Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America by James Davison Hunter (z-lib.org)

not an isolated event. It coincides with the slow but steady expansion of political and ideological tolerance (such as tolerance of communists and atheists), racial tolerance (of blacks and Hispanks), and sexual tolerance (of homosexuals and those cohabitating outside of marriage). 14

No one would say that interreligious and interideological tension of the kind that prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has disappeared altogether-nor, in all likelihood, will it ever disappear entirely. The voices of prejudice can continue to be heard by those who warn against "the Jewish Menace," or like the leadership of the World Congress of Fundamentalists who claimed in 1983 that the Roman Catholic Church is "the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth."15 Even so, overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the social ethos of the late twentieth century reflects dramatic change.

Social and historical tendencies as important as these compel us to confront a momentous possibility. The Enlightenment philosophes long ago predicted that as societies advanced, modern individuals would outgrow their reed for the comfort of religious "superstitions." One of the long-dreamed-for consequences of this would be the end to religiously motivated violence and division in society. If religion was deteriorating, its passions could no longer be linked with the tremendous power of the state. All such conflict would come to an end. Though the Enlightenment thinkers held out this hope universally, they were particularly anxious to see the end of hostilities between Protestants and Catholics and between -Christians and Jews in their own societies. It was the political disruption and.human suffering generated by these particular cleavages

.that were most immediate to their own time and experience.

The evidence just reviewed provides still another compelling explanati()n of why the very idea ofcultural conflict in contemporary Amer-

ica is so implausible to most Americans. When we look all around the socia·I and p~litic~l landscape, we see a general harmony among the

traditional faiths of the United States; by and large, Protestants get along well with Catholics, Christians get along better with Jews, and even the small number of religious cults are more of a curiosity than a source of widespread resentment and antagonism. If one can argue anything on the basis of scholarly study, it is that the predictions of the Enlightenment age are coming true after all.

But are they? ls the age of cultural and, in particular, religious conflict in America coming to a close?

The answer must be no. The reason is that cultural conflict is taking shape along new and in many ways unfamiliar lines.

42 INTRODUCTION

NEW LINES OF CONFLICT:

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

Let me begin to make sense of the new lines of culturarwarfare by first defining what I mean by "cultural conflict." I define cultural conflict very

simply as political and social hostility rooted in<iffferem systems of m;;..l · understanding. The end to which these hostilities tend is the domin~on

'O"r one cultural and moral ethos over all others. Let it be clear, the principles and ideals that ma.rk these competing systems of moral understanding are by no means trifling hut always have a character of ultimacy to them. They are not merely attitudes that can change on a whim hut basic commitments and beliefs that provide a source of identity, purpose, and togetherness for the people who live by them. It is for precisely this reason that political action rooted in these principles and ideals tends to be so passionate.

So what is new about the contemporary cultural conflict? As we have se !n, the cultural hostilities dominant over the better part of American history have taken place within the boundaries of a larger biblical cul- ture-among numerous Protestant groups, and Catholics and jewsover such issues as doctrine, ritual observance, and religious organization. Underlying their disagreements, therefore, were basic agreements about the order of life in community and nation-agreements forged by biblical symbols and imagery. But the old arrangements have been transformed (a matter we will explore in chapter 3). The older agreements have unraveled. The divisions of political consequence today are

most fi" Clamental ideas about who we are as Americans are now at

on t e range of issues e ated-whether abortion, child care, funding for the arts, affirmative action and quotas, gay rights, values in public education, or multiculturalism-~n he traced ultimately and finally to

tave very different ideas about what criteria to use in making moral

judgments, but this is just the point. It is the commitment to different and opposing bases of moral authority and the world views that derive from them that creates the deep cleavages between antagonists in the contemporary culture war. ;\§_we will see, this cleava~ js so deep that it cuts across the old lines of conflict, makin the distinctions that Ion divided Amenta

'

virtually irrelevant.

·me introduce a critical word of qualification.

tutions possess tremendous power in the realm of public discourse. They almost seem to have a life of their own: an existence, power, and agenda independent of the people for whom they presumably speak.

Polarizing Impulses: The Orthodox and the erogressive

To come right to the point, the cleavages at the heart of the contemporary culture ~ar are created by what I would like to call the impulse toward orthodoxy and the impulse toward progressivism. The terms are imperfect, but each aspires to describe in shorthand a particular locus and source of moral truth, the fundamental (though perhaps subconscious) moral allegiances of the actors involved in the culture war as well as their cultural and political dispositions. Though the terms "orthodox" and

INTRODUCTION

"progressive" may be familiar to many, they have a particular meaning here that requires some elaboration.

Let me acknowledge, first off, that the words, orthodox and progressive, can describe specific doctrinal creeds or particular religious practices. Take orthodoxy. Within Judaism, orthodoxy is defined mainly by commitment to Torah and the community that upholds it; within Catholicism, orthodoxy is defined largely by loyalty to church teachingthe Roman Magisterium; and within Protestantism, orthodoxy principally means devotion to the complete and final authority of Script1,1re. Substantively, then, these labels can mean vastly different things within different religious traditions.

But I prefer to use the terms orthodox and progressive as formal properties of a belief system or world view. What is common to all three approaches to orthodoxy, for example, (and what makes orthodoxy more of a formal property), is the commitment on the part ofadherents to an external, definable, and transcendent authority. Such objective and transcendent authority defines, at least in the abstract, a consistent, unchangeable measure of value, purpose, goodness, and identity, both personal arid collective. It tells us what is good, what is true, how we should live, and who we are. It is an authority that is sufficient for all time. Thus, as different as Chuck Mcllhenny, Yehuda Levin, and Mae Duggan are in their personal faith commitments, all three believe that moral authority comes from above and for all time. This is seen clearly in Yehuda's statement that what the Torah says about abortion is "the beginning and the end of the subject." Chuck and Mae, in their own ways, would say something similar. This fundamenta.I commitment, then, is what these three share in common and one reason why, in the current climate, their voices tend to resonate with each other.

Within cultural progressivism, by contrast, moral authority tends to be defined by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism. 16 Progressivist moral ideals tend, that is, to derive from and embody (though rarely exhaust) that spirit. From this standpoint, truth tends to be viewed as a process, as a reality that is ever unfolding. There are many distinctions that need to be made here. For example, what about those progressivists who still identify with a particular religious heritage? For them, one may note a strong tendency to translate the moral ideals of a re,ligious tradition so that they conform to and legitimate the contemporary zeitgeist. In other words, what all progressivist world views share in common is the tendency to resymbolize historic faiths according

to the prevailing assumptions of contemporary life. This is seen, for example, in Bea Blair's rejection of biblical literalism and her conviction that, as she put it, "people have to interpret the Scripture for themselves." The same theme is illustrated by stories Chuck Mcllhenny tells of ministers he has debated, some of whom, Chuck says, reinterpret Scripture to justify homosexuality, while others recognize what the biblical texts say about the immorality of homosexuality but reject its authority over one's life. From Chuck's point of view, progressivist church leaders base their views on the belief that "the Bible is just a human document, no different from any other book." The general point both Bea and Chuck make here is that the traditional sources of moral authority, whether scripture, papal pronouncements, or Jewish law, no longer have an exclusive or even a predominant binding power over their lives. Rather, the binding moral authority tends to reside in personal experience or scientific rationality, or either of these in conversation with particular religious or cultural traditions.

I have been talking about the contemporary cultural divide in the context of religious communities in order to highlight the historical novelty of the contemporary situation. But what about the growing number of "secularists"?17 These people range from the vaguely religious to the openly agnostic or atheistic. While they would probably claim no affiliation with a church or religious denomination, they nevertheless hold deep humanistic concerns about the welfare of community and nation. (Of those we met in the prologue, Harriet Woods of St. Louis would most closely match this description. She was raised in the Reform movement ofJudaism but has for many years maintained only the loosest attachments to that tradition. Instead, she thinks of herself as a humanist.) Secularists like Harriet are central to this discussion for the obvious reason that their presence and perspectives have become so prominent in American life. How then do secularists relate to the matter of moral authority?

Like the representatives of religious communities, they too are divided. Yet public opinion surveys show that a decided majority of secularists are drawn toward the progressivist impulse in American culture. 18 For these people religious tradition has no binding address, no opinion-shaping influence. Some secularists, however, (particularly many secular conservative and neo-conservative intellectuals) are drawn toward the orthodox impulse. For them, a commitment to'natural law or to a high view of nature serves as the functional equivalent of the

external and transcendent moral authority revered by their religiously orthodox counterparts.

In sum, the contemporary cultural conflict turns upside down (or perhaps inside out) the way cultural conflict has long been waged. Thus, we see those with apparently similar religious or cultural affiliations battling with one another. The culture war encompasses all Americans, religious and "non-religious," in very novel ways.

Political Dispositions: Cultural Conservatives Versus Cultural

Progressivists

The orthodox and progressivist impulses in American culture, as I have described them, contrast sources of moral truth and also the allegiances by which people, drawn toward one or the other, live and interpret the world. They also express, somewhat imperfectly, the opposing social and political dispositions to which Americans on opposing sides of the .cultural divide are drawn. Here, though, a word of elaboration.

It nearly goes without saying that those who embrace· the orthodox impulse are almost always cultural conservatives, while those who embrace progressivist moral assumptions tend toward a liberal or libertarian social agenda. Certainly, the associations between foundational moral commitments and social and political agendas is far from absolute; some people and organizations will cross over the lines, taking conservative positions on some issues and liberal views on others. Yet the relationship between foundational moral commitments and social and political agendas is too strong and consistent to be viewed as coincidental. This is true for most Americans (as seen in public opinion surveys), but it is especially true for the organizations engaged in the range of contemporary disputes. For the practical purposes of naming the antagonists in the culture war, then, we can label those on one side cultural conservatives or moral traditionalists, and those on the other side liberals or cultural progressives. These are, after all, the terms that the ac.tors in the culture war use to describe themselves. The danger of using these "political" labels, however, is that one can easily forget that they trace back to prior moral commitments and more basic moral visions. We subtly slip into thinking of the controversies debated as political rather than cultural in nature. On political matters one can compromise; on matters of ultimate moral truth, one cannot. This is why the full range of issues today seems interminable.

New and Unlikely Alliances

The real novelty of the contemporary situation emerges out of the fact that the orthodox and progressivist communities are not fighting isolated battles. Evangelical Protestants, for example, are not locked in an isolated conflict with liberal Protestants. Nor are theologically progressive Catholics struggling in isolation with their theologically conservative counterparts in the Roman hierarchy. The contemporary culture war is much larger and more complicated. At the heart of the new cultural realignment are the pragmatic alliances being formed across faith traditions. Because of common points of vision and concern, the orthodox wings of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are forming associations with each other, as are the progressive wings of each faith com- munity-and each set of alliances takes form in opposition to the influence the other seeks to exert in public culture.

These institutional alliances, it should be noted, are not always influential in terms of the joint power they hold. Some of the groups, after all, are quite small and have few resources. But these institutional alliances are culturally significant, for the simple reason that ideological and organizational associations are being generated among groups that have historically been antagonistic toward one another. Had the disagreements in each religious tradition remained simply theological or ecclesiastical in nature, these alliances would have probably never developed. But since the divisions have extended into the broader realm of public morality, the alliances have become the expedient outcome of common concerns. In other words, although these alliances are historically "unnatural," they have become pragmatically necessary. Traditional religiocultural divisions are superseded-replaced by the overriding differences taking form out of orthodox and progressive moral commitments.

These unlikely alliances are at the center of a fundamental realignment in American culture and, in turn, identify the key actors in an emerging cultural conflict. It is in this realignment that we find the real significance of the stories recounted at the opening of this book. Each one illustrated the shifting alliances: at the Police Academy on East 20th Street in Manhattan stood Orthodox rabbis, Evangelical pastors, and Catholic priests, all being charged with disorderly conduct. There in the offices of Bea Blair's Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights and in Mae Duggan's Citizens for Educational Freedom an array of faiths (progressive in Bea's case and orthodox in Mae's case) are represented. There

in San Francisco, there in Hartford, there in Cleveland, there in Boise, there in Birmingham, there in towns and cities all across America.

Points of Clarification

The first mistake we should guard against is to view the culture war as merely the accumulation of social issues debated today (such as abortion, values in schools, homosexuality, or the meaning of Columbus's discovery of America). The culture war encompasses these issues, but the source of the conflict is found in different moral visions. For this reason, it would also be a mistake to view the culture war as merely a social referendum on Ronald Reagan, George Bush, or other presidents and their political legacies. If this were the case, the present conflict would simply be a dispute between political "liberals" and "conservatives." The cleavages run much deeper. For the same reasons, it would be inaccurate to describe this as a collision between "religious liberals" and "religious conservatives." 19 Nor is it a clash between what one scholar described as "New Protestants" and "Old Protestants," "New Catholics" and "Old Catholics," and by extension, "New Jews" and "Old Jews."20 In a similar vein, it would be wrong to confuse the contemporary culture war with the ambitions of Protestant Fundamentalism and the New Christian Right and the backlash it created among such secular activists as feminists in the National Organization for Women (NOW) or attorneys of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). It is true that Evangelical and Fundamentalist Protestants are the most vocal and visible actors on the orthodox side of the new cultural divide and that the secular activists of NOW, the ACLU, or the People for the American Way are among the most visible actors on the progressive side of the divide. But to frame the contemporary culture war in this way ignores the central role played by a wide range of other cultural actors on both sides who are neither Fundamentalists on the one hand nor secular activists on the other. Besides, many of the organizations of the New Christian Right (for instance, such as the Moral Majority, Christian Voice, the Religious Roundtable) have either disappeared from public sight or gone out of business. Yet the cultural conflict continues-and it continues without any sign that it will soon abate.

THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA

RANDALL TERRY (spokesman for the pro-life organization Operation Rescue): The bottom line is that killing children is not what America is all about. We are not here to destroy our offspring.

FAYE WA'ITLETON (president of Planned Parenthood): Well, we are also not here to have the government use women's bodies as the instrument of the state, to force women into involuntary servitude-

RANDALL TERRY (laughing): Oh come on, Faye.

FAYE WA'ITLETON: - I think that as Americans celebrate the Fourth of July, our independence, and when we reflect on our personal liberties, this is a very, very somber time, in which the courts have said that the most private aspects of our lives are now ... not protected by the Bill of Rights and the Constitution. And I believe that that is a time for Americans to reflect on the need to return to the fundamentals, and the fundamentals of personal privacy are really the cornerstones upon which our democracy is built.

RANDALL TERRY: I think that to assume or even suggest that the founding fathers of this country risked their lives and many of them died so that we can kill our offspring is pathetic.21

Although Randall Terry and Faye Wattleton were debating the morality and legality of abortion, what they said goes far beyond the abortion controversy. First, the contemporary culture war is notjust an expression of different "opinions" or "attitudes" on this or that issue, like abortion. Ifthis were all there was to it, the conflict I refer to would be, as someone once suggested, the "politics of distraction"-a trivial pursuit that keeps Americans from settling more important matters.22 No, the conflict is deeper than mere "differences of opinion" and bigger than abortion, and in fact, bigger than the culmination of all the battles being waged. As suggested earlier, the culture war emerges over fundamentally different conceptions of moral authority, over different ideas and beliefs about truth, the good, obligation to one another, the nature of community, and so on. It is, therefore, cultural conflict at its deepest level. This is why the differences between Chuck Mcllhenny and Richmond Young, between Yehuda Levin and Bea Blair, and between Mae Duggan and Harriet Woods are so intense and seem so unresolvable.

Though the conflict derives from differences in assumptions that are philosophical and even theological in nature, the conflict does not