Counterterrorism, a game-theoretic analysis (Daniel G
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EU |
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EU |
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Freeze |
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Does not |
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Retaliate |
Does not |
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Freeze |
4,4 |
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1,3 |
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Retaliate |
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4,3 |
2,4 |
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US |
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US |
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Does not |
3,1 |
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2,2 |
Does not |
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3,1 |
1,2 |
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a. Freezing assets: weakest link |
b. Retaliation: |
asymmetric dominance |
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EU |
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EU |
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Gather |
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Does not |
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Infiltrate |
Does not |
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Gather |
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2,2 |
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4,3 |
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Infiltrate |
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2,2 |
3,4 |
US |
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US |
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Does not |
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3,4 |
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1,1 |
Does not |
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4,3 |
1,1 |
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c. Intelligence: |
hero |
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d. Infiltration: |
leader |
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Figure 6. Some alternative proactive policies and their ordinal game forms
Table 1 Policy Choices and Underlying Games
Policies |
Alternative Game Forms |
Proactive Policies |
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Preemption |
Prisoner’s Dilemma, chicken, assurance (threshold), |
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coordination (best shot), asymmetric dominance |
Freezing assets |
Prisoner’s Dilemma, chicken, asymmetric dominance, |
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assurance (weakest link) |
Retaliation |
Prisoner’s Dilemma, chicken, assurance (threshold), |
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coordination (best shot), asymmetric dominance |
Group Infiltration |
Leader, asymmetric dominance |
Intelligence |
Hero, asymmetric dominance |
New technological barriers |
Coordination (best shot) |
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Defensive Policies |
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Deterrence |
Prisoner’s Dilemma (deterrence race) |
Hardening targets |
Prisoner’s Dilemma (fortification race) |
Shoring up weakest link |
Prisoner’s Dilemma, chicken, asymmetric dominance |
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