2. Arms control and anti-proliferation strategies

Nuclear arms control has been seen as a central means of containing conflict and ensuring global security. Arms control is, nevertheless, a less ambitious goal than nuclear disarmament, which aims to decrease the size and capability of a state’s armed forces, possibly depriving it of weapons. The objective of arms control is therefore to regulate arms levels either by limiting their growth or by restricting how they can be used. There is nothing new about arms agreements: for example, in 600 BCE a disarmament league was formed amongst Chinese states. However, formal bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements to control or reduce arms were rare before the twentieth century. What changed this was the advent of industrialized warfare through the development of tech¬nologically advanced weapons. It is therefore no surprise that since 1945 the arms control agenda has been dominated by attempts to limit the spread of WMD and particularly nuclear weapons. The principal means through which this has been attempted are treaties and conventions of various kinds, which attempt to establish security regimes to counter the uncertainty, fear and paranoia that are generated by the security dilemma.

How effective has nuclear arms control been? On the credit side, there are some undoubted, if partial, successes. For example, the Partial Test Ban Treaty went a long way to ensuring the elimination of atmospheric nuclear testing. Similarly, the NPT, the single most important nuclear arms control treaty, has made a major contribution to slowing the pace of horizontal proliferation, espe-cially amongst developed states that clearly possess the economic and technolog-ical capacity to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, even when their specific provisions were effectively ignored, bilateral treaties between the USA and the Soviet Union at least went some way to reduce tension and promote caution, arguably helping to prepare the way ultimately for the end of the Cold War. On the debit side, however, nuclear treaties and conventions singularly failed to prevent the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, as the USA and the Soviet Union each built up nuclear arsenals of staggering propor-tions. START I and START II were, for example, simply ‘dead letters’, even though they set out only to reduce the increase in nuclear weapons, not to reduce them.

Why has arms control been so difficult to bring about? The first answer is, as realists would point out, that the security dilemma is an intractable problem, meaning that security regimes are always likely to break down and arms races are unavoidable. Second, there is a difference between national security, calculated on the basis of the interests of particular states, and the sense of collective or international security on which bilateral or multilateral agreements are based. In other words, states are always liable to view their build-up of arms as legitimate in terms of providing defence and ensuring deterrence, regardless of the inter-national agreements that they are encouraged to join or have signed up to. India, thus, has never signed the NPT, while Pakistan, a signatory state, has clearly ignored its provisions. Third, the greatest difficulty in ensuring effective and enforceable arms control is that it seeks to control the most heavily armed, and therefore the most powerful, of the world’s states. Great powers, and especially superpowers, will only be prepared to be bound by security regimes if they calculate that it is in their national interests to do so. Until 2010, genuine progress towards nuclear disarmament between the USA and Russia was confined to the relatively brief period after the end of the Cold War, forming part of the so-called ‘peace dividend’. However, the security priorities of both states soon changed. By the late 1990s, the USA, undoubtedly the most significant actor over the issue of arms control in the post-Cold War era, was revising its calculations about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, as well as about the means of countering it.

Concerns about nuclear proliferation have increas¬ingly come to focus on the threat posed by ‘rogue’ states. By their nature, such states are not susceptible to the pressures that are constructed by security regimes. This was highlighted in particular in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when weapons inspectors revealed that Iraq, a signatory of the NPT since 1968, had been developing nuclear weapons. Inspectors from the IAEA, supplemented by the UN Special Commissioners (UNSCOM), were then authorized to disarm Iraq of all nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials. However, the failure of the Saddam regime to cooperate consistently with UNSCOM and the weapons inspectors convinced many in the USA and in allied states that Iraq was hiding a significant weapons programme and that the inspection process was ultimately flawed. This resulted in 1998 in Operation Desert Fox, a short bombing campaign launched by the USA and the UK, which targeted installations that were believed to be housing Iraq’s biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. Following September 11, the US approach to ‘rogue’ states in general and Iraq in particular was significantly revised. Abandoning altogether the idea of containment and a reliance on diplomacy, the USA adopted the Bush doctrine, through which the combined threat from ‘rogue’ states and WMD would in future be addressed through pre-emptive war and regime change. This resulted in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and the outbreak of the Iraq War. The invasion of Iraq never¬theless failed to uncover stockpiles of WMD or evidence of an ongoing weapons programme, suggesting that, behind its stances Saddam regime had destroyed its weapons and abandoned its weapons programmes, even though it may have been only a temporary adjustment.

The USA’s more assertive stance towards ‘rogue’ states that may possess, or be seeking to acquire, WMD became evident in its relations with Iran and North Korea. In 2003, IAEA inspectors found that Iran, an NPT member, had constructed a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water produc¬tion plant at Arak, fuelling fears that it had an illicit nuclear weapons programme, supported by technology from Pakistan. This occurred in the context of growing anxieties about possible US intervention, following the outbreak of the Iraq War. The Iranian have nevertheless insisted that their facilities are for peaceful purposes only, highlighting the problem of ‘dual use’ nuclear technology that may generate both civil nuclear energy and weapons materials. Concerns about a nuclear Iraq were more acute in view of its relations with Israel, widely believed to be a nuclear power itself. While Israel’s opaque nuclear status is likely to have encouraged, and helped to legitimize Iran’s bid to join the ‘nuclear club’, others have warned that whereas Israel, surrounded by hostile Arab states, has clear deterrence motivations to possess nuclear weapons, Iran, committed under President Ahmadinejad to the destruction of Israel, may consider using nuclear weapons for offensive purposes. Anxieties about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons also reflect fears about the possibility of sparking a nuclear arms race in the volatile Middle East, as states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey act to prevent regional domination by a nuclear Iran. However, resisting diplomatic pressure from the USA and the EU3 (France, Germany and the UK), and despite the possibility of Iraq-style, US-imposed pre-emptive regime change, Iran announced in 2006, first, that it would restart small-scale uranium enrichment.

Concerns about North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons stem, in large part, from the threat that this would pose to South Korea, which would then be under pressure itself to follow suit, possibly leading to a nuclear arms race in the Korean peninsular. A further worry arises from to possibility of a North Korean nuclear attack on the US mainland. However, despite pressure to isolate North Korea, which intensified after September 11, US diplomatic leverage over North Korea has been weak and may have been counterproductive, especially as North Korea’s geographical proximity to China makes pre-emptive regime change much less likely. North Korea rejected calls for it to open its nuclear IAEA inspection, before withdrawing from the NPT in 2003. In 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear device, making it to world’s ninth nuclear state. However, following six-party talks, spearheaded by China and involving the USA, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and Japan, North Korea announced in 2007 that it had frozen its nuclear weapons programme, even though it resumed plutonium the following year. The, albeit failed, launch of a long-range missile in 2009, and the decision to expel nuclear weapons inspectors and pull out of six-party talks for good appear to indicate the continuing determination of North Korea to become a fully-fledged nuclear weapon state. From the perspective of postcolonialism of non-proliferation energies on countries such as Iran and North Korea, and the wider link between non-proliferation and of ‘rogue’ states, is largely driven by Eurocentric perceptions and assumptions.

An alternative approach to security in a world of nuclear proliferation is to erect missile shields. The idea behind missile defence systems is that as arms control and security regimes can never ultimately be relied on to prevent nuclear attacks, particularly from ICBM, the surest form of protection is provided by a network of anti-ballistic missiles.

However, missile shields also have their drawbacks. First, they are enormously expensive to develop, as they have to be sufficiently comprehensive, sophisticated and reliable to be able to guarantee that no missiles will be able to penetrate to shield, in view of the devastating potential of a single warhead. Second, many doubt whether, regardless of the resources devoted to their construction, missile shields can ever provide protection that is absolutely guaranteed, particularly as they are based, in effect, on the assumption that one bullet will always hit another bullet. Third, just as with the acquisition of any other weapons, the construction of missile shields may be perceived by other states as an aggressive or offensive act.

KEY POINTS

• The massive destructive capacity of nuclear weapons means that they have affected international and domestic politics in a way that no other weapons ever have. Vertical nuclear proliferation during the Cold War period witnessed the build-up of massive nuclear arsenals in the USA and the Soviet Union.

• While some believe that the Cold War nuclear arms race effectively underpinned the ‘long peace’ of the post- 1945 period, especially once the condition of Mutually Assured Destruction was achieved, others have associ¬ated the ‘balance of terror’ with instability and the ever-present dinger that deterrence would fail.

• The post-Cold War era has been characterized by heightened anxiety about nuclear proliferation. This occurred for reasons such as a growth in the number of states that have shown an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, the easier availability of nuclear materials and technology, and the increased danger that nuclear weapons get into the hands of actors who may use them.

• Despite the development of an extensive non-proliferation regime, effective arms control has been difficult to bring about because states tend to place concerns about national security above their obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements. Particular anxiety has been expressed about nuclear proliferation in rela¬tion to North Korea and Iran, based on the supposedly unstable and risk-prone natures of their regimes and the existence of significant regional tensions.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

Rogue state: a state whose foreign policy poses a threat to neighbouring or other states, through its aggressive intent, build¬up of weapons (particularly WMD), or association with terrorism. However, the term is controversial. It was used by US policy¬makers in the early post-Cold War period to draw attention to new threats to regional and possibly global security (examples included Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea). Critics have argued that the term has been used in a selective and self-serving fashion to justify US intervention in other countries’ affairs; that it is simplistic in disregarding the complex causes of 'rogueness'; and that it may entrench ‘rogue’ behaviour by strengthening a state’s sense of alienation from the international community.

Weapons of mass destruction: a category of weapons that covers nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, which have a massive and indiscriminate destructive capacity.

Arms race is a concerted military build¬up that occurs as two or more states acquire weapons or increase their military capability in response to each other. Classic examples include the UK-German naval arms race that preceded WWI and the US-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Arms races may be fuelled by defensive calculations or miscalculations (the security dilemma), or they may occur as one or more states seek military advantage in order to pursue offensive policies. While arms races may increase the likelihood of war, by heightening fear and paranoia and strengthening militarism and aggressive nationalism, they may also help to maintain an overall balance of power and so ensure deterrence.

Nuclear weapons: weapons that use nuclear fission (atom bombs) or nuclear fusion (hydrogen bombs) to destroy their targets, through the effect of blast, heat and radiation.

Nuclear proliferation: the spread of nuclear weapons, either by their acquisition by more states or other actors (horizontal proliferation), or their accumulation by established nuclear states (vertical proliferation).

Nuclear umbrella: protection afforded non-nuclear states or minor nuclear powers by guarantees made to them by major nuclear powers; a form of extended deterrent.

Arms control: mechanisms through which the proliferation of arms is constrained by agreements limiting their production, distribution and use.

Disarmament: the reduction of fighting capacity, either through scaling-down or eliminating arms or, more likely, categories of weapons.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Are WMD a distinct category of weapons, and are nuclear weapons the only genuine example of WMD?

2. Why do states seek to acquire nuclear weapons?

3. Why do some states not seek to acquire nuclear weapons?

4. How convincing is the theory of nuclear deterrence?

5. Why has effective nuclear arms control been so difficult to bring about?

6. Is a nuclear Iran a significant threat to interna¬tional peace and security?

7. Are efforts to achieve nuclear non-proliferation largely based on hypocrisy and Eurocentric biases?

8. Are missile shields a solution to the threat of nuclear attack?

9. Are nuclear weapons morally indefensible?

10. Is a nuclear-free world possible or desirable?

CHAPTER 7.TERRORISM

1. Defining terrorism

2. Rise of ‘new’ terrorism

3. Countering terrorism

- Strengthening state security

- Military repression

- Political deals

1. DEFINING TERRORISM

Until the 1990s, terrorism was widely considered to be a security concern of the second order, often being ignored by standard text books on international politics. However, the events of 11 September 2001 changed this dramatically, encouraging a major reappraisal of the nature and significance of terrorism. For some, what was variously dubbed ‘new’ terrorism, ‘global’ terrorism or ‘catastrophic’ terrorism had become the principal security threat in the early twenty-first century, reflecting the fact that, in conditions of globalisation, non-state actors (in this case terrorist groups) had gained important advantages over states. Beyond this, the inauguration of the ‘war on terror’ suggested that resurgent terrorism had opened up new fault lines that would define global politics for the foreseeable future. However, terrorism is both a highly contested phenomenon and a deeply controversial concept. Disagreements over the nature and significance of terrorism are nevertheless matched by debates about how terrorism should be countered. Not only are there divisions about the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism strategies, but there has also been intense debate about the price that may have to be paid for protecting society from terrorism in terms of the erosion of basic rights and freedoms. Should terrorism be countered through strengthening state security, through military repression or through political deals, and what are the implications of such strategies?

Terrorism is by no means a modern phenomenon. The first widespread association of western societies with terrorism occurred with the upsurge in clandestine violence by anarchist groups in the late nine¬teenth century, which reached its peak in the 1890s. Amongst its victims were Tsar Alexander II (1881), Empress Elizabeth of Austria (1898), King Umberto of Italy (1900) and Presidents Carnot (1894) of France and McKinley (1901) of the USA. Anarchist terrorism was a form of ‘propaganda by the deed’: it used violence as a way of raising political consciousness and stimulating the masses to revolt, sometimes by attacking what were seen as symbols of oppression and exploitation.

However, in the post-1945 period, terrorism generally had a nationalist orientation. During the 1940s and 1950s it was associated with Third World anticolonial struggles in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, later being taken up by national liberation movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and groups such as Black September. Terrorism was also used by disaf-fected national or ethnic minorities in developed western societies, notably by the IRA in Northern Ireland and on the UK mainland, by ETA in the Basque region of Spain, and by the FLQ in Quebec. Nevertheless, the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington convinced many people that terrorism had been reborn in a new and more dangerous form, leading some to conclude that it had become the principal threat to international peace and secu¬rity. However, before this assertion is addressed, it is necessary to consider the nature of terrorism, the different ways in which terrorism has been understood, and whether terrorism has changed in recent years.

The central feature of terrorism is that it is a form of political violence that aims to achieve its objectives through creating a climate of fear and apprehension. As such, it uses violence in a very particular way: not primarily to bring about death and destruction, but to create unease and anxiety about possible future acts of death and destruction. Terrorism, therefore, often takes the form of seemingly indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, although attacks on symbols of power and prestige and the kidnapping or murder of prominent businessmen, senior government officials and political leaders are usually also viewed as acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, the concept of terrorism remains deeply problematical. This applies, in part, because of confusion about the basis on which terrorism should be defined. It can be defined by the nature of:

• The act itself: clandestine violence that has a seemingly indiscriminate char-acter. However, the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself, because it rests, crucially, on intentions, specifically the desire to intimidate or terrify. Not only does this mean that terrorism is always a social fact rather than a brutal fact, but the inten¬tions behind acts of terrorism may be complex or uncertain.

• Its victims: innocent civilians. However, does this mean that attacks on mili-tary targets and personnel or the assassination of political leaders cannot be described as terrorism? Some terrorists, moreover, have viewed civilians as ‘guilty’, on the grounds that they are implicated in, and benefit from, struc-tural oppression that takes place on a national or even global level.

• Its perpetrators: non-state bodies that are intent on influencing the actions of governments or international organizations.

Terrorism, however, is only a meaningful term if it can reliably be distin-guished from other forms of political violence. Terrorism differs from conven-tional warfare in that, as a ‘weapon of the weak’, it is most often embraced by those who have no realistic possibility of prevailing against their opponents in a conventional armed contest. Lacking the organizational strength or destructive capacity to engage in open conflict, terrorists rely on strategies of provocation and polarization. Indeed, terrorism can even be thought of as the negation of combat, as its targets are attacked in such a way as to make self-defence difficult or perhaps impossible. Terrorism, nevertheless shares more in common with guerrilla warfare. Both are examples of asymmet¬rical warfare, in which tactics and strategies are adopted specifically to compensate for an enemy’s greater technological, economic and (conventional) military strength. In addition, both terrorism and guerrilla warfare place an emphasis on corroding an enemy’s will to resist by drawing it into a protracted armed struggle. The similarities, indeed, may go further, in that terrorism is often used part of a guerrilla or insurrectionary war, as demonstrated, for instance, by Taliban in Afghanistan. In this light, terrorism can perhaps be thought of either a special kind of ‘new’ war, or a strategy characteristically employed in ‘new’ wars.

Nevertheless, terrorism can also be distinguished from guerrilla warfare. In the first place, terrorism is characterized by the disproportionate weight it places on highly publicized atrocities as a mechanism for shaping the consciousness and behaviour of target audiences. This reflects the extent to which terrorists rely on ‘propaganda by the deed’, high visibility and conscience-shocking acts of violence that are designed to intimidate rival ethnic or religious communities or the public in general, or, in its classic form, to mobilize popular support and stimulate political activism. Second, the essentially covert nature of terrorist activity usually restricts the extent to which terrorists are able to engage in popular activism, by contrast with guerilla armies which typically rely heavily on a mass base of popular support.