Encyclopedia of Sociology Vol

present ‘‘tastes,’’ attitudes, or awareness. Hence, models based primarily on individual prejudice or ‘‘rationality,’’ whether psychological or economic, will uniformly understate and oversimplify the phenomenon.

2.Discrimination is typically cumulative and self-perpetuating. For example, an array of research on black Americans has demonstrated that neighborhood racial segregation leads to educational disadvantages, then to occupational disadvantage, and thus to income deficits (Pettigrew 1979, 1985). To be effective, structural remedies must reverse this ‘‘vicious circle’’

of discrimination. Affirmative action programs are one such remedy.

Seen in sociological perspective, then, discrimination is considerably more intricate and entrenched than commonly thought. The complexity of discrimination presents major challenges to social-scientific attempts to trace its impact.

This complexity also precludes any one-to-one correspondence between perpetration and responsibility for remedy. Broad social programs will be necessary if the full legacy of direct and indirect discrimination is finally to be erased.

REFERENCES

Amin, K., M. Fernandes, and P. Gordon 1988 Racism and Discrimination in Britain: A Select Bibliography, 1984–87. London: Runnymede Trust.

Antonovsky, A. 1960 ‘‘The Social Meaning of Discrimination.’’ Phylon 11:81–95.

Becker, G. 1968 ‘‘Economic Discrimination.’’ In D. L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. IV. New York: Macmillan.

Bergman, B. R., and I. Adelman 1973 ‘‘The 1973 Report of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors: The Economic Role of Women.’’ American Economic Review 63:509–514.

Blinder, A. S. 1973 ‘‘Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates.’’Journal of Human Resources 8:436–455.

Blumrosen, A. W. 1996 Declaration. Statement submitted to the Supreme Court of California in response to Proposition 209 (Sept. 26, 1996).

Braddock, J. H. II, and J. M. McPartland 1987 ‘‘How Minorities Continue to be Excluded from Equal

Employment Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers.’’ Journal of Social Issues 43:5–39.

——— 1989 ‘‘Social Psychological Processes that Perpetuate Racial Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Employment Desegregation.’’ Journal of Black Studies 19:267–289.

Burkey, R. 1978 Ethnic and Racial Groups: The Dynamics of Dominance. Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings.

Burstein, P. 1985 Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Castles, S. 1984 Here for Good: Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities. London: Pluto Press.

Conway, D. A., H.V. and Roberts 1994 ‘‘Analysis of Employment Discrimination through Homogeneous Job Groups.’’ Journal of Econometrics 61:103–131.

Corcoran M., and G. J. Duncan 1978 ‘‘Work History, Labor Force Attachment, and Earning Differences Between Races and Sexes.’’ Journal of Human Resources 14:3–20.

Daniel, W. W. 1968 Racial Discrimination In England. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.

Dempster, A. P. 1988 ‘‘Employment Discrimination and Statistical Science.’’ Statistical Science 3:149–195.

De Vries, S., and T. F. Pettigrew 1994 ‘‘A Comparative Perspective on Affirmative Action: Positieve aktie in the Netherlands.’’ Basic and Applied Social Psychology

15:179–199.

England, P., G. Farkas, B. Kilbourne, and T. Dou 1988 ‘‘Explaining Occupational Sex Segregation and Wages: Findings from a Model with Fixed Effects.’’ American Sociological Review 53:544–558.

Farley, R. 1984 Blacks and Whites: Narrowing the Gap?

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Feagin, J. R., and C. B. Feagin 1986 Discrimination American Style: Institutional Racism and Sexism, 2d ed. Malabar, Fla.: Krieger.

Feagin, J. R., and M. P. Sikes 1994 Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press.

Fox, M. F. 1991 ‘‘Gender, Environmental Milieux, and Productivity in Science.’’ In J.Cole, H. Zuckerman, and J. Bruer, eds., The Outer Circle: Women in the Scientific Community. New York: Norton.

Gill, A. M. 1989 ‘‘The Role of Discrimination in Determining Occupational Structure.’’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review 42:610–623.

Gordon, P., and F. Klug 1984 Racism and Discrimination in Britain: A Select Bibliography, 1970–83. London: Runnymede Trust.

Heckman, J. J., and B. S. Payner 1989 ‘‘Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina.’’ American Economic Review 79:138–177.

Layton-Henry, Z., and C. Wilpert 1994 Discrimination, Racism and Citizenship: Inclusion and Exclusion in Britain and Germany. London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society.

Leonard, J. S. 1994 ‘‘Use of Enforcement Techniques in Eliminating Glass Ceiling Barriers.’’ Report to the Glass Ceiling Commission. U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C.

MacEwen M. 1995 Tackling Racism in Europe: An Examination of Anti-Discrimination Law in Practice. Washington, D.C.: Berg.

MacMaster N. 1991 ‘‘The ‘Seuil de Tolerance’: The Uses of a ‘Scientific’ Racist Concept.’’ In M. Silverman, ed., Race, Discourse and Power in France. Aldershot, UK: Avebury.

Mayhew, L. H. 1968 Law and Equal Opportunity: A Study of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Pettigrew, T. F. 1979 ‘‘Racial Change and Social Policy.’’

Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science 441:114–131.

———1985 ‘‘New Black-White Patterns: How Best to Conceptualize Them?’’ Annual Review of Sociology

11:329–346.

———1998 ‘‘Responses to the New Minorities of Western Europe.’’ Annual Review of Sociology 24:77–103.

———, and R. W. Meertens 1996 ‘‘The Verzuiling Puzzle: Understanding Dutch Intergroup Relations.’’

Current Psychology 15:3–13.

Reskin, B. F. 1998 The Realities of Affirmative Action in Employment. Washington, D.C.: American Sociological Association.

Rosenfeld, R. A., and A. L. Kalleberg 1990 ‘‘A Crossnational Comparison of the Gender Gap in Income.’’

American Journal of Sociology 96:69–105.

Rosensweig, M. R., and J. Morgan 1976 ‘‘Wage Discrimination: A Comment.’’ Journal of Human Resources 11:3–7.

Sanborn, H. 1969 ‘‘Pay Differences Between Men and Women.’’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review

17:534–550.

Smith, D. J. 1976 The Facts of Racial Disadvantage: A National Survey. London: PEP.

Taylor, M. C. 1988 ‘‘Estimating Race and Sex Inequity in Wages: Substantive Implications of Methodological Choices.’’ Paper presented at the 1989 Research

Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. Seattle, Wash.

Veenman, J., and T. Roelandt 1990 ‘‘Allochtonen: Achterstand en Achterstelling.’’ In J. J. Schippers, ed., Arbeidsmarkt en Maatschappelijke Ongelijkheid. Groningen, The Netherlands: Wolters-Noordhoff.

Williams, R. M., Jr. 1947 The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions. New York: Social Science Research Council.

Wilpert, C. 1993 ‘‘Ideological and Institutional Foundations of Racism in the Federal Republic of Germany.’’ In J. Solomos and J. Wrench, eds., Racism and Migration in Western Europe. Oxford, UK: Berg.

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW

MARYLEE C. TAYLOR

DISENGAGEMENT THEORY

See Aging and the Life Course; Retirement.

DISTRIBUTION-FREE

STATISTICS

See Nonparametric Statistics.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

See Human Rights/Children’s Rights; Social

Justice.

DIVISION OF LABOR

The division of labor is a multifaceted concept that applies to several levels of analysis: small groups, families, households, formal organizations, societies, and even the entire ‘‘world system’’ (Wallerstein

1979). Each level of analysis requires a slightly different focus; the division of labor may refer to the emergence of certain roles in groups, to the relative preponderance of industrial sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary) in an economy, to the distribution of societal roles by sex and age, or to variability among occupational groupings. Sociologists at the micro-level are concerned with ‘‘who does what,’’ while macrosociologists focus on the larger structural issues of societal functions.

All of the major sociological theorists considered the division of labor to be a fundamental concept in understanding the development of modern society. The division of labor in society has been a focus of theoretical debate for more than a century, with some writers most concerned about hierarchical divisions, or the vertical dimension, and others emphasizing the heterogeneity or the horizontal dimension, of a social system. The analysis here is primarily theoretical, and so does not deal with debates about the technical problems of measurement (but see Baker 1981; Clemente 1972; Gibbs and Poston 1975; Land 1970; Rushing and Davies 1970).

THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SMALL

GROUPS

Most small groups exhibit ‘‘role differentiation,’’ as first described by Simmel (1890), Whyte (1943), and Bales and Slater (1955). The research on informal work groups stresses a hierarchical form of the division of labor, or the emergence of leadership; in particular, the emergence of both a ‘‘task leader’’ and a ‘‘social leader.’’ It appears that defining group goals and enforcing norms is a type of activity incompatible with maintaining group cohesion, and therefore most groups have a shared leadership structure. Even in same-sex groups, this structure of coleadership is apparent; also, the degree of role differentiation appears be greater in larger groups. The functional need for a social leader depends in part on the degree to which group members are task oriented, and on the degree to which the task leader is perceived as a legitimate authority (with the power to reward and punish other group members). Burke (1969) has also noted that a ‘‘scapegoat’’ role may emerge within task groups, reducing the need for a social leader to maintain harmony among the rest of the group members.

HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILY DIVISION

OF LABOR

When the family or household is the unit of analysis, issues concerning the division of tasks between spouses are of primary interest to sociologists.

One major finding has been the persistence of disproportionately high levels of traditional housework by the wife, even when she is employed

outside the home. This reflects the ‘‘provider’’ vs.

‘‘homemaker’’ role distinction that formerly characterized most nuclear families in industrialized societies. Another major family role, occupied almost exclusively by the wife, is that of ‘‘kinkeeper.’’ The maintenance of family traditions, the recording of important family anniversaries, and the coordination of visits between households are all vital elements of this role. The classic works by Bott (1957) and Blood and Wolfe (1960) documented the spousal division of labor as it was influenced by wider social networks and the relative power of the husband and wife. Kamo (1988) has noted that cultural ideology is a strong factor in the determination of spousal roles, although it is not entirely independent of the resources available to husband and wife.

Within a household, both age and sex structure the division of labor. Young children have few responsibilities, while parents have many, and males and females tend to do very different tasks. For example, White and Brinkerhoff (1981) studied the reported allocation of a variety of household tasks among a sample of Nebraska households, and found that the youngest cohort of children (aged two to five) performed relatively few household tasks and showed little differentiation by sex.

Older children, however, diverged considerably in their roles (males doing more outdoor work, females more responsible for cooking or childcare).

At the other end of the lifespan, the roles of the grandparent generation were strongly influenced by geographical proximity, the ages of the grandparents, and the ages of the children. Divorce among the parental generation can also substantially impact the roles adopted by grandparents (see Bengston and Robertson 1985).

FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION

Formal organizations are always structured by an explicit division of labor (an organization chart contains the names of functions, positions, or subunits). The horizontal differentiation in an organization, or task specialization, is normally based on functional units that are of roughly equivalent levels in the hierarchy of authority. The division of labor may also be constructed on a geographical basis, with the extreme examples being

transnational corporations that draw raw resources and labor from the developing nations, and management from the developed nations.

Labor is also organized hierarchically, into levels of authority. Max Weber was one of the first sociologists to analyze the emergence of modern bureaucracies, where the division of labor is fundamental. Weber’s approach suggests a maximum possible level of specialization, so that each position can be filled by individuals who are experts in a narrow area of activity. An extreme form of the bureaucratic division of labor was advocated by

Frederick Taylor’s theory of ‘‘Scientific Management’’ (1911). By studying in minute detail the physical motions required to most efficiently operate any given piece of machinery, Taylor pioneered ‘‘time and motion studies.’’ Along with Henry Ford, he also made the assembly line a standard industrial mode of production in modern society. However, this form of the division of labor can lead to isolation and alienation among workers, and so more recent organizational strategies, in some industrial sectors, emphasize the

‘‘craft’’ approach, in which a team of workers participate more or less equally in many aspects of the production process (see Blauner 1964;

Hedley 1992).

SOCIETAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Macrosociologists measure the societal division of labor in a number of ways, most commonly by considering the number of different occupational categories that appear in census statistics or other official documents (see Moore 1968). These lists are often implicitly or explicitly ranked, and so both horizontal and vertical division of labor can be analyzed. This occupational heterogeneity is dependent in part on the official definitions, but researchers on occupational prestige (the vertical dimension) have shown comparable levels in industrialized societies such as the United States,

Canada, England, Japan, Sweden, Germany, and

France (see Treiman 1977). The ‘‘world system’’ as described by Wallerstein (1979) is the upper limit of the analysis of the division of labor. Entire societies are characterized as ‘‘core’’ or ‘‘periphery’’ in Wallerstein’s analysis of the global implications of postindustrialism.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations (1776), produced the classic statement of the economic efficiencies of a complex division of labor. He observed that the manufacture of steel pins could be more than two hundred times more productive if each separate operation (and there were more than a dozen) were performed by a separate worker. The emergence of the systematic and intentional division of labor probably goes back to prehistoric societies, and is certainly in evidence in the ancient civilizations of China, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The accumulation of an agricultural surplus and the establishment of markets both created and stimulated the differentiation of producers and consumers. Another phase in the transformation in Europe was the decline of the ‘‘craft guilds’’ that dominated from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. When labor became free from the constraints of the journeyman/apprentice system and when factories began to attract large numbers of laborers, the mechanization of modern work flourished. (For economic and political perspectives on the division of labor see Krause 1982; Putterman 1990).

Early sociologists such as Herbert Spencer considered the growth of societies as the primary determinant of the increased specialization and routinization of work; they also emphasized the positive impacts of this process. Spencer, like other functionalists, viewed human society as an organic system that became increasingly differentiated as it grew in size, much as a fertilized egg develops complex structures as it develops into a full-fledged embryo. In his Principles of Sociology

(1884), Spencer considered the evolution of human society as a process of increasing differentiation of structure and function.

Karl Marx(1867) argued that the increasing division of labor in capitalist societies is a primary cause of alienation and class conflict, and therefore is a force in the eventual transformation to a socialist/communist society. In fact, a specific question asking for details of the division of labor appeared on one of the earliest questionnaire surveys in sociology done by Marx in 1880. Marx and his followers called for a new form of the division of labor, supported by an equalitarian ethos, in which individuals would be free to choose

their productive roles; labor would not be alienating because of the common ideology and sense of community.

Weber (1947) painted a darker picture when he documented the increasing ‘‘rationalization’’ of society, especially the ascendence of the bureaucratic division of labor with its coordinated system of roles, each highly specialized, with duties speci-

fied in writing and incumbents hired on the basis of their documented competence at specific tasks.

The ideal-type bureaucracy was in actuality subject to the negative consequences of excessive specialization, however. Weber pointed out that the ‘‘iron cage’’ placed stifling limits on human freedom within the organization, and that decisions by bureaucrats often became so rule bound and inflexible that the clients were ill served.

Georg Simmel’s ‘‘differentiation and the principle of saving energy’’ (1976 [1890]) is a littleknown essay that similarly describes the inevitable problems that offset the efficiencies gained by the division of labor; he called these ‘‘friction, indirectness, and superfluous coordination.’’ He also echoed Marx and Engels when he described the effects of high levels of differentiation upon the individual:

. . . differentiation of the social group is evidently directly opposed to that of the individual. The former requires that the individual must be as specialized as possible, that some single task must absorb all his energies and that all his impulses, abilities and interests must be made compatible with this one task, because this specialization of the individual makes it both possible and necessary to the highest degree for him to be different from all other specialized individuals. Thus the economic setup of society forces the individual for life into the most monotonous work, the most extreme specialization, because in this way he will acquire the skill which makes possible the desired quality and cheapness of the product. (Simmel 1976, p. 130)

While the foregoing theorists contributed substantially to the understanding of the division of labor, Emile Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society (1893) stands as the classic sociological statement of the causes and consequences of the historical shift from ‘‘mechanical solidarity’’ to

‘‘organic solidarity.’’ The former is found in smaller, less-advanced societies where families and villages are mostly self-sufficient, independent, and united by similarities. The latter is found in larger, urbanized societies where specialization creates interdependence among social units.

Following Spencer’s lead, Durkheim noted that the specialization of functions always accompanies the growth of a society; he also observed that increasing population density—the urbanization of society that accompanies modernization— greatly increases the opportunities for further increases in the division of labor.

It should be noted that the shift to a modern division of labor could not have occurred without a preexisting solidarity; in his chapter on ‘‘organic and contractual solidarity’’ he departed from Spencer’s utilitarian explanation of social cohesion, and noted that the advanced division of labor can occur only among members of an existing society, where individuals and groups are united by preexisting similarities (of language, religion, etc.).

A sense of trust, obligation, and interdependence is essential for any large group in which there are many diverse roles; indirect exchanges occur; and individuals form smaller subgroupings based on occupational specialization. All of these changes create high levels of interdependence, but with increasing specialization, and different world views develop, along with different interests, values, and belief systems. This is the problem Durkheim saw in the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity; he feared the ‘‘anomie’’ or lack of cohesion that might result from a multiplicity of views, languages, and religions within a society (as in the France of his times, and even more so today). The problems of inequality in modern industrial society were not lost on Durkheim, either; he noted how the ‘‘pathological form of the division of labor’’ posed a threat to the full development of social solidarity (see Giddens 1971). Although many simplistic analyses of Durkheim’s approach suggest otherwise, he dealt at length with the problems of ‘‘the class war’’ and the need for justice and fraternity.

The division of labor is treated as a key element in Peter Blau’s book, Inequality and Heterogeneity (1977). This important work emphasizes the primacy of differentiation (division of labor) as an

influence on mobility, prejudice, conflict, affiliation, intermarriage, and inequality. In Blau’s scheme, a society may be undifferentiated (all persons or positions are independent, self-suffi- cient, etc.) or strongly differentiated (a high degree of specialization and interdependence). This differentiation may be a matter of degree, on dimensions such as authority, power, prestige, etc.; this constitutes inequality. Or the differentiation may be a matter of kind, such as occupational differentiation—the division of labor.

Blau, like Durkheim, distinguished two major types of division of labor: routinization and expert specialization.

The two major forms of division of labor are the subdivision of work into repetitive routines and its subdivision into expert specialities. . .

when jobs are divided into repetitive routines, the training and skills needed to perform them are reduced, whereas when they are divided into fields of specialists, the narrower range of tasks permits greater expertness to be acquired and applied to the work, increasing the training and skills required to perform it.

(Blau 1977, p. 188)

Blau has shown that the division of labor always increases inequality in the organization. The managerial and technical experts coordinate the increasing number and diversity of routinized positions. As organizations and societies increase in size and population density, the division of labor increases. At the same time, the forces of industrialization and urbanization require and encourage further specialization, and in most cases, increase inequality, and indirectly, social integration. Some of the confounding boundaries include the degree of linguistic, ethnic, or cultural heterogeneity (all of which can inhibit integration), and social or geographic mobility (which can increase integration).

In a rare display of explicitly stated definitions and propositions, Blau created a landmark theory of social organization. Here are the most important of Blau’s assumptions and theorems relating to the division of labor:

•The division of labor depends on opportunities for communication.

•Population density and urbanization increase the division of labor.

•Rising levels of education and qualifications promote an advanced division of labor.

•Large work organizations promote the division of labor in society.

•Linguistic heterogeneity impedes the division of labor.

•The more the division of labor is in the form of specialization rather than routinization, the higher are rates of

associations among different occupations, which produces higher integration.

•The more the division of labor intersects with other nominal parameters (including kinship, language, religion, ethnicity, etc.) the greater is the probability that intergroup relations strengthen society’s integration.

•The smaller an organization, the more its internal division of labor increases the probabilities of intergroup and

interstratum associations, and therefore the higher the degree of integration. (Summarized from Blau 1977, pp.

214–215)

Blau concludes by noting that ‘‘Advances in the division of labor tend to be accompanied by decreases in various forms of inequality but by increases in inequality in power. Although the advancing division of labor does not generate the growing concentration of power, the two are likely to occur together, because the expansion of work organizations promotes both.’’ (p. 214).

CONCLUSION

Ford’s moving assembly lines began to produce the frames for Model T automobiles in 1913, at a rate of about one every two working days, but within months, refinements on the assembly process reduced this to four units per day. This eightfold increase in efficiency was accompanied by a decrease in the price of the cars and indirectly stimulated a very large industry. Now, automated factories, using robotics and highly specialized computer systems, have dramatically increased the efficiency of the automobile industry. The effects on morale and the environment, however, appear to be less salutary.

(SEE ALSO: Bureaucracy, Complex Organizations, Convergence Theories, Family and Household Structure, Family Roles, Industrial Sociology, Industrialization, Parental Roles, Social Change, Social Structure, Technology and Society, and Work and Occupations.)

REFERENCES

Baker, P.M. 1981 ‘‘The Division of Labor: Interdependence, Isolation, and Cohesion in Small Groups.’’

Small Group Behavior 12(1):93–106.

Bales, R.F,. and P.E. Slater 1955 ‘‘Role Differentiation in Small Decision-Making Groups.’’ In T. Parsons et al., eds., Family, Socialization, and Interaction Process. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Bengston, V.L., and J.F. Robertson 1985 Grandparenthood. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Blau, P.M. 1977 Inequality and Heterogeneity. New York:

Free Press.

Blauner, R. 1964 Alienation and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Blood, R., and D. Wolfe 1960 Husbands and Wives: The Dynamics of Married Living. New York: Free Press.

Bott, E. 1957 Family and Social Network. London: Tavistock

Publications.

Burke, P.J. 1969 ‘‘Scapegoating: An Alternative to Role Differentiation.’’ Sociometry 32(June):159–168.

Clemente, R. 1972 ‘‘The Measurement Problem in the Analysis of an Ecological Concept: The Division of Labor.’’ Pacific Sociological Review 15:30–40.

Durkheim, E. (1893) 1933 The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press.

Gibbs, J.P., and D.L. Poston 1975 ‘‘The Division of Labor: Conceptualization and Related Issues.’’ Social Forces 53 (March) 468–476.

Giddens, A. 1971 Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim, and Max Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hedley, R.A. 1992 Making a Living: Technology and Change. New York: Harper Collins.

Kamo, Y. 1988 ‘‘Determinants of Household Labor: Resources, Power, and Ideology.’’ Journal of Family Issues 9:177–200.

Krause, E.A. 1982 The Division of Labor: A Political Perspective. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Land, K.C. 1970 ‘‘Mathematical Formalization of Durkheim’s Theory of Division of Labor.’’ E.F. Borgatta, ed., Sociological Methodology 1970, 257–282. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Marx, K. (1867) 1977 Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. New York: Vintage Books.

Moore, W.E. 1968 Economy and Society. New York: Ran-

dom House.

Putterman, L. 1990 Division of Labor and Welfare: An Introduction to Economic Systems. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rushing, W.A., and V. Davies 1970 ‘‘Note on the Mathematical Formalization of a Measure.’’ Social Forces 48(March):394–396.

Simmel, G. (1890) 1976 ‘‘On Social Differentiation.’’ In P. Lawrence, ed., Georg Simmel, Sociologist and European. New York: Nelson.

Smith, Adam (1776) 1985 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library.

Smith, D., and R. Snow 1976 ‘‘The Division of Labor: Conceptual and Methodological Issues.’’ Social Forces 55:520–528.

Spencer, H. 1884 Principles of Sociology. New York: Ap-

pleton-Century-Crofts.

Taylor, F. 1911 Scientific Management. New York: Harper.

Treiman, D. 1977 Occupational Prestige in Comparative Perspective. New York: Academic Press.

Wallerstein, I. 1979 The Capitalist World-Economy. New

York: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, M. (1908) 1947 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press.

Whyte, W.F. 1943 Street Corner Society. Chicago: Chicago

University Press.

PAUL MORGAN BAKER

DIVORCE

Divorce is of sociological significance for several reasons. To begin, divorce rates are often seen as indicators of the health of the institution of marriage. When divorce rates rise or fall, many sociologists view these changes as indicating something about the overall quality of marriages or, alternatively, the stability of social arrangements more generally. Viewed from another perspective, divorce interests sociologists as one of several important transitions in the life course of individuals. The adults and children who experience divorce have been studied to understand both the causes and consequences. From this perspective, a divorce is as much an event in the biography of

family members, as other life-course transitions (remarriage, childbirth, and retirement). The sociological interest in divorce also focuses on the social trends it is part of, figuring prominently in any sociological analysis of industrialization, poverty rates, educational attainment, strategies of conflict resolution, or law.

For sociologists, divorce may characterize an individual, a family, a region, a subgroup, a historical period, or an entire society. It may be studied as either the cause or consequence of other phenomena. Still, the overriding concern of almost all research on this topic has been the increase in divorce over time. Divorce is now almost as common as its absence in the lives of recently married couples. The National Center for Health Statistics estimates that 43 percent of marriages begun in the early 1990s will end in divorce (NCHS 1998), a significant decline from the estimates of 50 percent to 65 percent in the late 1980s (Martin and Bumpass 1989). The decline in divorce rates in the recent past is probably a result of the aging of the post-World War II Baby Boom generation who are no longer at high risk of divorce because of their age. It is also possible that American marriages are becoming somewhat more stable than they were a decade ago. Still, the fluctuations in divorce rates one decade to the next do not mask the more general trend for the past two centuries. Understanding the increase in divorce has been the larger sociological endeavor regardless of the particular perspective employed. A historical account of trends is necessary before considering contemporary issues associated with divorce.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL RECORD OF

DIVORCE IN AMERICA

The Colonial Period. Divorce was not legal in any but the New England settlements. The Church of England allowed for legal separations (a mensa et thoro), but not for divorce. The New England

Puritans who first landed at Plymouth in 1621, however, were disenchanted with this, as well as many other Anglican doctrines. Divorce was permitted on the grounds of adultery or seven-year desertion as early as 1639 in Plymouth. Other New England colonies followed similar guidelines. Divorce governed by rudimentary codified law was granted by legislative decree. Individual petitions for divorce were debated in colonial legislatures

and were effected by bills to dissolve a particular marriage. Still, though legal, divorce was very rare. During the seventeenth century, there were fiftyfour petitions for divorce in Massachusetts, of which forty-four were successful (Phillips 1988, p.

138). The middle colonies provided annulments or divorces for serious matrimonial offenses such as prolonged absence or bigamy. The southern colonies afforded no provisions for divorce whatsoever.

Post-Revolutionary War. Immediately after the Revolutionary War, without British legal impediments to divorce, the states began discussion of laws to govern divorce. In New England and the middle states, divorce became the province of state courts while in the more restrictive southern states it was more often a legislative matter. By the turn of the nineteenth century, almost all states had enacted some form of divorce law. And by the middle of the century, even southern states were operating within a judicial divorce system.

The shift to judicial divorce is significant. By removing divorce deliberations from legislatures, states were forced to establish grounds that justi-

fied a divorce. Such clauses reflected the prevailing sentiments governing normative marriage— they indicated what was expected of marriage at the time. And by investing judges with the authority to interpret and adjudicate, such changes significantly liberalized the availability of divorce. Northern and southern states permitted divorces for specific offenses such as adultery, desertion, bigamy, and increasingly with time, cruelty. In the newer frontier western states, grounds resembled those of the East plus ‘‘any other cause for which the court shall deem it proper that the divorce shall be granted’’ (Phillips 1988, p. 453).

Throughout the nineteenth century, there was a gradual liberalization of divorce laws in the United States and a corresponding increase in divorce as well. Where divorces totaled a few hundred at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the numbers grew exponentially as the century wore on; 7,380 divorces in 1860, 10,962 in 1870, 19,663 in 1880, 33,461 in 1890, and 55,751 in 1900 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975). These figures assume greater significance when growth in population is removed from them. Whereas the divorce rate (number of divorces per 1,000 marriages) was but 1.2 in 1869, it had climbed to 4.0 by 1900. In short, the increase

in divorce outstripped the increase in population several times.

A number of factors have been identified as causes of such dramatic increases. In part, these can be described as social changes, which made marriage less essential. The growth of wage labor in the nineteenth century afforded women an alternative to economic dependence on a husband. In an economy dominated by individuals rather than families, marriage was simply less essential. Life as a single individual gradually lost its legal or social stigma (New England settlements had forbidden solitary dwelling while southern communities had taxed it heavily).

More important, however, were fundamental shifts in the meaning of marriage. Divorce codes reflected the growing belief that marriages should be imbued with heavy doses of affection and equality. Divorce grounds of cruelty or lack of support indicate that marriage was increasingly viewed as a partnership. Where a century earlier men had been granted greater discretion in their personal lives, latter nineteenth-century morality attacked such double standards. Men were not necessarily less culpable than women for their vices. Victorian morality stressed the highest standards of sexual behavior for both husbands and wives. Changing divorce codes coincided with the passage of laws restricting husbands’ unilateral control over their wifes’ property. The passage of married women’s property acts throughout the nation in the latter nineteenth century acknowledged married women’s claims to property brought to or acquired in marriage. By 1887, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia gave married women control over their property and earnings (Degler 1980, p. 332).

Divorce codes including omnibus grounds such as ‘‘cruelty’’ (which could justify a divorce from a drunkard husband, for example) may be viewed as reflecting a Victorian American belief that women were morally sensitive and fragile, and in need of protection (Phillips 1988, p. 500). More particularly, the growing use of offenses against the intimate and emotional aspects of marriage reflected a growing belief that such things constituted matrimonial essentials. If a failure of intimacy could justify the dissolution of a marriage, then intimacy may be viewed as a core expectation of marriage.

The Twentieth Century. The first half of the twentieth century was a continuation of trends

established in the latter nineteenth century. Two world wars and the Great Depression interrupted gradually increasing divorce rates, however. During each war and during the Depression, divorce rates dropped. After each, rates soared before falling to levels somewhat higher than that which preceded these events. Sociological explanations for these trends focus on women’s employment opportunities. Women’s labor force participation permits the termination of intolerable unions. The separations, hastily timed marriages, and sexual misalliances characteristic of wartime were also undoubtedly factors in the post-war divorces rates.

Further, the increases in divorce following these difficult times may be seen, in part, as a delayed reaction. Once the Depression or war was over, the reservoir of impending divorces broke. And

finally, postwar optimism and affluence may have contributed to an unwillingness to sustain an unhappy marriage.

The second half of the century witnessed even more dramatic increases in divorce. With the exception of the peculiar 1950s (for an explanation of this anomaly, see Cherlin 1992), the trend for the second half of the 1900s was a regular and exponential growth in divorce until around 1980, at which point the increase stopped.

Though specific explanations for the increase in divorces during the twentieth century vary, several themes may be noted. First, marriage has lost much of its central economic and social signifi- cance—especially for women. For example, divorce was undoubtedly inhibited by the fact that prior to the twentieth century, custody of children was uniformly awarded to fathers (since they were legally responsible for financial support). With the acceptance of Freudian ideas of psychosexual development and similar ideas about intellectual and cognitive growth, the so-called Tender Years Doctrine became accepted practice in courts during the early 1900s which then awarded custody to mothers as regularly as they had once done to fathers. And as it became more commonplace, remarriage began to lose some of its stigma. All these changes made it possible for women to divorce their husbands if they wished. But why did so many wish to obtain divorces?

The simplest explanation is that more divorce is a consequence of higher expectations of marriage. More and more grounds for divorce are

developed as there are higher and higher expectations for what a marriage should be. In the nineteenth century, drunkenness, cruelty, and failure to provide were added to more traditional grounds of adultery and desertion. In the early twentieth century, cruelty was continually redefined to include not only physical, but mental cruelty as well.

The post-war surges in divorce created sufficient numbers of divorced persons so that the practice lost much of its stigma. The increase in divorce becomes more understandable when the loss of stigma is considered alongside the increase in women’s employment since the mid 1960s. When women are employed, there is less constraint on them to remain in a marriage. But there is also less constraint on their husbands who will not be required to support their employed exwives after a divorce.

Since 1970, divorce has been fundamentally redefined. No-fault divorce laws passed since the early 1970s have defined as unacceptable those marriages in which couples are ‘‘incompatible,’’ have ‘‘irreconcilable differences’’ or in which the marriage is ‘‘irretrievably broken.’’ Prior to the nofault regime, divorces required proof of a fault

(crime) on the part of one spouse. The court decided whether to grant the divorce. Divorce proceedings were intentionally adversarial. Today, the non-adversarial grounds for divorce are almost entirely based on the failures of emotional essentials. Emotional marital breakdown may have been a feature of large numbers of marriages in earlier historical periods. Only now, however, is such a situation viewed as solely sufficient grounds for terminating the marriage.

DIVORCE IN THE WEST

Any theory of divorce must be able to account for the broad similarities in historical (twentieth century) trends throughout the entire Western world. These similarities exist despite notable differences in national economies, forms of government, and the role of the church. The trends are well known. There was very little divorce until the end of the nineteenth century, a slow but constant growth in divorce rates through the first half of the twentieth century (interrupted by two world wars and an international economic depression), and significant increases in divorce rates since the 1960s. The

twentieth century, in short, is when most significant changes in divorce rates occurred. And the changes noted in America were seen in most other

Western nations.

Between World Wars I and II, there were widespread changes in divorce laws that reflected changing beliefs about matrimony and its essentials. The strains of war and the associated problems that produced more divorces made the practice more conspicuous and consequently more acceptable. There is no doubt one cause of divorce is divorce. When obscure, the practice was stigmatized and there was little to counter stereotypes associated with its practice. When divorce became more commonplace, it lost some of its stigma.

Social changes pertaining to women’s roles are a large part of the story of divorce during the postwar era. One sign of these changes was the growth, throughout the West, of women’s labor force participation. But the most conspicuous symbol of the changing role of women was the passage of suffrage legislation throughout the Western world. Before 1914, women were permitted to vote only in New Zealand, Australia, Finland, Norway, and eleven western U.S. states. In the United States, women were enfranchised in 1920. In Britain, Sweden, Germany, and many other European countries, suffrage passed soon after World War I.

Divorce laws, similarly, were altered between the wars in accordance with changing views of marriage and the role of women. The British Parliament enacted divorce reform in 1937 by significantly extending the grounds for divorce

(including cruelty) and granting women new options for filing for divorce. Scotland reformed its divorce laws in 1938 by extending grounds for divorce to include failures of emotional essen- tials—cruelty and habitual drunkenness, for example. In 1930, the Canadian Parliament for the first time empowered judicial magistrates to grant divorce rather than requiring legislative decrees. And the Spanish divorce law of 1932 was the most liberal in contemporary Europe—providing divorce by mutual consent (Phillips 1988, p. 539). Even Nazi Germany permitted no-fault divorce by 1938 (though divorce law was aimed at increasing the number of Aryan children born).

Following World War II, divorce rates throughout the Western world stabilized after an initial increase. The low divorce rates, high fertility, and