an individual’s fate can be converted into behavioral control.

There are many variants of the decision-theo- retic approach to exchange, each differing with respect to how they treat the choice that underlies it. Value can be treated as objective (e.g., in monetary terms) or subjective (e.g., in terms of the meaning of money to the actor). The latter gives rise to a utility theory, such as in Thibaut and Kelley (1959), Blau (1964), and Bacharach and

Lawler (1981). The relation between choice of an alternative and its outcome can be treated deterministically (as is true of all three of the utility theories just cited) or probabilistically. If value is treated objectively and outcomes probabilistically, one has an expected utility theory as in Harsanyi (1962). Among probabilistic theories, probability itself can be treated objectively or subjectively: In March (1955) the probabilities are objective, in Nagel (1968) and Tedeschi and colleagues (1973) they are subjective. In the latter case one has a subjective expected utility theory. In all these variants of decision theory, the central axiom is that the actor maximizes whatever the theory’s criterion of choice.

Despite the variations among these theories, in general they predict that, given a conflict of interest, A is more likely to use power when more is at stake, when the cost of exercising power is less, when the likelihood of compliance is greater, and when there are fewer alternative means of obtaining compliance. The costs of exercising power include the relative depletion of A’s stock of resources, the likelihood of retaliation, and the effect of reactance on subsequent relations with B. In general, the evidence supports these predictions, although ‘‘use’’ sometimes refers to whether or not A prefers to impose his or her will on B; sometimes to whether or not, if A does have such a preference, it is accomplished by manipulating rewards and punishments rather than by other means; and sometimes to whether or not A’s behavior is overt and explicit, communicating threats or promises, or is covert. Rational choice theories will also in general predict that B is more likely to comply with A’s preferences the larger the reward attached to compliance, the larger the penalty attached to noncompliance, the greater the credibility of A’s promises of reward or threat of penalty, and the fewer the alternatives available to B. Again, the evidence largely supports these predictions. But it is well to keep in mind that with respect to both use and compliance, the evidence deals largely with voluntary relations.

Unlike other decision theories, subjective expected utility theory (especially Nagel 1968) makes use of Friedrich’s (1937) ‘‘law of anticipated reactions,’’ in which compliance occurs without directives, threats, or promises by A. In the case of punishment, not only is there no visible exercise of power by A, but compliance by B may appear to be

willing because there is no visible resistance. In addition, if one takes into account that the law of anticipated reactions can be applied to A as well as to B, A may know in advance that B will comply and therefore know that it is unnecessary visibly to exercise power in order to achieve A’s objective (Samuel and Zelditch 1989).

Bacharach and Lawler (1981) have pointed out that even though relative power in a relation is necessarily zero-sum, meaning that a gain by one actor implies loss by the other, relative power can be distinguished from absolute power, the sheer quantity of resources controlled by an actor. Hence, relative power can be distinguished from total power, the sum of the resources possessed by A and B. Total power, unlike relative power, is a variable that can increase for both actors at the same time. Bacharach and Lawler argue that total power has an effect independent of relative power, especially on the use of punitive power capabilities. Given a conflict of interest, if punitive power is an available tactic, the likelihood of its use by the more powerful actor increases as his or her relative power increases but decreases as total power increases.

Thibaut and Kelley note that all these ideas are more useful as the pattern of exchange becomes more stable; hence, the focus of exchange theory is often not only on the fact that power is relational, which is true even at the level of a unit act, but on the structure of relations arising from enduring patterns of repeated exchanges. The most influential theory of this kind has been Emerson’s theory of power–dependence relations (1962, 1972). Though it originally grew out of Thibaut and Kelley’s work, this theory has come to be associated more recently with behavioral exchange theory, a theory originating in the work of Homans.

Behavioral Exchange Theory. Homans (1961) behaviorized exchange theory by transforming rewards and costs into reinforcement contingencies and the process of exchange into mutual operant conditioning. Many fundamental concepts of decision theory, however, survive in behavioral exchange theory. Choices are determined by maximizing profit, which is the difference between rewards and costs. Costs in Homans take a form more like costs in economics than in Thibaut and Kelley, becoming opportunity costs, that is, profit forgone by choosing X over not-X. But, as in

Thibaut and Kelley, exchange occurs at a point at which for both actors exchange is more profitable than each actor’s best available alternative. Thus, A uses power in Homans—where ‘‘use’’ means attempts to direct the behavior of another—when it is more profitable than any alternative available to A, and B complies when compliance is more profitable than noncompliance. Homans, however, gives more emphasis than do Thibaut and Kelley to the effect of satiation on the value of a reward: Accumulation of rewards brings diminishing returns. Hence, poor actors are more responsive than are rich ones to offers of any given level of reward for doing an otherwise undesired act.

Emerson’s power–dependence theory, perhaps the most influential theory of interpersonal power, was originally a utility theory of relations like Thibaut and Kelley’s (Emerson 1962). But Emerson (1972) followed Homans in behaviorizing exchange theory, except that, unlike Homans, Emerson again dealt with relations rather than acts. Power–dependence theory is formulated in terms of two actors whose social relations entail ties of mutual dependence. ‘‘Power’’ is the amount of B’s resistance that can be overcome by A: It is potential rather than actual power that is used to describe the relation. Power is a function of dependence, which arises from the control by one actor of resources on which another depends for achieving his or her goals. Dependence varies directly with an actor’s motivational investment in goals but inversely with the availability of alternative sources of resources outside the relation. The ‘‘power advantage’’ of one actor over another is a function of the net balance of each one’s dependence on the other. If the net balance is zero, power is equal, or ‘‘balanced.’’ A relatively unique feature of Emerson’s theory is that balanced power is assumed to be stable, while imbalance creates pressures to change the power relation in the direction of balance. There are four kinds of balancing operations. B may (1) reduce motivational investment in the goals mediated by A, withdrawing from the relation; (2) increase the number of alternative sources of the resource (extend networks); (3) increase A’s motivational investment in goals mediated by B (e.g., by offering status to A); or (4) deny to A alternative sources of resources mediated by B (coalitionformation). Attention to these operations leads one to distinguish use of power from change of power—increasing or decreasing

dependence in the relation. These assumptions about balance have had a major impact on the study of organizations (beginning with Thompson 1967), but other exchange theories have tended to reject the balance assumption, especially Blau (1964), who instead treats the balance mechanisms as means by which A maintains or increases power over B.

‘‘Use’’ in power–dependence theory comes to mean something quite different from what it means in decision or field-theoretic formulations: It refers now to asymmetries in the outcomes of reciprocal exchange. It is assumed that use of power, in the more usual sense, increases until an equilibrium is reached, at which point the less powerful actor is receiving no more benefits than the best alternative source could provide. While power imbalance does in fact increase asymmetry of exchange, it has been consistently found that its use is suboptimal. It is constrained in part by search costs (Molm 1987s) and in part by commitment to the other and concern for equity (Cook and Emerson 1978). Furthermore, use of punishment power depends not only on punishment capability but also on reward capability: Those weaker in reward power are, other things being equal, more likely to use punishment power (Molm 1997). Molm argues they have more to gain and less to lose by the use of coercion than those with more reward power: It is muggers, who gain nothing at all without coercion, who have nothing to lose by using it.

Molm also finds that, given mutual dependence, the effectiveness of coercion is directly proportional to its use, providing that its use is: (1) instrumental rather than symbolic, that is, a specific consequence of a specific behavior rather than a personal challenge; (2) highly contingent on the undesired behavior; and (3) consistent, that is, the punishment of equivalent behavior is equivalent. Coercion is perceived as more symbolic if it is noncontingent, inconsistent, or threatened but not actually used, increasing the side effects of coercion (resistance, negative affect, retaliation, loss of the relation). If it is perceived as instrumental, on the other hand, a high probability of punishment for a specific behavior, because it is effective in the short run, actually increases the net frequency of rewards in the long run, while ‘‘weak’’—that is, sporadic—coercion decreases the