Culture Wars The Struggle to Define America by James Davison Hunter (z-lib.org)

upon thousands of your fellow citizens. I hope you too are worried. : .." In the end such language may titillate even the most dispassionate of listeners, but it can only lead to one conclusion: the further polari-

zation of public discourse.

The Drift Toward Bigotry

If it is true, as I argued earlier, that each embattled side upholds a different conception of the sacred, it is not surprising that each side lashes out at the other. Humans simply cannot tolerate the desecration of that which is most cherished. If it is true, therefore, that each side of the cultural divide represents a competing dogma, it would be no surprise to find evidence of a certain politics of exclusion~the markings of a social bigotry. And indeed, this is still another way in which each side of the new cultural divide mirrors the other.

The most obvious examples of social bigotry exist in a sector of the orthodox alliance-in that part of Protestant Fundamentalism that retains the strong nativist belief in a Christian America. Some in this grouping have claimed that God does not hear the prayers of Jews. In the early 1980s others within this community even encouraged prayer for the deaths of Supreme Court Justices so that they might be replaced with Justices who oppose abortion. On occasion, books and record albums by secularists are burned. The list of examples goes on. To these

e ample, at St. Patrick's Cathedral, in New York City, on a Sunday morning in mid-December 1989, thousands of gay rights and pro-choice activists demonstrated outside the church, shouting and raising placards that read, "Eternal life to Cardinal John O'Connor Now," "Know your scumbags," "Curb Your Dogma,'.' "Papal Bull," and the like. Dozens of protesters went inside during the mass and stood on pews, shouting, waving their fists, and tossing condoms in the air. Other displays of open hatred toward conservative Catholics and Evangelicals by the gay community are not uncommon.92 In another example, a political cartoon published in 1986 depicted five brains of different sizes. The largest was identified as the "brain of man"; those in the middle were identified as the brain of a Neanderthal, a homo erectus, and an ape; and the last, the size of the. head of a pin, was identified as the "brain of a creationist." The caption read, "Proof of Evolution."93 One wonders whether the

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cartoonist could have replaced "the brain of a creationist" with "the brain of a woman," or the "brain of a black person" with equal impunity. Other political cartoons stereotype Evangelical ministers as snake-handling, money-grubbing charlatans. Would the artists or newspapers take the same liberties in stereotyping, say, rabbis or priests?

The progressivist communities as a whole pride themselves on their cosmopolitanism, and defend the freedom to think and behave according to individual wishes with the provision that the exercise of those rights does not inflict harm on others. The preceding examples demonstrate, however, that these communities are not immune to asserting absolutes

creationists), "Absolute truth belongs only to one class of humans ... the class of absolute fools."94 Yet sometimes the ideal of tolerance assumes a kind of dogmatism of its own. For many progrs:ssivists intoleran~s ~ intolerable, and should be met with an equal measure of vehemence. The progressivist communities find it difficult to tolerate positions that are considered choice-restrictive and thus "intolerant." Renowned science fiction writer and humanist advocate Isaac Asimov, commenting on the New Christian Right in the Canadian magazine Macleans, wrote: "And it is these ignorant people, the most uneducated, the most unimaginative, the most unthinking among us, who would make of themselves the guides and leaders of us all; who would force their feeble and . childish beliefs on us; who would invade our schools and libraries and

is clear that most liberal groups are equally intransigent in their positions. One would hardly expect, for example, the National Abortion Rights Action Lobby to change its opinion on abortion, or the gay rights lobby to change its mind about the rights of homosexuals. In Rabbi Yehuda Levin's words, "What they call liberals are so 'open-minded' their brains are falling out. These people cannot be converted. They cannot be persuaded." One man's experience with progressives at Harvard Divinity School led him to comment, "Tolerance may exist on the denominational

levels, but once discussion moves to the oppression of women or the poor, strict standards of acceptability are applied. Tolerance quickly fades if these standards are violated, and the friendly atmosphere of religious pluralism gives way to serious combat."96

Former Iranian hostage and American foreign service officer Morehead Kennedy. described his experiences at the Peace Institute at the Episcopal cathedral St. John the Divine in New York City in similar terms: "I would have [had] a much easier time denying the Resurrection than I would have questioning the Nuclear Freeze."97 Absolutism and fanaticism, he concluded, apply not only to the Religious Right but to the Religious Left as well. When·progressivist groups call for "dialogue,"

nents. As one Fun amenta 1st mmister from Staten Island complained, progres;ivists are "denying us every right to the pluralism they say we're trying to destroy." Another put the complaint even more sharply. "Religious bigotry and political hatred are what [they are] all about."98

The Boundaries of Tolerance

In all of this the nature of tolerance and intolerance becomes very clear. Most scholars and lay people have attributed attitudes of tolera.nce to individual factors, such as a person's educational background. The

greater the educational achievement one had attained, the more tolerant one would likely be. Under previous cultural arrangements this has been shown to be true. But now our cultural environment has changed in such a way that one can see the structural preconditionii for tolerance. Tolerance, in this light, may not be so much a function of "enlightenment" as it is a function of the relative sharpness of moral boundaries separating groups. With the realignment of pluralism, the boundaries separating groups has shifted. As the lines dividing Protestant, Catholic, and Jew have become more indistinct, tolerance .has increased among the denominations. But as the lines dividing orthodox from progressivists or conservatives from liberals have become clearer and sharper, new bigotries have begun to take shape. Today the chasms are not so much between one alliance that is tolerant (because it is cosmopolitan and highly educated) and another that is intolerant (because it is religiously orthodox and less well educated). Nor are the rifts between those who would guide people toward truth and those who would indoctrinate. Now each side asserts its own parochialisms; each side lives by its own

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"narrow" dogma. In this light thc;,;_onfljct is in large part about whose d~ a(""'"" p•-i.;.i;,~... what is tolerah!c and

SYMMETRY IN ANTIPATHY

After considering the substance and style of public discourse engaged in by the principle actors in the contemporary culture war, one is tempted to agree with the adage that "the Left is the Right and the Right is the Left."99 Both ends of the cultural axis claim to speak for the majority, both attempt to monopolize the symbols oflegitimacy, both identify their opponents with a program of intolerance and totalitarian suppression.· Bo.th sides use the language of extremism and thereby sensationalize the threat represented by their adversaries. And finally, each side has exhibited at least a proclivity to fodulge the temptation of social bigotry.

What then, is the meaning of this rhetoric? Philoso hers and social scientists have observe t at urin time · ftuctuat 1-

e o rsary-e1t er exaggerate or man- u ured-the community expresses a common moral indignation, and asserts its moral authority anew. It is~t..~ng in one voice, "We are not like ou; we oppose Wliat you stand for." Thus, not only1Sthe commumty drawn toget er, u · a co ec vity, but it is reminded of its heritage, its duty, and its mission to the larger world. The "!atem

fcfce of what may be a far greater adversary, its own mternal morar disintegration. In the past, un er sue s resses, re igious communities punished a~nts of "evil," as the Catholic hierarchy punished heretics during the Inquisition in the sixteenth century, and as the Puritans of Salem, Massachusetts, punished "witches" in the seventeenth century. Political parties seek out "subversives," as the Nazis singled out Jews, as U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy and the Senate subcommittee on unAmeric(ln activities repressed communists and their sympathizers in the early 1950s, and as Mao Tse-tung and the "Gang of Four-" attacked

art o a sec et eHte se!!. Rather these developments are "systemi~' part I/:'). "

of anatural collective respC:nse to the threat of the community's own 'iJ., ~tr.U"ctural insequity and moral instability. These same sociological forces

are at play in today's culture war. In the context of America's own declining position in the larger world order, and after several decades of domestic social unease, both the orthodox and progressivist alliances, as relatively distinct sets of moral communities, have struggled to maintain their own cohesiveness and at the same time realize their own political ideals. Indeed, signs of America's failure to com ete ec nomically or educationally wit t e rest of the world-those mediagenic events that remind us of our failure to cope with the drug problem, homelessness, crime, teenage pregnancies, and so on-aj]..the•e rJ;iings previde

thEl,_identity and mission of eacl}ailiance has been forcefol!y reaffinned. Ironically, by those very same acts, each side has also unwittingly contributed to the invention of precisely that which they fear and oppose so much. ,

just because each side of the cultural divide has in some ways fictionalized the threat posed by its opponents does not mean 'that the conflict is somehow artificial and therefore inconsequential. Quite the contrary. Certainl b wer and privile e are at stake. Nothing else can adequ y account for the enormous sums of money and profusion of human energy poured into the conflict. The diabolic images fashioned and applied to the opposition are, in a way, merely resources used by either side to draw out the contrasts. This is the mechanism for making broad appeals for financial backing and for galvanizing popular sentiment.

To argue that each side of the cultural divide employs a similar rhetoric is also not to suggest that the two are somehow "morally equivalent." Rhetorical symmetry does not necessarilrimply moral symmetrx.: One mi h ar e theolo ·c hilos · or oliticall that one

Sociologically, then, this conflict is· not "about" who is right and who is wrong or even who is better or who is worse. As with all other expres-

. ,sions of cultural antagonism, this conflict is "about" the uses of symbols, _,..,. the uses of language, and the right to impose discrediting labels upon those who would dissent. It is ultimately a struggle over the right to define the way things are and the way things should be. It is, therefore, more of a struggle to determine who is stronger, which alliance has the institutional resources capable of sustaining a particular definition of reality against the wishes of those who would project an alternate view

of the world.

It is true that the contemporary culture war is built upon a long history of mutual animosity. Yet the struggle has evolved into something more extensive and more momentous. New and much broader coalitions are involved, a wider range of issues are disputed, a greater volume of information is available, and, as we shall see, new technologies communicate that information. Given the ·scope of what is being contested coupled with the urgency and shrillness by which each side voices its complaint, it is arguable that in this conflict, the stakes are much higher as well.

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THE ECLIPSE OF THE MIDDLE

The"e ·

we hav:e~al~r~e~a~d~y~m~e;,n~ti~o~n:e~d~:~~~i~:;..:~;:;:.,;.~~=>

rdinary mencans ave no mailing 1sts an there is no or~se w~ good and""bMI on bOth sides of an issue. R:elauid to tltie &H the issu~ themselves.. fo matters of li£e and death, mdividual liberties, social opji[Cssion, justice and inj1 1&tice, war and peace, ?Ad tbe ljke;ibis virtually iJJJ.POssible to sustain ambivalence ayer a long period of time. There is a distin~t forceful sociological propensity to find lasti'iig resolutions.

bate that is sensational is more likely to arouse an capture the attention of ordinary people than are methodical and reflective arguments. For this reason, the shrill pitch of harsh moral criticism and blunt commentary is much more likely to sell newspapers, build audience ratings, or raise money. The net effect of loud, sensational clamor, however, is to mute more quiet and temperate voices.

Another factor has to do with.l.he level of suspicion in today's p!Jblic culturZWfien new or alternate voices are heard, there is a strong inclination to categorize them according to the logic and language of the political polarities: "If they are not for us, then they must be against us."

In today"'S climate Qf;.pprehension and distrust, opinions that attempt to be distinctive and ameliorating tend to be classified with all others that do not affirm a loyalty to one's own cause. Perspectives that are moderately progreiisive or moderately conservative or traditionalist tend to be portrayed as extremes.

But there is still another factor that contributes to the polarization

media that public discourse acquires a life of its own; not only do the categories of public rhetoric become detached from the intenti~ns of the speaker, they also

overpower the subtleties of perspective and opinion of the vast majority of citizens who position themselves "somewhere in the middle" of these debates. The

categories of public rhetoric are so dominant that someone who favors legal abortion but only in the first trimester is considered "pro-choice." Likewise, someone who opposes homosexuality on moral grounds yet dd"eRd& •he dyjl rights of homosexuals is still considered a "homophobe."

Middling positions and the nuances of moral commitment, then, 'get played into the grid ofopposing rhetorical extremes. This chapter explores how this comes to be.

THE MEDIA OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The significance of the media is that they define the "environment" in which public discussion takes place. This is important because the environment predetermines much about the actual substance of what is communicated.

A historical comparison is illuminating. In colonial New England, where the only regular medium of public communication was the sermon, churchgoers listened to roughly 7,000 sermons in a lifetime, totaling about 15,000 hours of concentrated listening.4 Through the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, public discussion continued to be conducted through sermons but also in speeches, lectures, newspapers, religious tracts, and hundreds of pamphlets. Pamphleteering was particularly important. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America, "In America parties do not write books to combat each other's opinions, but pamphlets which are circulated for a day with incredible rapidity and then expire."5 These circulars written by local, regional, and national elites were disseminated widely through the literate population, an accomplishment made possible by increasing refinements in printing technology. Often these documents were lengthy treatises (such as transcriptions of full-length political speeches) and oriented toward a literate middle-class audience. New printing technology also generated a rapid profusion of newspaper dailies, weeklies, and periodicals, including the penny press. The number of newspapers and periodicals published in America grew from ~ut 7 m 1130 w 180 m 1800 to over

~~ 1851".6 fablk t!'.~L~e~also played a centr~ r0l~ ~le eatl) ft~e­

p~10nate, even mtlammatory. I his was especially true of the penny press of the mid-mneteenth ceiltUI y. But w1thm other forms of public

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discourse .there was the aspiration toward intellectual substance. SlJet!Cl'ies, de6ates, and pamphlets ;; eH Ieng enough to develop an argument yet not so long that they would be accessible only to intellectuals. They could be read, studied, and debated by a large and diverse public.

Public discourse continues to be carried on in political, moral, and religious oratory today. Of course, scholarly b09ks, lengthy articles, editorials, white papers, and the like also play a role. Yet in addition to all of these are still other, newer media and formats that not only reach a large audience but do so in a ~ay that substantially eclipses the communicative power of a more labored if scholarly format. These are the media of television commercials and news broadcasts, newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, print advertisements, brochures, direct mail solicitations, and so on. The volume of these media is much greater and their ability to convey images is much more powerful and universal than the penny press ever was. For this reason, their social impact cannot be.overestimated. Advocates of various political and social interests rely on these new media, and thus cumulatively these communications technologies have become an increasingly prominent facet of our public discourse.

Still, not all of these are relied upon in the same way. In some cases, the actors and organizations committed to public debate fund the publication of political advertisements to publicize their grievances. Though fairly rare (because they are expensive),. the ads themselves becom~ "events" after a fashion. For example, on 7 October 1984; Catholics for a Free Choice sponsored a full-page advertisement in the New York Times calling for "a dialogue within the Church on the issue of abortion."8 Ninety-seven people signed the statement; many were religious women, and a few were priests and religious brothers, making it an act of formal dissent within the American Catholic hierarchy. Between January and February 1989 the National Abortion Rights Action League published full-page ads in twenty-four national and regional newspapers commemorating the sixteenth anniversary of Roe v. Wade. These NARAL ads featured a coat hanger, suggesting that women would mutilate themselves in self-inflicted abortions if Roe was overturned. Through the spring of that same year, Planned Parenthood had a series of full-page advertisements in Time magazine accusing pro-life forces of a "campaign of violence and intimidation" and lies. The ACLU also ran ads in the spring of 1989 in the New York .Times, the Los Angeles Times, the New

Republic, and on billboards in major metropolitan areas. There have been other examples of groups conducting public discourse through paid