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survive into old age were not dependent upon the goodwill of or a sense of obligation on the part of their children to assure their financial support. In preindustrial economies both land and businesses, which served as the family’s source of sustenance, were owned by the oldest generation and passed down to the younger generation only at death. Hence, it was not the oldest generation that was dependent upon the younger generation, but rather the younger generation that was dependent on the older generation for housing and income. What care may have been provided to parents was, therefore, not necessarily based on a sense of moral obligation but instead stemmed from economic necessity (Haber and Gratton 1994; Schorr 1980).

As long as this economic basis for support existed, there was no need for filial responsibility laws (Schorr 1980). Only with the introduction of an industrial economy that provided a means for children to leave the parental home and obtain an income was there a need for the community to regulate filial responsibility. As Finch (1989, p. 84) notes:

Much of the historical evidence. . . suggests that under the harsh conditions of poverty which prevailed for most people in the early industrial period, family relationships necessarily were highly instrumental, with support being offered only if there was. . . hope of mutual benefit precisely because anything else would have been an unaffordable luxury (p. 84).

The shift to an industrial economy changed the financial base of the family and introduced the possibility of independent access to financial resources by children. This shift effectively emphasized the possibility of elders becoming destitute (Bulcroft et al. 1989).

LEGAL MANDATES FOR FINANCIAL

SUPPORT

From their first inception in Roman and English codes, filial responsibility laws were enacted as a means to protect the public purse (and minimize the financial responsibility of the wealthy class) (Jacobson 1995). The aim of such laws was to enable public authorities to recover the costs of

maintaining paupers by making claims on those relatives assumed to be naturally bound by normal obligations of kinship to offer support. The poor laws established for the first time in history that the community would help an indigent parent only after the means of his child had been exhausted (Schorr 1980). These laws were not simply about poverty; they were laws intended to govern the lower class in order to keep down public expenditure. This motivation continues to underlie current laws and practices concerning the care of the elderly in both England and the United States. Despite the moral rhetoric in which filial responsibility laws are often couched, these laws emerged not as a result of moral values but in response to the threat of the growing financial burden that dependent elders posed to an industrial society (Jacobson 1995; Montgomery 1999).

Perhaps this absence of a moral basis for filial responsibility laws accounts for the inconsistency among states in the statement of filial responsibility. Filial responsibility laws, which in 1999 existed in some form in twenty-two states, are variously located in domestic statutes, poor laws, penal codes, and human resource laws. The nature of the fiscal responsibility incorporated into these statutes varies widely and tends to be quite vague. There are variations in the specificity as to which members of the family are responsible and the conditions under which they are responsible. Moreover, these laws are inconsistently enforced (Narayanan 1996), and many questions have been raised about their constitutionality and practicality (Jacobson 1995). For the most part, filial responsibility as incorporated in laws is limited to financial support; and these laws have generally gone unenforced. In fact, several court challenges to Medicaid laws have affirmed the illegality of states’ requiring adult children to pay for care provided under Medicaid regulations (Jacobson 1995; Kline 1992).

ATTITUDES TOWARD FILIAL

RESPONSIBILITY

Just as the discrepancy between the existence of filial responsibility laws and the lack of enforcement suggests an equivocal attitude toward children’s responsibilities, results of attitude surveys about filial responsibility have been inconsistent.

While there is evidence that both parents and children acknowledge the existence of filial responsibility as a social expectation, individuals’ reports of filial responsibility have been found to differ as a function of the type of support (Ganong et al. 1998), geographic distance from parents (Finley et al. 1988), income (Lee, Netzer and Coward 1994), and ethnicity (Lee et al. 1998; Stein et al. 1998). Findings regarding gender differences in attitudes toward responsibility have been mixed (Ganong et al. 1998).

Surveys generally yield respectable percentages of responses favoring filial responsibility as long as the question is limited to ethical and general terms (Schorr 1980). However, a majority of aged persons oppose filial responsibility when the question is reframed to introduce an individual’s personal responsibility or to force a choice between the child and governmental/ community sources as the primary source of support (Schorr 1980). Recent studies have revealed a general trend in both Western and Asian cultures toward acceptance of the government or insurance programs as the source most appropriately responsible for fi- nancial support of the elderly (Sung 1990). The introduction of Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the United States and the introduction of national health care programs for the elderly in most other developed countries exemplify this trend. In a similar trend, adult children and their parents express a preference for independent living arrangements for the two generations even in Asian countries, where filial piety has long been a central value (Bleiszner and Hamon 1992).

Current practices of filial responsibility in the form of financial support correspond to these expressed preferences. For most families, the flow of financial support between generations is primarily from the oldest generation to the younger generation; and in most developed countries the two generations most commonly reside in separate housing units (Goldscheider and Lawton 1998). When parents and adult children do live together, it is usually due to the needs of the younger generation or the mutual benefits for both generations. The situation of a parent moving into the home of an adult child is relatively rare and is usually associated with a need for personal care rather than a need for housing.

FILIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS DIRECT

PARENT CARE

The assumption by large numbers of adult children of responsibilities for the welfare and direct care of their parents has been the most significant change in family roles and filial responsibility practices in recent history. Although the motives that prompt adult children to care for their frail parents are not well understood, the predominance of adult children among informal caregivers is undisputed when all types and levels of assistance are considered. The prevalence of children as sources of emotional support, assistance with transportation and banking matters, and help with household chores and activities of daily living has been widely documented over the past two decades (e.g., Brody 1985; Merrill 1997).

Gender Differences. There is, however, a significant difference between sons and daughters in their caregiving activities and experience. Almost uniformly, studies have shown that greater numbers of daughters than sons assist their parents with a wider range of tasks. Daughters’ predominance is especially strong with respect to direct personal assistance to their impaired parents (Merrill 1997). As a rule, daughters are more likely than sons to help elders with household chores, especially food preparation and laundry chores, as well as with personal care tasks that require hands-on care and daily assistance (Montgomery 1992). In contrast, sons tend to concentrate their efforts on tasks that are more circumscribed and sporadic, such as occasional shopping trips and annual yard and house maintenance activities.

The difference in the types of tasks that sons and daughters assume is related to the types of caregiving roles that the each group tends to assume. Daughters are not only more likely to engage in caregiving tasks; they are also more likely to assume the role of primary caregiver (Merrill 1997). As such, they are more likely to provide ‘‘routine’’ care over longer periods of time (Matthews and Rosner 1988; Stoller 1990). Sons, in contrast, assume supportive roles that require commitments over shorter periods of time; they tend to be peripheral helpers within a caregiving network rather than the central actors (Matthews 1995).

There is evidence that gender differences in patterns of care persist across cultures and classes. However, these patterns are mediated by the level

of dependency of the elder and the size and gender composition of the family network (Coward and Dwyer 1990; Matthews 1995). Fewer gender differences are observed in patterns of care for parents with low levels of disability. Also, sons from family networks that do not include daughters tend to provide care in a style that is more similar to that of daughters.

Numerous explanations have been advanced to account for the observed divergence of caregiving behaviors between sons and daughters. Most of these explanations center on differences between male and female roles and gender differences in power within the family and within society in general (see Finley 1989). However, there is little evidence to support any of the hypothesized explanations, and none of them account for the persistence of divergent parent care activities.

Class Variations. Patterns of parent care have also been found to differ within the United States by class and income. Lower-class and working-class caregivers are more likely to live with the elder and to provide direct care. In contrast, higher economic status has been found to be associated with larger financial gifts and help with procuring services (Merrill 1997). This tendency for wealthy families to purchase care for the elderly has also been noted in a wide range of countries at different stages of development throughout the world (Kosberg 1992).

Cultural Variations. Cultural differences in informal care have been the focus of a number of studies. However, evidence of cultural differences in parent care within the United States remains equivocal. Greater levels of kin support among African Americans and Hispanics than among whites have been documented in a few studies (Lee et al. 1998; Tennstedt and Chang 1998); but other researchers have reported no differences in informal support (Belgrave and Bradsher 1994) or have documented greater use of informal supports by whites (Silverstein and Waite 1993). These inconsistencies in findings are likely due to differences in sampling designs and the confounding of ethnicity with socioeconomic status.

AFFECTION AND OBLIGATION

The persistence of parent care activities, despite the absence of legal or economic imperatives,

has often led researchers and policy makers to focus on affection as the primary motivation for these filial responsibility practices (Jarrett 1985). Numerous studies have noted the relationship between affection and the felt obligation to provide for parent care (Blieszner and Hamon 1992) as well as the importance of attitudes of obligation as correlates of contact with and assistance to parents (Walker et al. 1990). However, there is a growing literature that questions the importance of ‘‘affection’’ as the primary force underlying filial responsibility and/or the performance of caregiving tasks. Repeatedly, it has been shown that there can be emotional closeness between parent and child without contact or aid being given (Walker et al. 1989). At the same time, it has been shown that children who do not feel a great amount of affection for their parents are still able and willing to provide needed assistance (Lee and Sung 1997; Walker et al. 1990). Furthermore, there is growing evidence that caregiving is governed by a cluster of motives that encompass both affection and obligation (Belgrave and Bradsher 1994). For many children, affection may influence the way in which responsibilities are experienced, but these children frequently provide care simply because parents need care (Litwin 1994) or because they perceive few alternatives (Guberman et al. 1992).

PARENT CARE AS A CONSEQUENCE

SOCIAL POLICY

It has been suggested that the lack of alternatives for parent care is due to existing social policy, which incorporates assumptions about filial responsibility although it does not necessarily explicitly legislate this responsibility (Finch 1989; Montgomery 1999). Specifically, as implemented and practiced, policies and programs concerned with services for the elderly in both developed and developing countries reflect the belief that there is a latent willingness, presumably based upon a residual sense of responsibility that can be activated. The decline in economic liability of children for their parents, which has resulted from the introduction of old-age pensions and health care programs for the elderly, has not been accompanied by a decline in expectations that children will care for and support their parents. In fact, the general trend in long-term care policy, which has emphasized the benefits of community-based care,

has been accompanied by a greater expectation of family care (Finch 1989; Hendricks and Hatch 1993). This expectation for relatives to provide direct care, however, remains more implicit in current long term-care policies than the fiscal liability of relatives, which was explicitly written into the original English poor laws and later adopted by many states (Doty 1995; Kapp 1995). For example, changes in Medicare coverage that are related to the prospective payment system have resulted in shorter hospital stays for elders, who are now being discharged with greater needs for assistance (Estes et al. 1993). The assumption appears to be that family members are, or should be, available to provide such care. Another example of the way in which current policy delegates the direct care responsibilities to family members is found in eligibility guidelines for (SSI), which reduce benefits for beneficiaries who live with other persons or who receive in-kind contributions from them (Hendricks and Hatch 1993). Built into this provision is the expectation that family members will provide the beneficiary with needed care at no cost. Although these regulations assure minimal financial commitment for states that otherwise would be responsible for nursing home care, they differ from fiscal responsibility laws in that the assignment of such responsibility is more diffuse (Doty 1995).

Most often, the delegation of responsibility for direct care to family is implicit rather than explicit. Expectations for direct care are often conveyed directly and indirectly to adult children by caseworkers and physicians who serve as gatekeepers for community services (Doty 1995). Even when elders are eligible for assistance through formal providers, there is often pressure placed on family members to perform care (Guberman et al. 1992). When resources are scarce and must be rationed, the living arrangement of the elder as well as the gender and location of relatives become criteria for the distribution of services. The effect of these family characteristics on distribution of homeand community-based services is contingent upon the elder’s level of functioning. For elders with lowto mid-level disability, priority for in home care services is given to those who live alone, with the expectation that family members will provide the necessary care for elders who live with them (Greene and Coleman 1995). In contrast, elders with high levels of disability who live with family members

are more likely to receive home care services than those who live alone because discharge planners and case managers view such supports as supplemental but not sufficient for an elder living alone to remain in the community (Doty 1995).

Regardless of the elder’s level of functioning, when practitioners convey expectations for care to family members, they are often influenced by cultural and gender norms regarding the division of labor within households (Walker 1983). Cumulative results overwhelmingly show that long-term care, like housework and child care, has been institutionalized as women’s work (Keith 1995). Practitioners, who serve as gatekeepers for community resources, tend to offer greater supports to male caregivers and convey lower expectations for sons to provide direct care services (Doty 1995). The impact of these practices has been observed by researchers, who report care-sharing patterns that are associated with gender and note that sons tend to receive more assistance from formal service providers than do daughters (Merrill 1997).

The clear line between long-term care policies and family care patterns provides evidence that care patterns are not simply a result of choices made by family members to adhere to some ‘‘inherent’’ moral order. Rather, these patterns of care emerge as a consequence of laws and practices that limit the alternatives available to family members (Neysmith 1993). Taken together, the evidence regarding filial responsibility suggests trends in laws and practice that reflect a decline in expectations for financial support of the elderly but a simultaneous growth in expectations for children, especially daughters, to support parents in more direct ways. There is also an indication that filial responsibility, as practiced in terms of both financial and direct care, stems largely from necessity and is created by social policies and practices that tend to invoke a questionable or mythical moral basis for such responsibility.

REFERENCES

Anderson, M. 1980 Approaches to the History of the Western Family 1500–1914. London, U.K.: Macmillan.

Belgrave, Linda, and Julia Bradsher 1994 ‘‘Health as a Factor in Institutionalization: Disparities between African Americans and Whites.’’ Research on Aging 16:115–141.

Blieszner, R., and R. R. Hamon 1992 ‘‘Filial Responsibility: Attitudes, Motivators and Behaviors.’’ In J. W. Dwyer and R. T. Coward, eds., Gender, Families and Elder Care. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.

Brody, E. M. 1985 ‘‘Parent Care as a Normative Family Stress.’’ The Gerontologist 25:19–29.

Bulcroft, K., J. Van Leynseele, and E.F. Borgatta 1989 ‘‘Filial Responsibility Laws: Issues and State Statutes.’’ Research on Aging 11:374–393.

Coward, R. T., and J. W. Dwyer 1990 ‘‘The Association of Gender, Sibling Network Composition, and Patterns of Parent Care by Adult Children.’’ Research on Aging 12:158–181.

Doty, P. 1995 ‘‘Family Caregiving and Access to Publicly Funded Home Care.’’ In R. A. Kane and J. D. Penrod, eds., Family Caregiving in an Aging Society. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Estes, C. L., J. H Swan, J. H and Associates 1993 The Long Term Care Crisis. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Finch, J. 1989 Family Obligations and Social Change. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press and Basil Blackwell.

Finley, N. J. 1989 ‘‘Theories of Family Labor as Applied to Gender Differences in Caregiving for Elderly Parents.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 51:79–86.

Finley, N. J., M. D. Roberts, and B. F. Banahan, III 1988 ‘‘Motivators and Inhibitors of Attitudes of Filial Obligation Toward Aging Parents.’’ The Gerontologist 28:73–78.

Ganong, L., M. Coleman, K. McDaniel, and T. Killian 1998 ‘‘Attitudes Regarding Obligations to Assist an Older Parent or Stepparent Following Later-Life Remarriage.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family

60:595–610.

Goldscheider, F. K., and L. Lawton 1998 ‘‘Family Experiences and the Erosion of Support for Intergenerational Coresidence.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 60:623–632.

Greene, V., and P. D. Coleman 1995 ‘‘Direct Services for Family Caregivers.’’ In R. A. Kane and J. D. Penrod, eds., Family Caregiving in an Aging Society: Policy Perspectives. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Guberman, N., P. Maheu, and C. Maille 1992 ‘‘Women as Family Caregivers: Why Do They Care? The Gerontologist 32:607–617.

Haber, C., and B. Gratton 1994 Old Age and the Search for Security. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hendricks, J., and L. R. Hatch 1993 ‘‘Federal Policy and Family Life of Older Americans.’’ In J. Hendricks and C. J. Rosenthal, eds., The Remainder of Their Days:

Domestic Policy and Older Families in the United States and Canada. New York: Garland Publishers.

Himes, Christine 1994 ‘‘Parental Caregiving by Adult Women: A Demographic Perspective.’’ Research on Aging 16:191–211.

Jacobson, R. 1995 ‘‘Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall: The Renaissance of Filial Responsibility.’’

South Dakota Law Review 40:518–545.

Kapp, M. B. 1995 ‘‘Legal and Ethical Issues in Family Caregiving and the Role of Public Policy.’’ In R. A. Kane and J. D. Penrod, eds., Family Caregiving in an Aging Society. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Kline, T. 1992 ‘‘The Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern Society.’’ Family Law Quarterly 26(3):193–210.

Keith, C. 1995 ‘‘Family Caregivng Systems: Models, Resources and Values.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 57:179–189.

Kosberg, Jordan 1992 Family Care of the Elderly: Social and Cultural Changes. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Laslett, P. 1972 ‘‘Introduction: The History of Family.’’ In P. Laslett and R. Wall, eds., Household and Family in the Past Time. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, Gary R., J. K Netzer, and Raymond T. Coward 1994 ‘‘Filial Responsibility Expectations and Patterns of Intergenerational Assistance.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 56:559–565.

Lee, Gary R, Chuck Peek, and Raymond T. Coward 1998 ‘‘Race Differences in Filial Responsibility Expectations Among Older Parents.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 60:404–412.

Lee, Yoon-Ro, and Kyu-Taik Sung 1997 ‘‘Cultural Differences in Caregiving Motivations for Demented Parents: Korean Caregivers Versus American Caregivers.’’ International Journal of Aging and Human Development 44:115–117.

Litwin, Howard 1994 ‘‘Filial Responsibility and Informal Support Among Family Caregivers of the Elderly in Jerusalem: A Path Analysis.’’ International Journal of Aging and Human Development 38:137–151.

Matthews, S. 1995 ‘‘Gender and the Division of Filial Responsibility Between Lone Sisters and Their Brothers.’’ Journals of Gerontology: Social and Behavioral Sciences 50B:S312–S320.

——— and T. T. Rosner 1988 ‘‘Shared Filial Responsibility: The Family as the Primary Caregiver.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 50:185–195.

Merrill, D. M. 1997 Caring for Elderly Parents. Westport, Conn.: Auburn House.

Montgomery, R. J. V. 1992 ‘‘Gender Difference in Patterns of Child-Parent Caregiving Relationships.’’ In J. Dwyer and R. Coward, eds., Gender, Families, and Elder Care. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage.

——— 1999 ‘‘The Family Role in the Context of LongTerm Care.’’ Journal of Aging and Health 11(3):401–434.

Narayanan, U. 1996 ‘‘The Government’s Role in Fostering the Relationship Between Adult Children and Their Elder Parents: From Filial Responsibility Laws to. . . What?, A Cross-Cultural Perspective.’’ The Elder Law Journal 4(2):369–406.

Neysmith, S. M. 1993 ‘‘Developing a Home Care System to Meet the Needs of Aging Canadians and Their Families.’’ In J. Hendricks and C. J. Rosenthal, eds.,

The Remainder of Their Days: Domestic Policy and Older Families in the United States and Canada. New York: Garland Publishers.

Schorr, Alvin L. 1980 Thy Father and Thy Mother. . . A Second Look at Filial Responsibility and Family Policy. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Silverstein, M., and L. J. Waite 1993 ‘‘Are Blacks More Likely Than Whites to Receive and Provide Social Support in Middle and Old Age? Yes, No, and Maybe So.’’ Journals of Gerontology: Social Sciences 48:S212–S222.

Stein, Catherine, Virginia A. Wemmerus, Marcia Ward, Michelle E. Gaines, Andrew L. Freeberg, and C. Jewell Thomas 1998 ‘‘Because They’re My Parents: An Intergenerational Study of Felt Obligation and Parental Caregiving.’’ Journal of Marriage and the Family 60:611–622.

Stoller, E. P. 1990 ‘‘Males as Helpers: The Role of Sons, Relatives, and Friends.’’ The Gerontologist 30:228–235.

Sung, K. 1990 ‘‘A New Look at Filial Piety: Ideals and Practices of Family-Centered Parent Care in Korea.’’

The Gerontologist 30:610–617.

Tennstedt, S., and B. Chang 1998 ‘‘The Relative Contribution of Ethnicity Versus Socioeconomic Status in Explaining Differences in Disability and Receipt of Informal Care.’’ Journals of Gerontology: Social Sciences

53B(2):S61–S70.

Walker, A. 1983 ‘‘Care for Elderly People: A Conflict Between Women and the State.’’ In J. Finch and D. Groves, eds., A Labour of Love: Women, Work and Caring. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

——— C. C. Pratt, H.-Y. Shin, and L. L. Jones 1990 ‘‘Motives for Parental Caregiving and Relationship Quality.’’ Family Relations 39:51–56.

RHONDA J. V. MONTGOMERGY

THE FRENCH SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY

The French School of Sociology was formed during the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. The nucleus of the school was created by Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), to whose work was joined the crystalizing efforts in the new science that were performed by the team of L’Année sociologique, which was founded in 1898. In recent times, scholars have undertaken the examination of the effects of this major contribution to the field by studying the vicissitudes of Durkheim’s legacy from the period between the two world wars and onward. We have also concentrated on clarifying the methods that permitted the exploitation and application of this legacy. In this regard, from 1979 to 1982, P. Besnard has fully informed us on the establishment and functioning of assistance strategies in the university and publishing fields. As important as the stakes of power may be, they are much less so than the thematic orientations that Durkheim and his disciples assigned to the science that, in 1838, Comte publicly baptized ‘‘sociology.’’ Thus, in this entry, we will first apply ourselves to the task of recalling the path that was forged by the French School of Sociology; we will then examine schematically how it was charted and, finally, discuss the new directions in which sociological research is currently headed.

PRINCIPAL BRANCHES OF THE FRENCH

SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY

Problems of periodization are particularly acute in the field of the history of ideas. They are associated with problems related to affiliations, to influences, to rupture and continuity in thought, and to collaboration. Of what, precisely, does ‘‘a group,’’ ‘‘a school,’’ or ‘‘a generation’’ in a given discipline consists? In his amply documented and unjustly maligned Manuel de sociologie (first published in 1950), A. Cuvillier resolved the question a priori: In the history of sociology there exists a ‘‘before’’ and ‘‘after’’ Comte, a series of national schools as well as an ensemble of disciplinary cross-currents. Today, one would more likely delineate a ‘‘before’’ and ‘‘after’’ Durkheim and to regard differently those who are situated upstream of him. At present, it is more precisely posited that ‘‘sociological

tradition,’’ formed in the nineteenth century, begins to have meaning with and after the appearance of four Durkheim masterpieces—De la division du travail social (1993), Les règles de la méthode sociologique (1995), Le Suicide (1997), Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912)—and that this tradition finds its origins in the works of Montesquieu and Rousseau, who are considered to be ‘‘the precursors of sociology.’’ As a rule, innovators tend to undervalue the works of those who preceded them. As the founder of scientific sociology, Durkheim does not escape this rule. He is even considered an obstacle according to a whole current of opinion, the perpetual ignorance of which has even given rise to the belief in a ‘‘blank’’ between Comte and Durkheim in the development of the discipline (cf. Yamashita 1995).

The concept of a scientifically based sociology was thus imposed. This concept affirms the specificity of social context; it pays close attention to the morphological substratum. While accenting collective tendencies, ‘‘forces which are just as real as cosmic forces,’’ it shows that ‘‘social life is essentially made up of representations.’’ From the introduction of the concept of anomie in the dissertation of 1893 to the analysis of the sacred and of beliefs that was developed in the 1912 work, the principal themes of a general sociology and those of specialized sociologies are freed from prejudices and preconceptions by a rigorously codified approach. Almost entirely, the domains in which they were implemented were ‘‘covered’’ with Durkheimians: judicial sociology by, notably, H. Lévy-Bruhl, economic sociology by F. Simiand (1873–1935), moral and political sociology by P. Fauçonnet and especially C. Bouglé (1870–1940), and religious sociology being particularly well by H. Hubert and M. Mauss (1872–1950). Again, the latter does not limit himself to this one sector, any more than M. Halbwachs (1877–1945) does to social morphology, or L. Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) to the writing of a masterpiece, La morale et la science des moeurs, published in 1903. Many other specialists—G. Bourgin, L. Gernet, M. Granet, C. Lalo, and so forth— produced works that, combined with those of their master, had a profound influence abroad. It was thus understood that every new development in the discipline had to rest upon the base that Durkeimism had furnished.

The fact that this vigorously formulated concept of sociology provoked the marginalization of

other trends is not at all surprising. Such was the case with the School of Social Reform, founded by F. Le Play (1806–1888), with the dissident school of E. Emolins, and with all the more or less obedient followers of Le Play whose allegiance inspired the family of monographs gathered together in Les Ouvriers européens (1855–1879) and Les Ouvriers des deux mondes (1857–1885): P. Bureau, E. Cheysson, P. Descamps, P. du Maroussem, P. de Rousiers, and the abbot of Tourville, all of whom were forgotten innovators, but all of whom were recently discovered by Kalaora and Savoya (1989). One will simply note that the collections of La Réforme sociale (from 1881 onward), those of La Science sociale, directed by Demolins after 1886, and those of Le Musée social (which became Cahiers du Musée social after 1945) comprise a documentary corpus parallel to that of L’Année sociologique. The same may be said for the Revue internationale de sociologie, published from 1893 onward by René Worms (1867–1926), who was the director of the International Sociological Library from 1896, the author of an important work, Pholosophie des sciences sociales

(3 vol., 1903–1907), and, most notably, the founder in 1894 of the International Institute of Sociology and in 1895 of the Society of Sociology of Paris.

One may, however, extend to sociology the relation that R. Aron extended for the field of history expanded into historiography: Every society produces the social science that it needs. Durkheim’s brand of sociology, strongly tinged with morality, was necessary to the Third Republic, which had been badly shaken by successive crises (Panama, boulangisme, the Dreyfus affair). Scholars have often stressed the concerns that are raised in Durkheim’s work about political thought, which is itself centered on social integration and cohesion; these concerns are evidenced by the course he taught in 1902–1903 entitled L’Education Morale. With regard to these concerns, what could be worth provoking objections raised in the name of old-fashioned individualism, and what interest could this ‘‘intermental’’ psychology pres- ent—that is, a collective conceptualized by G. Tarde (1843–1904), author of Lois de l’imitation (1890) and of Logique sociale (1894)—against which Durkheim polemicizes so effectively and so unjustly? A number of ruptures were deliberately intentional on Durkheim’s part; it was against psychology that he intended to build sociology, while

refusing moreover to consider history to be a science and simultaneously reducing economics to nothing more than an incarnation of metaphysics. He was so effective that, whereas in Germany sociology could be developed at the crossroads of history, economics, and psychology, in France all the conditions were right for it to be defined in opposition to these disciplines.

Perhaps this sociological tradition was ordered at a later date. One has only to refer to the Eléments de sociologie by C. Bougle and J. Raffault (first edition, 1926; second edition, 1930) to measure the reshaping that occurred between the two world wars. The range of this anthology is wide open, from Bonald to Jaurès, and passing by way of Constant, Tocqueville, and Guizot. Texts by Le Play and Tarde figure alongside those of Durkheim and some of the Durkheimians who, of course, carve out the lion’s share. Spencer, Frazer, Jhering, and Mommsen are among the others who are cited, while excerpts of Principes historiques du droit by the Russian, P. Vinogradoff, are presented. Yet, more than because of the authors they assemble, these selected pieces interest us because of whom they exclude: Tönnies, Weber, Simmel, Michels, Mosca, Pareto, and Comte, who is only cited a single time! Shortly thereafter, Aron introduced

Sociologie allemande contemporaine (1935) to French researchers, but for a long while he remained closed to the sociology of Pareto. Other perspectives finally emerged on the eve of World War II: a major contribution to this process was made by Stoetzel, who was the founder of the IFOP in 1938 and of the review Sondages in 1939 upon his return from the United States, where he became acquainted with Gallup’s works; he would later devote his doctoral thesis to a Esquisse d’une théorie des opinions (1943). With Stoetzel was born in France an electoral psychosociology during the electoral ecology inaugurated in 1913 by A. Siegfried’s Tableau politique de la France de l’Quest. Other important contributors to the broadening of perspectives were G. Bataille, R. Caillois, and M. Leiris, who were reunited within the College of Sociology between 1938 and 1939; as brief as the existence of this institution was, it was the framework for interdisciplinary contributions on myth, the sacred, the imaginary, and the problems of the age (democracy and totalitarianism) that are still striking today for their modernity.

FRENCH SOCIOLOGIES OF TODAY

Rupture or continuity? For M. Verret, co-author with H. Mendras of a collection of studies entitled

Les Champs de la sociologie française Mendras and Verret (1988), there is no doubt about the answer: ‘‘French contemporary sociology cannot be understood without taking into consideration the great rupture between the two world wars; 1940 was a terrible critical test for French society. . . .

There is nothing surprising about the fact that during this disaster, French sociology was also on the rocks. This includes not only Durkheimian sociology which constituted the latest face of it, but all the tradition from which it proceeded.’’ The rereading of the fundamental chapters of

Traité de sociologie générale (2 vols., 1958–1960), begun by G. Gurvitch (1897–1965) a dozen years after the end of World War II, leads one to nuance this assessment, which links devastation and reconstruction. A number of their authors began their careers before the rupture of 1940: This is the case of the taskmaster himself, whose L’Idée de droit social was published in 1932; of G. Friedman, who, beginning in 1936, inaugurated in France research in industrial sociology; and of J. Stoetzel. Others began during the Occupation: for example, A. Girard, working within the framework of the Alexis Carrel Foundation, which was tranformed upon the Liberation into the National Institute of Demographic Studies. The documentation upon which they rely owes a great deal to Durkheim and his disciples.

May one say that these authors, senior and junior—F. Bourricaud, J. Cazeneuve, H. Mendras, and others—approach the study of social phenomena in a radically new spirit by breaking the connections established in the twentieth century between knowledge and power over society, by abandoning the research of the great consonance targeted by Durkheimism, and by stripping the discipline of its conquering aspects? It would seem not. A degree of optimism characterized the works of sociologists during the two and a half decades that followed the end of World War II. This is indicated by a flourishing of publications, all marked by a certain voluntarism, like the essays gathered together through the initiative of the French Society of Sociology under the title Tendances et volontés de la société française (1966). In a number of areas, people trusted this young science: One expected from its application a decisive improvement in the

government of mankind and in the management of things: various adjustments in the highly industrialized societies and in the developing countries such that they might contribute to the realization of the chosen model of growth.

However, many changes took place behind this permanence that had found its incarnation in a Durkheimian orthodoxy. G. Davy (1883–1973), whose Eléments de sociologie (1932) was republished in 1950, beginning in 1931, gathered together ‘‘sociologists of yesterday and sociologists of today’’ who were in the pursuit of the same goals. Those which are easiest to identify are of an institutional nature: the creation, under the auspices of the National Center of Scientific Research, of the Center for Sociological Studies, organizer of important ‘‘sociological weeks’’ that treated various issues such as Industrialisme et technocratie (1948), Villes et campagnes (1951), and La Famille contemporaine

(1954); the constitution of numerous research groups (such as the Social Ethnology group run by P.-H. Chombart de Lauwe) and of associations like the one for the Development of the Sociology of Work; and the launching of new reviews, for example, the Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, founded in 1946 by G. Gurvitch, then, ten years later, the

Archives de Sociologie des Religions, an organ of the sociology of religions group over which G. Le Bras presided, and two more in 1960. La Revue Française de Sociologie by J. Stoetzel, and Sociologie du travail by G. Friedman. On the academic front, sociology integrated with the study of philosophy became an entirely separate discipline with the creation of a B.A. in Sociology in 1958; this was the beginning of full academic recognition, which would lead to the institution of an aggrégation in Social Science in 1976.

To these organizational transformations are added conflicts of paradigms. They are linked to the affirmation of, to use the expression of D. Lerner (1959), the ‘‘American concept,’’ that is, to the diffusion of a concept and a practice of sociology that had come from the far side of the Atlantic. Without oversimplifying, one can, in fact, say that during the period under consideration, the study of social facts was pursued on the one hand within the framework of functionalism, and on the other, on the bases of historical and dialectical materialism. It occurred on a basis of debate, called upon in the 1960s to take a polemical and ideological turn, when one wrongly and sterilely opposed the

descriptive and the explicative, the qualitative and the quantitative, empirical research and theoretical speculation, the exploitation of investigation and of social criticism.

Against the sociological scientism with which one assimilated the new American referent (whether it concern the sociometry of J.-L Moreno or the functionalism of T. Parsons, the works of R. K. Merton or those of P. Lazarsfeld), the tenets of the dialectic hark back to C. W. Mills, who denounced the invasion of bureaucratic techniques into the social sciences (in The Sociological Imagination, 1957), and to P. Sorokin, vigorous critic of the compulsion to enumerate which then reigned, notably in electoral sociology. Imported into France, the German quarrel in the social sciences which, in the beginning of the 1960s, pitted T. Adorno, one of the principal representatives of the Frankfurt School, against K. Popper, the great epistemologist of Vienna, underlined the rift between the protagonists of both camps. Caught up in the turbulence of the late 1960s, sociology then entered a period of crisis (cf. R. Boudon 1971). The gulf widened between the functionalist sociologists, who adhered to systemic analysis, which could be denounced (and not without reason) for its schematism, its optimism, and its conservatism, and their adversaries who countered with a critical rhetoric that often sounded hollow, unsubstantiated as it was by precise data concerning controversial problems such as social change.

The major event of this period would remain, for French sociology, the coming of structuralism, with, in the background, the antagonistic conceptual orientations of G. Gurvitch, who was a proponent of the study of global societies, and of R. Aron, who shared the open perspective of Tocqueville. With the replacement of the Marxist explicative schema by the theorized structural analysis of C. Lévi-Strauss, a mutation of knowledge occurred: A paradigm centered on the idea of conflict was replaced by another that was formed of the stable elements of structure; new modes of conceptualization appeared and with them, new intellectual modes. The history of ideas shows how, in the succession of such modes, a model that has been dominant is shaken, and how it loses or even exhausts the merit that has been attributed to it. The reemergence of structuralism, which one must take care not to confuse with structural analysis, and whose range and limits have been

stressed, permitted the subsistence of four theoretical orientations that P. Ansart (1990) has clearly identified. These have certain affinities with the four schools distinguished by A. Touraine (1988): genetic structuralism, dynamic sociology, the functionalist and strategic approach, and, finally, methodological individualism.

These theoretical models reflect different visions of the world. Thus, P. Bourdieu’s analyses lead to a highlighting of the division of society into classes; studies of the frequenting of museums or of the grandes écoles reveal practices that differ widely according to origin and to class. Associated with the study of determining structures, which is the goal of genetic structuralism, are the analyses of the author of La Distinction (1979) and those of the research team he conducts, who publish their works in Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales. The epistemology they display can be qualified as ‘‘poststructuralist’’ because of the introduction of the concept of habitus and because of the importance of the developments that support this conceptual proposition. Associated with the study of social dynamism are the names G. Balandier and A. Touraine. The former, beginning with African societies, conceptualized economic and social change; the latter, working from a base of the sociology of work, theorized collective action and social movement. Individual behavior and the problems posed by their aggregation occupies a central place in the work of R. Boudon, notably in Effets pervers et ordre social (1977), in La Logique du social

(1979), and in La Place du désordre (1984).

One will note the cleavage that separates the latter two theoretical constructions (M. Crozier, R. Boudon) from the preceding ones. These latter constructions reveal the same structural social model of social determinations: The former prioritize the strategy of the participant and value the individual; nevertheless, their openness to social psychology remains distinct. Thus, M. Crozier reproaches several interactionist models for treating interaction as a generalizable element, as though interaction revealed the totality of the regulations of a system of action. One is aware, on the other hand, of the close relationship between individualism and social interactionism.

It is not only the radical position that exists between the principles applied by genetic structuralism and those which prevail in methodological

individualism that must here be noted, the ‘‘epistemological distance’’ being perfectly measured by the debate on the inequality of chance. A nodal point of divergence appears, constituted by the conception of this subject. What is, in fact, the subject in generic structuralism and in a strategic conception of individual actions? Whether it be a question of the analysis of conflicts and of the representation of social relationships that it implies, a question of symbolic systems which contemporary sociologists are working to rethink, or finally a question of the place, the role and the function of the sociologist in the city, it clearly appears, as P. Ansart (1990) notes, that ‘‘the works of R. Boudin mark a critical position with regard to other sociological paradigms . . . , and, like every explicitly critical position, this position clearly marks the divergences, the points of disagreement which can be taken to be, on the epistemological level, insurmountable’’ (p. 285).

To conclude, these four theoretical orientations prolong and renew tendencies that were charted in the nineteenth century. In a certain manner, P. Bourdieu carries on the ambition of the first sociologists of the nineteenth century, which was picked up by Durkheim: that of constituting a science of social phenomena, with the certitude that social reality is indeed a reality and that it is ponderable by means of strictly codified rules. One can also say that dynamic sociology retains a vision of the world that has its origins in the works of Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx, and Spencer, insofar as these thinkers posed the problem of social change and proposed explicative models for it. One also recognizes without difficulty that in the background of methodological individualism may be distinguished the influence of Tocqueville, Weber, the Austrian marginalist school, and the debates of the Vienna Circle. As for the functionalist and strategic approach, one may consider it to be the inheritor of an administrative science that, with M. Vivien and M. Block, was put into place in the second half of the nineteenth century.

CONCLUSION

What, all in all, is sociology in France at the end of the twentieth century? The statement made at the beginning of the 1990s by J.-M. Berthelot in La