#57 The First Phase of The II ww (1929-1940)

When N. Chamberlain addressed the House of Commons on September 2, 1939, it was widely anticipated that he would announce a British declaration of war upon Germany. His failure to declare war shocked Parliament. As a result, the remaining months of his premiership became known as the "Phoney War". It seemed possible that, if Britain avoided drawing German fire in the West, Hitler's success in Eastern Europe might bring whole affair to an end without the necessity for major conflict on her part. The leading appeasers continued to entertain such hopes for some time, but the effect was to undermine confidence in Chamberlain's capacity as a war leader. The country and the political parties were united about the justness of the war against fascism. The first indication of a breakdown of the interwar pattern of politics came with the refusal of the Labour and Liberal Parties to join Chamberlain in a coalition government. However, some steps were taken to put the government onto a war footing. New ministries appeared for Home Security, Economic Warfare, and Food and Shipping, and Winston Churchill accepted the prominent post of First Lord of the Admiralty. Yet the leading appeasers, Simon, Hoare and Halifax, remained in office. The situation was not unlike that faced by Asquith's 1914 administration, in which a peacetime system was marginally adapted for war. The first phase of the war (September 1939 — April 1940) was conducted in a half-hearted manner by Chamberlain. Within a matter of weeks Poland had surrendered to German invasion from the west and Russian advances from the east. Meanwhile neither the French army nor the British Bomber Command took the opportunity of German absorption in the east to seize the initiative. Four infantry divisions were dispatched to France, the Royal Navy began to apply a blockade, and the Royal Air Force scattered propaganda over the German mainland. By the beginning of 1940 the situation at home and abroad was beginning to deteriorate. The Gallup polls began to record a slide in the Prime Minister's popularity. Churchill alone generated an air of purposefulness, but as in the previous war, he showed an inclination for inventing wild military schemes. Chamberlain may well have calculated that he would discredit himself in this way. Such a prospect rapidly materialized as Churchill grew enthusiastic about sending troops to the Norwegian port of Narvik and mining Norwegian waters, with a view to checking German access to iron-ore supplies. This was both politically and militarily unrealistic, but eventually Churchill overcame his colleagues’ opposition to the idea. In the event the campaign was incompetently managed, and Hitler moved in quickly to overrun the country. Although large amounts of German shipping were destroyed, allied forces suffered heavy casualties and had been driven back from Norway by April. Although Churchill deserved to be blamed for this, it was Chamberlain who suffered.