Self-luminosity of the Self

According to Prabhakara, the self, being the substratum, of conciousness or samvit and not consciousness itself, is not self-luminous. He holds that it is knowledge, the attribute of the self, that is self-luminous and not the self as such. At the time of its rise, knowledge illumines, along with itself, both the self and the object. This illumination of the self or knower, the object or known, and knowledge in the same act of knowledge-is called triputi-pratyaksa or three-fold perception. In it, the self is revealed as T or the agent, as distinct from knowledge and the object of knowledge. It is held that the self is cognised as the agent only whsn knowledge arises. In deep sleep, there being no knowledge of any object, the self is not cognised. The self is thus, not self-revealed ; it is revealed by knowledge¹⁶. To quote Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, "It is not the soul whhh is self-illuminated but knowledge ; so it is knowledge which illumines both the self and the object in one operation"¹⁷. This position of the Prabhakaras 'neither accepts the realist view that the self is known as an object, nor the Advaita view that it is self-revealed'. Of course, the self for the Prabhakaras is self-luminous-in the sense that it is cognisable by every person for himself. Prabhakara says that the self is proved by the universally admi­tted and undeniable notion of T, which is self-luminous. To

quote MM. G. N. Jha, " like cognition, the Soul also is

self-luminous. Each man cognises his own soul for himself"¹⁸.

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The Self in Mimansa

Further, Prabhakara sometimes declares the self as samvit. And samvit being self-luminous, the self also should be regarded as self-luminous, ^alikanatha, too, while refuting the view of Kumarila that the self is an object of mental perception, holds that the self is self-luminous and is manifested in the cognition of external objects¹⁹.

As regards the view of Kumarila regarding the self-lumino­sity of the self, scholars differ in their opinions. Dr. S. N. Das­gupta is of the view that Kumarila, like Prabhakara, denies the self-luminosity of the self on the ground that in deep sleep the self does not manifest itself. MM, G. N. Jha, on the other hand, holds that, according to Kumarila, the self is self-luminous²⁰. But the point is that, according to Kumarila, the self is not merely the substratum of consciousness, it is of the nature of consciousness as well. And, consciousness being self-luminous, the self should be regarded as self-luminous. Kumarila himself says that the self is revealed by itself to it­self²¹. Of course, the self is self-luminous not in the sense of the Advaitins, since Kumarila divides the self, as it were, into two, namely the aspect of dravya and the aspect of bodha. Par-thasarathi, however, holds that the self is not self-luminous.

Multiplicity of the Self

According to the Minv.nsakas, the self is not one but many ; it is different in every individual. As one's body can perform actions because of the presence of the self, it is assumed that the actions in others' bodies are also caused by the presence of the corresponding selves in those bodies. If there were no different selves, there would not be differences in experiences of pleasures, pains, etc. in different individuals. The differences of dharmas, adharmas, births, deaths etc. of different individuals also could not be explained without presuming the plurality of the selves²². If there were only one self in all persons, then all of them would be endowed with the same attributes. Some Advaitins say that,

41

The Self in Indian Philosophy

just as one sun reflected in different locil seems to be many, so one self reflected in many individual avidyfts seems to be many. The MImansakas counter that, as in this case the difference of qualities is due to the reflecting media, and not to the sun, this analogy will imply that the qualities said to be residing in the self belong actually to the body, and not to the self²³. As regards the Upanisadic statement that the self is 'one', KumSrila holds that the implication of this statement lies not in the one­ness of the selves, but in their similarity, because all the selves, being of the nature of consciousness, are similar to one another²⁴. The Buddhistic view that the self is merely series of ideas without any persisting substratum is, according to the MImansakas, untenable. They argue that without a persisting self, the Law of Karman and the Law of Rebirth will be meaningless. The fact of memory also will be unintelligible if the self be impermanent. For the experience of an event occuring at an earlier point of time and the remembrance of the same at a later point of time must point to the same agent. Further, the facts of self-consciousness, desire, pleasure, pain etc. could not be explained if the self were merely a chain of fleeting cognitions²⁵.