Тема VI.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA: TOWARDS A COMMON STRATEGY?

Institutional theory learns that institutions have a rather large capability to adopt themselves to changing conditions in their internal organization or in their external relations. This was obviously the case for the European Union, an institution which in its move towards further integration successfully managed to combine divergent expectancies of its member states with the need to develop a common policy. The history of the European Union shows that in EU internal policy matters, it was always possible to find a compromise between interests of the member states and the need to come to a joint decision. The so-called communitarian method was a success in EU internal decision making.

Confronted with the need to streamline its foreign policy, the European Union sought inspiration in its domestic decision making procedures. The idea was to apply the above mentioned successful method of seeking compromises between member states to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Common strategies of the European Council were conceived to add a strategic dimension to the common foreign policy of the European Union, which had hitherto been lacking. This was indeed the way in which the common strategy towards Russia came into being.

Development of EU Foreign Policy Making

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Union sought for an answer to the challenge of the establishing new relations with its neighbors. The European Union could hardly follow the growing ambitions of its new post-communist partners on the European continent. Bilateral treaties, such as the Trade and Cooperation Agreements soon appeared not to answer the ambitions of the post-communist countries. In this sense the story of the relation between the European Union and the post-communist countries reflects the story of European integration. Ambitions to reach a sustainable foreign policy can be found in the original treaties in the fact that important powers were conferred to the community in the field of development cooperation and foreign trade. Early attempts to come to a common European political cooperation , such as the European Defense Community, the European Political Community in 1954 and the Fouchet plan in 1961 failed. In 1970 European Political Cooperation came into being as a rather procedural cooperation link, which found its legal consolidation in the Single European Act of 1986. Notwithstanding the tension between national interests and common interest, which was so typical for the intergovernmental character of early cooperation, consultations on all levels in the framework of European Political Cooperation "created the feeling of a diplomatic club, where contradictions of the intergovernmental procedure faded".

However, in its foreign policy towards a disintegrated post-Cold War Central and Eastern Europe, the European Union soon had to admit its weakness. The European initiatives in the former Yugoslavia failed. The strengthening of the European Political Cooperation by the Single European Act did not seem to be sufficient. The treaties of Maastricht (1991) and Amsterdam (1996) had to overcome this problem by introducing new procedures, which, be it partially, introduced decision-making based on qualified majority voting. The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 was intended to correct the failures of Maastricht, but again failed to bring real solutions to an increasing problem. The Union's external relations were divided between the Union's predominantly intergovernmental second pillar, in which decision making by unanimous agreement prevailed and where the difficulties inherent to a union of fifteen states, most of them jealous of their sovereignty, remained, and first, the community pillar, where qualified majority voting normally applies and where the commission has a key role. It became clear that it would be absurd to divorce European foreign policy from the institutions which have been given responsibility for most of the instruments for its accomplishment: for external trade questions, including sanctions; for European external assistance; for many of the external aspects of Justice and Home affairs. The Amsterdam Treaty came up with an institutional answer: it introduced a secretariat and a secretary general as new institutions and three new instruments: common strategies, common actions and common positions. These new instruments, which qualified majority voting in the second pillar, had to induce a pro-active and strategic policy.

Common Strategies

The Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union of 1997 introduced the common strategy as a new instrument for European foreign policy, more in particular for European Common Foreign and Security Policy. The common strategy was initially perceived by the scientific world as a remarkable and ingenious tool, in that it is both part of the EU' s external relations and internal institutional innovation. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam indeed explains that the drafting process of the common strategy is based on a common denominator, derived from the national interests of the member states :" The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have important interests in common. Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and means to be made available by the Union and the member states. The Council shall recommend common strategies and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions". In this way the common strategy, as a technique, represented an innovation in EU external institution building, aiming at a delicate balance between intergovernmentalism and federal ambitions in the second pillar. The idea was to decouple broad strategic decisions based on unanimity from smaller tactical steps, approved by qualified majority voting. Common Strategies were perceived as agreements between the member states and the European Council, which are meant to streamline the Union's CFSP mechanisms, to integrate the activities of the individual member states and to introduce qualified majority voting in the Council. This is why the procedure of drafting a common strategy was called the "Christmas tree method": the Council defines the general lines and afterwards each individual country can hang some "ornaments" expressing its own national interests (for example cooperation in the field of trade, ecological protection, high technology).

At the Vienna Summit in 1998 the European Council decided to devise common strategies on Russia, Ukraine, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans, geographically speaking, "the borderlands of the European Union", a kind of "Near Abroad" for the enlarged European Union. The Common Strategy on Russia was adopted first in June 1999; the Common Strategy on Ukraine followed some six months later on 11 December 1999. Both were adopted for a period of four years and soon have to be revised. The Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region is the third strategy of its kind and was adopted on 19 June 2000. These common strategies suffer from similar general problems, but we will concentrate in our paper on the common strategy on Russia and its effects and implications for international relations and geopolitics.

The first EU common strategy was aimed at the Russian Federation. By doing, the member states did express their intention to come to a strategic partnership with the most important continental partner of the Union. Previously, the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1994 was presented as the keystone of a new strategic approach of the European Union towards Russia.

However, with the outbreak of the first Chechen War, it became clear that European Common Foreign and Security Policy did not dispose of enough instruments to influence Russia. The Common Strategy towards Russia was presented as complementary to the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty, certainly not replacing the latter. In this way the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty and the Common Strategy remain until now the most important building blocks of the relation between the Union and Russia. This relation is intrinsically bound with developments within the second pillar of the European construction.

Critical Observations

The initial optimism with the common strategy was bound to fade, it was soon replaced by critical observations: the individual member states were not in favour to leave the consensus rule, the common strategies reiterated the words of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, they did not add much to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, and thus could not be called strategic. One of the most important – down to earth – reasons for these flaws is that no additional budget was provided for implementing the common strategy. Moreover, several individual member states appeared not be willing to accept qualified majority voting in the implementation of foreign policy strategies. The common strategy one-sided, it was told, more a tactical instrument for compromise between the member states than a strategic for foreign policy.

This uneasiness about the Common the Common Strategic of the Council became in particular clear when, in the autumn of 2000 the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, asked by the General Affairs Council, submitted an evaluation report on the operation and possible improvement of the existing common strategies. Solana was rather straight in his criticism identifying the gap between poor effectiveness on the other hand. The common strategies, according to Solana, had not yet contributed to a stronger and more effective European Union in international affairs.

The report criticizes the limited value of the Common Strategy as an internal working tool, in particular in sensitive crisis situations, and the uncertainty as to how the common strategies relate to the already existing instruments, most notably the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. The Prospect of qualified majority voting decisions was singled out a reason for making member states more reluctant to engage with the common strategies. The presidencies' work plans were referred to by Solana as "routine exercises" and "inventories of existing policies and activities".

Solana's report asks for the common strategies to be turned into primarily internal EU policy documents, to be more selective in scope and contain "verifiable objectives" against which progress can be measured and on the basis of which member states could promote the common strategies in other international institutions. The common strategy is essentially meant to be intergovernmental framework by means of which individual member states are reasserting their say in EU foreign policy, Mr. Solana underscored.

Afterwards, the European Parliament expressed its support for both the common strategies and Solana's conclusions about the need to make the documents more credible and ensure means for their implementation.

Perhaps Solana's criticism was even not far reaching enough, as a more fundamental question remains open: how "common" and how "strategic" is a common strategy of the European Council anyhow? The commonality of the strategy, if there is any, only resides in the fact the EU internally tries to seek a solution for divided approaches within its own organization. A common strategy does not rely on a consensus between partners, on the contrary. Common strategies are unilaterally conceived by the European Union without participation or advice of the target country. Russia was not involved in the redaction and negotiation of the common strategy. Moreover, there is not much strategic in the common strategy: instead of becoming a policy blueprint, the common strategy tends to become a policy substitute: the gap between the wording of the document and real politics became a symptom of the deficit of common foreign policy within EU internal policy making. One can conclude that this strategy is mistakenly called a "common strategy". The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation does not even mention the EU Common Strategy towards Russia.

At the end, the crucial question becomes whether his unilateral behaving by the European Union towards third countries was harmful for the aim of establishing balanced relations on the European continent?

Russia's Answer

A few months after the adoption of EU's common strategy towards Russia, Russia came with its own medium-term strategy towards the European Union. Although generally accepting the wording of EU's common strategy, Russia presented itself as an indignant partner, claiming to be taken seriously as the main trade partner with the European Union and as the most important and leading member state of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this way one can talk about a two-headed foreign policy profile, formulated by Russia towards the European Union. On the one hand Russia accepted the conditionality formulated by the European Union, but on the other hand it presented itself as claiming a leading role within the CIS and asking the European Union to sustain his role and not to interfere by establishing bilateral relations with the New Independent States of the CIS.

It is often forgotten that Russia formulated its own strategy towards the New Independent States of the CIS as early as 1995, be in the form of a presidential decree. In this decree Russia constructs, institutionalizes and legitimizes its geopolitical influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

This approach can be qualified as specific for Russia. Ukraine's docility in this field for example strongly constructs with the ambivalent attitude of Russia. The reaction of Ukraine to the EU common strategy towards its own country did not show that two-layered structure (on the one hand accepting conditionality, on the other imposing its own strategy, as Russia did). Ukraine was well prepared to answer in an enthusiastic way to the EU common strategy. In a decree "On the Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the European Union" of 11 June 1998, following the ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Treaty, President Kuchma singled out EU membership as Ukraine's strategic goal, and associate membership as a mid-term foreign policy objective. But the European Union appeared to be a cool lover, becoming tired of all this activity and adding only a few of Ukraine's detailed suggestions to the "wish list".

Notes:

geopolitics – the study of how politics is affected by geographical factors;

hitherto – до сих пор;

notwithstanding (preposition) – не смотря на;

notwithstanding (adverb) – все-таки;

notwithstanding that...( conjunction ) – не смотря на, что... ;

keystone (fig.) – краеугольный камень.

Active Vocabulary:

ambivalent – двойственный;

coherent – связный, логически последовательный; членораздельный;

coherent argument – логичный / последовательный довод;

coherent policy – последовательная внешняя политика;

coherent reasoning – логически последовательное обоснование / доказательство;

contradiction – 1. опровержение; 2. противоречие, расхождение, несоответствие;

a contradiction in terms – логическое противоречие;

in contradiction with – в противоречии с;

official contradiction of the rumors – официальное опровержение слухов;

communality – общность, совпадение точек зрения;

compromise – компромисс, соглашение сторон;

to agree to compromise – пойти на компромисс;

quest for a compromise – поиск компромисса;

to reach, to strike a compromise – прийти к компромиссу;

credible – заслуживающий доверия, авторитетный;

to confer – 1. присваивать, присуждать, даровать; 2. совещаться, вести переговоры;

to confer a right (upon somebody) – предоставлять право кому-либо;

to confer a diplomatic rank(upon somebody) – присваивать дипломатический ранг кому-либо;

to confer a title (upon somebody) – даровать, жаловать титул кому-то4

to confer honorific titles – присваивать почетные звания;

to confer military ranks – присваивать воинские звания;

to confer responsibility (upon somebody) – возлагать на кого-то ответственность, делать кого-либо ответственным;

denominator – знаменатель;

to reduce to a common denominator – привести к общему знаменателю;

to devise – придумывать, изобретать, разрабатывать;

to devise a plan – разрабатывать план;

geopolitical – геополитический;

interest – интерес, заинтересованность; обыкновенно мн.ч. pl практическая заинтересованность, выгода, польза; важность, значение;

conflict/confrontation of interest (s) – столкновение интересов;

identity of interests – тождество интересов;

to provoke interest – вызывать интерес;

to defend one's interests – защищать свои интересы;

to conflict with interests – противоречить интересам;

to enhance one's interests – усиливать заинтересованность;

to mask one's interests – скрывать свои интересы4

to go against somebody's interests – идти вразрез с чьими-либо интересами;

to jeopardize the (supreme) interests of the country – поставить под угрозу (высшие) интересы страны;

flaw – недостаток, изъян, упущение, ошибка;

to reside in (to inhere, to be vested) – принадлежать, быть присущим;

supreme authority resides in the President – президент облечен высшей властью;

sustained – устойчивый, длительный, непрерывный (об экономическом росте).

Exercise 1. Give Russian equivalents of the following word combinations from the text:

to develop a common policy, the gap between the wording of the document and real politics, to leave the consensus rule, to accept qualified majority voting in the implementation of foreign policy strategies, the initial optimism with the common strategy was bound to fade, to seek a solution for divided approaches, to make the documents more credible and ensure means for their implementation, to overcome the problem by introducing new procedures, to seek for an answer to the challenge of the establishing new relations, to be confronted with the need to streamline the foreign policy, to find a compromise between interests of the member states, to combine divergent expectancies, to add a strategic dimension to the common foreign policy, to be derived from the national interests, to detect a flaw in one's argument, to enhance a reputation,

Exercise 2. Give Russian equivalents of the following to go with the words, make up sentences of your own with some collocations:

compromise

1. to agree on/to, to aim at, to come to, to effect, to negotiate, to patch up *, to reach, to reject, to seek, to work out

2. compromise failed, worked

3. acceptable, definite, early, fair, good, potential, reasonable, (un)satisfactory, shaky, tacit *,uneasy, working

to patch up * – (fig.) мирить, примирять

tacit *– молчаливое, подразумеваемое

interest

1. to arouse, to awake, to catch, to develop ~ in..., to express, to feel, to feign *, to focus, to foster, to have, to keep up, to lose, to neglect, to profess, to raise, to retain, to revive, to show, to stimulate, to sustain, to take, to whip up

2. ~ declined, dwindled * , flagged *, focused on sth, grew, peaked *, picked up, waned*

3. abiding, absorbing, academic, active, brief, burning, close, common, compelling* , considerable, consuming, deep, detached, enduring, exceptional, fading, fleeting *, general, great, intense, human, intensive, keen, marked, mounting, natural, obsessive, passing, persistent, personal, profound, renewed, scientific, serious, slight, strong, sustained, tremendous, universal, wide-ranging, world-wide

4. flicker of *, flurry of, * lack of, surge of ~

to dwindle * – уменьшаться, сокращаться;

to flag * – ( to grow weary) ослабевать;

to feign * – (to invent) придумать, придумывать, изобретать;

to wane * – ослабевать, убывать, идти на убыль, падать; to be on the wane (fig.)- быть на исходе , убывать;

to peak * – достичь предела; demand peaked спрос достиг высшей точки;

to pick up – (to resume) оживляться, возобновляться; trade is picking up торговля оживляется;

flicker – проблеск; flicker of hope* проблеск надежды; flicker of interest – слабое проявление заинтересованности;

flurry – шквал, суматоха; flurry of interest* – всплеск заинтересованности;

surge – подъем.

contradiction

1. to be aware of , to acknowledge, to do away with *, to eliminate, to explain, to get round *, to ignore, to lessen *, to notice, to perceive, to resolve, to see, to solve, to take into account, to take account of

2. contradiction is embodied in sth, was evident, has become less marked, came about, emerged, existed

3. apparent, basic, clear, definite, direct, distinct, glaring, inherent, intrinsic, lasting, logical, marked, obvious, plain

4. contradictions in terms, mass of contradictions

to do away with* – покончить c;

to get round* – we got round this difficulty (contradiction) нам удалось преодолеть эту трудность; преодолеть противоречие (расхождение);

to lessen* – уменьшать, приуменьшить;

to come about* – (to happen) происходить, возникнуть.

Exercise 3. Give English equivalents of the following collocations with the words compromise, interest, contradiction

пойти на компромисс, поиск компромисса, прийти к компромиссу, сферы интересов, баланс интересов, в интересах рабочего класса, скрывать свои интересы, отвечать чьим-то интересам, пренебрегать чьими-либо интересами, представлять чьими-либо интересы, столкнулись интересы двух стран, государственные интересы, интересы безопасности, долговременные интересы, защита интересов страны, преодолеть противоречие, нам удалось преодолеть противоречие, логическое противоречие, в противоречии с, официальное опровержение слухов, всплеск заинтересованности, возникло противоречие в сфере экономических интересов двух стран, торговля оживляется, слабое проявление заинтересованности, противоречить интересам, усиливать заинтересованность, скрывать свои интересы, идти вразрез с чьими-либо интересами, поставить под угрозу (высшие) интересы страны, внутренние противоречия

Exercise 4. Study the following information and translate what follows:

Слово One в качестве местоимения может выполнять функцию подлежащего неопределенно-личного предложения. На русский язык One переводится тем существительным, которое оно заменяет, либо совсем не переводится, если смысл предложения ясен.

One can conclude that this strategy is mistakenly called a "common strategy".

Можно сделать заключение, что эта стратегия ошибочно названа "общей стратегией".

Translate what follows:

1. One can easily notice a sustained growth of the economies and consumption in every CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States) state.

2. In this way one can talk about a two-headed foreign policy profile, formulated by Russia towards the European Union.

3. One can strongly doubt whether it is possible to develop sustainable commonality without mobilizing human and financial resources to establish the framework for a better market economy.

4. One can recognize that the monetary policy of the European Union in the euro zone has also been tighter than in America.

5. Besides, one cannot deny that EU enlargement creates a situation of opposed interests between the European Union on the one hand, claiming the closing of its external borders in the framework of Schengen regulations, and Russia on the other hand, claiming a free trade zone in the real sense of the word, implying permeability of the borders.

6. The European Union, as one might say, needs its own strategy, it has to define its own strategic partnership with Russia, emancipation from US geopolitical dependency is Europe' s in interest.

7. One can ask the question whether the European Union and Russia can evolve in their relation towards a real common strategy: a relation that deserves the qualification of "common" and "strategic"?

8. As one can see the stretched concept of strategic partnership is included in the texts of EU common strategies as "based on shared values and common interests, as a vital factor enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe".

Exercise 5. Match the columns of synonyms or synonymous explanations:

1. to enhance

2. to criticize

3. to conceive

4. to confront with

5. to confer

6. to perceive

7. to reiterate

8. to draft

9. to streamline

10. to prevail

1. to predominate, to preponderate, to triumph

2. to increase or improve further the good quality, value, status of something or somebody

3. to frame, to formulate, to visualize, to work out

4. to become aware of, to make out, to discover, to identify

5. to draw up, to outline, to plan, to sketch out

6. to face up, to oppose, to defy, to stand up to, to withstand

7. to analyze and find fault with, to disapprove of, to blame

8. to award, to bestow, to grant, to honor with, to invest

9. to make a system or organization more efficient and effective by using faster and simpler working methods

10. to repeat something that has already been said for emphasis

Exercise 6. Paraphrase or explain the meaning of the word combinations taken from the text:

1. to become a policy blueprint

2. the outbreak of war

3. to be based on a common dominator

4. the community pillar

5. the keystone of a new strategic approach

6. the commonality of the strategy

7. to become a policy substitute

8. to introduce qualified majority voting

9. the difficulties inherent to a union of fifteen states

10. to set out some objectives

11. to institutionalize and legitimize geopolitical influence on the territory

Exercise 7. Supply attributes for the following nouns and give a back translation of the word combinations:

question, strategy, policy, concept, relations, continent, support, implementation, criticism, solution, blueprint, decision, framework, role, approach, affairs, tool, crisis, denominator, alternative, structure, objectives, pillar, difficulties

Exercise 8. Word families and word stress. Look back at the text and complete the grid with the missing words from these families and mark each of the words to show the word stress, give the Russian equivalent to each line.

Pattern: depress – depression -depressing

verb noun adjective

apply

prevent – -

institutionalize

legitimize

dispose

recommend

reiterate

implement

confront

streamline

organize

perceive

conclude

innovate

draft

enlarge

revise

expect

compromise

sustain

consolidate

qualify

include

substitute

select

identify

Exercise 9. Mark the word stress on these nouns. What is the adjective formed from each of the nouns? Is the word stress in the same place in the adjective? Use a dictionary if necessary:

noun adjective

1. theory

2. capability

3. condition

4. strategy

5. divergence

6. method

7. application

8. defense

9. procedure

10. consultation

11. character

12. disintegration

13. government

14. problem

15. ambivalence

Exercise 10. Prepare some detailed reports on the topics keeping close to the text. Use some introductory sentences below:

I should like to emphasize/point out – Мне хотелось отметить (подчеркнуть), что

I think, suppose, presume that… – Я думаю, что…

I must say that… – Надо сказать, что…

I have every good reason to believe… – У меня есть (все) основания считать, что…

In my opinion, as to me, as for me, to my mind… – По-моему…

I hold (am of) the same opinion… – Я придерживаюсь, того же мнения

I could comment on the question… – Я мог бы прокомментировать этот вопрос

I’m particularly interested in this problem – Меня особенно интересует этот вопрос

Will you allow me to take the floor, please – Разрешите мне выступить(взять слово)

I would like to clarify my point of view on… – Я хотел бы разъяснить мою точку зрения по…

1. Development of EU Foreign Policy Making.

2. Critical observations.

3. Russia’s strategy.

4. Development of EU Foreign Policy Making.

5. Common strategies.

6. The need to develop a common policy.