- •The project has been funded by the European Commission. The Education, Audiovisual and
- •Windows Artefacts
- •Content
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Introduction
- •Windows Artefacts
- •Methodology
- •Methodology
- •Leaves on harddisk
- •Leaves on Harddisk
- •Leaves on Harddisk
- •Approach to analyzing local tracks
- •Limits: Portable Software
- •Limits: Portable Software
- •Limits Malware
- •Special software
- •Approaches
- •Sandboxies
- •What is a Sandbox
- •What is Sandboxies
- •Advances of Sandboxies
- •Alternatives for sandboxies
- •Virtualization with EvaLaze
- •Virtualization with EvaLaze
- •Sanboxies
- •How does Sandboxies work?
- •Automasition commandline
- •Recovery in Sandboxie
- •Analyse of Sandboxie Results
- •Redirecting Registry
- •Redirecting Registry
- •Logfiles of Hives
- •Analyzing Sanboxie-Registry Hives
- •Analyzing Sanboxie-Registry Hives
- •Runtime behavior
- •Overview
- •Using of Jabber with Jabbin
- •Usage in practise
- •The project has been funded by the European Commission. The Education, Audiovisual and
- •Windows OS-Artifacts
- •Typical application traces
- •File access via mailer
- •FTP-Client
- •FTP-Client
- •FTP-Client
- •FileShare P2P:eMule
- •FileShare P2P: BitTorrent
- •FileShare P2P: BitTorrent
- •FileShare P2P: μTorrent
- •BitTorrent Forensic
- •Virusscanner
- •Firewall Win 7
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •Windows Eventlogs
- •openVPN
- •openVPN
- •The project has been funded by the European Commission. The Education, Audiovisual and
- •Windows OS-Artifacts
- •Operating System
- •Windows Operating System
- •Windows Folder Structure
- •Artifacts of Forensic Interest
- •USER PROFILES
- •Which Version ?
- •Application Data
- •Application Data (subfolders)
- •AppData Local
- •Appdata LocalLow
- •AppData Roaming
- •SUMMARY
- •Registry Description
- ••what kind of information is actually stored there?
- •Registry Information
- •Registry’s Structure
- •HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE -HKML
- •HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE -HKML
- •And what about user data?
- •NTUSER.DAT location in Windows XP
- •NTUSER.DAT location in Windows 7
- •Registry Files Examination
- •From Forensics point of view
- •Examples
- •RESTORE POINTS vs. VOLUME SHADOW COPY
- •RESTORE POINTS vs. VOLUME SHADOW COPY
- •RESTORE POINTS (Windows XP)
- •RESTORE POINTS (Windows 7)
- •RESTORE POINTS vs. VOLUME SHADOW COPY
- •RESTORE POINTS (Windows XP)
- •RESTORE POINTS vs. VOLUME SHADOW COPY
- •VOLUME SHADOW COPY
Alternatives for sandboxies
•Returnil Virtual System Pro
•Shadow Defender
•EvaLaze
•Attack Surface Analyzer
•Total Uninstall
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Virtualization with EvaLaze
• Select the monitored area for files and registry
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Virtualization with EvaLaze
•Pre-Scan
•Execute application for virtualisation
•Post-Scan
•Generating virtual application
•Test virtual application
•Free version no comparing
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Sanboxies
•How to use Sandboxies (comparing changes, creating new sandbox, settings the attribute,...)
•How does it work ( No direct access, monitored systemobjects, security issues)
•Automated commands (prombt)
•Recovering data from the sandbox
•Analyzing sandboxie results
•Redirecting and analyzing registry results
–Regshot
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How does Sandboxies work?
•No direct Access
–Application could not access direct to the hardware, OS is interposed
•Monitored systemobjects
–Files, drivers, registry keys, processes ....
•Securiy issues against breaking out
–Prevents seizure of programs
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Automasition commandline
•Start selected programs in Sanbox
–Start.exe /box:MyBox /silent /wait /elevate <command>
•Stop all executed programs
–Start.exe /box:MyBox /terminate
•List all Prozess-Ids
–Start.exe /listpids | more
•Delete content of sandbox
–Start.exe /box:MeineBox delete_sandbox
•.......
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Recovery in Sandboxie
•Rudimentary
–Sanboxie-Control > right click > show content
•Quick recovery
–Sandbox-Menu > Sandbox > quick recovery
•Immediate Recovery
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Analyse of Sandboxie Results
•Buster Sandbox-Analyzer (BSA), v.1.53 (29. march 2012) Malware-Analyse
•http://bsa.isoftware.nl/bsa.rar
http://www.sandboxie.com/phpbb/viewtopic.
php?t=6557
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Redirecting Registry
•Seperate Registry
–Root folder sandboxies RegHive and RegHives.LOG
•Mount Registry
•Rerouting path
–U der HKEY_USERS > KeyRootPath
–Default: HKEY_USERS\ Sandbox_<USername>_<Sandboxname> or \ REGISTRY\USER\Sandbox_%USER%_%SANDBOX%
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Redirecting Registry
•HKLM\Software\NewKey is reroutet to
<KeyRootPath>\machine\Software\NewKey
•HKCU\Software\NewKey is reroutet to
<KeyRootPath>\user\current\Software\NewKey
•Similar with subkeys from HKLM\ and HKCU\ to machine and reroutet to user\current
•HKCR is not reroutet to user\current_classes
•Key user\current\software\classes is a symbolic Link to user\current_classes.
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