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LEISURE

leisure’’ by Robert Stebbins (1979) is activity in which there is considerable personal investment in skills and often in equipment and organization. Such investment places serious leisure in a central position in identity formation and expression. Leisure identities may provide continuity through the transitions and traumas of the life course. Yet, how women and men define themselves and take action toward redefinition has been a subject of speculation more than research.

Third, what is the place of leisure in the schema of life investments and commitments? Further, how do those investments differ according to the life conditions of men and women as they make their way through the shifting expectations and possibilities of the life course? Xavier Gallier (1988) presents a model of the life course that emphasizes disruptions rather than linear progress. In an irregular life journey, work, family, and leisure may rise and fall both in salience and in the ‘‘chunks’’ of time they are allocated. He proposes that education, production, and leisure become themes woven through life rather than discrete sequential periods.

THE NATURE OF LEISURE

As already suggested, perspectives on the nature of leisure have changed in the modern period of scholarly attention from the 1930s to now. The change is not self-contained, but reflects shifts in theoretical paradigms as well as drawing from other disciplines, especially social psychology.

Leisure as Free Time and Meaning. Despite repeated references to Greek roots and especially Aristotle, the first accepted operational definition of leisure was that of time. Leisure did not require that all other role obligations be completed, but that the use of the time be more by choice than by requirement. How choice was to be measured was seldom addressed. Concurrently, international ‘‘time-budget’’ research quantified leisure as one type of activity that could be identified by its form (Szalai 1974). Leisure was assumed to be clearly distinguished from work, required maintenance, and family responsibilities.

The first consensus, although persisting in many research designs, did not endure long without amendment. To begin with, it was obvious that any activity might be required, an extension of

work or other roles. Further, even such simple terms as ‘‘choice’’ and ‘‘discretionary’’ implied that the actor’s definition of the situation might be crucial.

In the 1970s, the field claimed more attention from psychologists, who focused on attitudes rather than activities. Leisure was said to be defined by attitudes or a ‘‘state of mind’’ that included elements such as perceived freedom, intrinsic motivation, and a concentration on the experience rather than external ends (Neulinger 1974). Attention was directed toward meanings, but wholly in the actor rather than in definitions of the social context. Such psychological approaches were one salient influence on sociologists, who added at least three dimensions to the earlier timeand activityknown to common definitions.

First, in the 1950s, the Kansas City research (Havighurst 1961) along with the community studies tied leisure to social roles. The satisfactions anticipated in an activity involved meanings and relationships brought to the action context as well as what occurred in the time frame.

Second, the immediate experience might be the critical focus for leisure, but it occurs in particular environments that involve social learning, acquired skills and orientations (Csikszentmihalvi 1981), and interaction with components imported from other role relationships (Cheek and Burch 1976). Freedom is perceived, or not, in actual circumstances.

Third, although the dimension of freedom recurs in the literature, studies of experiences and activity engagements found that leisure seldom is monodimensional. The meanings, outcomes, motivations, and experiences themselves are multifaceted (Havighurst 1961; Kelly 1981).

Leisure, then, in the revised approaches is a more complex phenomenon than either the earlier sociologists or the psychologists proposed. In fact, the consensus broke down under the weight of multiple approaches that ranged from individualistic psychology to functional sociology, from presumably self-evident quantities of time to interpretive self-definitions and lines of action, and from discrete self-presentations (Goffman 1967) to actions embedded in life-course role sequences (Rapoport and Rapoport 1976).

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Revolt against the Abstract. Antithetical themes came from several directions.

First, which is fundamental to accounting for life in society, the interpretive acts of the individual or the social context in which the action takes place (Giddens 1979)? Further, since the forms and symbols by which action is directed are learned and reinforced in the society, can action be prior to the context? The nature of leisure, then, is neither an acontextual nor a determined social role. Rather, it is actualized in processual action. And this process has continuities that extend beyond the immediate to personal development and the creation of significant communities (Kelly 1981).

Second, a number of critical analysts have raised questions about the positive cast usually given to leisure. Such positive approaches seem to presuppose resources, options, perspectives, and self-determination that are in fact unequally distributed in societies (Clarke and Critcher 1986). Do the unemployed and the poor have enough resources for discretion and choice to be meaningful concepts? Do histories of subjugation and lifedefining limits for women in male-dominated societies make assumptions of self-determining action a sham? Such opportunity differences are most substantive in a market system of buying, renting, or otherwise acquiring resources. The real contexts of leisure are not voids of time and space, but are extensions of the structures of the society and ideologies of the culture. There is clearly an ‘‘other side’’ to leisure that includes many kinds of activity with destructive potential such as gambling, substance use, and sexual exploitation. There are also negative elements in other activities such as physical violence and racial stereotyping in sport, sexual violence in socializing, and even turning driving into a contest endangering others. All social forms of exploitation and exclusion are found in leisure (Rojek 1995; Kelly and Freysinger 1999).

Third, a consequence of this distorted and constricted context of leisure is alienation. Leisure is not entirely free, creative, authentic, and com- munity-building activity. It may also be, perhaps at the same time, stultifying and alienating. It may separate rather than unite, narrow rather than expand, and entrap rather than free. It may, in short, be negative as well as positive. It is not a rarified ideal or a perfect experience. It is real life,

often struggle and conflict as well as development and expression.

The dialectic between expression and oppression that characterizes the rest of life in society is the reality of leisure as well. Being role-based in a stratified society means being limited, directed, and excluded. The contexts of any experience, however free and exhilarating, are the real culture and social system. The multiple meanings of leisure include separation as well as community, determination as well as creation, and routine as well as expression. The former simplicity of leisure as essentially a ‘‘good thing’’ becomes alloyed by situating it in the real society with all its forces, pressures, and conflicts.

Leisure as a Dimension of Life. The question, then, is what does such extension and critique do to any conceptualization of the nature of leisure? Leisure encompasses both the existential and the social. It has myriad forms, locales, social settings, and outcomes. Leisure is neither separated from social roles nor wholly determined by them. Leisure has developed amid conflict as well as social development, in division as well as integration, with control as well as freedom. It may involve acquiescence as well as resistance, alienation as well as authenticity, and preoccupation with self as well as commitment to community. Leisure, then, is multidimensional and cannot be characterized by any single or simple element.

A further issue is whether leisure is really a domain of life at all. Is leisure clearly distinguished from work, family, community, church, and school: or is it a dimension of action and interaction within them all? In the Preparation period, leisure is a social space for the exploration and development of sexual identities as well as working out the issues of peer identification and independence from parents and the past. It also stresses the theme of expression that is central to developing a sense of selfhood, of personal identity among emerging social roles. In the Establishment period, leisure adds the dimension of bonding to intimate others, especially in the formation and consolidation of the family. In the Third Age, leisure has meanings tied to both integration with significant other persons and maintenance of a sense of ability when some work and community roles are lost (Kelly 1987b). Leisure, then, might

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be conceptualized as being woven into the intersecting role sequences of the life course rather than being a segregated realm of activity. Productivity is not limited to work, nor bonding to the family, nor learning and development to education, nor expression to leisure. Production, bonding and community, learning and development, and relative freedom and self-authenticating experience may all be found in any domain of life.

Yet there must also be distinguishing elements of leisure or it disappears into the ongoing round of life. Further, those elements should be significant in relation to central issues of life such as production and work, love and community, sexuality and gender, learning and development, emotion and involvement. Leisure should connect with the lived conditions of ordinary life rather than being an esoteric and precious idea to be actualized only in rare and elite conditions.

Leisure, then, may be more a dimension than a domain, more a theme than an identifiable realm (Kelly 1987a). That dimension is characterized by three elements: First, it is action in the inclusive sense of doing something, of being an intentioned and deliberate act. Such action is existential in producing an outcome with meaning to the actor. Second, this action is focused on the experience more than on the result. It is done primarily because of what occurs in the defined time and space. Third, leisure as a dimension of life is characterized by freedom more than by necessity. It is not required by any role, coercive power, or repressive ideology. Leisure is not detached from its social and cultural contexts, but is a dimension of relatively self-determined action within such contexts. Its meaning is not in its products as much as in the experience, not in its forms as much as in its expression.

The Sociology of Leisure in the Future. Leisure sociology, then, is not a closed book or a finalized product. Rather, central issues are currently being raised that promise to reform the field in its premises as well as conclusions. No common wisdom will go unchallenged, no consensus remain unchanged, and no theoretical formulation be above conflict. Yet, every challenge, every conflict, and every developing synthesis provides a new basis for at least one conclusion: Leisure is a significant dimension of life that calls for both disciplined and innovative attention. From this

perspective, a number of issues are likely to receive greater attention in the new century (Kelly and Freysinger 1999):

The first issue is the ascendancy of the market sector as the primary leisure resource provider, with an estimated 97 percent of total spending. In a global economy, leisure including tourism is attracting more investment capital with a significant bias toward upscale markets, big-ticket toys, sport as business and spectacle, and entertainment with multiple entrance fees. This bias combined with media images of a commodified ‘‘good life’’ may underlie trends away from skill-based physical activity and ‘‘serious’’ leisure with high time costs. Is there a fundamental conflict between developmental and consumptive leisure?

The second issue is the emergence of a global culture. The dominant direction of the dispersal is currently from the West through the mass media. However, as communication links and business and cultural contacts become more common, both the concepts and the practices of leisure in the West will become more affected by other cultures.

Third, a focus on gender is leading away from male-oriented ‘‘reasoned action’’ modes of leisure decisions and toward the significance of emotions and especially sexuality. Since all social interaction is gendered and most has deep dimensions of sexuality, leisure will be understood more as a multidimensional process rather than a singular choice. Leisure, then, is both contextual and contested.

Fourth, leisure becomes more a part of ‘‘ordinary life’’ rather than segregated activities with special designations. In a more fragmented social milieu, elements of leisure may be located in almost any social context. Further, if work itself loses familiar continuities, then leisure may become more central to identities and persistent lines of meaning as individuals seek to make sense of their lives.

Fifth, there will likely be concerns over many negative aspects of leisure. Will easy entertainment lessen personal investments in challenging leisure? Will available and affordable electronics damage the social fabric of associations and intimate relationships? Will leisure increasingly become privatized at the cost of community exploitative of the poor and powerless? Will leisure become

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spectacular rather than engaging, violent rather than sharing, destructive of natural environments, and divisive rather than integrating?

The basic questions, of course, are those of the kind of society that is emerging and the kind of people who will live in it. It is clear, whatever is ahead, that leisure will be a significant dimension in a variety of forms and contexts.

(SEE ALSO: Life Course, Gender, Social Class, Social Identity)

REFERENCES

Atchley, Robert 1989 ‘‘A Continuity Theory of Normal Aging.’’ The Gerontologist 29:183–190.

Blauner, Robert 1964 Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cheek, Neil, and William Burch 1976 The Social Organization of Leisure in Human Society. New York: Harper and Row.

Clarke, John and Chas Critcher 1986 The Devil Makes Work: Leisure in Capitalist Britain. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly 1981 ‘‘Leisure and Socialization.’’ Social Forces 60:332–340.

Cutler, Stephen, and Jon Hendricks 1990 ‘‘Leisure and Time Use across the Life Course.’’ In R. Binstock and L. George, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 3rd ed. New York: Academic Press.

Deem, Rosemary 1986 All Work and No Play: The Sociology of Women and Leisure. Milton Keynes, United Kingdom: Open University Press.

Dumazedier, Joffre 1967 Toward a Society of Leisure. New York: Free Press.

Gallier, Xavier 1988 La Deuxieme Carriere: Ages, Emplois, Retraite. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Giddens, Anthony 1979 Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Goffman, Erving 1967 Interaction Ritual. New York:

Anchor Books.

Gordon, Chad, C. Gaitz, and J. Scott 1976 ‘‘Leisure and Lives: Personal Expressivity across the Life Span.’’ In R. Binstock and E. Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Habermas, Jurgen 1975 Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Bea-

con Press.

Havighurst, Robert 1961 ‘‘The Nature and Values of Meaningful Free-time Activity.’’ In R. Kleemeier, ed., Aging and Leisure. New York: Oxford University Press.

Henderson, Karla, M. Deborah Bialeschki, Susan Shaw, and Valeria Freysinger 1996 Both Gains and Gaps: Feminist Perspectives on Women’s Leisure. State College, Pa.: Venture Publishing.

Kelly, John R. 1981 ‘‘Leisure Interaction and the Social Dialectic.’’ Social Forces 60:304–22.

———1983 Leisure Identities and Interactions. London: Allen and Umwin.

———1987a Freedom to Be: a New Sociology of Leisure. New York: Macmillan.

———1987b Peoria Winter: Styles and Resources in Later Life. Lexington. Mass.: Lexington Books.

Kelly, John R., and Valeria Freysinger 1999. 21st Century Leisure: Current Issues. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Lundberg, George, Mirra Komarovsky, and M. McInerney 1934. Leisure: A Suburban Study. New York: Columbia University Press.

Lynd, Helen, and Robert Lynd 1956 Middletown. New

York: Harcourt Brace.

Marx, Karl 1970 The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Neugarten, Bernice 1968 Middle Age and Aging. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Neulinger, John 1974 The Psychology of Leisure. Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas.

Parker, Stanley 1971 The Future of Work and Leisure. New York: Praeger.

Rapoport, Rhona, and Robert Rapoport 1976 Leisure and the Family Life Cycle. London: Routledge.

Roberts, Kenneth 1970 Leisure. London: Longmans.

Robinson, John, and Geoffrey Godbey 1997 Time for Life: The Surprising Ways Americans Use Their Time. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press.

Rojek, Chris 1985 Capitalism and Leisure Theory. Lon-

don: Tavistock.

——— 1995 Decentring Leisure. London and Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.

Schor, Juliet 1991 The Overworked American. New York:

Basic Books.

Stebbins, Robert 1979 Amateurs: On the Margin between Work and Leisure. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Szalai, Alexander 1974 The Use of Time: Daily Activities of Urban and Suburban Populations in Twelve Countries. The Hague: Mouton.

Veblen, Thorstein (1899) 1953 The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: New American Library.

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Wilensky, Harold 1960 ‘‘Work, Careers, and Social Integration.’’ International Social Science Journal

12:543–560.

Wilson, John 1980 ‘‘Sociology of Leisure.’’ Annual Review of Sociology 6:21–40.

proposed solutions or partial solutions to the problem of cross level inference when data at only a single level of analysis are available.

TYPES OF VARIABLES USED TO DESCRIBE

JOHN R. KELLY

LESBIANISM

See Alternative Life Styles; Sexual Orientation.

COLLECTIVES AND MEMBERS

Lazarsfeld and Menzel (1969) propose a typology of the kinds of properties (variables) that describe ‘‘collectives’’ and ‘‘members.’’ For example, in discussing the properties of collectives, Lazarsfeld and Menzel distinguish between analytical, structural, and global properties.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Determining the level of analysis is usually straightforward, but whether to, or how to, draw inferences from one level of analysis to another is a difficult problem for which there is no general solution. The cases used as the units in an analysis determine the level of analysis. These cases may be quite varied, for example, countries, political parties, advertisements, families, or individuals. Thus, analysis may occur at the individual level, family level, advertisement level, and so forth.

The types of variables used at any one level of analysis, however, may be quite different. As an example, in studying the determinants of individuals’ attitudes toward public education, the individuals (the units of analysis) may be described in terms of their sex and race (measures of individual properties), whether they attended a public or private college, and the region of the country in which they reside (measures of the collectives to which they belong). The analysis in this example is at the individual level because the cases used are individuals who are described in terms of individual properties and the properties of the collectives to which they belong.

This article focuses on (1) the types of variables used to describe the properties of collectives and members and the use of these variables at different levels of analysis; (2) problems that arise when using relationships at one level of analysis to make inferences about relationships at another level of analysis; (3) a brief discussion of a statistical model that explicates these problems; (4) some useful data analytic techniques to use when data at two or more levels of analysis are available, and (5)

Analytical properties are obtained by performing some mathematical operation upon some property of each single member. These properties are typically referred to as aggregate variables. Examples are the percentage of blacks in cities, the sex ratio for different counties, and the Gini Index as a measure of inequality of incomes in organizations.

Structural properties of collectives are obtained by performing some operation on data about the relations of each member to some or all of the others. Such measures are common in network analysis. Friendship density, for example, could be defined as the relative number of pairs of members of a collective who are directly connected by friendship ties. Since the total number of potential ties in a group with N members is N (N−1)/2, one measure of density is the total number of ties divided by this number.

Global properties of collectives do not use information about the properties of individual members either singly or in relationship to one another. Having a democratic or nondemocratic form of government is a global property of collectives. Being a private rather than a public school is a global property of a school. The proportion of gross national product (GNP) spent on education is a global property of countries.

Thus, variables that describe collectives can be based on summary data concerning single members of those collectives, the relationships of members to other members, or some global characteristic of the collective itself. Turning to variables that describe the properties of members of collectives, there are four major types: absolute, relational, comparative, and contextual.

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Absolute properties are obtained without making use either of information about the characteristics of the collective or of information about the relationships of the member being described to other members. Thus, sex, level of education, and income are absolute properties of individuals.

Relational properties of members are computed from information about the substantive relationships between them and other members. For example, the number of friends an individual has at school or the number of family members is a property of the individual based on other members in the collective.

Comparative properties characterize a member by a comparison between his or her value on some (absolute or relational) property and the distribution of this property over the entire collective to which the person belongs. A person’s class rank and birth order are comparative properties.

Contextual properties describe members by a property of the collective to which they belong. For example, being from a densely populated census tract or a school with a certain percentage of nonwhite students is a contextual property describing the context in which the member acts. Contextual properties are characteristics of collectives that are applied to members.

Contextual variables remind us that the level of analysis is determined by the cases used as the units of analysis, not by the level of the phenomena described by a particular variable. Thus, all the variables that describe a collective may be used at the individual level of analysis as well as those that describe individual properties; for example, a person’s attitude may be predicted on the basis of the percentage of blacks in the person’s school (contextual/analytic), whether or not the school is private or public (contextual/global), the density of friendships at the school (contextual/structural), the person’s sex (absolute), his or her class standing (comparative), and the number of friendship choices he or she receives (relational).

INFERENCES FROM ONE LEVEL TO

ANOTHER

The section above describes abstractly two different levels of analysis, the collective (or aggregate) and the member (or individual). Sociologists typically distinguish levels concretely depending on

the units of analysis; for example, the units may be schools, advertisements, children’s stories, or riots. To make inferences from relationships discovered at one level of analysis to relationships at another level is not logically valid, and sociologists have labeled such inferences ‘‘fallacies.’’ Still, at times one may be able to argue for the reasonableness of such inferences. These arguments may be based on statistical considerations (Achen and Shively 1995; Duncan and Davis 1953; Goodman 1953, 1959; King 1997) or on rationales that closely tie relationships at one level with those at another (Durkheim [1897] 1966; Dornbusch and Hickman 1959).

Disaggregative fallacies (often called ecological fallacies) are the classic case of cross level fallacies. Robinson (1950) brought them to the attention of sociologists. He cites two cases of cross level inferences, both of which involve making inferences about relationships at the individual level based on relationships discovered at the aggregate level. Robinson noted that the Pearson product moment correlation between the percent black and the percent illiterate in 1930 for the Census Bureau’s nine geographical divisions was 0.95 and for states it was 0.77, while the correlation (measured by phi) on the individual level between being illiterate or not and being black or not was only 0.20. The relationship between percent illiterate and percent foreign-born was negative for regions and states (−0.62 and −0.53, respectively), while the relationship between being illiterate and being foreign-born at the individual level was positive (0.12).

Robinson demonstrated that relationships at one level of analysis do not have to be the same as those at another level. To assume that they must be the same or even that they must be quite similar is a logical fallacy.

Aggregative fallacies occur in the opposite direction, that is, when one assumes that relationships existing at the individual level must exist at the aggregate level. Robinson’s results show that the positive relationship between being foreign born and being illiterate at the individual level may not be mirrored at the state level.

Universal fallacies (Alker 1969) occur when researchers assume that relationships based on the total population must be true for subsamples of the whole. It may be true, for example, that the

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relationship between population density and the crime rates of cities for all cities in the United States is not the same for southern cities or for cities with a population of over one million. Here, the fallacy is to assume that a relationship based on the total population must hold for selected subpopulations.

Similarly, one might commit a selective fallacy (Alker 1969) by assuming that relationships based on a particular sample of cities must hold for all cities. If the selected cities are a random sample of cities, this is a problem of statistical inference, but if they are selected on some other basis (e.g., size), then making inferences to all cities is a selective fallacy.

Cross-modality fallacies occur when the inference is from one distinct type of unit to another distinct type of unit. A cross-modality fallacy occurrs when trends in advertisement content are used to make inferences about trends in the attitudes of individuals, or designs on pottery are used to infer the level of need for achievement in different cultures. (Aggregative and disaggregative fallacies are cross-modality fallacies because groups and individuals are distinct units. But these fallacies have traditionally been classified separately.)

Cross-sectional fallacies occur when one makes inferences from cross-sectional relationships (relationships based on units of analysis from a single point in time) to longitudinal relationships. For example, if unemployment rates and crime rates are positively related at the city level, this fallacy is committed by inferring that increases over time in the unemployment rate are related to increases in the crime rate over time.

Longitudinal fallacies occur when one makes inferences from longitudinal relationships (relationships based on units of analysis across time units) to cross-sectional ones, that is inferring from a relationship between unemployment rates and crime rates over time to the relationship between these rates over units such as cities, counties, or states at a given point in time.

In all of their varied manifestations, cross-level inferences are not logically valid inferences (Skyrms 1975). That is, relationships on one level of analysis are not necessarily the same as those on another level. They may not even be similar. In the final section of this article, however, we note that data at

one level of analysis may serve as evidence for relationships at another level of analysis even if they do not strictly imply such a relationship.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF

DISAGGREGATIVE AND AGGREGATIVE

INFERENCES

This section presents the results of a mathematical demonstration of why disaggregative and aggregative inferences are fallacies, that is, why results at the aggregate level are not necessarily mirrored at the individual level. The derivation of this model is not shown here but may be found in several sources (Duncan et al. 1961; Alker 1969; Hannan 1971; and Robinson 1950). Readers who prefer can skip to the next section without loss of continuity.

The individual level or total correlation (rtxy) between two variables (X and Y) can be written as a function of the correlation between group means (the aggregate level correlation: rbxy), the correlation of individual scores within groups (a weighted average of the correlations within each of the groups: rwxy), and the correlation ratios for the two variables, X and Y. The correlation ratio is the ratio of the variance between groups (the variance of the group means: Vbx) to the total variance (variance of the individual scores: Vtx). Thus, the individual level or total correlation can be written

 

 

 

 

 

2

 

(V t y

2

t

w

 

 

(V t x )

 

)

 

 

 

 

Vbx

 

 

Vby

r xy = r xy

1–

 

 

 

 

1–

 

 

(1)

 

(V t x )(V t y )

 

 

 

b

 

Vbx

 

 

 

Vby

 

 

 

 

+ r xy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Similarly, the individual level regression coefficient can be written as a function of the withingroup regression coefficient, the group level (between group) regression coefficient, and the correlation ratio for variable X (equation 2):

 

2

 

 

btyx = bwyx +

(V t x )

(bbyx bwyx)

(2)

Vbx

It is a simple algebraic exercise to derive formulas for rbxy and bbyx (the aggregate level correlation and regression coefficients) in terms of correlation ratios, and correlation and regression coefficients at other levels.

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These formulas clearly demonstrate why one cannot use the ecological or group level correlation or regression coefficients to estimate individual level relationships: The individual level relationships are a function of group level relationships, within-group level relationships, and correlation ratios. This approach can be extended to include other levels of analysis, for example, individuals on one level, counties on another, states on another, and time as yet another level (see, e.g., Alker 1969; Duncan et al. 1961).

SEPARATING AGGREGATE LEVEL AND

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EFFECTS

Obtaining data at the different levels of analysis solves the problem of inferring relationships from one level to another. Researchers in this situation know the relationship at both levels for their data. Such data also provide additional information about the relationships at different levels of analysis.

O’Brien (1998) shows that when individual level data are aggregated to create summary measures at the aggregate level (e.g., means or rates for aggregates), then it is possible to estimate the reliability of the aggregate level measures. Further, when two or more of the aggregate level measures are based on samples of the same respondents within each aggregate, correlated errors between aggregate level measures are likely to occur. This correlated error can be measured and the aggregate level relationships can be corrected for this spurious correlation as well as for unreliability in the aggregate level measures.

In some situations one may want to argue that the best measures of individual level ‘‘effects’’ (in a causal sense) are provided by analyses at the individual level that include as predictors relevant individual properties and the properties of the collective to which the individuals belong (contextual variables). Estimates of these individual level relationships are then ‘‘controlled’’ for group level effects (Alwin and Otto 1977).

Since the relationship between group level means may reflect nothing more than the relationship between variables at the individual level, it has been suggested that the best estimate of group level ‘‘effects’’ compares the regression coefficient for the group means and for the individual scores. Lincoln and Zeitz (1980) show how this may be

done in a single regression equation while at the same time controlling for other relevant variables. For both of these techniques to work, some stringent assumptions must be met, including assumptions of no measurement error in the independent variables and of a common within-group regression coefficient. Most importantly, these techniques depend upon having data from different levels of analysis.

The introduction of Hierarchical Linear Models (HLM) provides a flexible method for examining the relationship of individual level variables to group level variables (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). These models allow for the relationships between individual level variables to vary within different groups and for differences between these relationships to be predicted by group level characteristics. It might be the case, for example, that the relationship between socioeconomic standing and student achievement differs depending upon class size and whether the school is private or public. These models allow for the prediction of different relationships for different individuals based on group level characteristics. These models may be extended to several levels of analysis in which members are nested within collectives.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF INFERENCES FROM ONE LEVEL TO ANOTHER

Even when data at only one level of analysis are available, cross level inferences can be and often are made by sociologists. There is no absolute stricture against making such inferences, but when researchers make them, they need to do so with some awareness of their limitations.

While both Duncan and Davis (1953) and Goodman (1953, 1959) maintain that it is generally inappropriate to use aggregate level (ecological) relationships to make inferences about individual level relationships, they each propose strategies that set bounds on the possible relationships that could exist at one level of analysis given relationships that exist at the other. The bounds are designed for use with aggregated data (analytic measures), and in some circumstances these techniques are useful.

Goodman (1953, 1959) suggested a technique called ‘‘ecological regression,’’ which became the

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most widely used method for making inferences from aggregate level data to individual level relationships when group level variables are ‘‘analytical properties of collectives.’’ Goodman’s method has been extended by a number of authors and summarized in the work of Achen and Shiveley (1995). King (1997) has proposed a statistical ‘‘solution to the problem of ecological inference,’’ but the success of that solution is controversial (Freedman et al. 1998).

‘‘Theory’’ may also allow one to make cross level inferences. For example, Dornbusch and Hickman (1959) tested Riesman et al.’s contention (1950) that other-directedness in individuals declined in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. They obviously could not interview individuals throughout the first half of the century, so they turned to advertisements in a women’s magazine (Ladies Home Journal, 1890– 1956) to examine whether these ads increasingly used themes of other-directedness. Their units of analysis were advertisements, but they explicitly stated that they wanted to make inferences about changes in the other-directedness of individuals. Is this justified? The answer is no, on strictly logical grounds, and this constitutes a cross-modality fallacy. Certainly changes in the contents of advertisements do not demonstrate changes in individuals’ personalities. But Dornbusch and Hickman (1959) convincingly argue that advertisements (in this case) are likely to reflect aspects of otherdirectedness in the targets of the advertisements (individuals). They recognize the need for other tests of this hypothesis, using other types of data.

Perhaps the classic case in sociology of an analysis built on the ecological fallacy is Emile Durkheim’s analysis of suicide ([1897] 1966). One factor that Durkheim sees as ‘‘protecting’’ individuals from suicide is social integration. When individuals are married, have children, are members of a church that provides a high degree of social integration (e.g., Catholic rather than Protestant), or live at a time when their countries are in crisis (e.g., a war or electoral crisis), they are seen as more integrated into social, religious, and political society and less likely to commit suicide. Much of the data available to Durkheim did not allow an analysis on the individual level. There was no ‘‘suicide registry’’ with detailed data on the sex, religion, family status, and so forth of those committing suicide. There were, however, census data

on the proportion of Catholics, the proportion married, and the average family size in different regions. Other sources could be used to ascertain the rate of suicide for different regions. Using these data, Durkheim showed that Catholic countries had lower suicide rates than Protestant countries, and that, France and Germany, Catholic cantons exhibited lower suicide rates than Protestant cantons. Further, departments in France with larger average family sizes had lower suicide rates, and the suicide rate was lower during the months of electoral crises in France than during comparable months of the previous or following year. He combined this evidence with other evidence dealing with individuals (e.g., suicide rates for married versus unmarried men), and it was all consistent with his theory of suicide and social integration.

One could dismiss these aggregate level relationships by arguing that perhaps in Protestant countries those of other religions kill themselves at such a high rate that the suicide rates are higher in Protestant countries than in Catholic countries (and similarly in Protestant cantons in France and Germany). Isn’t it possible that in departments with relatively small average family sizes there is a tendency for those in large-size families to kill themselves relatively more often? This would create a relationship at the aggregate level (department level) in which smaller average family size is associated with higher rates of suicide. It is possible, because relationships at one level of analysis are not necessarily mirrored at another level of analysis. But Durkheim’s results are not easily dismissed.

Strict logic does not justify cross level inferences. But strict logic is not the only rational way to justify inferences. If a series of diverse relationships that are predicted to hold at the individual level are found at the aggregate level, they do not prove that the same relationships would be found at the individual level, but they are not irrelevant. It is incumbent on the critic of a study such as Durkheim’s to give a series of alternative explanations explaining why the relationships at the aggregate level should differ from those at the individual level. If the alternative explanations are not very convincing or parsimonious, researchers are likely to find Durkheim’s evidence persuasive. To the extent that social scientists are convinced that a set of advertisements is designed to appeal to motivations in their target population, that the target

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population of the magazine in which the advertisements appears represents the population of interest, and so on, they will find Dornbusch and Hickman’s cross level inference persuasive. That a relationship at one level of analysis does not imply a relationship at another level of analysis does not mean that it cannot be used, along with other evidence, to help infer a relationship at another level of analysis.

Persuasion is a matter of degree and is subject to change. Sociologists would want to examine additional studies based on, for instance, other populations, modalities, and periods. These data might strengthen cross level inferences.

Hannan, Michael T. 1971 Aggregation and Disaggregation in Sociology. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

———, and Leigh Burstein 1974 ‘‘Estimation from Grouped Observations.’’ American Sociological Review

39:374–392.

King, Gary 1997 A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., and Herbert Menzel 1969 ‘‘On the Relation Between Individual and Collective Properties.’’ In Amitai Etzioni, ed., A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.

Lincoln, James R., and Gerald Zeitz 1980 ‘‘Organizational Properties from Aggregate Data: Separating Individual and Structural Effects.’’ American Sociological Review 45:391–408.

REFERENCES

Achen, Christopher H., and W. Phillips Shively 1995 Cross-Level Inference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Alker, Hayward R. 1969 ‘‘A Typology of Ecological Fallacies.’’ In Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan, eds.,

Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Alwin, Duane F., and Luther B. Otto 1977 ‘‘High School Context Effects on Aspirations.’’ Sociology of Education 50:259–272.

Bryk, Anthony S., and Stephen W. Raudenbush 1992

Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Dornbusch, Sanford M., and Lauren C. Hickman 1959 ‘‘Other-Directedness in Consumer-Goods Advertising: A Test of Riesman’s Historical Theory.’’ Social Forces 38:99–102.

Duncan, Otis D., Ray P. Cuzzort, and Beverly Duncan 1961 Statistical Geography: Problems in Analyzing Areal Data. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Duncan, Otis D., and Beverly Davis 1953 ‘‘An Alternative to Ecological Correlation.’’ American Sociological Review 18:665–666.

Durkheim, Emile (1897) 1966 Suicide. New York: Free Press.

Freedman, D. A., S. P. Klein, M. Ostland, and M. R. Roberts 1998 ‘‘A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem (Book Review).’’ Journal of the American Statistical Association 93:1518–1522.

Goodman, Leo A. 1953 ‘‘Ecological Regression and Behavior of Individuals.’’ American Sociological Review 18:663–664.

——— 1959 ‘‘Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation.’’ American Journal of Sociology 64:610–625.

O’Brien, Robert M. 1998. ‘‘Correcting Measures of Relationship Between Aggregate-Level Variables for Both Unreliability and Correlated Errors: An Empirical Example.’’ Social Science Research 27:218–234.

Reisman, David, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney 1950 The Lonely Crowd. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Robinson, William S. 1950 ‘‘Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals.’’ American Sociological Review 15:351–357.

Skyrms, Brian 1975 Choice and Chance. Encino, Calif.:

Dickenson.

ROBERT M. O’BRIEN

LIBERALISM/CONSERVATISM

NOTE: Although the following article has not been revised for this edition of the Encyclopedia, the substantive coverage is currently appropriate. The editors have provided a list of recent works at the end of the article to facilitate research and exploration of the topic.

‘‘Is (or was) Blank a liberal?’’ The precise reply to this question inevitably begins with a throatclearing preface such as, ‘‘It all depends on the period you have in mind—and the place. Are you speaking of someone in nineteenth-century England, the United States during the Franklin Roosevelt New Deal days, contemporary Great Britain, continental Europe, or contemporary U.S.A.?’’

For Americans nurtured on the ‘‘liberal’’ tradition of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Democratic party, the significance of the L word was quite clear. The private business establishment,

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