
- •Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East: comparison of perceptions among Russian civic and ethnic nationalisms
- •Mark Saamov Spring 2014
- •Student Declaration
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Main Body
- •3. Conclusion
- •Abstract
- •1. Introduction
- •1.1. Improvement of Bilateral Sino-Russian relations
- •1.2. The Problem: Russian Anxiety About Chinese Immigration
- •2. Main Body
- •2.1. History of Sino-Russian Relations
- •2.2. Overview of the Socio-Economic Situation in the Far East
- •2.4. Russian Civic Nationalism
- •2.5. Russian Ethnic Nationalism
- •2.6. Antagonism Between the Government and Right-Wing Nationalists
- •2.7. Discourse of Two Nationalisms on Chinese Immigration
- •2.7.1. Ethnic Nationalism Discourse
- •2.7.2. Civic Nationalism Discourse
- •3. Conclusion
- •3.1. Future of the Discourse in the Context of State’s Changing Political Order
- •Alexeev, m., Hofstetter, r. (2006). Russia, China, and the immigration security dilemma. Political Science Quarterly, 126. Retrieved from http://www.Jstor.Org/stable/20202643
2.7.2. Civic Nationalism Discourse
On the side of government, which serves as a representation of the Russian civic nationalism, the analysis will concentrate on statements made by Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Stegnii.
Dmitry Medvedev is, in some sort, a counterpart to Alexander Belov as he also assumes a high-ranking leadership in his respective camp - Medvedev was the President of Russia from 2008-2012 and has been working as the Prime Minister since 2012; needless to say, Medvedev is obviously one of the most important and well-known figures in modern Russian politics. Medvedev, apart from being the Prime Minister, also has a position of a chairman of the “United Russia” party which enjoys the status of a dominating political force in the country by having an absolute majority in the Russian Duma (238 out of 450 seats).
Its
ideology is described as a “social conservatism” which distincts
itself both from liberal democracy and socialism.
h
Such ideology once again constructs a view of Russia being, a “unique, distinct and powerful” civilization that would play a role of mediator in the world affairs, however, apart from right-wing nationalists, the discourse is dominated by the emphasis on diversity as Russia is referred to be a “family of free peoples” as well on “peaceful coexistence”.
On
the other hand, the reality shows that this theoretical concept of
diversity is limited towards those groups who live on the territory
of former USSR and hence, experienced direct Russian rule as well as
influence of the Russian culture (the above mentioned citizenship law
serves as a good proving example); consequently, Chinese immigrants,
even despite the fact that Russian civic nationalism in the form of
“United Russia” theoretically acknowledges the necessity of
having a “family of free peoples”, do not fit into this “family”
model. it
all allows Russia being a mighty and significant country in the
world.ious co
Considering the above mentioned facts, it is possible to say that Medvedev, being the Prime Minister of the country as well as party’s leader, is likely to be affed facts, it is possible to say that Medvedev, being the Prime Minister of the country as well as pected by the values his party proposes. In 2012, while working on the matters of the Russian Pacific Fleet, Medvedev received a report from the Ministry of Defense that two nuclear submarines would be sent to Vladivostok (fleet’s base). In his response to the message, Medvedev pointed out that it was important to protect the vast Far East from “excessive expansion by bordering states”; he also added that there must be no “negative manifestations, including the formation of enclaves made up of foreign citizens” (Grove, 2012).
Eventually, such rhetoric constructs the factor of fear which civic nationalism has towards Chinese immigrants due to their “alien” culture that may potentially refuse to comply with Russian cultural and legal norms. Even though, Medvedev mentions multiple “bordering states”, in the context of Far East he really talks only about China as, apart from it, vast territory where and with Mongolia which has a vast territory where and a population of less than 3 million inhabita the Far East has land borders only with Kazakhstan which is Russia’s ally and one of the key members of Russian-dominated Customs Union; with Mongolia which has a vast territory and a population of less than 3 million inhabitants; and with North Korea which is a closed society where even internal migration is under restriction (Tanaka, 2008).
Incompatibility
between the host population and Chinese is also emphasized by the
word “enclave”, which constructs the state of separation and
division of people, therefore meaning that the possibility of
integration is not considered by Medvedev. This may cultural
and legal norms,-ethnic relations and istability an civic nationalism
and is regarded as unacceptable.
Finally, these statements were made in the context of expansion of Russian military presence in the region what already speaks for itself in terms of how members of the government can potentially perceive Chinese immigration.d expansion of Russian military forces in the region what already speaks for
The second example represents n s"ngs in additional argument which was not present in the pamphlet as he defines ".
f
perceptions - more
In their paper, Alexeev & Hofstetter provided several statements made by Stegnii. The first one discussed China as the potential military threat to Russia: even though, Stegnii stated that “at present, we can destroy China 33 times”, he also warned: “in the future, the military balance will worsen for us. China has a lot of money that it can spend on the military. We cannot invest at the same rate” (Alexeev & Hofstetter, 2006; p.10). Even more interestingly, Stegnii also brought in the factor of Chinese nationalism: he argues that China, remaining under rule of the Communist Party accepts “Mao's view that 1.5 million hectares of territory stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific are China's 'Great Northern Virgin Lands' waiting to be developed some day by and for the Chinese people” (Alexeev & Hofstetter, 2006; p.13). His final point worth mentioning was that “as long as Chinese migrants would learn to abide Russian laws, rules and customs, they would not be a threat, no matter how many of them come” (Alexeev & Hofstetter, 2006; pp.31-32).
In the context of discourse, one can see that Stegnii, in many ways, reacts to immigration the same way Medvedev does, however, he raises his concerns in a much more explicit manner by saying that the “military balance will worsen in the future”, bringing in the notion of “shady future” as well as expressing fears about Russia’s inability to remain strong militarily, what raises concerns about the superpower status. Being a local official, Stegnii has a much more well-formed concept about Chinese nationalism as well, directly pointing to its potential hostility towards Russia as Chinese nationalism perceives a large chunk of current Russian territory as “Great Northern Virgin Lands” – if Russia loses political authority in the Far East, it will not only lose the opportunity of becoming a superpower but will completely deteriorate in its significance; virtually, this degradation of Russia is the greatest concern the government can have.
Contrary to Medvedev, however, Stegnii thinks that Chinese can be integrated into the “family of free people” and even mentions the necessary prerequisites such as learning Russian “rules, laws and customs”; he provides the civic interpretation of the term “Russian” as he primarily takes into account cultural affiliation rather than ethnicity what is definitely a very interesting finding which shows that there is an alternative way of seeing Chinese migration, transforming it from a “problem” into “opportunity”.