A conclusion

These arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that the Steering Rules become operative only when vessels are in sight of one another; the measure of safety which they promote in the visual case is absent when radar is the sole indication of the presence of another ship. It would be unreasonable, for example, for a ship in fog with efficient radar, competently used, finding that the echo of another vessel at 15 miles range on the port bow is steady, to consider herself bound to maintain her course and speed, with the potential danger of the sit­uation increasing minute by minute, until the second paragraph of Article 16 comes into play.

A master, who in the above case, has considered himself bound by Article 21 to maintain his course and speed, may find himself on the horns of a dilemma. The other ship may have closed to 5 miles range and show no signs of altering course. Seamanlike caution will suggest a reduction of speed, but under Article 21 he must maintain it until Article 27 can be held to apply. But if he stops at the moment when the other ship (who may have radar after all) decides to alter course to pass under his stern, the danger of collision may be greatly increased.

There can be no real doubt that to attempt to follow the rules for mutual action without the assurance of mutual compliance is to in­vite disaster and the conclusion must be reached that, while all ves­sels, whether fitted with radar or not, are subject to the Steering Rules, those rules come into operation only when vessels are in sight of one another.

There is on record in the United States a collision in fog between a vessel fitted with but not using radar and one not so fitted. The judgement in the case included these words "...the offending ship could have informed herself of the presence and track of the ship in abundant time to have avoided by a wide margin and danger what­ever of striking her." It will be seen that this contains a court opinion not only on the responsibility for using radar if it is available but also on the use to which it should be put.

In view of the above a final emphasis on the inability of radar and radar plotting alterations of course quickly to notice will, there­fore, not be out of place. It is seamanlike in clear weather to make avoiding action early and bold; when placing reliance on radar the importance of this is greatly accentuated.

Radar brings responsibility

The advantages which may be derived from the use of radar as an aid to avoiding collision have been discussed in some detail. In this sphere as in all others, however, privilege brings with it respon­sibility and it may be useful to conclude the chapter in this note. If the ship which possesses radar maintains it in a state of high effi­ciency, operates it competently, and deals intelligently with the in­formation made available there is no doubt that she can make a sub­stantial contribution to safety at sea. One court in the United States has ruled that it is duty of possessors of radar to use it in circum­stances in which this advantage can be derived. There seems little doubt that this view will be upheld by others. An Admiralty Court has pointed out in effect that the use of radar must be intelligent if it is to excuse action which would be condemned in its absence

From these two comments the generalization may be permitted that a ship to whose equipment radar is added is given at the same time a considerable additional responsibility, which she will be un­able to discharge unless:

1. The set is kept in a high state of operational efficiency.

2. It is used in all appropriate circumstances.

(3) The responsible officers are thoroughly conversant with its technical operation, its capabilities and limitations and the methods of dealing with the information obtained from it.

The further responsibility for taking avoiding action which hasbeen implied by a United States court judgement is a very serious, and it may be concluded that confirmation of this attitude by other courts is desirable. One thing is quite certain -— it would be most unwise to attempt avoiding action on radar information alone unless it is certain that all the responsibilities which have been mentioned here have been discharged.

This book does not attempt to suggest what specific action would be best in particular circumstances. Whatever action may be taken will carry its own load of responsibility, but there can be little doubt that the greatest measure of safety will be in:

Taking it early;

Making it bold;

Observing closely and continuously its effect by keeping a plot.

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