англ тэк

parative fiscal analyses to ensure their royalty regimes will be competitive in attracting investment.

The northern and east coast Canadian projects are not competitive with other opportunities around the world primarily because of the high costs and long lead time characteristic of these frontier projects. The conventional Alberta pool is very attractive, however, its small size (1 MMBBLs) is a major drawback from the perspective of the reserve replacement needs of investors.

The impact of the Russian fiscal system is very negative because the combined local, regional and federal taxes and royalties are so high and not sensitive to profit that the economic aspects of the project are driven to very uncompetitive levels. If Russia wants to attract foreign investment it must compete, like Canada, for limited mobile capital against other oil-producing countries. The Russian federal and regional government fiscal systems must be competitive with standard world taxation levels and practices.

If we compare the government's share of the revenue (its «take») over the life of the same project in Russia and in Canada under a high, medium and low export oil price scenario and the corresponding rates of return to the investors, we immediately notice how much more burdensome the Russian government take is in the initial years of a project since so many taxes are not tied to profit. At lower export oil prices, this initial burden is even more pronounced. Both the timing and the level of government take affect the economic aspects of capital-intensive projects and a country's ability to compete with other countries in attracting investment. If Russia wants to attract foreign investment, both its federal and regional governments must formulate more attractive, profit sensitive, and stable fiscal terms to be able to compete with other oil producing countries given the limited pool of capital. Comparative fiscal analysis must be done to assess the impact of fiscal systems on potential projects and assess whether the terms are competitive with other alternatives around the world taking into account geological, geographic and political risks.

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12. Прочтите текст и изложите его содержание поанглийски.

Конкурентоспособность.

Суммы, потраченные канадскими компаниями на инвестиции в нефтедобычу за рубежом, резко возросли за последние 5 лет — с 7-8 процентов от общей суммы всех капитальных затрат в 1989-91 годах до 12 процентов в 1993 году (что составило порядка 1,3 миллиарда долларов). Этому способствовало открытие доступа к разработке природных ресурсов в таких регионах, как Россия, СНГ, Латинская Америка, Африка и Азия. Открывшиеся для капиталовложений возможности значительно превосходят возможности по наличному капиталу, тем более, что бюджеты нефтедобывающих компаний значительно похудели в последнее время из-за общего экономического спада и периода низких цен на нефть.

В связи с усилившимся оттоком канадского нефтяного капитала за рубеж, Министерство Природных Ресурсов Канады недавно провело исследование по сравнительному анализу конкурентоспособности канадской системы налогообложения на мировом рынке финансовых инвестиций. В ходе проведения исследования было проанализировано, препятствует ли существующая система налогообложения инвестированию и каким образом её можно было бы усовершенствовать с тем, чтобы повысить её конкурентоспособность и вернуть поток инвестиций

вКанаду. Правительства провинций также не остаются безучастными к этому международному аспекту налогового режима: Альберта недавно объявила о новой категории нефти — «третичной нефти» (открытой после сентября 1992 года) — и о снижении ставки роялти на такую нефть с одновременным установлением постоянно действующих «каникул на роялти» сроком на 1 год. Правительства Новоскотии и Ньюфаундленда

внастоящее время заняты разработкой своих режимов взимания роялти и также проводят международный сравнительный анализ с тем, чтобы обеспечить их конкурентоспособность и привлекательность для инвестиций.

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Проекты, реализуемые на северном и восточном побережье Канады, не конкурентоспособны в связи, в основном, с высокими затратами и длительным подготовительным этапом, который должен предшествовать освоению. Запасы нефти Альберты очень привлекательны для инвесторов, однако их сравнительно небольшие объёмы (порядка 1 млн. баррелей) представляют собой важный недостаток, поскольку ограничивают маневр инвесторов.

Налоговый режим России представляется отрицательным, поскольку в сумме местные, федеральные и региональные налоги столь велики и не ориентированы на прибыльность, что экономические аспекты российских проектов делают их непривлекательными и неконкурентоспособными. Если Россия стремится привлечь международные капиталовложения, она должна, как Канада, бороться за имеющиеся в наличии ограниченные инвестиции. Федеральная и местные системы налогообложения в России должны быть конкурентоспособными и соответствовать принятым во всём мире практике, стандартам и ставкам налогообложения.

Если провести сравнение между объёмами налогов в России и Канаде, взимаемых на протяжении периода реализации типового проекта в условиях высоких, средних и низких цен на нефть и соответствующих норм прибыльности инвестиций, то становится очевидно, насколько более обременительны российские налоги, особенно на начальном этапе, поскольку большинство налогов не привязаны к рентабельности. При более низких экспортных ценах налоговое бремя становится ещё более ощутимым. Как график взимания налогов, так и их масштабы отрицательно сказываются на экономической стороне наиболее инвестоёмких проектов и на неспособности России конкурировать с другими странами в плане инвестиционной привлекательности. Если Россия заинтересована в привлечении иностранных инвестиций, то федеральное и региональные правительства должны выработать более привлекательные, ориентированные на рентабельность и стабильные условия налогообложения, позволяющие России конкурировать с другими нефтедобывающими странами в борьбе за ограниченные сво-

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бодные капиталы. Следует провести сравнительный анализ системы налогообложения и определить её влияние на потенциальные проекты, насколько она способна выдержать конкуренцию с налоговыми системами других стран с учётом геологического, географического и политических рисков.

13. Используя материалы урока, поясните своему англоговорящему коллеге, в чём заключаются основные различия между канадской и российской системами налогообложения в нефтегазовом секторе.

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Урок 3

OVERVIEW OF CA>ADIA> FEDERAL

EXPLORATIO> I>CE>TIVES

ФЕДЕРАЛЬНАЯ СИСТЕМА НАЛОГОВЫХ СКИДОК, ПРЕДНАЗНАЧЕННЫХ ДЛЯ СТИМУЛИРОВАНИЯ РАЗВЕДКИ НА НЕФТЬ И ГАЗ

1. Прочтите английский и русский тексты. Проанализируйте, сумел ли переводчик передать смысл английского оригинала.

OVERVIEW OF CA>ADIA> FEDERAL

EXPLORATIO> I>CE>TIVES

A. Introduction

In response to the energy crisis years of the 1970s, years which were characterised by a rapid increase in world energy prices, the Canadian federal government introduced the National Energy Program (NEP) the goals of which were: 1) to promote security of supply by stimulating frontier exploration, 2) to increase the Canadian ownership of energy resources, and 3) to redistribute petroleum revenues more equitably across Canada. A complex system of producer taxes and exploration grants and credits was introduced. Its impact on federal government revenues and expenses is discussed below.

This interventionist program was predicated on the high oil prices and the forecast continued increase in oil prices. Thus, in 1986, when oil prices collapsed, the NEP became unsustainable; it was not self-financing and it squeezed producers with heavy taxes and raised regional-federal tensions. It was dismantled in 1987 due to budget constraints and the uncompetitive nature of investment in Canada's frontier at the lower world oil prices. Most incentives supporting or stimulating petroleum exploration activity were phased out by 1990. The current federal fiscal system includes only one

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royalty credit directly aimed at frontier exploration. The other current incentives are more general in nature and are targeted at poorer regions of Canada and at research and development, energy efficiency and environmentally friendly activities.

A more market-oriented approach to petroleum exploration incentives in Canada has prevailed since the end of NEP. Current incentives are based on a «market-test» principle whereby their use depends on the sound economic basis of the activity. This paper will look at the evolution of this market-based approach to upstream incentives in Canada. The experience of the United Kingdom (U. K.) in stimulating reinvestment into offshore exploration is also interesting to examine given the U. K.'s tremendous success and the different circumstances which exist between the U. K. and Canada.

Before discussing the evolution of exploration incentives in Canada, a description of the standard corporate income tax deductions is provided as well as their application through a sample income tax calculation.

1. Standard Corporate Income Tax Deductions

2. Sample Income tax Calculation Assumptions:

Gross Income = $300, Operating Costs = $40, Royalty = $90 Capital Expenditures: CEE = $50, CDE = $25 Well Equipment = $25

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*Resource Allowance (R. A.): In 1974, in reaction to increases in provincial royalties shifting a significant portion of the government share of resource development profits from the federal to the provincial governments, royalties were disallowed as deductions for federal income tax purposes and replaced by a Resource Allowance set at 25 % of Resource Profits for R. A. (above).

B. TAX REMOVAL THROUGH ALLOWABLE DEDUCTIO>S I> EXCESS OF COSTS:

Incentives before the NEP period were tax based, structured to raise the cost base of an asset for tax purposes. This effectively provided a greater tax deduction than the incurred cost of the capital as well as accelerating the depreciation of the asset, important from the perspective of the time value of money. However, because these incentives were based on the tax system, they did not benefit companies which were not in a tax-paying position. (A company may not owe income taxes if its expenses have been greater than its income for a tax year.) Instead, these companies carried forward the tax deduction to use in a later year and thus they accumulated large pools of unused tax deductions.

1. Earned Depletion Allowance up to 1987:

Depletion increased the cost base of an asset allowing 133.3 % of its cost to be deducted; 33.3 % through depletion and 100 % as CEE, CDE, or CCA over the life of the asset. The annual maximum permitted to be claimed was 25 % of resource profits.

2. Frontier Exploration Allowance or Super Depletion

1977-1980:

Under this program, frontier exploration costs in excess of $5 million per well earned an extra depletion at a rate of 66.6 %, deductible against income from any source. In combination with

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earned depletion, for each eligible dollar spent, a taxpayer earned a combined depletion allowance of $1 on top of the 100 % CEE write-off — a $2 deduction per $1 of eligible expenditure.

C. TAX REMOVAL THROUGH A SYSTEM OF DIRECT GRA>TS TO FIRMS:

During the NEP, a change in policy occurred with respect to providing incentives. There was a more away from the earlier taxbased incentives system explained in part B. above, which was only of benefit to companies in a taxable position, to a system of cash grants available to any investor. The government tried to «level the playing field» (provide equal opportunity to all investors) by treating all investors alike regardless of tax position.

1. Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP) 1981-1987

To help meet the objectives of energy security and Canadian ownership and control, and in an attempt to provide all investors with the same incentives regardless of their taxable position, PIP provided cash payments of up to 80 % of expenditures, depending on the following factors (see also Table 2 for the PIP framework and Figure 2):

1) Canadian Ownership Rate (COR) Level

Table 1: Canadian Ownership Rate Level

2)the Canadian-control status

3)the location of the expenditure — Canada or provincial lands,

4)expenditure type — exploration, development or eligible capital

5)the year in which the expenditure was incurred.

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Table 2. Percentage Levels of Incentive Payments for Oil and Gas Exploration and Development.

*The 25-percent Crown Share Incentive

** Includes the 25-percent Crown Share Incentive available to all investors.

For example, under PIP, for an applicant with a COR of 63 % which incurred $1 million of exploration expense on provincial lands in 1981 the calculation would be as follows:

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Eligible Expense x COR-based/Location-based PIP Rate = Incentive

COR level = 63 %, therefore, use Level 3 from Table 1.

From Table 2, the rate for Level 3 on provincial lands in 1981 is 25 %.

Therefore, the incentive = $1 million X 25 % = $250,000.

PIP did not seek to assess the nature or quality of exploration or development work undertaken. The grants were in no way dependent on the results of the investment activity. The goal of PIP was to provide incentives to investors to undertake exploratory work in the Canadian frontier and to provide more of an incentive to Canadian-owned companies than foreign-controlled ones, regardless of the soundness of the investment.

D. TAX DEFERRAL A>D TAX CREDIT TRA>SFERRAL:

The collapse of oil prices in 1986 led to an abrupt change in energy policy in Canada. The NEP was dismantled in 1987 due to budget constraints and the uncompetitive nature of investment in Canada's north at the lower world oil prices. By 1990, most incentives were phased out and replaced by a more market-oriented approach to petroleum exploration incentives. There was also a move away from tax deferrals through grants to a system of transferring tax credits from investors in a non-taxpaying position to investors that were in a tax-paying position.

1.Flow-Through Shares (FTS) 1986 — present

Flow-through shares were introduced to assist petroleum companies in raising capital for investment if the investment was perceived by the market to result from a sound investment decision. Investors provide funds to a corporation to be used for petroleum exploration or development. In return, the investor receives shares of the corporation and the ability to deduct the exploration or development costs in calculating its tax liability as if it had incurred the expenses directly. The ability to transfer the deductions is especially attractive to companies which are in a non-taxpaying position or

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