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(oligopoly), two sellers (duopoly, a type of oligopoly), one buyer and one seller (bilateral monopoly), and so on, lend themselves to game-theoretic analysis because the payoffs to each player depend on the strategies of the other players.

Economists have modeled oligopolies both as noncooperative games and as cooperative games. Several analyses of oligopolies as noncooperative games show that the standard Chamberlin pricesetting strategy is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies (Telser 1972). Beyond that, various analyses have treated oligopoly as a noncooperative multistage game. These analyses have produced generalizations concerning the effects of adjustment speed, demand and cost functions, and incomplete information regarding demand on the dynamic stability of the traditional Cournot solution and other equilibria (Friedman 1977; Radner 1980).

Analyses of collusion among oligopolists usually view this as a cooperative game. These treatments analyze outcomes via such solution concepts as the core or the bargaining set (Kaneko 1978). Reviews and discussions of game-theoretic models of oligopoly appear in deFraja and Delbono (1990), Friedman (1983), Kurz (1985), and Shubik (1984). Game theoretic literature on collusive equilibria is surveyed in Rees (1993).

A second topic of interest to game-theoretic economists is general equilibrium in a multilateral exchange economy. An early paper (Arrow and Debreu 1954) modeled a general competitive exchange economy (involving production, exchange, and consumption) as a noncooperative game, and then showed that a generalized Nash equilibrium existed for the model. Other theorists have modeled a multilateral exchange economy as a cooperative n- person game. Shubik (1959) showed that the core of such a game is identical to Edgeworth’s traditional contract curve. More generally, Debreu and Scarf (1963) showed that the core converges to the Walrasian competitive equilibrium. Telser (1996) discussed the core as a tool for finding marketclearing prices in economies with many inputs and outputs. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) discussed the matching problem in labor and marriage markets.

By representing an economy as an n-person cooperative game, analysts can investigate general equilibrium even in markets that do not fulfill the

neoclassical regularity assumptions (e.g., convexity of preferences, divisibility of commodities, absence of externalities) (Rosenthal 1971; Telser 1972). Beyond that, some economists model general equilibrium in game-theoretic terms because they can introduce and analyze a variety of alternative institutional arrangements. This includes, for instance, models with or without trade, with or without production, with various types of money (commodity money, fiat money, bank money, accounting money), and with various types of financial institutions (shares, central banks, bankruptcy rules, and the like) (Dagan et al. 1997; Dubey and Shubik 1977; Karatzas et al. 1997). Depending on the models used, such cooperative solutions as the core, Shapley value, and nucleolus play an important role in these analyses, as does the Nash noncooperative solution.

A third concern of game-theoretically oriented economists is the analysis of public goods and services (e.g., bridges, roads, dams, harbors, libraries, police services, public health services, and the like). Of special relevance is the pricing and crosssubsidization of public utilities; a central issue is how different classes of customers should divide the costs of providing public utilities.

Theorists can model such problems by letting the cost function of a public utility determine the characteristic function of a (cooperative) cost-shar- ing game. Games of this type are amenable to analysis via such solution concepts as the Shapley value (Loehman and Whinston 1974), the nucleolus (Littlechild and Vaidya 1976; Nakayama and Suzuki 1977), and the core (Littlechild and Thompson 1977), each of which represents alternative costsharing criteria. Moulin (1996) compared alternative cost-sharing mechanisms under increasing returns. Other work has used game-theoretic concepts to model negotiation with respect to provision of public goods (Dearden 1998; Schofield 1984a). A survey of experimental research on public goods appears in Ledyard (1995).

Political Institutions. Like economists, political scientists have analyzed a variety of institutions in game-theoretic terms. One broad line of work— termed the study of social choice—investigates various methods for aggregating individual preferences into collective decisions (Moulin 1994). Of special concern is the stability of outcomes produced by alternative voting systems (Hinich and Munger

1997; Nurmi 1987; Ordeshook 1986). Analysts have studied many different voting systems (e.g., majority voting, plurality voting, weighted voting, approval voting, and so on.) Strikingly, this work has demonstrated that in majority voting systems where voters choose among more than two alternatives, the conditions for equilibria (i.e., the conditions that assure a decisive winner) are so restrictive as to render equilibria virtually nonexistent (Fishburn 1973; Riker 1982).

Topics in voting include the detailed analysis of cyclic majority phenomena (generalized Condorcet paradox situations), the analysis of equilibria in novel voting systems such as weighted voting (Banzhaf 1965) and approval voting (i.e., a method of voting wherein voters may endorse as many candidates as they like in multicandidate elections) (Brams and Fishburn 1983), and the development of predictive solution concepts for voting systems that possess no stable equilibrium (Ferejohn and Grether 1982).

A second line of work by game theorists concerns the strategic manipulation of political institutions to gain favorable outcomes. One topic here is the consequences of manipulative agenda control in committees (Banks 1990; Plott and Levine 1978). Another topic is the effects of strategic voting—that is, voting in which players strive to manipulate the decision by voting for candidates or motions other than their real preferences (Cox and Shugart 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998; Niemi and Frank 1982). Analyses by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) showed that no voting procedure can be completely strategy-proof (in the sense of offering voters no incentive to vote strategically) without violating some more fundamental condition of democratic acceptability. In particular, any voting mechanism that is strategyproof is also necessarily dictatorial. An important issue here is how to design voting systems with at least some desirable properties that encourage sincere revelation of preferences.

A third broad line of work concerns the indexing of players’ power in political systems (Owen 1982, ch. 10). Frequently this entails assessing differences in a priori voting strength of members of committees or legislatures. For example, a classic study applied the Shapley–Shubik index of power to the U.S. legislative system and assessed the relative power of the president, senators, and

representatives (Shapley and Shubik 1954). Other measures of power include the Banzhaf–Coleman index (Banzhaf 1965; Dubey and Shapley 1979) and Straffin’s probabilistic indices (Straffin 1978).

A fourth game-theoretic topic is cabinet coalition formation, especially in the context of European governments. This topic is of interest because political fragmentation can produce instability of cabinet coalitions, which in turn can lead to collapse of entire governments. Work on this problem ties in with that on spatial voting games and weighted majority games, discussed above. Some cabinet coalition models stress policy (or ideological) alignment among members, while other models stress the transfer of value (payoffs) among members. Important theoretical models include DeSwaan (1973), Grofman (1982), Laver and Shepsle (1996), and Schofield (1984b).

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H. ANDREW MICHENER

GANGS

See Criminal and Delinquent Subcultures; Juvenile Delinquency.

GENDER

Gender, race, ethnicity, and social class are the most commonly used categories in sociology. They represent the major social statuses that determine the life chances of individuals in heterogeneous societies, and together they form a hierarchy of access to property, power, and prestige.

Gender is the division of people into two categories, ‘‘men’’ and ‘‘women.’’ Through interaction with caretakers, socialization in childhood, peer pressure in adolescence, and gendered work and family roles, women and men are socially constructed to be different in behavior, attitudes, and emotions. The gendered social order is based on and maintains these differences.

In sociology, the main ordering principles of social life are called institutions. Gender is a social institution as encompassing as the four main institutions of traditional sociology—family, economy, religion, and symbolic language. Like these institutions, gender structures social life, patterns social roles, and provides individuals with identities and values. And just as the institutions of family, economy, religion, and language are intertwined and affect each other reciprocally, as a social institution, gender pervades kinship and family life, work roles and organizations, the rules of most religions, and the symbolism and meanings of language and other cultural representations of human life. The outcome is a gendered social order.

The source of gendered social orders lies in the evolution of human societies and their diversity in history. The gendered division of work has shifted with changing means of producing food and other goods, which in turn modifies patterns of child care and family structures. Gendered power imbalances, which are usually based on the ability to amass and distribute material resources, change with rules about property ownership and inheritance. Men’s domination of women has not been the same throughout time and place; rather, it varies with political, economic, and family structures, and is differently justified by religions and laws. As an underlying principle of how people are categorized and valued, gender is differently constructed throughout the world and has been throughout history. In societies with other major social divisions, such as race, ethnicity, religion,

and social class, gender is intricately intertwined with these other statuses.

As pervasive as gender is, it is important to remember that it is constructed and maintained through daily interaction and therefore can be resisted, reformed, and even rebelled against. The social construction perspective argues that people create their social realities and identities, including their gender, through their actions with oth- ers—their families, friends, colleagues. It also argues that their actions are hemmed in by the general rules of social life, by their culture’s expectations, their workplace’s and occupation’s norms, and their government’s laws. These social restraints are amenable to change—but not easily.

Gender is deeply rooted in every aspect of social life and social organization in Western-influ- enced societies. The Western world is a very gendered world, consisting of only two legal cate- gories—’’men’’ and ‘‘women.’’ Despite the variety of playful and serious attempts at blurring gender boundaries with androgynous dress and desegregating gender-typed jobs, third genders and gender neutrality are rare in Western societies. Those who cross gender boundaries by passing as a member of the opposite gender, or by sex-change surgery, want to be taken as a ‘‘normal’’ man or woman.

Although it is almost impossible to be anything but a ‘‘woman’’ or a ‘‘man,’’ a ‘‘girl’’ or a ‘‘boy’’ in Western societies, this does not mean that one cannot have three, four, five, or more socially recognized genders—there are societies that have at least three. Not all societies base gender categories on male and female bodies— Native Americans, for example, have biological males whose gender status is that of women. Some African societies have females with the gender status of sons or husbands. Others use age categories as organizing principles, not gender statuses. Even in Western societies, where there are only two genders, we can think about restructuring families and workplaces so they are not as rigidly gendered as they are today.

WHY GENDER AND NOT SEX

Gender was first conceptualized as distinct from sex in order to highlight the social and cultural processes that constructed different social roles

for females and males and that prescribed sexappropriate behavior, demeanor, personality characteristics, and dress. However, sex and gender were often conflated and interchanged, to the extent that this early usage was called ‘‘sex roles’’ theory. More recently, gender has been conceptually separated from sex and also from sexuality.

Understanding gender practices and structures is easier if what is usually conflated as sex/ gender or sex/sexuality/gender is split into three conceptually distinct categories—sex (or biology, physiology), sexuality (desire, sexual preference, sexual orientation, sexual behavior), and gender (social status, position in the social order, personal identity). Each is socially constructed but in different ways. Gender is an overarching category—a major social status that organizes almost all areas of social life. Therefore bodies and sexuality are gendered—biology and sexuality, in contrast, do not add up to gender.

Conceptually separating sex and gender makes it easier to explain how female and male bodies are socially constructed to be feminine and masculine through sports and in popular culture. In medicine, separating sex from gender helps to pinpoint how much of the differences in longevity and propensity to different illnesses is due to biology and how much to socially induced behavior, such as alcohol and drug abuse, which is higher among men than women. The outcome is a greater number of recorded illnesses but longer life expectancy for women of all races, ethnicities, and social classes when compared to men with the same social characteristics. This phenomenon is known in social epidemiology as ‘‘women get sicker, but men die quicker.’’

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER

As with any other aspect of social life, gender is shaped by an individual’s genetic heritage, physical body, and physiological development. Socially, however, gendering begins as soon as the sex of the fetus is identified. At birth, infants are placed in one of two sex categories, based on the appearance of the genitalia. In cases of ambiguity, since Western societies do not have a third gender for hermaphrodites as some cultures do, the genitalia are now ‘‘clarified’’ surgically, so that the child can be categorized as a boy or a girl. Gendering then

takes place through interaction with parents and other family members, teachers, and peers (‘‘significant others’’). Through socialization and gendered personality development, the child develops a gendered identity that, in most cases, reproduces the values, attitudes, and behavior that the child’s social milieu deems appropriate for a girl or a boy.

Borrowing from Freudian psychoanalytic theory, Nancy Chodorow developed an influential argument for the gendering of personalities in the two-parent, heterogendered nuclear family. Because women are the primary parents, infants bond with them. Boys have to separate from their mothers and identify with their fathers in order to establish their masculinity. They thus develop strong ego boundaries and a capacity for the independent action, objectivity, and rational thinking so valued in Western culture. Women are a threat to their independence and masculine sexuality because they remind men of their dependence on their mothers. However, men need women for the emotional sustenance and intimacy they rarely give each other. Their ambivalence toward women comes out in heterosexual love–hate relationships and in misogynistic depictions of women in popular culture and in novels, plays, and operas.

Girls continue to identify with their mothers, and so they grow up with fluid ego boundaries that make them sensitive, empathic, and emotional. It is these qualities that make them potentially good mothers and keep them open to men’s emotional needs. But because the men in their lives have developed personalities that make them emotionally guarded, women want to have children to bond with. Thus, psychological gendering of children is continually reproduced.

To develop nurturing capabilities in men and to break the cycle of the reproduction of gendered personality structures would, according to this theory, take fully shared parenting. There is little data on whether the same psychic processes produce similarly gendered personalities in singleparent families, in households where both parents are the same gender, or in differently structured families in non-Western cultures.

Children are also gendered at school, in the classroom, where boys and girls are often treated differently by teachers. Boys are encouraged to develop their math abilities and science interests; girls are steered toward the humanities and social

sciences. The result is that women students in the United States outnumber men students in college, but only in the liberal arts; in science programs, men still outnumber women. Men also predominate in enrollment in the elite colleges, which prepare for high-level careers in finance, the professions, and government.

This data on gender imbalance, however, when broken down by race, ethnicity, and social class, is more complex. In the United States, upperand middle-class boys are pushed ahead of girls in school and do better on standardized tests, although girls of all social statuses get better grades than boys. African-American, Hispanic, and white working-class and poor boys do particularly badly, partly because of a peer culture that denigrates ‘‘book learning’’ and rewards defiance and risk taking. In the context of an unresponsive educational structure, discouraged teachers, and crowded, poorly maintained school buildings, the pedagogical needs of marginal students do not get enough attention; they are also much more likely to be treated as discipline problems.

Children’s peer culture is another site of gender construction. On playgrounds, girls and boys divide up into separate groups whose borders are defended against opposite-gender intruders. Within the group, girls tend to be more cooperative and play people-based games. Boys tend to play rulebased games that are competitive. These tendencies have been observed in Western societies; anthropological data about children’s socialization shows different patterns of gendering. Everywhere, children’s gender socialization is closely attuned to expected adult behavior.

GENDER AND WORK

Whether they have fully internalized Western society’s gender binarism and social construction of gender differences or rebelled against gender typing, adults encounter a gendered work world. The workplaces in industrialized societies are either gender-segregated or composed of all one gender. During the 1970s and 1980s, decades in which women were thought to have made inroads into many occupations previously dominated by men in the United States, about 6 percent of occupations saw an increase of women workers that was significantly greater than the increase of women

overall in the paid labor force during that period. Rather than desegregating occupations, most of the new women workers went into occupations where most of the employees were women, and those who went into occupations where the employees were predominantly men soon found that their coworkers became predominantly women. Some U.S. occupations that went from having a predominance of workers who were men to mostly women workers were personnel, training, and labor relations specialists; computer operators; and insurance adjusters, examiners, and investigators. These occupations had resegregated. When women and men work in nontraditional occupations, gender typing is often maintained symbolically, as when policewomen view their work as social work and men nurses emphasize the technical and physical strength aspects of what they do.

The processes that sort women and men of different racial and ethnic groups into different types of work include a matching of ranked workers and jobs, or queues of workers and jobs. Workers are ranked by employers from their first picks to their last. Jobs are ranked by workers similarly. Lower-ranked workers get the chance to move into better jobs than they have held in the past when these jobs are abandoned by favored workers or there are too few of these workers to go around, such as in wartime. The process works the other way, too; when there are too few of the best jobs for the preferred workers, as in a recession, only the best qualified or experienced among them will be hired; those with fewer credentials and less seniority move down the queue, bumping out lower-ranked workers. When workers are moving up, the most preferred on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender usually get the better jobs. If gender segregation is so rigid that men will not apply or be hired for ‘‘women’s work,’’ when manufacturing jobs decline or are taken elsewhere, women in service, sales, and clerical work may continue to work as men’s unemployment rates rise.

Workers rank jobs on the basis of payoff for education and experience in salaries and also in fringe benefits, prestige, autonomy, security, and chances of promotion. For some workers, having any job may be an improvement over economic dependency. Employers’ preferences for workers, however, are not so uniform. Some will rank gender and race above qualifications; others will choose the most highly qualified of the preferred race and