4. A multipolar global order. The rise of multipolarity

Debate about the decline, or even end, of US hegemony is invariably linked to an assessment of rising multipolarity. This involves two main issues. First, to what extent, and in what ways, is world order acquiring a multipolar character? Second, what are the likely implications of multipolarity?

World order, in the modern period, is being shaped by a number of multipolar trends. The most significant of these is the rise of so-called ‘emerging powers’. These are the new, or the would-be, great powers of the twenty-first century. Some states already have a significant measure of regional influence - Brazil and, possibly, Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America; South Africa and Nigeria in Africa; Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Middle East; and South Korea, Indonesia, Pakistan and Australia in Asia and Oceania. However, a range of other powers have acquired, or are acquiring, wider, and possibly global, significance. These include, most obviously, China, Russia and India, but also Japan and the European Union. Between them, and together with the USA, these powers account for over half the world’s popu-lation, about 75 per cent of global GDP and around 80 per cent of global defence spending.

Of all the powers that may rival, and even eclipse, the USA, the most signifi-cant is undoubtedly China. Indeed, many predict that the twenty-first century will become the ‘Chinese century’, just as the twentieth century had supposedly been the ‘American century’. The basis for China’s great power status is its rapid economic progress since the introduction of market reforms in the mid-1970s under Deng Xiaoping (1904-97), the most dramatic phase of which began only in the 1990s. Annual growth rates of between 8 and 10 per cent for almost thirty years (about twice the levels achieved by the USA and other western states) have meant that China became the world’s largest exporter in 2009, and in 2010 it overtook Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. By 2010, the Chinese economy was 90 times larger than it had been in 1978. With the world’s largest population, China has a seemingly inexhaustible supply of cheap labour, making it, increasingly, the manufacturing heart of the global economy. China also has a growing military capacity, being second only to the USA in terms of arms expenditure.

Some argue that the twenty-first century will not so much be the ‘Chinese century’ as the ‘Asian century’, with India and Japan in particular also being viewed as key actors. The transformation of India into an emerging power has been based on economic growth rates only marginally less impressive than China’s. India has become a world leader in industries such as computer software and biotechnology. Japan, on the other hand, emerged as a major power though its post-1945 ‘economic miracle’, becoming the second largest economy in the world during the 1970s. Indeed, until the 1990s, Japan, together with Germany, was widely seen as an economic superpower and perhaps as a model for the ‘de-militarized’ great powers of the twenty-first century.

Not all multipolar trends in twenty-first century world order are associated with the rise of emerging powers, however. Three broader developments have supported the fragmentation and pluralisation of global power, and perhaps suggest that all state-centric models of world order (bipolar, unipolar or multi-polar) and the distribution of global power are outmoded. The first of these developments is unfolding globalisation. As all great powers are embedded to a greater or lesser extent in global economic arrangements and participate within an interlocking capitalist system, the pursuit of national self-interest can only mean, globalists argue, increased integration and cooperation. This implies that great power rivalry in terms of major geopolitical conflicts and certainly world war be a thing of the past. In a context of increased interdependence and interconnectedness, economic rivalry may have displaced military conflict (at least among great powers). The second development is the growing trend towards global and sometimes regional governance. This stems from the fact that the principal challenges confronting states - climate change, crime, migra-tion, disease and so on - are increasingly transnational in character and so can only be tackled through cooperation, emphasizing that power is as much about collaboration as it is about conflict.

Finally, the trends towards globalisation and in favour of regional and global governance have both had the effect of strengthening the role of non-state actors in world affairs. These non-state actors are many and various, ranging from transnational corporations (TNCs) and non-governmental organiza¬tions (NGOs) to terrorist networks and international criminal groups. For some, the emergence of global civil society is in the process of bringing a form of cosmopolitan democracy into existence, thereby empowering previously weak or marginalized groups and movements. If global power is dispersed amongst a growing collection of great powers, as well as an expanding range of interna-tional organizations and non-state actors, the very idea of polarity is brought into question, meaning that world order may be acquiring a nonpolar character.

KEY POINTS

• Power, in its broadest sense, is the ability to influence the outcome of events. Distinctions are nevertheless drawn between actual/potential power, relational/structural power and ‘hard/soft’ power. The notion of power as material ‘power over’ others has been subject to increased criticism, leading to more nuanced and multidi¬mensional conceptions of power.

• The Cold War was marked by bipolar tension between a US-dominated West and a Soviet-dominated East. The end of the Cold War led to proclamations about the advent of a ‘new world order’. However, this new world order was always imprecisely defined, and the idea quickly became unfashionable.

• Twenty-first century world order increasingly has a multipolar character. This is evident in the rise of so- called ‘emerging powers’, notably China, but it is also a consequence of wider developments, including the advance of globalisation and global governance and the growing importance of non-state actors.

• For neo-realists, a multipolar diffusion of power amongst global actors is likely to create a tendency towards instability and even war. On the other hand, multipolarity may strengthen the trend towards multilateralism, leading to stability, order and a tendency towards collaboration.

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

Self-help: state's reliance on its own capacities and resources, rather than external support, to ensure security and survival.

Culture: in its broadest sense, is the way of life of a people; their beliefs, values and practices. Sociologists and anthropologists tend to distinguish between ‘culture' and ‘nature', the former encompassing that which is passed on from one generation to the next by learning, rather than through biological inheritance. Culture therefore embodies language, religion, traditions, social norms and moral principles. A distinction is sometimes drawn between ‘high’ culture, represented especially by the arts and literature, which is supposedly the source of intellectual and personal development, and 'low' or 'popular' culture, which is orientated around mass consumption and populist instincts, and may even have a debasing impact on society.

Multiculturalism is used as both a descriptive and a normative term.

As a descriptive term it refers to cultural diversity arising from the existence within a society of two or more groups whose beliefs and practices generate a distinctive sense of collective identity, usually linked to racial, ethnic or language differences.

As a normative term, multiculturalism implies a positive endorsement of communal diversity, based either on the right of different cultural groups to respect and recognition, or on the alleged benefits to the larger society of moral and cultural diversity. Multiculturalism, in this sense, acknowledges the importance of beliefs, values and ways of life in establishing self- understanding and a sense of self-worth for individuals and groups alike.

Power: the ability to influence the outcome of events, in the sense of having the power to do something. In global politics, this includes the ability of a country to conduct its own affairs without the interference of other countries, bringing power very close to autonomy. However, power is usually thought of as a relationship: that is, as the ability to influence the behaviour of others in a manner not of their choosing, or ‘power over’ others.

Relational power: the ability of one actor to influence another actor or actors in a manner not of their choosing.

Deterrence: a tactic or strategy designed to prevent aggression by emphasizing the scale of the likely military response (the cost of an attack would be greater than any benefit it may bring).

Hegemony: (from the Greek hegemonia, meaning ‘leader’) - the leadership or domination of one element of a system over others.

Structural power: the control of economic and military resources, enabling the hegemon to shape the preferences and actions of other states, typically by promoting willing consent rather than through the use of force.

Hard power: the ability of one actor (usually but not necessarily a state) to influence another through the use of threats or rewards, typically involving military 'sticks’ or economic ‘carrots’.

Soft power: the ability to influence other actors by persuading them to follow or agree to norms and aspirations that produce the desired behaviour.

Bipolarity refers to an international system which revolves around two poles (major power blocs). The term is most commonly associated with the Cold War, restricting its use to the dynamics of East-West rivalry during the 'superpower era'. For a system to be genuinely bipolar a rough equality must occur between the two pre-eminent powers or power blocs, certainly in terms of their military capacity.

Neorealists have argued that this equilibrium implies that bipolar systems are stable and relatively peaceful, being biased in favour of a balance of power.

Liberals, however, have associated bipolarity with tension and insecurity, resulting from their tendency to breed hegemonic ambition and prioritize military power.

Unipolarity refers to an international system in which there is one pre¬eminent state, or ‘pole'.

In a unipolar system there is but a single great power, implying an absence of constraints or potential rivals. However, as this implies some form of world government, unipolarity is always relative and not absolute. Critics argue that unipolarity promotes megalomania on the part of the dominant actor, as well as fear, resentment and hostility among other actors.

Multipolarity: refers to an international system in which there are three or more power centres. However, this may encompass arrangements ranging from tripolar systems (the USA, Japan and the EU in the latter decades of the twentieth century) to effectively nonpolar systems, in which power is so diffuse that no actor can any longer be portrayed as a 'pole'.

Neorealists argue that multipolarity creates a bias in favour of fluidity and uncertainty, which can lead only to instability and an increased likelihood of war (‘anarchical’ multipolarity).

Liberals nevertheless argue that multipolar systems are characterized by a tendency towards multilateralism, as a more even division of global power promotes peace, cooperation and integration (‘interdependent’ multipolarity).

World order: the distribution of power between and amongst states and other key actors giving rise to a relatively stable pattern of relationships and behaviours.

Unilateralism: one¬-sidedness; a policy determined by the interests and objectives of a single state, unconstrained by other states and bodies.

Multilateralism: policy of acting in concert with other states or international organizations, or a system of coordinated relations amongst three or more actors.

Balance of power: a condition in which no one state predominates over others, tending to create general equilibrium and curb the hegemonic ambitions of all states.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What is power?

2. How, and to what extent, has the nature of power changed?

3. Has ‘hard’ power become redundant in world affairs?

4. What were the implications for world order of the end of the Cold War?

5. Did Cold War bipolarity tend towards stability and peace, or tension and insecurity?

6. Was the idea of a ‘new world order’ merely a tool to legitimize US hegemony?

7. Is China in the process of becoming the next global hegemon?

8. To what extent is the world now multipolar, and are these trends set to continue?

9. Should emerging multipolarity be welcomed or feared?

 

CHAPTER 5.NATURE OF WAR

1. Defining war

- Types of war

- War as a continuation of politics

2. From ‘old’ wars to ‘new’ wars

3. Justifying war

- Realpolitik

- Just war theory

1. DEFINING WAR

Military power has been the traditional currency of international politics. States and other actors have exercised influence over each other largely through the threat or use of force, making war a ubiquitous feature of human history, found in all ages, all cultures and all societies. However, even though war appears to be as old as humankind, there are questions about its nature. What distinguishes war from other forms of violence? What are the main causes of war and peace? And does the declining incidence of war in some parts of the world mean that war has become obsolete and military power is a redundant feature of global politics? Nevertheless, the nature of warfare has changed enormously over time, particularly through advances in the technology of fighting and military strategy. The longbow was replaced by the musket, which in turn was replaced by rifles and machine-guns, and so on. Major shifts were brought about in the twentieth century by the advent of ‘total’ war, as industrial technology was put to the service of fighting. The end of the Cold War is also believed to have ushered in quite different forms of warfare.

So-called ‘new’ wars tend to be civil wars (typically involving small-scale, low-intensity combat), which blur the distinction between civilians and the military and are often asymmetrical. In the case of so-called ‘postmodern’ warfare, a heavy reliance is placed on ‘high-tech’ weaponry. How new are these new forms of warfare, and what are their implications? Finally, there are long-standing debates about whether, and in what circumstances, war can be justified. While some believe that matters of war and peace should be determined by hard-headed judgements about the national self-interest, others insist that war must conform to principles of justice, and others still reject war out of hand and in all circumstances. How can war be justified? Can and should moral principles be applied to war and its conduct?

Types of war

First of all, war is a conflict between or among political groups. Traditionally, these groups have been states, with inter-state war, often over territory or resources - wars of plunder - being thought of as the archetypal form of war. However, inter-state war has become less common in recent years, seemingly being displaced by civil wars and the growing involvement of non-state actors such as guerrilla groups, resistance movements and terrorist organizations. Second, war is organized, in that it is carried out by armed forces or trained fighters who operate in accordance with some kind of strategy, as opposed to carrying out random and sporadic attacks. Conventional warfare, in fact, is a highly organized and disciplined affair, involving military personnel subject to uniforms, drills, saluting and ranks, and even acknowledging that war should be a rule-governed activity as set out by the ‘laws of war’. Modern warfare has, nevertheless, become less organized in nature. It involves more irregular fighters who are loosely organized and may refuse to fight by the rules, developments that tend to blur the distinction between military and civilian life.

Third, war is usually distinguished by its scale or magnitude. A series of small-scale attacks that involve only a handful of deaths is seldom referred to as a war. Finally, as they involve a series of battles or attacks, wars usually take place over a significant period of time. That said, some wars are very short, such as the Six Day War of 1967 between Israel and the neighbouring states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Other wars are nevertheless so protracted, and may involve sometimes substantial periods of peace, that there may be confusion about exactly when a war starts and ends. For example, the Hundred Years’ War was in fact a series of wars between England and France, dated by convention 1337-1453, which form part of a longer conflict that began when England was linked to Normandy (1066). Similarly, although World War I and World War II are usually portrayed as separate conflicts, some historians prefer to view than as part of a single conflict interrupted by a twenty-year truce.

However, the nature of war and warfare has changed enormously over time, as they have been refashioned by developments in military technology and strat¬egy. Wars, indeed, reflect the technological and economic levels of developments of their eras. From the days of smoothbore muskets, with soldiers fighting in lines and columns, war gradually became more flexible, first through the advent of rifles, barbed wire, the machine gun and indirect fire, and then through the development of tanks and extended movement, especially in the form of the Blitzkrieg as used by the Germans in WWII. Industrialization and the greater capacity of states to mobilize whole populations gave rise in the twentieth century to the phenomenon of total war (a war involving all aspects of society, including large-scale conscription, the gearing of the economy to military ends, and the aim of achieving unconditional surrender through the mass destruction of enemy targets, civilian and military), exemplified by the two world wars of the twentieth century. Other differences between wars are based on the scale of the conflict and the nature of the outcomes at stake. At one extreme there are hegemonic wars, sometimes called global’, general’, ‘systemic’ or ‘world’ wars, which usually involve a range of states, each mobilizing its full economic and social resources behind a struggle to defend or reshape the global balance of power. On the other hand, there are ‘limited’ or ‘regional’ wars that are fought in line with more limited objectives, such as the redrawing of boundaries or the expulsion of enemy occupiers, as in the 1991 Gulf War (expelling Iraq from Kuwait) and the 1999 US-led NATO bombing of Kosovo (expelling Serb forces). Finally, a range of conflicts are often considered to be examples of ‘unconven-tional warfare’, either because of the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or because they fall into the classification of ‘new’ wars, sometimes seen as guerrilla wars (Spanish: literally, ‘little’ war; an insurgency or ‘people’s’ war, fought by irregular troops using tactics that are suited to the terrain and emphasize mobility and surprise rather than superior firepower).

War as a continuation of politics

The most influential theory of war was developed by Clausewitz in his master work, On war ([1831] 1976). In Clausewitz’s view, all wars have the same objective character: ‘War is merely a continuation of politics (or policy) by other means’. War is therefore a means to an end, a way of forcing an opponent to submit to one’s will. Such a stance emphasizes the continuity between war and peace. Both war and peace are characterized by the rational pursuit of self-inter-est, and therefore by conflict; the only difference between them is the means selected to achieve one’s goals, and that is decided on an instrumental basis. States thus go to war when they calculate that it is in their interest to do so. The Clausewitzian, or ‘politi¬cal’, conception of war is often seen as a product of the Westphalian state-system, in which international affairs were shaped by relations between and amongst states (although, strictly speaking, any political actor, including non-state ones, could use war as a political instrument). The image of war as the ‘rational’ pursuit of state interest was particularly attractive in the nineteenth century when wars were overwhelmingly fought between opposing states and roughly four-fifths of all wars were won by the state that started them. Moreover, although the hostility of the people was needed to fight a war, wars were fought by armies and therefore affected formal combatants rather than the larger civilian population. This made the costs of warfare more limited and easier to calculate.

The Clausewitzian conception of war has nevertheless attracted growing crit¬icism. Some of these criticisms are moral in character. Clausewitz has been condemned for presenting war as a normal and inevitable condition, one, further-more, that can be justified by reference to narrow state interest rather than wider principles such as justice. This therefore suggests that if war serves legitimate political purposes its moral implications can be ignored. On the other hand, had Clausewitz’s suggestion that the recourse to war should be based on rational analysis and careful calculation been followed more consistently, many modern wars may not have taken place. Other criticisms of the Clausewitzian conception of war empha¬size that it is outdated, relevant to the Napoleonic era but certainly not to modern wars and warfare. First, modern economic and political circumstances may dictate that war is a less effective, and perhaps even an obsolete, policy instrument. If modern states are rationally disinclined to resort to war, military power may have become irrelevant in world affairs. Second, the advent of industrialized warfare, and particularly the phenomenon of total war, has made calculations about the likely costs and benefits of war much less reliable. If this is the case, war may have ceased to be an appropriate means of achieving political ends. Finally, most of the criticisms of Clausewitz highlight changes in the nature of war that make the Clausewitzian paradigm of war no longer applicable.