
- •Chinese immigration into the Russian Far East: comparison of perceptions among Russian civic and ethnic nationalisms
- •Mark Saamov Spring 2014
- •Student Declaration
- •1. Introduction
- •2. Main Body
- •3. Conclusion
- •Abstract
- •1. Introduction
- •1.1. Improvement of Bilateral Sino-Russian relations
- •1.2. The Problem: Russian Anxiety About Chinese Immigration
- •2. Main Body
- •2.1. History of Sino-Russian Relations
- •2.2. Overview of the Socio-Economic Situation in the Far East
- •2.4. Russian Civic Nationalism
- •2.5. Russian Ethnic Nationalism
- •2.6. Antagonism Between the Government and Right-Wing Nationalists
- •2.7. Discourse of Two Nationalisms on Chinese Immigration
- •2.7.1. Ethnic Nationalism Discourse
- •2.7.2. Civic Nationalism Discourse
- •3. Conclusion
- •3.1. Future of the Discourse in the Context of State’s Changing Political Order
- •Alexeev, m., Hofstetter, r. (2006). Russia, China, and the immigration security dilemma. Political Science Quarterly, 126. Retrieved from http://www.Jstor.Org/stable/20202643
2. Main Body
2.1. History of Sino-Russian Relations
Before diving into distinctions between the two nationalisms, it is important to analyze the historical context of Sino-Russian relations, understand the geopolitical aspect of the Far East as well as define the nature of Chinese immigration.
Eventually, when the history of relations between China and Russia starting from the 19th century and into modern times is analyzed, it can be described as a “story of cyclical swings between periods of antagonism and periods of rapprochement” (Paramonov & Strokov, 2006).
Paramonov & Strokov define five major periods of modern bilateral relations: first lasted from 1850 until 1890s and included the signing of the Beijing Treaty which “set the border over most of its length, especially the low-lying parts” as well as economic cooperation. The second period lasted from 1900s until the mid 1920s and was characterized by the deterioration of the bilateral relations due to Russian involvement in suppression of the anti-Western Boxer Rebellion. The third period began with Stalin’s rule in the USSR and lasted until the late 1950s and can be characterized by dramatic improvement of political climate due to common Japanese threat and due to establishment of a Communist regime in China. The forth period lasted from 1960s until late 1980s and was characterized by Sino-Soviet rivalry for the leadership in the Communist world, reaching its most critical point in 1969, when two countries almost started an armed conflict. The current fifth period has been taking place since 1989 when the new border treaty was signed and can be characterized by strategic rapprochement and expanding economic cooperation (2006; pp.1-5).
Consequently, it can be argued that these shifts in relations were driven by the pragmatism of the ruling elites, who cooperated or opposed each other when their own long term goals demanded so (Paramonov & Strokov, 2006; p.4).
2.2. Overview of the Socio-Economic Situation in the Far East
The Far East is the largest part Russia – its area roughly equals six million square kilometers – one-third of the entire territory of Russia and if the Baikal region is added, then the total area would account for more than 40 percent of Russia’s territory. Region contains a vast resource base which includes oil, gas, gold, fish, lumber, large river basins and water resources. The region has connections with the economies of the Pacific Region, major part of the Trans-Siberian railroad lies on its territory and, finally, it provides Russia a “window” to the Pacific Ocean (Government of Russia, 2013; pp.5-6).
Despite having so many strategic resources, regional economy is largely weak and inefficient as it only exports raw materials and has little manufacturing: the total volume of gross regional product produced on the territory of the region in 2012 was only about 6 percent of Russia's total GNP (Government of Russia, 2013; pp.6-7).
Being economically weak, the Far East is heavily dependent on China and the majority of basic goods on the internal market are of Chinese origin: “regional export industries, traditionally isolated from internal markets in Russia and the CIS, exploited established ties in the Pacific Rim to offset partial losses from the collapse in the domestic demand” (Minakir, n.d.; p.90).
In addition to that, there are serious demographic issues as well: the population has been declining steadily from 1991, due to poor economic condition and general turmoil of the 1990s. Population has dropped by 2.7 million people and now accounts for only 10.8 million people. In fact, 7.5 percent of Russia’s population lives in the area which equals to 45.5 percent of Russia’s total area (Government of Russia, 2013; pp.6-8).
This becomes extremely worrisome for the government, especially in the light of the fact that bordering Chinese provinces contain 10-20 more people than the entire Far East: for example, the Primorskii Krai with the population of 2.2 million inhabitants borders Heilongjiang province with 38 million inhabitants (Alexeev & Hofstetter; 2006; p.7).
2.3. Character and Numbers of Chinese Immigration
Eventually, tight trade connections between China and the Far East not only produced trade interest on the side of China but also desires of direct investment what led, for the first time, to Chinese nationals appearing in the region in significant numbers. Minakir mentions that lax immigration regulations on the side of Russia as well as entrepreneurial interest, resulted in the significant influx of Chinese traders into the area, starting from 1992 (Minakir, n.d.; p.92).
When one looks into the patterns of Chinese immigration, it is possible to define three main groups: traders, laborers and “white-collar” employees. These streams react to changing conditions in sending and receiving sites, while migration patterns reflect an interaction among economic conditions, family strategies, and evolving networks (Balzer & Repnikova, 2009; p.16).
Traders, for instance, are mostly individuals, who often travel with tourist visas and have sacks of goods with themselves – due to good knowledge of markets, traders have created well-developed commercial infrastructures for themselves; many have at least some knowledge of Russian. What is remarkable is that women make up nearly half of the Chinese traders. (Balzer & Repnikova, 2009; pp.16-17).
Laborers, on the other hand, are primarily dominated by male immigrants; they are mostly occupied with construction, agriculture, and forestry. Laborers work in Russia under fixed contracts for specific periods of time. In fact, they are the least visible part of Chinese in Russia, as they often live in barracks and rarely go out on their own (Balzer & Repnikova, 2009; pp.18-19).
Last and the smallest group are students and intellectual workers. Despite the fact that this category is the most preferred one among officials and the local population, this stream is thin due to language barriers as well as existing xenophobia. Russian government made efforts to attract Chinese students but these attempts largely failed as Russian education system is generally incapable of competing with Western and Australian universities (Balzer & Repnikova, 2009; pp.19-20).
Surprisingly, despite the fact that streams of immigration are rather well-defined, the actual number of Chinese in Russia remains a mystery. This is largely connected to illegal immigration patterns and problems in enforcing border control. Illegal immigration occurred almost immediately with the liberalization of the border as “significant number of Chinese immigrants used illegal channels to settle in the Russian Far East in order to conduct basic commercial activity. Coming to the Far East to sell small shipments of goods, they stayed on illegally, taking advantage of comparatively inexpensive housing accommodations and the prospects for high incomes” (Minakir, n.d.; p.93).
Consequently, incredible speculations have been made, while trying to find out the accurate number of Chinese in the country. For example, the 2010 census provides a number of just 30,000, while other sources provide much bigger numbers, including completely absurd estimates: in 2002 interview, the Russian deputy minister of nationality policy stated: “If you ask me officially, there are 400,000 Chinese. If you ask me for the real number, it is four million”, meaning that Chinese would constitute one of the largest minority groups in Russia and would enjoy ethnic majority in the Far East. The Council of Europe, for instance, in late 2008 provided the figure of one million Chinese (Balzer & Repnikova, 2009; pp.13-15).
According to Ryazantsev, the number of Chinese in Russia ranges from 300,000 to 400,000 and this number is likely to grow due to prospect of high profits – 67% of migrants 700$ or more per month in 2008 what is considered to be a fine salary on the Russian labor market; 20% of immigrants made more than 1000$ per month in the same year what surpassed the average salary in Russia in that year (2010; p.79). Despite having such opposing data, one can say that Chinese, due to legal and illegal immigration, may represent a sizeable minority group in the population of the Far East and parts of Siberia that border China: their numbers are likely to be higher than 250,000.