Practicality of African liberation

After the wave of independence broke on the African continent in the early 1960s, Soviet policy-makers had to decide whether the remaining nationalist movements were worth supporting. This required a hard look at their chances for success and at the political value of merely giving them support. As these movements emerged in the early sixties, the Soviets seemed to have no definitive policy. In 1962, for example, Soviet writers praised various nationalist movements in Mozambique that later merged to form the Mozambique Liberation Front.³ Despite favorable commentary, it seems the Soviets were confused by the prospect of having to support multiple liberation groups, sometimes within one country. Having made little headway with newly independent states, somewhere in the mid or late sixties the Soviets resigned themselves to playing a supporting role in helping those territories yet to be “liberated,” particularly the Portuguese territories.

Whether the U.S.S.R. really believed in the ultimate success of the movements is open to speculation. It is probable, however, that the Soviets saw more in these movements than the prospects of independent pro-Soviet states. Because of their initial clumsiness in Africa, the Soviets were widely regarded with suspicion. Support for the liberation groups then became an opening that could gain them some respectability in African eyes and at the same time damage the West. At the very least the Soviets could not be called allies of the colonial/imperialist powers. Furthermore, the main Soviet goal in Africa may not have been to establish pro-Communist regimes but rather to exploit the rift between African elites and the West. This would have the effect of keeping Africa a source of division, conflict, and ultimate danger.⁴ This more modest goal may well underlie Soviet aid programs for the guerrilla forces.

African liberation movements have identity problems stemming from their lack of exposure and the general lack of importance attached to them outside Africa. In the Third World, there has been extensive acceptance of the African movements. The Soviet Union has supported many of these organizations in the last decade. All are relatively small, and they seek ultimately to wrest control of their respective homelands from white-controlled governments. All have turned to violence in some form, some founding active insurgencies. In most cases it is politically convenient for the Soviets to extend at least verbal support.

The fact that the Soviets assist African liberation movements is widely known. Writers during the sixties warned of Communist training for subversive cadres to be used in Africa. Despite these warnings, the success of the guerrilla movements themselves does not seem to have been a prime motivating factor. The Russians realized, however, that they could get a maximum political return on a minimal investment.⁵ By aiding the cause of African liberation against the “evils of racism” in southern Africa, they saw the opportunity to score a propaganda coup. One might even speculate as to whether Moscow has wanted the insurgents to triumph and terminate this advantageous situation for one of uncertainty. Or on the other hand, whether the movements themselves are really seeking self-perpetuation above all else.