2.2.2 Conflicting and complementing concepts

At a quick glance, the issue of defining autonomy seems utterly hopeless. The definitions we have presented above do not only say different things (which would allow for an eclectic approach – that is, collecting all the characteristics and presenting a sort of kaleidoscopic picture of the concept); they seem to quarrel and react to each other – sometimes loudly denouncing a notion that another definition proudly presents. Of course, we could easily define autonomy to suit our purposes, quoting one source and neglecting the rest, but that would certainly not spare us the unpleasant feeling that while we are conducting research into a topic, we are not quite sure what the topic is. Therefore, a survey of conflicting concepts needs to be made, and conclusions have to be drawn².

There are three main conflicts that lie at the very heart of the issue of autonomy. Firstly, the researchers disagree as to whether autonomy is a finite concept; that is, whether it is some final state that displays absolute characteristics. Dickinson (1987) claims that it is, and so does, to some extent, Holec (1985). Where Dickinson speaks about "total responsibility" and "no involvement of a teacher or institution", thus making autonomy into a sort of 'end status' or 'end product' of learning, Holec merely mentions the "greatest possible degree of independence in a given set of circumstances".

Little (1991) disagrees, stating that autonomy is "never absolute", "always conditional and constrained" and that it is "not a steady state" enjoyed by a group of learners. Most other researchers stay somewhere in between, mentioning "taking control" (Cotterall, Benson) and "significant responsibility" (Boud). However, their definitions do not go further to specify to what extent this control or responsibility is constrained or absolute.

Even though this conflict sounds dramatic, it probably only reflects the development the concept went through over time. Or possibly, where Little restricts his concept of autonomy to the language classroom, Dickinson takes a broader perspective, taking into account those learners who leave the educational system to make use of what they have learnt in everyday life. Whatever the reason for the misunderstanding might be, Dickinson (1992) corrects her view, stating that independence does not entail exclusion from the classroom and freedom of all instruction.

Secondly, certain definitions display peculiar differences in defining autonomy as merely a capacity (ability, capability) or a combination of capacity and action. Holec (qtd. in Benson 2001) argues for the former, insisting that "all the practical decisions [learners] make … must be distinguished from [this capacity]", and Little (1991) agrees. Littlewood (1996), on the other hand, argues that autonomy consists of two components – ability and willingness. Other researchers adhere to one view or the other – whether they speak of active engagement (Dickinson 1992), "taking responsibility" (Boud), or merely of "ability" (Cotterall).

This conflict is fully illustrated in Benson (2001: 52-53). It is clear that accepting one or the other point of view will make an enormous difference in the way one is going to describe an autonomous learner – is it someone who is merely able to act independently, or rather someone who truly takes initiative and performs independent action? The definitions cited above do not make such decisions any easier.

The last major conflict rests with the concepts of independence versus interdependence. The word 'independence' is used fairly loosely, describing "total independence" of all manners of instruction (Dickinson 1987) or "degrees of independence" (Holec 1985). Indeed, making the concept of autonomy synonymous with independence has led many researchers to believe that autonomy is more suitable for self-directed learning environments, and that it has no place in the language classroom. Little (1995), on the contrary, argues that "total independence is not autonomy but autism". In addition, Allwright (qtd. in Little 1995) proposes the term interdependence, making it clear that a learner is not on his own; rather than that, his learning is born out of interaction with others. Once again, we are presented with a set of fairly polarized views, and each one of them manages to create a very different picture of an autonomous learner.

We have presented, in a fairly concise form, three major conflicts that are apparent in the definitions we have listed. Also, we have shown that the existence of these conflicts would present significant difficulties in attempting to construct a definition from the relevant literature on the subject. For those who might think that these conflicts amount to mere quibbling, Benson gives ample, if a little logically inconsistent, evidence of the magnitude of the mismatches and the impact they had on the idea of autonomy, using expressions such as "conceptual confusion" or "crisis of identity" (Benson 2001: 13-14).

The desire to produce a coherent and unconflicting definition/description of the term is not a thing of the past, as we can see in Tassinar, who made a proposal for a PhD thesis with the following aim:

In the academic literature there are many different definitions and approaches to learner autonomy in foreign language learning: I intend to take them into account, to analyze and compare them critically and on this basis to work out a consistent definition with general validity and suitable for the context of higher education. (Tassinar 2007)

Luckily, the definitions listed above do not only contradict but also complement each other. Therefore, we can infer some characteristics of autonomy that might later be useful in its description. The following observations can be made:

• being autonomous includes the ability to use a set of "tactics", or strategies (Cotterall)

• it includes "detachment" and "critical reflection" – that is, ability to reflect on one's learning (Little)

• it gives learners the chance to "express who they are and what they think" (Kenny)

• it is not a "method" (Little)

• it is a multidimensional concept, cannot be reduced to a single behavior (Little)

• it signifies actions that are performed "over and above responding to instruction" (Boud), which implies that autonomous learning itself cannot be "instructed", taught

• it cannot be reduced to organizing one's own learning (Little)

• the structure of the teaching materials also plays a part in limiting/enhancing a learner's independence (Dickinson)

Already, a pattern seems to emerge – autonomy includes using a set of strategies and powers of reflection, it is not limited to learning management (and may therefore encompass social and/or affective aspects of learning?), it stands above methods, it is synonymous with self-expression, it cannot be taught – only presented as an opportunity, and it plays a part in organizing teaching materials.

Also, the terms "responsibility", "freedom" and "independence", which are often used, signify a relatively low measure of hierarchy. This inference might already give us some insight into the distribution of roles within the language classroom.

Finally, we need to address three more problems that may be taken into account when constructing a definition or description of autonomy. Firstly, there seems to be a variety of narrow and wide definitions of the concept, ranging from Cotterall's "set of tactics", through Allwright's "equilibrium between self-development and interdependence" to Kenny's holistic view which transcends individual subjects. Apparently, we cannot simply infer that all of them were constructed for specific purposes; rather than that, we shall respect the variety of applications that autonomy offers.

Secondly, there has been much confusion as to the terms autonomy and self-direction. Gremmo and Riley (1995), for instance, use them interchangeably; Benson claims that self-direction is "something that learners are able to do more or less effectively" (Benson 2001: 34) and autonomy is the sum of moral and personal qualities that make up a learner's capacity to do so, while Dickinson claims exactly the opposite, producing a definition of self-direction that sounds dangerously similar to Holec's definition of autonomy:

This term describes a particular attitude to the learning process, where the learner accepts responsibility for all the decisions concerned with his learning but does not necessarily undertake the implementation of those decisions. (Dickinson 1987: 11)

In Benson's overview of the issue, autonomy even takes a fairly marginal role, when compared to self-direction. However interchangeable or unclear these two terms are, in our work, we shall use the term "autonomy", for we believe that, unlike in the case of "self-direction", the word retains the social aspect of learning.

Finally, there is an important common point certain definitions of autonomy share – they speak of "taking charge", "accepting responsibility" or of a progression from a degree of dependence to a degree of independence. This assumes an initial state of not being responsible or being dependent – a peculiar preconception that sets the definitions in time – as reactions to formal education that thwarts learners' freedom, rather than definitions of a universal concept. We shall avoid this in our work, for we find it erroneous to preconceive that learners are dependent or not responsible for their learning, before taking any steps to research into the issue.