
- •Deutsche Telekom Taps the Global Capital Market
- •Introduction
- •Figure 11.1
- •The Investor's Perspective: Portfolio Diversification
- •Information Technology
- •Deregulation
- •Figure 11.7
- •Global Capital Market Risks
- •The Eurocurrency Market
- •Genesis and Growth of the Market
- •Attractions of the Eurocurrency Market
- •Figure 11.8
- •Interest Rate Spreads in Domestic and Eurocurrency Markets
- •Drawbacks of the Eurocurrency Market
- •The Global Bond Market
- •Favorable Tax Status
- •The Global Equity Market
- •Foreign Exchange Risk and the Cost of Capital
- •Implications for Business
- •Case Discussion Questions
Chapter 11 Outline
Deutsche Telekom Taps the Global Capital Market
Introduction
Benefits of the Global Capital Market
The Functions of a Generic Capital Market
Attractions of the Global Capital Market
Growth of the Global Capital Market
Information Technology
Deregulation
Global Capital Market Risks
The Eurocurrency Market
Genesis and Growth of the Market
Attractions of the Eurocurrency Market
Drawbacks of the Eurocurrency Market
The Global Bond Market
Attractions of the Eurobond Market
The Global Equity Market
Foreign Exchange Risk and the Cost of Capital
Implications for Business
Chapter Summary
Critical Discussion Questions
The Search for Capitalin the Czech Republic
Notes
Deutsche Telekom Taps the Global Capital Market
Based in the world's third largest industrial economy, Deutsche Telekom is one of the world's largest telephone companies. Until late 1996, the company was wholly owned by the German government. However, in the mid-1990s, the German government formulated plans to privatize the utility, selling shares to the public. The privatization effort was driven by two factors: (1) a realization that state-owned enterprises tend to be inherently inefficient, and (2) the impending deregulation of the European Union telecommunications industry in 1998, which promised to expose Deutsche Telekom to foreign competition for the first time. Deutsche Telekom realized that, to become more competitive, it needed massive investments in new telecommunications infrastructure, including fiber optics and wireless, lest it start losing share in its home market to more efficient competitors such as AT&T and British Telecom after 1998. Financing such investments from state sources would have been difficult even under the best of circumstances and almost impossible in the late 1990s, when the German government was trying to limit its budget deficit to meet the criteria for membership in the European monetary union. With the active encouragement of the government, Deutsche Telekom hoped to finance its investments in capital equipment through the sale of shares to the public.
From a financial perspective, the privatization looked anything but easy. In 1996, Deutsche Telekom was valued at about $60 billion. If it maintained this valuation as a private company, it would dwarf all others listed on the German stock market. However, many analysts doubted there was anything close to $60 billion available in Germany for investment in Deutsche Telekom stock. One problem was that there was no tradition of retail stock investing in Germany. In 1996, only 1 in 20 German citizens owned shares, compared with 1 in every 4 or 5 in the United States and Britain. This lack of retail interest in stock ownership makes for a relatively illiquid stock market. Nor did banks, the traditional investors in company stocks in Germany, seem enthused about underwriting such a massive privatization effort. A further problem was that a wave of privatizations was already sweeping through Germany and the rest of Europe, so Deutsche Telekom would have to compete with many other state-owned enterprises for investors' attention. Given these factors, probably the only way that Deutsche Telekom could raise $60 billion through the German capital market would have been by promising investors a dividend yield that would raise the company's cost of capital above levels that could be serviced profitably.
Deutsche Telekom managers concluded they had to privatize the company in stages and sell a substantial portion of Deutsche Telekom stock to foreign investors. The company's plans called for an initial public offering (IPO) of 713 million shares of Deutsche Telekom stock, representing 25 percent of the company's total value, for about $18.50 per share. With a total projected value in excess of $13 billion, even this "limited" sale of Deutsche Telekom represented the largest IPO in European history and the second largest in the world after the 1987 sale of shares in Japan's telephone monopoly, NTT, for $15.6 billion. Concluding there was no way the German capital market could absorb even this partial sale of Deutsche Telekom equity, the managers of the company decided to simultaneously list shares and offer them for sale in Frankfurt (where the German stock exchange is located), London, New York, and Tokyo, attracting investors from all over the world. The IPO was successfully executed in November 1996 and raised $13.3 billion for the company.
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Source: J. O. Jackson, "The Selling of the Big Pink," Time, December 2, 1996, p. 46; S. Ascarelli, "Privatization Is Worrying Deutsche Telekom," The Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1995, p. A1; "Plunging into Foreign Markets, The Economist, September 17, 1994, pp. 86 - 87; and A. Raghavan and M. R. Sesit, "Financing Boom: Foreign Firms Raise More and More Money in the U.S. Market," The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 1993, p. A1.