Introduction

Vijnana Bhiksu ( 16th century A. D.) propagates a philoso­phy which is a type of bhedabheda. He does not accept the difference-less Brahman of l^ankara as the sole and absolute reality. Nor does he accept the purusa and prakfti of Sariikhya as the ultimate principles. Like Ramanuja, he accepts three tattvas or ultimate principles, namely, prak\ti, puru?a and Brahman. Prakfti is the ultimate non-conscious dynamic principle and the material cause of the material world ; purusa or the self is the static principle of pure consciousness ; and Brahman, the universal pure consciousness, is the Absolute, being the common substratum of both purusa and prakrti. For the creation of a purposeful world, the two independent principles of purusa and prakTti are required to come in con­tact with each other and act in a harmonious way. This conjunction between prakfti and the purusa and the harmony in their actions are superintended, according to Bhiksu, by Brahman¹.

Nature of the Self

According to Bhiksu, the self is a real part of Brahman, and emerges from it just as a spark emanates from a blazing fire. Being a part of Brahman, the universal pure conscious­ness, the self derives from it the nature of consciousness. Though the consciousness of the self is all-pervasive like that of Brah-

The Self in Vijnana Bhiksu's Philosophy 59.

man, in the empirical state, it is limited by the adjunct of buddhi. Consciousness is not the attribute of the self, but the very essence of it² : it is a substance which illuminates the not-self. Like consciousness, the activity of the self is also derived from Brahman. Bliss, however, is not the essence of the self, as the ^ankarites hold. BhikSu argues that bliss, being a mo­dification or effect of prakrti, cannot be the essence of the self which is not an effect. Moreover, as the self is of the nature of consciousness, it cannot, at the same time, be of the nature of bliss. It should not be argued that consciousness is essen­tially bliss, because acquisition of knowledge does not nece-ssarity bring pleasure with it³. Further, if the self be of the nature of bliss, it will have to be regarded as both the agent and the object of the enjoyment of bliss. The Saiikarite view that in liberation the self attains bliss is not supported by Bhik§u. He argues that it is not possible for the self to enjoy bliss during liberation, since at that time it is devoid of any organ, internal or external. Bliss ascribed to the state of libe­ration by the scriptures means, according to Bhik§u, simply negation of pains, and not positive bliss⁴. Neither can it be said that in the empirical state, the self is endowed with bliss. For the self, being eternal, unchangeable and transcendental, cannot be influenced by the joys and sorrows of the world. Pleasures and pains belong to the internal organ i.e. antah-karana or buddhi, but are super-imposed on the empirical self, as a result of which the latter seems to be endowed with these qualities. Actually, however, the self is not touched by them⁵.

The self is an active agent. If it were not free to act, the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions would be meaningless. In its essence, however, the self is passive ; it seems to be active only because of its conjunction with mahat, ahamkara etc. This conjunction, on its part, is caused by adfsta or the fruits of the past actions of the self. In reality, activity lies in buddhi but is attributed to the self through aviveka or indiscriminations. The self is not one, but many, since the Јruti declares,

,6(9

The Self in Indian Philosophy

"Many souls are born o_u* of the Supreme Person"⁷. The self is atomic, because the Sruti asserts that the self departs from a body at the time of death, and returns to its embodied exis­tence at the time of the next birth. If the self were all-perva­sive, it could not depart; nor could it return. Further, the Sruti says, "This atomic self should be known through the manas", "The self is to be known as the hundredth part of the hundredth part of a tip of hair" etc. The Vedic statement, "The Stman is neither gross nor minute" relates, according to Bhiks.u, to Brahman which is also called dtman. The atomic self resides in the heart and pervades the whole body through its quality of knowledge. Essentially, however, the self is all-pervading. It seems to be atomic in the empirical state because of its conjunction with the upadhis like mahat, ahamkdra etc. In liberation, the all-pervasive nature of the self is again revealed".

The Self and Brahman

The self emerges from Brahman, subsists in it and again merges into it. Brahman is the primary principle of pure cons­ciousness, and the individual self, which is also of the nature of pure consciousness, derives its existence from it. During pralaya, the self remains merged in Brahman as indistinguish­able from it. At the time of creation, it emanates from the bosom of Brahman, just as a spark emanates from tire. Thus, the self is the arhsa or part, and Brahman is the athsin or whole. Bgdarayana clearly says, The self is a part of Brahman, since it is described as many by the Sruti⁹. That the self is an am§a of Brahman means that the two entities are inseparable from each other like the sun and its rays. Like JIva Goswami, Bhiksu regards the self as the power or attribute of Brahman. And, as power or attribute may be regarded as a part of its substratum, the self also may be regarded as a part of Srahman.

The Self in VijtiUna Bhikju's Philosophy 6V

Now, as the whole and the part are both different and non-different from each other, Brahman and the self are also both different and non-different. Again, just as a powerful entily and its power, or a luminous body and its lustre, or a subs­tance and its attribute are both different and non-different, so Brahman and the self are both different and non-different¹⁰. In other words, though the self is different from Brahman, it has no separate or independent existence of its own. Of course, in the empirical state, the self, being veiled by nescience, cannot realise its non-difference from Brahman, When this nescience is destroyed by spiritual practices, the knowledge of non-difference is again manifested. Non-difference, for Bhiksu,. is not identity but non-separate-ness. It consists in having the same characteristics or manifested attributes, while difference consists in possessing different characteristics or manifested attributes. Thus, Brahman and the self are non-different, because they are essentially similar, both being formless, chan­geless and of the nature of self-manifest consciousness. Also, they are different, since they are endowed with different characteristics. Brahman is infinite and endowed with un­limited power, while the self is atomic and possessed of limited power ; Brahman is the controller, while the self is the con­trolled ; an'' Brahman is the substratum, while the self is its

attribute.

The ViWu-Purdria says, "Brahman is distinct from the entire universe comprising the material things and the indivi­dual selves, but nothing is distinct from it". Again, it says, "Its pure and tupreme abode, which lies beyond the selves bnd prakfti, is visioned by the liberated selves"¹¹. This means that Brahman and the self are not absolutely identical but are both identical and different. Further, Bhik§u holds that the significance of the Upanisads and the Brahman-sutra lies not in the absolute identity between Brahman and the self, but in their identity-cum-difference, since they are said to be related as whole and part. The Јruti says that the self, like prakrti,.

• i 1.1 iniiiiiii i hi

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The Self in Indian Philosophy

merges in Brahman, indicating thereby that Brahman and the self are non-different from each other. Badarayana also main­tains in the Brahma-sutra that Brahman and the self are non-different. Again, the Sruti says that Brahman is the lord of all and that it lies beyond the selves. Badarayana also says, "Brahman is greater than the selves, as the latter are asserted by the Sruti as different from Brahman". Brahman and the self are thus both identical and different¹².

It is asked : Brahman being partless, how can the self be regarded as its part ? To this, Bhikgu replies that, on the strength of the scriptures, Brahman must be regarded as posse­ssed of parts. The Sruti declares, "All creatures form one quarter of him",'The whole world is pervaded by his parts", and so on. The Bhagavad-Gltd. also says, "The selves are eternal parts of God". Badarayana, too, maintains that the self is a part of Brahman¹³. Bhiksu, therefore, asserts that the self is a part of Brahman and is non-different from it, just as the son is a part of his father and is non-different from him in the sense that throughout the whole span of life, the son remains related to his father through the relation of son-ship. Further, the self acquires consciousness from B ahman, just as a son acquires consciousness from his father¹⁴.

It is held by the opponents that if the self weie a part of Brahman, it would not be subject to misery, just as the ray of the sun cannot be cold. Bhik§u replies that though the self is a part of Brahman and is of the nature of pure conscious­ness, it is subjected to misery because of its contact with the psycho-physical organism, just as the ray of the sun coming in contact with the moon becomes cool, or just as water coming in contact with salt becomes saline¹⁵.

Bhik§u holds that, in reality, there is only one Supreme Self which is the whole, all the selves forming its parts. These parts or selves reflected in the adjuncts called buddhi are revea­led as the empirical selves. The Sruti says, "One Supreme Self exists in all creatures and looks like many reflections of the

The Self in Vijmna Bhikisu's Philosophy 63

moon in different vessels of water". Here it is notable thatBhikSu does not regard the self as a reflection of Brahman in buddhi, as some, Sankarites do. In his view, it is the conscious selves forming parts of Brahman that are reflected in the adjuncts called buddhi¹*.

According to the Avaccheda-vada or the Theory of Limita­tion held by some Advaitins, the self is nothing but Brahman limited by the upftdhi or adjunct called avidya or individual nescience or by its product called antah-karana or the internal organ. This theory holds that Brahman limited by mayd. or cosmic nescience is ISvara or God, while Brahman limited by avidyS or individual nescience or by the antab-karaQa is the

self.

Bhiksu refutes this view by the following arguments : 1. This theory holds that reality is only one, while the Sruti states that Brahman and the self are two realities. Accordingly, none of them is the limitation of the other. Thus, the ^ruti says, "Of the two beautiful birds residing in the same tree, one ( i. e. the self) eats sweet fruits, while the other ( i. e. Brahman ) merely looks on, without eating". The Theory of Limitation, therefore, goes against the Sruti¹'¹.

2. The view thatlSvara and the self are different only because of their vise$anas or qualifying adjuncts is not tenable. It may be asked whether the qualified being is distinct from the qual­ifying adjuncts or not. (a) If distinct, in the Sruti, 'Thatthou art', 'that' or qualified Brahman and 'thou' or the self cannot denote one reality i. e. unqualified Brahman, because these two terms—'that' and 'thou'—have got two different denotations. It is argued that, here, through laksaijd or implication, both the terms 'that' and 'thou' mean the common entity i. e. the unqualified transcendental pure consciousness. Bhik§u coun­ters that, in that case, it will not be possible for the self to ter­minate its nescience and the consequent false identification with the psycho-physical organism by hearing the monistic texts of the Sruti. That means, implication, being not the true meaning

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The Self in Indian Philosophy

of the passage, cannot bring forth true knowledge of the identity between Brahman and the self, with the result that nescience will remain undestroyed¹⁸. For Bhik§u, however, this passage can be explained in the primary sense of the terms. Thus, accor­ding to his interpretation, Brahman and the self, being related as whole-and-part, are identical, since the whole and the part are identical in their essence, (b) If the qualified being is said to be not distinct from the qualifying adjuncts, then one and the same Brahman will have to be regarded as confined by both the adjuncts, namely, mclyd and avidyft or antah-karana. This will force the idea that the same reality is both released and bound, omniscient and non-omniscient, and will, conse­quently nullify the difference between the bound and the released selves. This position will contradict the Sruti saying, "Those who know Brahman become immortal and others suffer misery"¹⁹. It may be argued that in the empirical level, difference caused by nescience amongst the selves should be accepted. But Bhik§u counters that in that case, it will be meaningless for the self to make an endeavour for the destruc­tion of nescience and also for the attainment of Brahma-know­ledge. For if nescience be devoid of ontological reality, knowledge arising from the destruction of such nescience will also have no ontological reality. None makes any effort for the attainment of an unreal thing. Moreover, if Brahman be not distinct from its adjuncts, and if it be the only reality, then the released self will be liable to further bondage. That means, even if the self is dissociated or released from one adjunct, it may again be associated with or bound by another adjunct, just as the space confined by a jar may again be confined by another jar after the destruction of the former one²⁰.

The Theory of Limitation cannot explain numerous passages of the scriptures. Thus, the passage "They engaged in medi­tation and trance and realized Brahman concealed by its gunas, which was their abode" shows that the selves existed even before creation and abided in Brahman. The passage "Isvara,

The Self in Vij^na Bhik^s Philosophy 65

entered into prakrti and the selves, and agitated them at the time of creation" also indicates that the selves existed before creation and were under the control of Brahman. The text "A taintless self attains supreme equality with Brahman" shows that after release also the self maintains its difference from Brahman and attains supreme equality with it²¹. The Theory of Limitation cannot explain these passages, since according to this view, the selves, being identical with Brahman before and after the association with the limiting adjuncts, cannot be said to be superintended by, or to be abiding in, Brahman.

According to some Sankarites, the self is a reflection of Brahman in avidyft or nescience. Bhiksu refutes this view by the following arguments :

1. Reflection being false, this theory cannot account for the bondage of some selves and the liberation of others²². 2. If this theory be accepted, at release the self will have to be regarded as destroyed along with the destruction of avidyft by Brahma-knowledge. For if the self be a reflection in avidyd, the destruction of the latter will entail the destruction of the former²³. 3. The ISruti "That thou art" asserts identity between Brahman and the self. But the self, being a reflection in avidyH, is unreal, while Brahman is real. Accor­dingly, the self cannot be said to be identical with Brahman, since no identity can be established between a real entity and an unreal? one'-²*. 4. According to this theory, difference between Brahman and the self is an illusion like the illusion of the double moon. But if their difference be thus illusory, the facts of bondage and liberation will remain unaccounted for. Bondage and liberation presuppose real difference between Brahman and the self. It is possible only for a real self, and not for a false reflection, to undergo bondage and attain libera­tion²⁵. 5. Nescience is regarded as the cause of bondage. If this nescience be an entity distinct from Brahman, then the Sruti which declares Brahman as the only reality will be con­tradicted. 6. It may be asked as to where this nescience be-

5

•The Self in Vijfiana BhikWs Philosophy

1.

1.

3.

4.

5.

6. 1.

9.

.10,

11.

112. 13.

,14.

15. 16,

.17

66 The Self in Indian Philosophy

longs. If nescience is said to abide in Brahman, it will go against such Vedic passages as, "Brahman is fearless and devoid of false knowledge" and others which deny the exis­tence of nescience in Brahman. Moreover, if Brahman be the locus of nescience, it will be ignorant or limited in knowledge, while the Sruti always asserts that the knowledge of Brahman knows no bound. Further, Brahman, being of the nature of self-luminous infinite knowledge, cannot be the substratum of nescience²⁶. If, again, it is said that the self is the locus of ignorance, and that Brahman is reflected in the self's ignorance, then it will involve the fallacy of mutual dependence. Thus, for proving the reality of the self, reference is made to the difference between the archetype or Brahman and the reflec­tion or the self caused by illusion. Again, for proving the illusion of the difference between the two, reference is made to the reality of the self³⁷. 7. The Theory of Reflection stands in direct opposition to the Sruti, the Smftis and the Brahma-sutra of Bgdargyana. All these texts regard the self as a part of Brahman, while a reflection of Brahman can never be regarded as a part thereof. Badargyana says, "The self is a part of Brahman, since the latter is asserted by the Sruti to be many". 8. In the aphorism "The self is a mere ctbhQsa", the term 'HbhQsa' does not mean 'reflection', as the i^ankarites hold, because, first, this term is never used in this sense, and, secondly, this meaning will contradict the other sutras which regard the self as a part of Brahman. It is more reasonable, Bhiksu says, to take the term 'dbhclsa' in the sense of 'self-luminous light of consciousness'²⁸.

Thus, Bhiksu concludes that the self cannot be regarded as a limitation of Brahman ; nor can it be considered as a re­flection thereof. For him, the self is a real part of Brahman, and is, therefore, both identical with and different from it.

61

REFERENCES

prakrti-purusa-sarhyoga isvarena kriyate—B8V, 1.2.

caitanyam ca atmano na gupah kirn tu dravya-vigesa eva, dharma-

dharmi-vibhfiga-iunyas cetana iti—BSV, 1.1.2 ; jnana-svarupa evatmii.

—ibid, 2.3.50.

naikasyananda-cid-rupatve virodhat iti sarhkhya-sutrokta-nyayac ca

-BSV, 1.1.2.

sukham sukha-duhkhatyayah—BSV, 1.1.2 ; atmatvasya'pi prema-pra-yojakatvat duhkha-nivrtti-rupatvad va bodhyam—ibid; etena moksasya sukha-rupatvam apastam—ibid ; duljkha-nivrttir-eva puru-

jarthah—ibid.

buddheh sukha-duhkhayoh. posaijarii buddher bhogalj—ayam eva

bhogas cetane pratibimbati—ibid, 1.1.2.

jivo buddhi-kartitvad eva upadhi-vasat karta, svatas tu paramartha-

tah akarta—ibid, 2.3.4 ; see also ibid, 1.3.37.

bahvih prajah. purusat samprasutah—- see ibid, 2.3.42-43.

svata anantyam aupadhika-paricchedapagama-matram—ibid,

2.3.29; paricchinna-vikara-vigame sati—vibhutvabhivyaktilj—ibid ;

see ibid, 2. 3. 19-29, 43.

ariiso nana vyapadesat — BS. 2. 3. 43.

jiva-brahmapor amsarhsi-bhava eva—BSF, 2. 3. 28 ; agni-sphulihga-

vat amsaiiiiy-abhedah—ibid, 2. 3. 26 ; tatha saktisaktimad-avibhago'-

pi nitya eva—ibid', jivaih saha brahma prakasa-tadasrayavad

abhinnam—ibid, amsamsinoj ca bhedabhedau vibhagavibhaga-rupepa

—ibid, I. 1.2.

parasya brahmapo rupam purusaft prakrtelj parah, pasyanti surayah

suddliam tad-vi§noh paramam radam—Vi&w-Pur5t}a, 1. 1. 15,16.

See BSV on 'adhikam tu bheda-nirdesat'—BS.

pado'sya sarva bhutani—Ch Up, 3. 12. 5 ; mamaivamso jiva-loke

jiva-bhutah saniitanah—BG, 15. 7 ; see 1 above.

•••pitus ca putra iti, sarve ca jlvah pitari putra-cetana iva—BSV,

1. 1. 2 ; cf. jiva-brahmanor amsarhfci-bhavas tayor abhedai ca piia-

putravad eva iti bhriva^— YV, 1.26.

yatha jyotilj-samanyasya ariTsatalj candra-mandala-sambandhat sai-

tyanujna—B5F, 2.3.48.

tattvatah eka evatma-'-ekah. paramatma amsarhsi-vibhagena upadhiju

pratibimbitah-.-jivah paramatmanah pratibima iti bhramo na

karyah...cetananam sva-svopadhau ptatibimbasyaiva labhat— ibid,

3.2.18.

avaccheda-vade'pi 'tayor-anyah pippalam svadv-atty-anasnannanyo'

'bhicakaslti' ityadi-vibhaganupapatten, dharmiijali ekatvat—ibid,

1. 1. 2.

68

The Self in Indian Philosophy

18.

bhavad-abhimatasya tat-tvamasy-adi-vakyarthasya akhandatvasya anupapatteh—ibid, 1.1.2 ; vakyarthayoh visist,ayofe> atiriktataya kevala-caitanye tatastha-lak§agapattau jlvasya dehady-abhimana-nivrtty-asambhavat—ibid, 1.1.2.

19.

ekasmin eva atmani avaccheda-bhedena bardha-mok§aisvaryadi-prasaktya—ibid, 1.1.2.

20.

muktasya punah bandbapattih"-yatha eka-ghatavacchinnakasasya tadgha(a-bhaiige api gh^taantarena punab. sambandhali bhavati — ibid.

21.

niranjanah paramarii samyam upaiti...mok$a-kale api bhedaghatitam samyarh sruyate—ibid.

24. 25. 26.

22. pratibimbasya tucchataya bandha-mok§anaucityat—ibid.

23. jnanena upadhi-viyoge jTva-nasa-prasangat—ibid. "' sad-asatoh abhedanupapattelj—ibid.

bandha-mok.janupapatti-tadavasthat—ibid.

brahmanab. bhraQtatve—brahmani ajnana-pratijedhasya virodhat— ibid.

27. bhramena bimba-pratibimba-bheda-siddhau jlva-siddhih, jlva-siddhau, ca tadasrayasya bhramasya siddhih—ibid.

28. pratibimba-vaJe amsa-sruti-smfti-sutragim virodhah syat—ibid',. abhasa-sabdah na pratibimba-vacT— kirn tu prakasavacl—ibid.

CHAPTER

11

THE SELF IN ^AJstKARA VEDANTA